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Résumé 
 
Mots clés: HEIDEGGER, ARISTOTE, ÉTHIQUE À NICOMAQUE, 
PHRONESIS, PRAXIS, ENERGEIA, ENTELECHEIA, KINESIS, PHYSIS, 
MÉTAPHYSIQUE DE LA PRÉSENCE. 
L’objectif de cette thèse est d’élucider l’intention, la pertinence et la cohérence de 
l’appropriation par Heidegger des concepts principaux de la philosophie pratique 
aristotélicienne dans ses premiers cours. Notre analyse portera principalement sur 
les notions clefs d’energeia et de phronēsis. La première section de la thèse est 
préparatoire : elle est consacrée à une analyse étroite des textes pertinents de 
l’Éthique à Nicomaque, mais aussi de la Métaphysique, en discussion avec d’autres 
commentateurs modernes. Cette analyse jette les fondations philologiques 
nécessaires en vue d’aborder les audacieuses interprétations de Heidegger sur une 
base plus ferme. La deuxième et principale section consiste en une discussion de 
l’appropriation ontologique de l’Éthique à Nicomaque que Heidegger entreprend de 
1922 à 1924, à partir des textes publiés jusqu’à ce jour et en portant une attention 
spéciale à Métaphysique IX. 
Le résultat principal de la première section est un aperçu du caractère 
central de l’energeia pour le projet d’Aristote dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque et, plus 
spécifiquement, pour sa compréhension de la praxis, qui dans son sens original 
s’avère être un mode d’être des êtres humains. Notre analyse reconnaît trois traits 
essentiels de l’energeia et de la praxis, deux desquels provenant de l’élucidation 
aristotélicienne de l’energeia dans Métaphysique IX 6, à savoir son immédiateté et sa 
continuité : energeia exprime l’être comme un « accomplissement immédiat mais 
inachevé ». L’irréductibilité, troisième trait de l’energeia et de la praxis, résulte pour sa 
part de l’application de la structure de l’energeia à la caractérisation de la praxis dans 
l’Éthique à Nicomaque, et du contraste de la praxis avec la poiēsis et la theōria. Ces trois 
caractéristiques impliquent que la vérité pratique ― la vérité de la praxis, ce qui est 
l’ « objet » de la phronēsis ― ne peut être à proprement parler possédée et ainsi 
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transmise : plus qu’un savoir, elle se révèle surtout comme quelque chose que nous 
sommes. C’est ce caractère unique de la vérité pratique qui a attiré Heidegger vers 
Aristote au début des années 1920.  
La deuxième section, consacrée aux textes de Heidegger, commence par la 
reconstruction de quelques-uns des pas qui l’ont conduit jusqu’à Aristote pour le 
développement de son propre projet philosophique, pour sa part caractérisé par 
une profonde, bien qu’énigmatique combinaison d’ontologie et de phénomé-
nologie. La légitimité et la faisabilité de l’appropriation clairement ontologique de 
l’Éthique à Nicomaque par Heidegger est aussi traitée, sur la base des résultats de la 
première section. 
L’analyse de ces textes met en lumière la pénétrante opposition établie par 
Heidegger entre la phronēsis et l’energeia dans son programmatique Natorp Bericht en 
1922, une perspective qui diverge fortement des résultats de notre lecture 
philologique d’Aristote dans la première section. Cette opposition est maintenue 
dans nos deux sources principales ― le cours du semestre d’hiver 1924-25 Platon: 
Sophistes, et le cours du semestre d’été 1924 Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie. 
Le commentaire que Heidegger fait du texte d’Aristote est suivi de près dans cette 
section: des concepts tels que energeia, entelecheia, telos, physis ou hexis ― qui trouvent 
leur caractérisation ontologique dans la Métaphysique ou la Physique ― doivent être 
examinés afin de suivre l’argument de Heidegger et d’en évaluer la solidité. 
L’hypothèse de Heidegger depuis 1922 ― à savoir que l’ontologie aristotélicienne 
n’est pas à la hauteur des aperçus de ses plus pénétrantes descriptions phéno-
ménologiques ― résulte en un conflit opposant phronēsis et sophia qui divise l’être 
en deux sphères irréconciliables qui auraient pour effet selon Heidegger de 
plonger les efforts ontologiques aristotéliciens dans une impasse. Or, cette 
conclusion de Heidegger est construite à partir d’une interprétation particulière de 
l’energeia qui laisse de côté d’une manière décisive son aspect performatif, pourtant 
l’un des traits essentiels de l’energeia telle qu’Aristote l’a conçue. Le fait que dans les 
années 1930 Heidegger ait lui-même retrouvé cet aspect de l’energeia nous fournit 
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des raisons plus fortes de mettre en doute le supposé conflit entre ontologie et 
phénoménologie chez Aristote, ce qui peut aboutir à une nouvelle formulation du 
projet heideggérien. 
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Abstract 
 
Key words: HEIDEGGER, ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 
PHRONESIS, PRAXIS, ENERGEIA, ENTELECHEIA, KINESIS, PHYSIS, 
METAPHYSICS OF PRESENCE. 
The purpose of this thesis is to sort out the intent, the philosophical relevance and 
the consistency of Heidegger’s appropriation of the basic tenets of Aristotle’s 
practical philosophy in his early lecture courses. Our analysis will focus mainly on 
the key notions of energeia and phronēsis. The first preparatory section of the thesis 
is devoted to a close analysis of Aristotle’s relevant texts of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
but also of the Metaphysics, in discussion with other modern commentators. This 
lays the philological groundwork which will enable us to engage Heidegger’s 
challenging interpretations on a more secure footing. The second and main 
section discusses Heidegger’s ontological appropriation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics from 1922 to 1924 on the basis of the texts so far published, and with a 
special attention to Metaphysics IX. 
The main result of section I is an insight into the central character of 
energeia for Aristotle’s project in the Nicomachean Ethics and, more specifically, for 
his understanding of praxis, which in its genuinely original sense turns out to be a 
way of being of human beings. Our analysis recognizes three essential traits to 
energeia and praxis, two of which stemming from the analysis of Aristotle’s own 
elucidation of energeia in Metaphysics IX 6, namely immediacy and continuity: energeia 
expresses being as an ‘immediate unfinished fulfillment’. Irreducibility, the third trait 
of energeia and praxis, results from applying the structure of energeia to the 
characterization of praxis in the Nicomachean Ethics, and from contrasting it with 
poiēsis and theōria. These three features entail that practical truth―the truth of 
praxis, the ‘object’ of phronēsis―cannot be properly possessed and thus transferred: 
more than something we know, it is something we are. It is this special character of 
practical truth that primarily attracted Heidegger to Aristotle in the early 1920s. 
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Section II, devoted to Heidegger’s texts, starts by reconstructing some of 
the intellectual steps that led him to resort to Aristotle for the development of his 
own philosophical project, characterized by a profound, yet intriguing 
intermingling of ontology and phenomenology. The legitimacy and feasibility of 
Heidegger’s pointedly ontological appropriation of the Nicomachean Ethics is also 
discussed, on the basis of the results of section I.  
The analysis of these texts is characterized by the sharp opposition set by 
Heidegger between phronēsis and energeia in his 1922 programmatic Natorp Bericht, a 
perspective that strongly diverges from the results of our philological reading of 
Aristotle in section I. The assessment of this opposition is maintained throughout 
the discussion of the two main sources―the 1924-25 winter course Platon: 
Sophistes, and the 1924 summer course Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie. 
Heidegger’s direct commentary of Aristotle’s text is followed closely in this 
section: concepts such as energeia, entelecheia, telos, physis and hexis―which find their 
ontological characterization in the Metaphysics or Physics―need to be scrutinized in 
order to follow Heidegger’s argument and to assess its soundness. Heidegger’s 
hypothesis from 1922―namely, that Aristotle’s ontology does not fit the insights 
of his more penetrating phenomenological descriptions―eventually culminates in 
a clash between phronēsis and sophia which divides being into two irreconcilable 
spheres and brings Aristotle’s ontological efforts to a dead end. Yet, this 
conclusion of Heidegger is built upon a specific interpretation of energeia that 
critically leaves in the shade its performative side, one of its essential traits as 
Aristotle conceived it. The fact that in the 30s Heidegger himself comes to see this 
side of energeia provides us with stronger grounds to question the supposed 
conflict between ontology and phenomenology in Aristotle, which can result in a 
new formulation of the Heideggerian project. 
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“Man versteht den Aristoteles nicht, wenn man 
bei ihm stehen bleibt. Man muß auch wissen,  
was er nicht sagt, und selbst muß man  
die Wege gewandelt haben, die er wandelt,  
die Schwierigkeiten, mit denen er kämpft,  
den ganzen Prozeß, den er durchlaufen, 
durchempfunden haben, um zu verstehen,  
was er sagt. Ein bloß historisches Wissen 
 ist in Bezug auf keinen Philosophen  
weniger als auf Aristoteles möglich” 
FRIEDRICH SCHELLING 
 
“Heidegger has taught us that it is  
necessary to immerse oneself 
 in the Aristotelian bath” 
FRANCO VOLPI
Introduction 
The sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics (NE VI) is perhaps one of the densest 
texts in the works of Aristotle. Heidegger understood very soon the fundamental 
reach of the questions it tackles, and devoted a great deal of effort to it in his early 
courses. Nowadays it is certain that Sein und Zeit, the most influential philosophical 
work in the twentieth century, owes a lot to Aristotle’s insights in that book. 
Ever since the second half of the 19th century, this text has been the ob-
ject of intensive though not always productive debate―inducing sometimes an 
“irritating quarrel”1 between interpreters. Ricœur attributes the amount of 
literature on NE VI to the “complex, even tortuous character of this text, [which 
may] partly explain the overinterpretation of which it has been the object”2. 
However much this text may have been ‘overinterpreted’, though, it still remains 
that the Aristotelian notion of practical truth is definitely “one of the most 
productive basic conceptual patterns in the history of Western metaphysics”3. The 
vast philosophical influence of Heidegger seems to suggest that this is far from 
being an exaggeration. 
This thesis starts with an interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of 
phronēsis in section I. This first step is methodologically crucial, not because we 
intend to evaluate whether Heidegger does justice to Aristotle’s thought but rather 
because we intend to reach an understanding of Heidegger’s thought through an 
                                               
1 BODÉÜS, R. The Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s Ethics. Albany: SUNY, 1993 p. 27.  
2 RICOEUR, P. “À la gloire de la phronēsis” in Chateau, J.-Y. (ed.) 1997 pp. 13-22 (p. 13 for ref.). 
Gauthier in his turn speaks of “the unfinished and disordered state in which [the text] has arrived to 
us” (GAUTHIER, R. A. and JOLIF, J. Y. L’Éthique à Nicomaque. Introduction, Traduction et Commentaire 
Louvain/Paris: Publications Universitaires de Louvain/Béatrice Nauwelaerts, 1970, vol. II.2 p. 446 
(hereafter GJ II). For quotations of the commentary on book VI, we will refer only to Gauthier, as 
author of this part of the work). We subscribe to these opinions: the concentration of obscure passages 
of NE VI is remarkable in relation to the rest of this treatise. 
3 VIGO, A. “Verdad práctica y virtudes intelectuales” in Vigo, A. Estudios Aristotélicos, Pamplona: 
Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 2006d p. 403. 
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analysis of his appropriation of this concept. The distinction between ‘interpretation’ 
and ‘appropriation’, which has also been expressed as that between ‘reproductive’ 
and ‘productive’ interpretations, is in fact one of the philosophical returns of the 
work of Heidegger4. We believe that his relation to Aristotle is to be primarily 
conceived of in terms of ‘appropriation’ or ‘productive interpretation’, insofar as 
he does not intend so much to elucidate what Aristotle said as rather build his own thought upon 
some of Aristotle’s insights. Such an approach is based on the crucial point that 
emphasizing certain aspects of texts and downplaying others, far from being 
defective, is constitutive of an interpretation―also of a reproductive one. However, 
insofar as we do not remain only within texts but there is a Sache concerned by 
them, an appropriation may still be judged in terms of doing justice, not to the 
texts, but to the Sache, or to put it in Husserlian terms, die Sache selbst, things 
themselves. It is precisely this phenomenological strain to go beyond the text that 
guides the appropriations of Heidegger, and that leads us to develop in the first 
place an interpretation of Aristotle’s understanding of phronēsis in NE VI. 
‘Interpretation’, insofar as we do not intend to unfold a train of thought, but 
rather to extract from the texts what Aristotle seems to say, without discarding the 
possibility of extracting from the text what the concise style of the author does 
not make explicit. This interpretation shall provide us a necessary guiding line to 
appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger’s productive interpretation, 
always in reference to the things themselves. 
Our research intends to mediate between the two most frequent ap-
proaches to Heidegger’s relation to Aristotle: on the one hand, those who in the 
name of the non-historiographical nature of Heidegger’s project assume that all of 
his moves in interpreting Aristotle are best suited to the service of that project, 
                                               
4 Vigo holds that understanding (and interpretation) is in the core of contemporary hermeneutical 
philosophy because of “the shift of interest from the merely reproductive forms towards the original 
productive forms of understanding, in the philosophical consideration of the phenomena of openness 
and appropriation of sense” (VIGO, A. “Caridad sospecha y verdad. La idea de racionalidad en la 
hermenéutica filosófica contemporánea” Teología y Vida 46/1-2 (2005) cf. esp. pp. 259 ff. 
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with a repeated emphasis on the unthought by Aristotle, sometimes to the 
detriment of what he might have thought, and even written5; on the other, those who in 
learning the violence to which Heidegger submits the texts, concentrate their 
efforts on showing how Aristotle eludes Heidegger’s Destruktion6. While the 
former do not adopt a necessary critical distance, so that they remain blind to 
possible inaccuracies of Heidegger’s thought, the latter hardly appreciate the 
potentialities of this project. 
To our mind, a correct approach to Heidegger’s relation to Aristotle 
should balance between both extremes. Lingering too much on the first one 
would not enhance a necessary critical distance, which is necessary to evaluate 
whether certain aspects of the Heideggerian project could be improved or re-
thought, e.g whether the Holzwege have to remain to be such, or there are other 
new ways which could be opened. And giving too much importance to the second 
approach would not enter well into the Heideggerian search for new ways: critical 
distance should not prevent us from understanding Heidegger’s breakthroughs. 
Finally, we would like to add a word on the title before briefly sketching 
out the structure of the thesis: as our argument unfolds the reader may wonder, in 
view of the relevance of the concept of praxis, why the thesis is not entitled “praxis 
                                               
5 Sommer’s Heidegger, Aristote, Luther is to our mind an example of this kind of approach. In spite of its 
thorough documentation, it ultimately seems to us to take too much for granted Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Aristotle, in the name of overcoming sterile “dogmatic faithfulness” to Aristotle’s 
text: “Heidegger is not a philosophy historian in the strict sense of the word. The phenomenological 
resource to history is a critical destructive return to the beginning of this history (...). The corpus of a 
philosopher is not just a stock of historiographically fixed opinions which we should restrict ourselves 
to index according to the sterile ideal of a dogmatic faithfulness to the text. The productive access to 
heritage operates by an over-interpretative translation of the text to make it say what it has not been 
able to say (...). The necessary historiographical critique must not overlook the main aspect of the 
heideggerian approach, namely the performative operativity of his philosophical practice, which aims at 
the transformation of a historical corpus to produce, by repetitive destruction, an unprecedented issue 
(une problématique inédite)” Cf. SOMMER, Christian Heidegger, Aristote, Luther. Les sources aristotéliciennes et 
néo-testamentaires d'Être et Temps PUF, 2005 pp. 307-308. 
6 Cf. e.g. BERTI, Enrico Aristotele nel Novecento Bari: Laterza 1993 pp. 60 ff. Although many of Berti’s 
precisions are valuable not only for an understanding of Aristotle’s philosophy but also for an 
approach to Heidegger like the one we develop in this thesis, he actually does not succeed in 
appreciating the ‘unprecedented issues’ that Heidegger may raise with his interpretation. 
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and energeia” rather than “phronēsis and energeia”, since phronēsis is a dynamis in 
relation to praxis, and praxis is itself a form of energeia. To be sure, it is praxis that 
supports the ontological weight of phronēsis, and Heidegger himself focuses almost 
exclusively on the term praxis in his 1924 course Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen 
Philosophie. Yet, both in the Natorp Bericht where the ontological breakthrough into 
phronēsis is made, and in the 1924-25 course on Plato’s Sophist, this latter term is 
predominant to characterize a mode of alētheuein. Furthermore, it is under the term 
phronēsis that the topic of discussion developed in this thesis is generally identified 
among scholars, while praxis, in part perhaps because of its adoption by most 
modern languages, has come to invoke a wider range of themes. Praxis would 
therefore indicate less specifically what the reader will find in the present thesis, 
although its exclusion from the title is not intended in the least to diminish its 
relevance.  
Section I is based on a combination of a close reading of Aristotle’s text 
and a dialogue with the interpretations provided by different commentators. Yet, 
we take sides in the debate and come to a defined view of phronēsis, because we 
believe that it is only thus that we can subsequently enter into a dialogue with 
Heidegger’s appropriation. Our overall view is not set therefore on Aristotle but, 
on the contrary, it takes its departure from Aristotle to approach Heidegger’s 
project. References to Heidegger are scarce in section I, also because we expect 
our initial distance from his appropriation of Aristotle to enrich our dialogue with 
his philosophy. Still, it is unavoidable that the thought of Heidegger somehow 
affects our reading in that first section―it definitely does, often through the per-
spectives of authors who are clearly indebted to Heidegger in their approaches to 
Aristotle, such as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Pierre Aubenque, Rémi Brague, Paul 
Ricœur, Leonardo Polo and Alejandro Vigo. 
Chapter 1 analyzes the intellectual soil in which the Aristotelian under-
standing of phronēsis arises and the breakthrough implied by his original integration 
of aretē and orexis. The reflection in that chapter leads us to the concept of organic 
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unity (symphysis), which acquires increasing importance thereafter. From that basis, 
chapter 2 suggests an interpretation of how the distinction between phronēsis and 
technē―or their respective enactments, praxis and poiēsis―is built on the basis of 
energeia and the closely related concept of entelecheia. The ontological force of the 
distinction between praxis and poiēsis is to our mind the, as it were, secret weapon 
of the NE, and also the main reason for Heidegger’s interest in it. To our mind, 
crucial concepts such as readiness (Fertigkeit), or present-at-handness (Vorhanden-
heit) can be traced back to this basic distinction, from which the Aristotelian de-
termination of praxis is obtained. It is also from the characterization of praxis that 
the much debated binomial phronēsis-sophia is approached at the end of this chap-
ter. 
After this search for our own voice as regards Aristotle’s concept of 
phronēsis and its place in his philosophy, the ground is ready to engage Heidegger’s 
texts in Section II. Chapter 3 starts considering the question of the immediacy of 
life as a leitmotiv for Heidegger’s renewal of phenomenology, and discusses the 
influence of his methodological efforts and his religious studies from 1919 to 1921 
on his new approach to Aristotle. An essential point is still discussed, on the basis 
of the results of section I, namely the legitimacy and feasibility of Heidegger’s 
ontological appropriation of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
Chapters 4 to 7 constitute the core of our dialogue with Heidegger. We 
depart in chapter 4 from an analysis of Heidegger’s programmatic Natorp Bericht 
and the first course that he develops in the form of a close reading and comment 
of Aristotle’s texts. Chapter 5 enters the main source for our work, the long 
interpretation of the NE developed in the 1924-25 course Platon: Sophistes, and 
specifically the relation between phronēsis and technē as read by Heidegger. As is the 
case in section I, this distinction calls sooner or later for the concepts of energeia 
and entelecheia, which ultimately turn around that of telos. Chapter 6 stands 
therefore as a kind of interlude, since it turns to the previous course that year, 
where some of Heidegger’s most important points about these concepts are made, 
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and where his view of their relation with ethics is most explicit. Only from this 
basis can we go back to the interpretation of the NE in the Sophistes course, and 
specifically to what we have called the gigantomachia between phronēsis and sophia 
that is held in it. For all of Heidegger’s emphasis on phronēsis, we hold there that 
his ultimate goal is not a dethronement of sophia, but a rethinking of its disclosing 
capabilities―one that, according to Heidegger, is not possible from within 
Aristotelian conceptuality. 
Last but not least, chapter 8 actually works as a synthesis of the traversed 
way, and a further explicitation of the basic idea that guides its advance, namely 
that not only is there no conflict between Aristotle’s concepts of phronēsis and sophia 
or hexis and telos, as Heidegger believes there to be, but also that the important 
passage of Metaphysics IX 6 where Aristotle elucidates at once the ontological 
structure of praxis and that of energeia provides new elements for a rethinking of 
being in the same terms in which Heidegger pointed to the ontological relevance 
of NE VI. Thus the paradox of an Aristotle providing ways out of his own 
labyrinth is probably enlarged, and we are provided with new insights to go on 
exploring, hand in hand with Aristotle and Heidegger, what things themselves 
have to say. 
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1. Aristotle’s Orectical Reframing of Phronēsis 
 
1.1. From Ancient Tradition to Aristotle 
The term phronēsis7 has a long trail in ancient Greek prior to Aristotle’s original 
development of it. Gauthier provides a detailed history of its wanderings in his 
analysis of NE VI8. Its sense was originally very wide: “as well as phren means the 
soul as a whole, heart and spirit, and phronein means feeling as much as thinking, 
phronēsis can refer to all the nuances of feeling or thought”9. Democritus and 
Socrates, however, use it more specifically as meaning a kind of practical wisdom: 
a discernment of good and evil that would eventually adopt a contemplative 
character in Plato. Although this necessarily simplifies the multifariousness of 
views expressed in Plato’s dialogues, Gauthier assumes this approach, yet with the 
qualification that the term ‘contemplative’ does not entail Platonic phronēsis 
renouncing to lead action, but rather rising above action to direct it, as a 
transcendent knowledge rooted in the acquaintance with the idea of the Good10. 
However, he proceeds, “the contemplative parenthesis opened by Plato in the 
history of phronēsis” is closed soon after him: Aristotle recovers its sense as 
developed by Democritus, Socrates and Isocrates, namely that of a practical 
                                               
7 We preferably use the Greek term. If the context requires referring to it in English, though, we follow 
Ross’ translation: ‘practical wisdom’. We refer to sophia also preferably using the Greek term, or else as 
‘theoretical wisdom’, to distinguish it from ‘practical wisdom’, also following Ross. For a different 
handling and translation of phronēsis and sophia, cf. Gauthier’s in GJ II pp. 463 ff: in order to underscore 
the intellectual role of phronēsis, he rejects Aubenque’s translation (prudence), and translates it into 
French simply as sagesse (wisdom). Sagesse, he holds, is not to be confused with sophia, which he declines 
translating.   
8 Cf. GJ II pp. 463-469.  
9 GJ II, p. 464. Cfr. also BRAGUE, R. Aristote et la question du monde. Essai sur le contexte cosmologique et 
anthropologique de l'ontologie. PUF, 1988, p. 41 (hereafter AQM). 
10 GJ II, pp. 465-466. Gauthier concedes, though, that Plato’s Seventh Letter and Aristotle’s Protrepticus, 
supposedly faithful to an alleged Platonic doctrine, speak of two wisdoms, one of which is practical. 
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wisdom that immediately directs actions and therefore is a knowledge of singulars 
and means11. 
Although he tends to see Plato’s understanding of phronēsis as a parenthesis 
too, Aubenque points out that such an opposition of Plato and Aristotle should 
be qualified, since some dialogues of Plato show an awareness of the limitations of 
a contemplative grasp of the Good as a guiding principle for action12. This point, 
which is made by other commentators13, faces a deeply rooted approach that has 
been reinforced in the twentieth century by the influential though contested work 
of Jaeger14. 
According to Aubenque, though, Plato’s hesitations would not be but an 
effect of tradition: if we were to highlight all the passages where Plato gives 
phronēsis a sense which is not the ‘Platonic’ one, he contends, we would realize that 
“Platonic phronēsis only announces Aristotelian prudence insofar as it evokes the 
phronēsis of tradition”15. As for this traditional sense, Aubenque points beyond 
                                               
11 Cf. GJ II, pp. 467-469. 
12 AUBENQUE, P. La prudence chez Aristote Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963, p. 24. 
(hereafter PRA). 
13 Cf. BERTI, E. La filosofia del primo Aristotele Padova: Publicazioni della Facultà di Lettere e Filosofia 
Università di Padova/CEDAM 1962 esp. pp 550-553; DÜRING, I. Aristoteles. Darstellung und Interpretation 
seines Denkens. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1966 esp. pp. 456-468; GADAMER, Hans-Georg Die Idee des 
Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles (1978) in Gesammelte Werke 7. Griechische Philosophie III Mohr Siebeck, 
Tübingen 1991 pp. 128-227; GRANT, A. The Ethics of Aristotle. Illustrated with Essays and Notes. London: 
John W. Parker and Son, 1865 Vol. 1 esp. pp. 135-169, essay “On the Relation of Aristotle’s Ethics to 
Plato and the Platonists”, partly modified in a later edition (New York: Arno Press, 1973, vol. 2 pp. 
179-217); POIRIER, J.-L. “Socrate avait raison...” in Chateau, J.-Y. (ed.) La vérité pratique: Aristote, 
« Ethique à Nicomaque », livre VI Paris: Vrin, 1997 pp. 137-150; ROWE, C. J. “The Meaning of Phronēsis 
in the Eudemian Ethics” in Mueller-Goldingen (ed.) Schriften zur Aristotelischen Ethik Hildesheim: Olms, 
1988 p. 260, who acknowledges that speaking of a “Platonic use of phronēsis” might be misleading in 
certain cases. 
14 JAEGER, W. Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung. Berlin: Weidmann, 1923. 
15 PRA pp. 24-25. 
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Socrates and his contemporaries (Socrates is said to be an “unconscious heir”16 of 
it), namely to what he calls “the tragic source”17: 
Greek tragedy was full of problems of this kind: what is man allowed to know? What 
is he supposed to do in a world where chance reigns? What can he expect from a 
future that is concealed to him? How to remain, men as we are, within the limits of 
man? The answer, tirelessly repeated by the choirs of tragedies, is summarized in a 
word: phronein (...). It is because Aristotle has been always approached within the 
shadow of Plato that we have ended up forgetting that he was a Greek, perhaps even 
more of a Greek than his teacher (...)18. 
Phronēsis for Aristotle would then be ultimately that rationality which is 
proper to the finitude of man. Knowledge that is conscious of its limits: “one of 
the most constant traits of the Greek spirit”19, which leads Socrates to hold that 
“real wisdom is the property of God” and that the wisest man is who has realized 
that “in respect of wisdom he is really worthless”20; a conviction that lies also in 
Aristotle’s concession that a life of pure contemplation is “too high for man” (X 
6, 1177b 26f), although “we must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and 
strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us” (33f). The old 
Greek wisdom reminding human beings of their limits, which the Stoics will turn 
upside down by conceiving them as gods21, is conserved in the popular use of the 
term phronēsis at least until the time when Aristotle recovers it to develop the 
structure of the wisdom of those who “know what is good for themselves and 
what is good for men in general” (VI 5, 1140b 9f). 
This knowledge, Aubenque points out, “is moral not because of its reach, 
but rather because of its limits, [which] are present in the term phronēsis itself, this 
                                               
16 PRA p. 164. 
17 Cf. PRA pp. 25, 30 and 155-177. Gauthier also refers to this tradition (cf. GJ II p. 464), but he does 
not make it a major subject. 
18 PRA p. 30. Martha C. Nussbaum explores extensively this trend in The Fragility of Goodness. Luck and 
Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
19 PRA p. 165. 
20 Apology of Socrates 23 a-b. 
21 PRA p. 162. 
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old word that Plato had conserved by detaching it from its sense”22. That morality 
is a mark of finitude would explain why Aristotle considers it senseless to attribute 
virtues to gods: “What would their temperate acts be? Is not such praise tasteless, 
since they have no bad appetites?” (X 8, 1178b 15f). Pace Aubenque, though, and 
however large or imprecise the concept of phronēsis is for Plato, it is significant that 
a very similar point is made in the critique of poets of the Republic23. Besides, 
Aubenque himself admits that Aristotle’s play on words relating sōphrosynē and 
phronēsis―namely that sōphrosynē, i.e. temperance, owes its name to the fact that it 
preserves phronēsis―is taken from Plato24. 
In this respect, it is most surprising―in view of the eventual direction of 
his interpretation―to read in Jaeger’s Aristoteles the concession that “there is 
nothing to which Plato has more passionately objected to the last moment of his 
life as the idea that the soul can know what is good without being good itself”25. Jaeger 
himself acknowledges that Plato showed an awareness of the limits of the theory 
of the Ideas, and he even rejects the hypothesis that the criticisms on this theory 
in the Parmenides would have been written by Aristotle. However, while he admits 
that it would be misguiding, for an adequate understanding of the relation be-
tween the thought of Aristotle and that of Plato, to intend to reduce the latter’s to 
a fully consistent whole26, he declines to do so only to reduce Plato to a smaller 
whole: that of his latest dialogues which, like the Philebus, are supposed by Jaeger to 
search for an ideal of scientifical exactness in ethics27. This reduction, of course, is 
                                               
22 PRA p. 152. 
23 Cf. Republic II, 381 b-c. 
24 PRA pp. 159-160 (Cf. Cratylus 411e; Republic IV, 442 c-d; NE VI 5, 1140b 11f). 
25 JAEGER, W. p. 22 (our e). 
26 Ibidem p. 10. Cf. GRANT, A. 1973 p. 181: “If we ask, at what point of his fifty years of authorship 
was Plato most himself? In which of the dialogues can we put our finger on the most essential features 
of his philosophy?―the answer must be, nowhere and everywhere. Plato is to be regarded as a dynamic 
force, rather than as the setter forth of a system”. 
27 Cf. Ibidem pp. 13-15. Düring and Berti object to this point (cf. note 13). Cf. also GADAMER, Hans-
Georg “Der aristotelische ›Protreptikos‹ und die Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Betrachtung der 
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crucial to his theory on the evolution of Aristotle’s thought from an unshakeable 
adherence to a Platonic theoretical phronēsis in the Protrepticus to a mature 
Aristotelian theory-free phronēsis in the NE28. We do not intend to join here the 
long debate provoked by this theory. What is most significant about it, as Auben-
que accurately diagnoses, is that it has ultimately said very little about the philoso-
phical sense of the Aristotelian concept of phronēsis29, to which we now turn. 
1.2. For the Sake of Precision 
In addition to the need to pay close attention to the text itself, as Aubenque and 
others recommend30, we suggest that primarily conceiving of the philosophical 
relation between Aristotle and Plato as one of radical opposition may be mis-
guiding to understand their own philosophies31. Such a conception is often taken 
                                                                                                                                 
aristotelischen Ethik” (1927) in GW 5 Griechische Philosophie I Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1985 pp. 164-186, 
esp. pp. 176-177. 
28 Natali, who refutes Jaeger’s interpretation on the basis of textual evidence in the Topics and the EE, 
claims rather that Aristotle holds a sustained struggle throughout his work with the concept of phronēsis, 
which shows itself as both an excellence of character and of intelligence. (Cf. NATALI, C. “Virtù o 
Scienza? Aspetti della phronesis nei Topici e nelle Etiche di Aristotele” Phronesis 29 (1984) pp. 50-72, 
republished later in Natali, C. The Wisdom of Aristotle SUNY, 2001). 
29 “Ever since the publication of the works of philologists as E. Kapp and W. Jaeger, the problem of 
the interpretation of Aristotelian Ethics within the whole of Aristotelian speculation has been replaced 
by that of the place of the Nicomachean Ethics within the history of Aristotelian Ethics and, more 
generally, of Aristotelian Ethics within the history of Ethics (...). The result is that, by regarding 
Aristotelianism as a simple stage between the Pre-Aristotelianism of the young Aristotle and the Post-
Aristotelianism of epigones, we have ended up forgetting what was specific of Aristotelianism itself. It 
is such a misfortune that has happened to phronēsis, torn between the contemplation from which it 
detaches and the practice towards which it heads (...). Thus, genetic method, always more concerned 
with processes than with structures, readier to highlight the contradictions of a doctrine than its 
consistency (...) [does not see] anything else but transition and passage between extremes, where the 
point of view of the author could have seen a peak”. PRA pp. 26-27. Cf. also BODÉÜS, R. 1994 pp. 
1-2 and YEPES, R. “El origen de la energeia en Aristóteles” Anuario Filosófico 22/1 (1989) pp. 94-95. 
30 The works of Natali and Chateau are nice examples of this close reading. Some of their strengths are 
to our mind the following: i) avoiding to base an interpretation on short difficult passages; ii) taking 
seriously Aristotle’s difficult points, if he insists on them in different passages; iii) for Aristotle’s 
understanding of a concept, giving priority to passages where he develops it over passages where he 
could be just using the term in a colloquial sense (Cf. NATALI, C. 1984 and 2001; CHATEAU, Jean-
Yves “La phronèsis et la vérité” in Chateau, J.-Y. [ed.] 1997 pp. 185-261). 
31 Grant believes that the NE “is manifestly indebted to the dialogues of Plato, [which] go far towards 
furnishing its entire skeleton” (GRANT, A. 1973 p. 198). Marías, a translator of Aristotle into Spanish, 
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for granted and summarized by the commonplace term ‘Anti-Platonism’―a term 
no doubt fed partly by Aristotle, whose harshest criticisms seem however directed 
to the Platonists32. As a matter of fact, Aristotle refers explicitly to Plato only three 
times in the NE, not quite to criticize him but to insert his teachings as relevant to 
the argument33. 
The often unconscious prejudice of many commentators consists perhaps 
in regarding Aristotle as Anti-Platonic until otherwise proven. We suggest an al-
ternative point of departure by observing Aristotle’s relation to Plato as one of a 
gain in accuracy or precision34. This does not exclude originality in his thought nor 
detachment from Plato on certain issues, but it downplays an approach of mutual 
exclusion that is usually based on the reduction of the ‘real Plato’ to some of his 
                                                                                                                                 
observes: “The philosophy of Aristotle cannot be understood but from Platonism. But let us not 
misunderstand that: from does not mean within. It is an eminent case (...) of what I call «intellectual 
filiation», which can be formulated as follows: «incomprehensible without him, irreducible to him». 
The Aristotelian concepts, except for perhaps a pair of them―energeia, entelecheia, and few more―come 
from Plato. There can be hardly found a page of Aristotle that does not come from Plato (but we should 
add: nor one that remains in Plato)” (MARÍAS, J. “Introducción” to Aristotle, Ética a Nicómaco Madrid: 
Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales [1959] 2002, p. xi). 
32 Cf. NE I 6 and Met. I 9. As for the passage that has come to be known under the motto Amicus Plato 
magis amica veritas (cf. NE I 6, 1096a 11ff), it is remarkable that Aristotle speaks of a collective: “the 
Forms have been introduced by friends of our own (dia to philous andras eisagagein ta eidē)”. Surely, we do 
not intend to question Plato’s authorship of the notion of Forms or Ideas, otherwise clearly indicated 
by Aristotle in Metaphysics I 6, but to avoid the oversimplification of reducing Plato’s thought to a 
theory developed in some of his dialogues, which too easily reads Plato and Aristotle as poles apart. 
33 Cf. NE II 3, 1104b 11ff, where Plato’s view is far from being regarded as ‘intellectualist’ (cf. also 
note 25) “[M]oral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account of pleasure that we 
do bad things, and on account of pain that we abstain from the noble ones. Hence we ought to have been 
brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as to delight in and to be pained by the things that 
we ought; for this is the right education” (Cf. Republic III 402a and Laws II 653 a-c). Cf. also, for the 
other references, NE I 4, 1095a 32; X 2, 1172b 28. 
34 Rodrigo, while acknowledging relevant threads of continuity between Plato and Aristotle, character-
izes the latter’s analyses as “more qualified than those of his predecessor”. RODRIGO, P. Aristote. Une 
philosophie pratique. Praxis, politique et bonheur. Paris: Vrin, 2006 p. 120. Vigo, for his part, characterizes 
Aristotle’s methodological concern as “a kind of phenomenological reserve before the tendency to 
obtain systematic all-embracing unities” (VIGO, A. Zeit und Praxis bei Aristoteles. München: Karl Alber, 
1996 p. 41). This attitude can be traced for instance in the passage that has inspired the title of this 
subsection: “Most of these qualities also are unnamed, but in these as in the other cases we must 
attempt to coin names for them ourselves, for the sake of clarity and so that our meaning may be easily 
followed” (NE II 7, 1108a 15ff, Rackham). Cf. also EE 1 6, 1216b 26; and NE I 3, 1094b 11f: “Our 
discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of”. 
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dialogues or some of his assertions. The passage on the contemplation of the 
Good in the Republic is in this respect one of the favorite targets35. Less com-
mented upon, however, is e.g. his skepticism about the efficacy of laws “enacted 
only in words and on paper (logō te kai grammasin)”36 which cannot make the city 
“good in the full sense of the word, [i.e.] wise, brave, sober and just”37. In this same 
trend, one may well cling to the statement at the end of the Meno that whoever has 
virtue gets it “by divine dispensation (theia moira)”38 as evidence that Plato would 
understand ethics in a contemplative manner. However, a few lines above in the 
same dialogue it is clearly stated that virtue is not knowledge (phronēsis) and that it 
cannot be taught (didakton)39. If the dialogue finishes referring to the gods, it is 
precisely because it comes to an aporia: neither Socrates nor Meno are clear on the 
nature of virtue, but still they agree on what it is not, i.e. mere theoretical knowl-
edge; hence Socrates’ constant criticism, here and elsewhere, of the Sophists, who 
believe that virtue can be taught40. 
When the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues considers virtue and knowl-
edge as equivalent he is pointing to a wider conception of knowledge than the 
Sophists have. “Assuming knowledge in such a sense that this equivalence appears 
as unintelligible or arbitrary, Gadamer argues, entails that the reproach of intel-
lectualism turns against itself”41. Yet, the reduction of Plato and Socrates to the 
intellectualist cliché is undoubtedly a comfortable resort in the case of so complex 
authors, and that is perhaps one reason why the commentators of Aristotle who 
                                               
35 Cf. Republic VII, 517 c-d. 
36 Ibidem IV, 425b. 
37 Ibidem IV, 427e. 
38 Cf. Meno 99e–100b. 
39 Cf. ibidem 98e. Plato is here obviously using the wide Greek sense of phronēsis, which cannot be 
simply leveled to the more clear-cut understanding of the concept in Aristotle. 
40 Cf. Meno 90c ff. and GUTHRIE, William K. C. A History of Greek Philosophy. Volume III: The Fifth-
century Enlightment. Cambridge University Press, 1979 pp. 250-260. 
41 GADAMER, Hans-Georg “Praktisches Wissen” (1930) in GW 5 Griechische Philosophie I Mohr 
Siebeck, Tübingen 1985, pp. 230-248 (p. 231 for ref). 
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assume it are legion. An inmediate result of this assumption is for instance the 
transformation of the allegedly Platonising book X of the NE into a source of 
puzzlement and controversy that does not benefit the overall interpretation of the 
treatise42. 
On the other hand, holding as we do that the Platonic dialogues set 
relevant precedents for Aristotle’s ethical reflection does not entail leveling the 
differences between these authors. For Grant, the thesis that virtue is a science, 
“far from being an abstract theory, [is] intimately connected with life and 
reality”43. And yet, 
[it] exhibits one of the characteristics of early Ethics, namely, that they contain 
extremely little psychology. At first men are content with the rudest and most 
elementary mental distinctions; afterwards greater refinements are introduced. Plato’s 
threefold division of the mind into Desire, Anger and Reason, was the first scientific 
attempt of the kind. But even in Plato, the distinction between the moral and the 
intellectual sides of our nature was hardly established44. 
It is precisely Aristotle’s merit to have provided analytical accuracy where 
required, e.g. in the articulation of “the moral and the intellectual sides of our na-
ture”. What is new in his philosophy, Aubenque argues, “is not an unprecedented 
interest in action―neither Socrates nor Plato had been pure speculators―but the 
discovery of a split within reason, and the acknowledgement of it as the condition of 
a new practical intellectualism”45. Socrates, Aristotle argues in the Eudemian Ethics, “in-
                                               
42 Thus, for instance, in spite of her lucid analyses of many aspects of the NE, Nussbaum considers 
NE X 6-8 as a remnant of Platonism in Aristotle and therefore as incompatible with the rest of 
Aristotle’s ethical thought (Cf. NUSSBAUM, M. 1986 pp. 373 ff). The effects of considering this 
difficult passage as not genuinely Aristotelian, though, go beyond the seemingly innocent excision of a 
text. This shall be dealt with in section 2.6 below. 
43 GRANT, A. 1865 p. 122. Poirier holds that Socrates’ emphasis on virtue being a science is due to 
the aim to take sides against the biologism of the Protagorean position (Cf. POIRIER, J.-L. p. 141). 
44 GRANT, A. 1865 p. 124. 
45 PRA p. 144 (our e). Here Aubenque is less restrictive than in the first pages of his study and seems 
to concede that Plato (now related to Socrates) did something else for phronēsis than just assume the 
insights of the “tragic source” (cf. note 15). In tune with this view, Poirier defines Aristotle’s effort of 
chapters 12 and 13 of NE VI as a reworking of the Socratic theory on the unity of virtues where 
Aristotle takes care not to break away from Socratism (cf. POIRIER, J.-L. p. 139). 
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quired what excellence is, not how or from what it arises”46. Aristotle’s contribu-
tion could then be summarized as coming to grips with the complex structure of 
rationality by showing how knowledge is intertwined with practice. Yet, the articu-
lation of this ‘how’ does not entail a general overturning of Plato or Socrates that 
would justify the term ‘Anti-Platonism’ as a basic trait of Aristotle’s thought. The 
point is, again, not to level differences, but to avoid transforming a question of 
method or precision―which evidently provides new philosophical insights―into 
one of radical opposition. 
One of the trends of Aristotle’s precision in regard to Plato is the sorting-
out of the problem of the ambiguity of the good, which is “either means or 
end”47. While Plato and Socrates tend to consider the end as the defining term of 
a moral action, Aristotle puts special emphasis on the means48. By doing so, 
however, he does not at all relinquish an appreciation of ends, but inserts the 
question about them into the context of action: he somehow puts them in motion, 
or better, he grasps them in their original motion. Thus he manages to explain the 
relation between the right aprehension of ends and ethical virtue (ethikē aretē)49, 
which Jaeger recognizes Plato to have detected50. However, such an account 
requires a distinction and articulation of action (praxis) on the one hand and 
disposition or habitual state (hexis) on the other, in which praxis is as much the 
cause of hexis as its result. Here Aristotle goes too beyond Plato, who had already 
stressed the essential role of hexis, but had not accounted for the way in which 
                                               
46 EE I 6, 1216b 16. 
47 GRANT, A. (1865) p. 125.  
48 Cf. CHATEAU, J.-Y. 1997 p. 201: “Against this Socratic or Platonic perspective which traces 
everything back to the end, Aristotle endeavors here, at first, to trace everything back to the action 
itself (i.e. to the means undertaken in sight of the end)”. Cf. NE III 5, 1113b 5f. For Plato, cf. Gorgias 
426 c-d: “If a man acts with some purpose, he does not will the act, but the purpose of the act”; Laches 
185d: “When [one] considers anything for the sake of another thing, [one] thinks of the end and not of 
the means?”. 
49 Unless otherwise indicated, the use of the term aretē hereafter refers to ethikē aretē. 
50 Cf. note 25 above. 
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such dispositions are produced51. In NE I he introduces―in a correction that, 
again, seems to concern Platonists more than Plato himself52―his chief thesis that, 
rather than a state, eudaimonia or human good is an activity (energeia) of the soul 
according to virtue53: 
it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in possession 
(ktēsis) or use (chrēsis), in state (hexis) or in activity (energeia). For the state may exist 
without producing any good result, as is a man who is asleep or in some other way 
quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has the activity (energeia) will of 
necessity be acting (prattein), and acting well (eu prattein).  (I 8, 1098b 31ff). 
Thus, the Aristotelian emphasis on means―only apparently to the detri-
ment of ends―seems to be closely related to the primacy of action over disposi-
tion or use over possession. This new accent, though, does not simply downplay 
dispositions and ends54: it rather reinforces them through a new understanding; as 
we said, it puts them in motion, it roots them in human life, which is essentially active. A 
conscientious exploration of two fundamental concepts allows in our opinion for 
this ‘activation’ of ethics: orexis and energeia. Both are crucial for Aristotle’s new 
understanding of phronēsis and its relation to aretē, technē and sophia.  
                                               
51 Cf. GAUTHIER, R.A. La morale d’Aristote PUF, 1973 pp. 76-78; ROWE, C. J. p. 258. 
52 According to Rodrigo, “concerning hexis, Aristotle plays Plato off against the Platonics (Speusippus 
and Xenocrates); he carries out a «return to Plato», so to speak, against those Platonics who weaken the 
notion of hexis”. (RODRIGO, P. 2006 p. 122). The term ‘return’, of course, does not intend to flatten 
the differences between Plato and Aristotle. For a general perspective of the argument, cf. pp. 118-126. 
Plato distinguishes between a passive and an active sense of hexis, and in the Philebus he places 
eudaimonia among the latter (Cf. ibidem p. 119, providing other references, and YEPES, R. 1989 pp. 97 
ff.). Cf. also NATALI 2001 pp. 118 ff. 
53 Cf. also e.g. NE I 7 1098a 16f; 13, 1102a 5f. 
54 Cf. CHATEAU, J.-Y. 1997 pp. 217-218: “Phronēsis is of course not excluded from dealing with the 
end of action, conceived as it is by Aristotle as the excellence of intelligence in the practical domain; it 
is just that its way of dealing with them is none other than that of deliberation concerning the means”.  
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1.3. The Irreducibility of Orexis 
The Aristotelian notion of phronēsis can be regarded either as a widening of the 
concept of ethical virtue (aretē) or as a widening of that of knowledge55. That is in 
fact what is at stake in a reference to Socrates near the end of NE VI: 
Socrates in one respect was on the right track while in another he went astray; in 
thinking that all the excellences (aretai) are forms of practical wisdom (phronēsis) he 
was wrong, but in saying they implied practical wisdom he was right (...). But we 
must go a little further. For it is not merely the state (hexis) in accordance with right 
reason (kata logou), but the state that involves right reason (meta logou), that is excellence 
(...). Socrates, then, thought the excellences were forms of reason (for he thought 
they were, all of them, forms of knowledge), while we think they involve reason56. 
Aristotle makes here a double point that provides an important key to 
understand NE VI. On the one hand, ethical virtue requires phronēsis to exist, but 
such a requirement cannot be understood as an identification: phronēsis and ethical 
virtue are to be kept as different principles if we are to understand them. Broadie 
rightly underlines in this respect that Aristotle says that prudent actions require an 
agreement of right desire and true reason, “which implies harmony, hence not 
identity”57. On the other, we do not understand this requirement if it is conceived 
of as an external agreement: virtue is not a state of desire according to (kata) the 
reasons furnished by a sensible person or to those of an accurate treatise advising 
one on how to act. When Aristotle calls for the involvement of right reason, he 
means that virtue is a state necessarily structured by one’s own reason. Rackham’s 
translation is in this respect perhaps more enlightening: “Virtue is not merely a 
disposition conforming to right principle (kata logou), but one cooperating with right 
                                               
55 Cf. NATALI, C. 1984 p. 59: “Now virtue is understood as a wider kind (...), which embraces two 
species: the aretē of intellect or dianoetic species, and the aretē of character or ethical species (...) In its 
turn, phronēsis is not anymore a science, but another kind of knowledge”. 
56 NE VI 13, 1144b 18-30, mod. tr. 
57 BROADIE, S. Ethics with Aristotle New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991 p. 217. Cf. NE 
VI 2, 1139a 29ff. 
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principle (meta logou)”―cooperating, i.e. operating together, in such a way that one 
makes possible the operation of the other.  
The topos of this encounter between one’s own virtue and one’s own rea-
son is phronēsis, “a true, rational, practical disposition (hexis alethē meta logou praktikē) 
with regard to the things that are good or bad for man” (VI 5, 1140b 4ff)58, the 
elucidation of which constitutes one of the main goals of the NE59. This true ra-
tional disposition provides the standard that makes ethical virtue possible, as 
stated in NE II: “aretē, then, is a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean 
(mesotēs) relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the 
man of practical wisdom (phronimos) would determine it” (II 6, 1106b 35ff). How-
ever, in order to provide this standard that is constituent of virtue, phronēsis re-
quires in turn the rectitude of orexis, i.e. ethical virtue: “it is evident that it is im-
possible to be practically wise (phronimos) without being good” (VI 12, 1144a 36f). 
This circularity, the crux of many interpreters, is the center of gravity of Aristotle’s 
conception of practical truth that attracted the interest of the young Heidegger.  
This relation between aretē and phronēsis, which may be literally called a 
‘virtuous circularity’60, turns on the concept of orexis. According to the detailed 
analysis by Nussbaum61, this term is reported to have been used before Aristotle 
only in “the dubious ethical fragments of Democritus”. The verb oregesthai does 
                                               
58 Mod. tr. Ross translates hexis alethē meta logou praktikē as follows: “a true and reasoned state of 
capacity to act”. We follow here Marías’ translation, which seems to us clearer. 
59 “It should be determined what right reason is and what is the standard that fixes it” (NE VI 1, 1138b 
33f). 
60 By ‘literally’ we mean that the term ‘virtuous’ can be applied both formally and materially to this 
circularity; what is more: the formal sense finds its origin in the material one―this consistent circularity 
is not a conceptual construction but a feature of the dynamics of virtue. We may also speak of a 
‘vicious circularity’, in the case of vice, but not in the formal sense (that remains ‘virtuous’, or 
consistent) but only in the material one: inasmuch as virtue is generated as a result of this interaction 
between orexis and phronēsis (or excellence of praxis), vice is also generated as a result of an interaction 
between orexis and defective praxis. 
61 Cf. NUSSBAUM, M. pp. 273 ss. 
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appear, though rarely, in Plato62, and also in Homer as meaning ‘reach out for’ or 
‘grasp at’63. Aristotle appears to have selected it as a generic term to cover “all 
cases of goal-directed animal movement”. Epithumia and boulēsis, respectively those 
desires proper of bodily appetites and of reason, are then species of the genus 
orexis64. For Nussbaum, the English translation ‘desire’ does not faithfully render 
this generic meaning65, which she defines with two essential traits: (i) it implies 
directedness towards an object and (ii) it is active more than passive, in the sense 
that it does not entail just ‘being in need of something’. Her analysis, based also on 
the De Motu Animalium and the De Anima, concludes that for Aristotle orexis is 
involved in every action and “accounts for what is common to all animal 
movement (...). Both human and other animals, in their rational and non-rational 
actions, have in common that they stretch forward, so to speak, towards pieces of 
the world which they then attain or appropriate”66. 
This view is developed in De Anima III where Aristotle clearly states that 
“in any case it is the object of appetite that originates movement”67. The point is 
                                               
62 Plato had indeed dealt with desire, although he lacks the interwoven conception of hexis and orexis 
developed by Aristotle, which reveals the more intricate structure of both. On Plato’s consideration of 
orexis in the Republic, cf. III 402a, where although the specific term is not used, enjoying and being 
pained at the right moments is considered an essential result of good education. Later in that dialogue 
oregesthai is used in the context of a discussion on the articulation between reason and irrational 
impulses: “The soul of the thirsty, then, in so far as it thirsts, wishes nothing else than to drink, and 
yearns for this (oregetai) and its impulse is toward this” (IV 439a-b). The term epithymia is used nearby in 
the same sense, in a statement that parallels clearly the beginning of the NE: “All men desire good 
(pantes tōn agathōn epithymousin), and so, if thirst is desire (epithymia), it would be of good drink (…) and 
similarly of other desires” (438a). Cf. also VI 485d on striving after (oregesthai) “truth in every form”. 
63 Cf. LSJ, entry oregesthai. 
64 Vigo shares this view, and attributes to boulēsis the concern with plans for one’s life (Cf. VIGO, A. 
“Razón práctica y tiempo en Aristóteles” in Vigo, A. 2006a p. 285. 
65 In this thesis we shall use preferably the Greek term. If it is necessary to translate it, though, we shall 
render it as ‘desire’. 
66 NUSSBAUM, M. pp. 275-276. Cf. also ANSCOMBE, G.E.M. Intention (1963) Cambridge/ London: 
Harvard University Press, 2000 pp. 63 ff. “[A] point insisted by Aristotle himself [is that] the archē 
(starting point) is to orekton (the thing wanted)”. 
67 De Anima III 10, 433a 27f (cf. the whole of chapter 10, 433a 9 – 433b 30). For Vigo, De Anima III 9-
13 “points out significantly to [the] priority of the desiderative factor” (cf. VIGO, A. 1996 p. 261).   
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confirmed in a crucial passage of NE VI to which we will return later in this 
chapter: 
Intellect itself (...) moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and is 
practical (...). [F]or good action (eupraxia) is an end (telos), and desire (orexis) aims at 
this. Hence choice is either desiderative thought or intellectual desire, and such a 
principle (archē) is man (VI 2, 1139a 35 - b5)68. 
It is otherwise significant that Aristotle places desire at the outset of both 
the Metaphysics and the NE: “All men by nature desire (oregontai) to know”69; “[T]he 
good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim (ephietai)” (I 1, 
1094a 2f)70. Both assertions place this ‘reaching out for an end’ in the first place, 
as a prior driving force, even for thought. The Eudemian Ethics is also quite clear in 
this respect: “The end aimed at is (...) the starting-point of our thought, [and] the 
end of our thought the starting-point of action”71.  
This irreducibility of desire, though, does not conflict with the priority of 
action over disposition, or with the new emphasis of means that is characteristic 
of Aristotle. It just accounts for the ties between man and the rest of reality: orexis 
connects praxis with the physis to which human beings belong72―which also 
implies, crucially, the distension in time in which we are. In fact, an important 
point of the doctrine of the psychic powers, developed in the De Anima73 and 
summarily expressed in the NE74, is that each one includes the lower ones, so that 
                                               
68 The English translation by Ross runs as follows: “and such an origin of action is man”. We assume 
rather Grant’s and Marías’ translation “and such a principle as this is man”, which makes more explicit 
Aristotle’s reference to man himself (kai e toiaute archē anthropos). Rackham’s, in this respect, is 
Solomonic: “man, as an originator of action, is a union of desire and intellect”. 
69 Met. I 1, 980a 21. 
70 Cf. ephiēmi in LSJ, meaning here ‘aiming at’. 
71 EE II 11, 1227b 32-33. 
72 As Nussbaum puts it, orexis “demystifies rational action by asking us to see it as similar [though not 
irreducible, C.A.] to other animal motions (NUSSBAUM, M. p. 276). 
73 Cf. esp. De Anima II 3. 
74 Cf. NE I 7, 1097b 33f; 13, 1102a 26ff. 
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the relevance of orexis for reason might better explain this “desiderative thought or 
intellectual desire”75 that constitutes man. 
Aristotle’s insistence on the irreducibility of orexis is also far from implying 
a devaluation of reason. It does not imply that desire governs reason, just as the 
fact that the senses provide the information for abstract thinking does not mean 
that they govern it76. What is at stake here―Vigo puts it in a way that makes clear 
Heidegger’s interest in Aristotle―is to show how rational agents “move always 
already within an ambit of understanding in which cognitive momentums (viz. per-
ception, belief, thought) are indissolubly intertwined with projective anticipations (viz. 
desires, intentions, plans, expectations)”77. The key question is how this intertwine-
ment has to be understood in order not to denaturalize neither desire nor knowl-
edge. 
1.4. Ends and Means: Toward the Organic Paradigm 
In his definition of physis in Metaphysics V, Aristotle distinguishes organic unity 
(symphysis) from mere contact (haphēs), “for in the latter case there need not be 
anything besides the contact, but in organic unities there is something identical in 
both parts, which makes them grow together instead of merely touching”78. The 
structure of this peculiar kind of unity can be very helpful to our mind for an 
accurate understanding of the interplay between desire and reason―or ends and 
means―in Aristotle’s definition of phronēsis in NE VI: “a true (i), rational (ii), 
practical (iii) disposition (hexis alethē meta logou praktikē) with regard to the things 
that are good or bad for man (iv)” (VI 5, 1140b 4f)79. Four features are detailed in 
                                               
75 Cf. NE VI 2, 1139b 4f. 
76 Cf. Politics VII 14, 1333a 21ff: “[I]n the world both of nature and of art the inferior always exists for 
the sake of the superior, and the superior is that which has a rational principle”.  
77 VIGO, A. 2006a p. 290. 
78 Met. V 4, 1014b 22ff. Cf. also the definition of holon in V 26, esp. 1023b 32ff. 
79 Mod. tr, cf. note 58. 
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this definition―besides the categorization of phronēsis as a disposition (hexis)―and 
they are meant to form a whole: they occur simultaneously, and they reciprocally 
transform themselves, as in an organic whole80. Thus, for instance, the inclusion 
of the terms ‘true’ (i) and ‘practical’ (iii) in this definition implies that the phronimos 
‘holds’ a peculiar kind of alētheia, i.e. practical truth, which cannot be just equated 
with the restricted sense in which Aristotle uses alētheia when he warns us in NE I 
about the limited precision of his statements: “[W]e must be content (...) to 
indicate the truth roughly and in outline” (I 3, 1094b 19ff). The truth of 
statements―the written letter of the NE―is not practical truth, however much this 
work may deal with practical issues. 
Therefore, we cannot grasp the alētheia of phronēsis unless we conceive it at 
once with the rest of elements in the definition: it must be meta logou, i.e. not only 
agree with a rational principle, but take its lead from the exercise of one’s own 
reason; it must be praktikē, i.e. stemming from and pointing towards action, rather than 
being just learnt from a teaching that can be subsequently transmitted81; and 
concerned with what is good or bad for man (peri ta anthrōpō agatha kai kaka), 
taking for ‘man’ the whole of one’s being, and not just a part of it, like e.g. one’s 
profession. 
                                               
80 Many of the misunderstandings concerning Aristotle’s ethics might be due to a reading guided by a 
mechanical paradigm. Trendelenburg actually considered ethics a privileged source for the idea of 
organicity: “Ethics provides for the first time, as an outcome of Metaphysics, the basic access to the 
idea of the whole, and surely the organic view of the world (organische Weltanschauung), against a 
mechanical one” (TRENDELENBURG, Adolf Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik Leipzig: Hirzel, 
1860 § 3, cf. also § 19). Rodrigo suggests the mereologic theory of Stanislaw Lesniewski as a clue to 
explain the relation between virtues and happiness in Aristotle. We think that it can shed light here too: 
in this theory, “the relation between parts [is conceived] as relation between ingredients rather than as 
elements, in the sense that an ingredient is defined by the relation itself, and does not exist at all before 
it (...). In brief, the being of the ingredient is totally relative” (RODRIGO 2006, p. 48). The logical 
scheme of priority proteron-hysteron developed by Aristotle can also provide insight in this respect (for a 
detailed analysis of this issue, cfr. VIGO, A. “Prioridad y prioridad ontológica según Aristóteles” in 
Vigo, A. 2006e pp. 23-54).     
81 Cf. NE X 9, 1179b 4ff.  
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This organicity of the binomial ‘true’ and ‘practical’ is expressed also 
before in NE VI: “of the part [of reason] which is practical and intellectual the 
good (to eu) is truth in agreement with right desire (alētheia homologōs ekhousa tē orexei tē 
orthē)” (VI 2, 1139a 29ff)82. The term alētheia included inside this definition, if 
observed as an isolated component, would be restricted to truth on the fact that 
certain means lead to a certain end, while the truth that is object of the 
definition―i.e., practical truth, the good (to eu) of the part of reason which is at the 
same time practical and intellectual―results from an agreement between true reason 
and right desire. 
Within the peculiar truth that is the result of this agreement, Aristotle links 
rightness of ends to desire and correctness of means to reason: “wish (boulēsis)83 
relates rather to the end (telos), choice (proairesis) to what contributes to the end (ta 
pros to telos)” (III 2, 1111b 26f). This meets his repeated statement that deliberation 
(bouleusis), which is the necessary step prior to choice, is concerned with means, 
not with ends: “We deliberate not about ends but about what contributes to ends. 
For a doctor does not considerate whether he shall heal (...) nor does any one else 
deliberate about his end. Having set the end, they consider how and by what things it is to be 
achieved” (III 3, 1112b 11-16). The doctor, qua doctor, does not deliberate about 
curing: this is an end that is set prior to his professional exercise here and now84. 
Only with the view set on this telos can he come to deliberate about the ways 
through which he could attain it. In the same way, insofar as one is ready to act, 
one has already set an end. The point is taken up in NE VI: 
                                               
82 Mod. tr: Ross renders to eu and to kakōs as ‘the good state’ and ‘the bad state’, thus perhaps restricting 
too much their meaning.   
83 Boulēsis is rational desire (cf. note 64); choice is defined some lines above by Aristotle as a typically 
rational activity (cf. b 7 ff). That Aristotle uses boulēsis instead of orexis reinforces our point above on 
the reciprocal transformation of the ‘ingredients’ of practical truth. 
84 The same point is made by Plato in Republic I 342, with a similar purpose, i.e. pointing towards a 
sphere of excellence that is wider than professional skills. 
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Phronēsis (...) is concerned with things human and things about which it is possible to 
deliberate; for we say this is above all the work of the man of practical wisdom 
(phronimos), to deliberate well, but no one deliberates about what cannot be otherwise, 
nor about things which have not an end (VI 7, 1141b 8-12)85. 
Here a further step is taken: good deliberation, i.e. good choice of the 
means, is attached to phronēsis―which seems to be confirmed towards the end of 
NE VI, where phronēsis is plainly affirmed to deal with the means, seemingly to the 
exclusion of ends: “excellence (aretē) makes the aim (skopos) right, and practical 
wisdom (phronēsis) the things leading to it (ta pros touton)” (VI 12, 1144a 8f)86. These 
passages have been the object of controversy because they seem to contradict 
other statements in the NE where phronēsis is said to determine the end of action87. 
What seems to follow from them is that phronēsis is indeed a rational faculty, 
though limited to a calculation of means to attain an end in the determination of 
which it would not take part. However, Gauthier argues, understanding that the 
end is set without the intervention of phronēsis would entail “abandoning [the 
constitution of values] to desire”88―which calls for the question as to whether 
phronēsis has a role in the determination of the end and, if so, as to why Aristotle 
would insist so much that this is the task of desire. 
The phronimos is indeed characterized as the one who is excellent in delib-
eration, although this excellent deliberation (euboulia) is distinguished from that 
deliberation which correctly leads to attaining what one should not do, or also 
                                               
85 Cf. also NE VI 9, 1142b 32f; VI 5, 1140a 25f: “it is thought to be the mark of a man of practical 
wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for him”; 1140a 30f: “the man 
who is capable of deliberating has practical wisdom”. 
86 Cf. also NE III, 1111b 26f. “wish (boulēsis) relates rather to the end [and] choice (proairesis) to what 
contributes to the end (tōn pros to telos)”. 
87 The clearest one is the following: “The choice will not be right without phronēsis any more than 
without aretē; for the one determines the end and the other makes us do the things that lead to the 
end” (NE VI 13, 1145a 4ff); Another one may be taken to adopt the same stance, depending on how it 
is interpreted: “excellence in deliberation will be correctness with regard to what conduces to the end 
of which practical wisdom (phronēsis) is the true apprehension” (VI 11, 1142b 32f). This second text is 
at the core of the controversy between Gauthier and Aubenque, discussed below. 
88 Cf. ibidem p. 565. 
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from that which leads to attaining what one should do, but not by the right means. 
This, Aristotle holds, does not yet entail “excellence in deliberation (euboulia)” (VI 
9, 1142b 24f)89. The first case (deliberation that leads to attaining what one should 
not do) is especially relevant to elucidate, by contrast, the specificity of phronēsis. 
This is developed later when Aristotle distinguishes phronēsis from cleverness 
(deinotēs), the unqualified cleverness or skill to choose the right means to achieve 
an end90. For Aristotle, euboulia―the deliberation of a phronimos―leads to take (a) 
the effective means for achieving (b) a good end, in such a way that (a) without 
consideration of (b) does not describe the deliberation of phronēsis, but of deinotēs, 
which is a skill present in a villain as well as in a phronimos:  
There is a faculty which is called cleverness (deinotēs); and this is such as to be able to 
do the things that tend towards the mark (skopos) that we have set before us and hit 
it. Now if the mark be noble (kalos), the cleverness is laudable, but if the mark be bad 
(phaulos), the cleverness is mere villainy; hence we call clever both phronimoi and vil-
lains. Phronēsis is not the faculty [of cleverness], but it does not exist without this fac-
ulty” (VI 12, 1144a 23ff).  
The good deliberation of phronēsis, therefore, has something that the good 
deliberation of deinotēs does not have: it points to an excellence that transcends the relation 
between ends and means here and now91, although it is only ‘realized’ in this relation here and 
now92. In order to grasp its structure, we should first dwell on the relation between 
ends here and now, following Aristotle’s maxim that we should start from things 
that are easier to know for us93.  
                                               
89 Aristotle furnishes a third case excluded from excellence in deliberation: attaining what one ought to 
do but only after long deliberation (b26) 
90 Cf. NE VI 12, 1144a 23ff. 
91 Cf. NE VI 5, 1140a 25ff, where Aristotle characterizes the phronimos as the one who is able “to 
deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect (...) but about 
what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general (pros to eu zēn holōs)”. 
92 Broadie’s firm prevention against the idea of a ‘grand end’ directing actions in Aristotle’s Ethics is 
very enlightening in this respect. Cf. BROADIE, S. esp. pp. 196 ff. and 238 ff. 
93 Cf. NE I 6, 1095b 2ff; EE I 6, 1216b 26ff.  
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Many commentators agree that, if we are to understand phronēsis, ends and 
means have to be understood as a kind of dynamic unity94. In other words, we 
have to be forewarned about the risk of applying modern separations to 
Aristotle’s distinctions. Aristotle’s frequent way of alluding to means as referred to 
ends, i.e. ‘what leads to the end’ (ta pros to telos) is very significant of this connec-
tion95. Deliberating is dealing with ends in terms of means, and acting is setting 
means as ends in view of a subsequent end, so that there is not such a thing as an end 
conceived of independently from the means that leads to it, as much as there is not such a thing as 
a means that is not oriented towards an end. Even happiness has to be conceived of as 
happiness here and now in order to point to happiness as a life-project96. Broadie 
expresses accurately this dependence of means on ends that Plato had already 
noted97:  
The person did X-for-the-sake-of-Y rather than merely X, the doing of which would 
be explained by reference to something outside that doing, e.g. a desire for Y (...). We 
ask «Why are you doing X?» because “doing X” does not describe the whole item 
(...). Mentioning Y reveals what choice the agent makes in choosing X. It reveals the 
real nature of the project98. 
Indeed, as Aristotle puts it, “if the mark be noble (kalos), the cleverness is 
laudable, but if the mark be bad (phaulos), the cleverness is mere villainy” (VI 12, 
1144a 26f). But his perspective is wider, because he also stresses the converse 
dependence of ends on means: “excellence makes the choice right, but the things 
                                               
94 “The unique and identical object that thought states and that desire pursuits is neither the means 
isolated from the end, nor the end separated from the means: it is the means-through-the-end or the 
end-through the means” (GJ II pp. 447-448). Vigo speaks of the “intentional complex object 
compounded by end and means” (VIGO, A. “La concepción aristotélica de la verdad práctica” in 
Vigo, A. 2006b p. 308). Cf. also DUNNE, J. Back to the Rough Ground. ‘Phronesis’ and ‘Technē’ in Modern 
Philosophy and in Aristotle Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993 p. 272; NATALI, C. 
1984, and 2001 pp. 39-61; BROADIE, S. pp. 179 ff. 
95 Cf. also e.g. NE III 3, 1112b 12, 33f; III 5, 1113b 4; VI 9, 1142b 30-34; VI 12, 1144a 24f. 
96 Cf. CHATEAU, J.-Y. 1997 pp. 228 ff. “The deliberation of phronēsis (...) is not a determination of 
what the end is (happiness), nor of what happiness is from a theoretical point of view, but a 
determination of what happiness is here and now”. 
97 Cf. Gorgias 426 c-d. 
98 BROADIE, S. pp. 180-183. 
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which should naturally be done to carry out our choice belongs not to excellence 
but to another faculty” (1144a 20ff). Paraphrasing Broadie, the person searched Y-
through-X rather than merely Y, the search of which could be explained by refer-
ence to something outside that searching, e.g. doing X. We ask ‘How will you get 
Y?’ because ‘getting Y’ does not describe the whole item. Mentioning X reveals 
what kind of end the agent searches by searching Y. It reveals the real nature of 
the project.  
Therefore, while Aristotle assumes Plato’s point that means are not mor-
ally neutral insofar as they are always defined by their end, he also emphasizes the 
opposite dependence. And this he does not only because an end shall not be 
reached unless the necessary means to attain it are found but, much more fundamen-
tally, because the end cannot be given a moral character independently from the means through 
which it is attained. The end, settled as it is before starting deliberation, is in fact 
‘realized’ by the choice of the means99. Furthermore, that this intertwinement be-
tween ends and means is not just a conceptual requirement is shown by the fact 
that within a course of actions what now is an end may subsequently become a 
means: 
in each deliberation process a certain end is assumed, and there is no deliberation 
anymore about it in that deliberation process (...). This does not avoid that, in a new con-
text of deliberation, one may deliberate on that end [as a mean C.A.], relating it to a 
superior end100. 
What this observation helps us understand is that Aristotle ultimately does 
not hold that we cannot deliberate about ends, but rather that each deliberation is 
already settled within an orientation, so that the ends we deliberate about are means ordered to an 
                                               
99 Thus, means are anything but neutral, which is precisely an anticipated challenge to machiavellism 
(pace Aubenque, who considers Aristotle not to have dealt with such an idea: cf. PRA p. 136). Höffe is 
also of the opinion that a “machiavellian prudence” is considered by Aristotle in NE VI 12, 1144a 23ff. 
(cf. note 90 and HÖFFE, O. Aristotle Albany: SUNY, 2003 p. 140).  
100 VIGO, A. 2006b p. 306. That is what Aristotle means when he says that “if we are to be always 
deliberating, we shall have to go on to infinity” (NE III 3, 1113a 1f). A similar point is made by Natali: 
“At every stage it is possible to redefine the means found, considering it as the end of a still more 
specific means. Thus the end/means distinction is relative” (NATALI, C. 2001 p. 81). 
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end: “no one deliberates about what cannot be otherwise, nor about things which have 
not an end (...)” (VI 7, 1141b 10f). This does not entail that we are necessarily tied 
to our orientation, but surely that we do not depart from an aimless state: 
“intellect itself (...) moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and 
is practical” (VI 2, 1139a 35f). 
As was the case with the call into question of Socrates’ identification of 
phronēsis and ethical virtue101, it does make a difference to keep the distinction between ends 
and means, in order to understand deliberation properly, i.e. accounting for its being always set-
tled within an orientation, and framed within the temporal distension of human life. However, 
Aristotle’s emphasis on this distinction has originated a probably unnecessary 
controversy, of which Gauthier and Aubenque are perhaps the outstanding repre-
sentatives. Their diverging opinions provide conflicting translations of a passage 
of NE VI 9: “Excellence in deliberation will be correctness with regard to what 
conduces to the end of which practical wisdom (phronēsis) is the true apprehen-
sion” (1142b 32f). Ross’ translation is open to both theses: either Gauthier’s, who 
holds that phronēsis is the true apprehension of the end, or Aubenque’s, who holds 
that phronēsis is the true apprehension of what leads to the end102. We agree with 
Gauthier that emphasizing the role of virtue in the determination of ends to the 
point of reducing phronēsis to an instrumental deliberation would leave phronēsis in 
the hands of virtues, against Aristotle’s point that phronēsis is essential to the genesis 
of virtues103. However, Gauthier’s effort to give back to phronēsis a voice in the 
determination of the ends almost reduces the role of virtue to a mechanical acti-
vation of what phronēsis orders: “if virtue is necessary, it is not at all to know the 
                                               
101 Cf. p. 18 above. 
102 Cf. “Compte-rendu de l’ouvrage de P. Aubenque sur La Prudence chez Aristote” Revue des Études 
Grecques 76 (1963) pp. 265-268 ; AUBENQUE, P. “La prudence aristotélicienne porte-t-elle sur la fin 
ou sur les moyens?” Revue des Études Grecques 78 (1965) pp. 40-51. 
103 NE II, 1106b 35ff: “Excellence, then, is a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to 
us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the phronimos would determine it”. 
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end, but to do it”(!)104. Neither of these accounts does justice, to our mind, to 
Aristotle’s view; and it is mainly due to a misunderstanding of the articulation 
between ends and means, intimately tied to that between orexis and dianoia within 
phronēsis105. 
This dialectic or ‘transaction’ between ends and means turns on Aristotle’s 
statement that “the end of an action is relative to the occasion (kata ton kairon)” 
(III 1, 1110a 13): it is in the now of the action that ends and means converge. That 
Aristotle does not conceive this in an utilitarian way is made clear by the fact that 
he regards the deliberation proper to phronēsis as irreducible to that of the deinotēs. 
What makes a difference, we have stated, is a principle regulating those 
transactions of ends and means, making sure that they are also right from the point 
of view of an excellence that transcends the relation between ends and means here 
and now, albeit it is only realized in this relation here and now106. However, how is 
this to take place? How can a principle that is beyond the occasion become a principle relative 
to the occasion? Aristotle provides an answer for this, as Chateau has shown by 
underlining the relevance of NE III to an understanding of book VI107. The 
principle is not, properly speaking, beyond the occasion, but rather already 
operating beneath it. 
                                               
104 GJ II p. 577. Aubenque, for his part, adopts a difficult intermediate position. He rightly objects to 
Gauthier’s intellectualistic picture, but he is not comfortable either with a merely instrumentalist 
conception of phronēsis. We believe that the controversy is due to a separation of ends and means that 
does not reflect Aristotle’s articulation of these concepts. This is also Chateau’s view, who envisions 
the controversy as a quarrel between isolated passages seen in the light of one or the other interpretive 
thesis, highlighting or moving passages into the shade to convenience of it (cf. CHATEAU, J.-Y. 1997 
p. 198). 
105 “Such is then the status of the question with the peculiar object of prudence. It is an inescapable 
question, and indeed an insoluble one, insofar as it is posed as an alternative between ends and means” 
(RODRIGO, Pierre Aristote, l’eidétique et la phénoménologie Grenoble: Millon, 1995 p. 130). 
106 Cf. NE VI 5, 1140a 25ff. and note 91. 
107 Cf. CHATEAU, J.-Y. 1997 pp. 198 ff. 
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1.5. Intelligent Desire 
NE III starts with an analysis of voluntary and involuntary acts, after which 
Aristotle turns to choice, and it is here that we find the statement, quoted above, 
that deliberation does not devote itself to ends but to means. The same is stated 
of choice (proairesis): while “wish relates rather to the end, choice [relates] to what 
contributes to the end” (III 2, 1111b 26f). Choice, of course, is also a fundamentally 
rational operation: “Those who say that it is appetite or anger or wish or a kind of 
opinion do not seem to be right. For choice is not common to irrational creatures 
as well, but appetite and anger are” (1111b 10ff). However, does Aristotle actually 
succeed in holding together the orectical reference to the end with the rationality 
of choice? We believe that Chateau is right in pointing to this text as the key for 
an answer108: 
The end, then, being what we wish for, [and] the things contributing to the end what 
we deliberate about and choose, actions concerning the latter must be according to 
choice and voluntary. Now the exercise of the excellences is concerned with these. 
Therefore excellence also is in our power, and so too vice (...). Now if it is in our power 
to do noble or base acts, and likewise in our power not to do them, and this was what being 
good and bad meant, then it is in our power to be virtuous or vicious (III 5, 1113b 2-13). 
What can be inferred from this is that, inasmuch as choice is caused by 
orexis, the way in which orexis itself desires later on is caused in its turn by the 
present choice: it is with our actions that we carve out our character (ēthos). 
Against those who say that “all men aim at the apparent good, but have no 
control over how things appear (phainesthai) to [them]”, Aristotle replies that “if 
each man is somehow responsible for the state he is in, he will also be himself 
somehow responsible for how things appear” (III 5, 1114b 2f). Therefore, it remains 
that we are always already oriented, but not because of a fate that is not ours to 
decide upon, but most fundamentally because of our previous decisions. And this 
orientation does not only imply an irrational desire, but also, inseparably, a desire 
                                               
108 Cf. CHATEAU, J.-Y. 1997 pp. 208 ff. 
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emerging from an understanding of reality. That is why, following a Platonic 
intuition109, Aristotle says that “vice is destructive of the principle” (VI 5, 1140b 
19f)110. Or, in other words, we are responsible even for the end of our actions111.  
Therefore, lying under the determination of ends that is proper to a chain 
of deliberations112, be it that of deinotēs or that of phronēsis, there is not only contin-
gency in the sense of what one cannot control (what the Greeks called tychē) but 
also a deeper momentum of human action: another level of determination which precedes our 
deliberations as well as it is derived from them, that of orexis. However, whereas it is in 
our power to be vicious or virtuous, “it does not follow that if [one] wishes he will 
cease to be unjust and will be just. For neither does the man who is ill become 
well on those terms” (III 5, 1114a 12ff). The statement that we cannot deliberate 
about what cannot be otherwise113 is thus applied also to the changing domain of 
human actions: to a certain extent we cannot immediately reverse the way in 
which we wish right now, because that is the result of the kind of person we have 
come to be with our previous decisions114. If we manage, as it were, to wish 
against our base wishes in a given moment, it is only because there were already in 
our being some forces which we have been able to retrieve now. If, in spite of our 
effort, we cannot, it is only because ēthos is a state, a dynamis that requires time to 
be developed and time to be changed115. 
                                               
109 Cf. note 24. 
110 Cf. also VII 8, 1151a 14ff. 
111 Cf. CHATEAU, J.-Y. 1997 p. 208. 
112 Cf. note 100. 
113 Cf. NE VI 7, 1141b 10f. 
114 Cf. NE VI 2, 1139b 5ff: “Nothing that is past is an object of choice, e.g. no one chooses to have 
sacked Troy; for no one deliberates about the past, but about what is future and contingent, while what 
is past is not capable of not having taken place”. Analogously, the ēthos with which we face a choice 
here and now is a given―to put it in a Heideggerian term, it is facticity. 
115 Aubenque’s connection of morality and finitude is opportune here too (cf. note 22). 
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Right after this analysis in NE III, Aristotle undertakes the task of 
exploring ethical virtues, which occupies him until book VI. His first approach to 
choice in the latter shows clear signs of the continuity outlined by Chateau 
between both books, and introduces subsequent concepts: 
The origin of action―its efficient, not its final cause―is choice, and that of choice is 
desire and reasoning with a view to an end (…). Intellect itself, however, moves 
nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical (...). [F]or good 
action (eupraxia) is an end (telos), and desire (orexis) aims at this. Hence choice is either 
desiderative thought or intellectual desire, and such a principle (archē) is man (orektikos 
nous hē proairesis ē orexis dianoetikē, kai hē toiautē archē anthrōpos) (VI 2, 1139a 31 - b5)116. 
Aristotle’s well-known way of formulating that choice is “either desidera-
tive thought or intellectual desire”, with this exchange of substantives and adjec-
tives, can well be regarded as a rhetorical way of emphasizing the circularity be-
tween desire and intelligence, orexis and dianoia. However, we suggest reading this 
formula as a structural explanation of this circularity. Leandri hints at this in his 
comment of this passage:  
The symmetry of the conclusive formula (...) [shows that] both connections must be 
maintained jointly: on the one hand, a desire that is not penetrated by thought is not 
a source of an action (...); on the other, thought without desire does not produce any 
action on its own (...) which enables us to conclude «so the preferential choice can be 
said indifferently to be either desiderative thought or intellectual desire»117.  
Our nuance to Leandri is that “if both connections must be maintained 
jointly”, then the point is not that they can be applied ‘indifferently’ to choice, but 
that it is the conjunction of them that defines choice. “Intelligent desire” (orexis dianoetikē) 
and “desiderative thought” (orektikos nous) are rather two elements of choice that find 
each other (cf. the figure below), in such a way that thought and desire are both 
present throughout all the process. A passage of the EE quoted elsewhere 
suggests this reading: “The end aimed at is (...) the starting-point of our thought, 
                                               
116 Mod. tr: cf. note 68. 
117 LEANDRI, A. “L’action et la vérité” in Chateau, J.-Y. (ed.) 1997 p. 51. This is also suggested by 
Chateau’s overall interpretation (cf. below). 
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[and] the end of our thought the starting-point of action”118. An orexis determined 
by the present situation and by the ēthos (or set of hexeis) of the agent ‘precedes’ 
choice because “intellect itself moves nothing”119 (not even choice). This desire 
activates intelligence of means (deliberation) and comes to terms with it, and 
subsequently ‘follows’ the conclusion of deliberation, i.e., it provides intelligence 
with the power to move, as desiderative thought. As an additional and necessary 
result, the initial ēthos is transformed120.  
 
 
                                               
118 EE II 11, 1227b 32-33. Cf. note 71. 
119 NE VI 2, 1139a 35f. 
120 What is developed here is analogous to what has been characterized on as ‘practical syllogism’ by 
many commentators. However, the parallelism of the practical syllogism with the theoretical one has 
provoked misunderstandings and unnecessary controversy, of which we do not intend to tackle the 
details here. On this issue, and on the relation between choice and action, cf. paragraph 2.5. below on 
the structure of practical truth. 
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Two points should be secured here: (i) that orexis is placed both before and 
after thought is far from meaning that the intellectual faculty is suspended before 
and after choice; and (ii) the fact that deliberation is placed in the center does not 
mean that the desiderative faculty is suspended while one is deliberating (the 
dotted line in the figure suggests the inner connection of both moments). As for 
(i), insofar as the moving orexis comes to an agreement with reason, it is not an 
irrational orexis, but that of a rational agent121: an ēthos determined to a greater or 
lesser extent by reason122, which is transformed throughout the process. The new 
ēthos that comes out is the reconfiguration of desire that will operate in subsequent 
deliberations. Moreover, (ii) if deliberation is a transformation of the desire from 
which it departs, it is because it comes to terms with it: desire is present throughout 
the deliberation process, in such a way that “it makes itself heard by intelligence”, 
as much as intelligence makes itself heard by it123. 
What is suggested, all in all, is a picture that shows desire and intelligence 
in a constant feedback, i.e. what Aristotle implies by his insistence that there is no 
phronēsis without aretē and vice versa: they are cooriginary, which implies that they are 
distinct, although they require each other to exist, like the organs of a living body; 
the organic paradigm prevails again124. The scheme, therefore, intends to explicate 
how an understanding of the mutual belongingness of desire and reason within 
                                               
121 While in NE VI Aristotle uses the generic term orexis for this agreement, in book III he chooses the 
term boulēsis, rational desire (cf. note 64) as distinct from epithumia, bodily appetite: “wish (boulēsis) 
relates rather to the end, choice (proairesis) to what contributes to the end” (III 2, 1111b 26f). Choice is 
defined some lines above by Aristotle as a typically rational activity (cf. b 7ff). 
122 Cf. NE II 6, 1106b 35ff. According to Aristotle’s definition of ethical virtue, the closer it is to the 
mean term, the more determined by reason it is. Insofar as it admits different degrees, the scheme 
accounts for defective cases of the use of reason; the fact remains, in any case, that the agent is 
rational, and precisely because of that his defective use of reason results in a further weakening of his 
reason. 
123 Cf. CHATEAU, J.-Y. 1997 pp. 221-222. 
124 Cf. p. 22 ff. Aretē without the know-how of phronēsis is not such, because it lacks the standard to 
reach the mean term that characterizes it; thus, NE II explains how for instance courage might result in 
temerity without an adequate calculation of circumstances (Cf. NE II 2). On the other hand, phronēsis 
cannot exist without virtue, because the right end is not evident except to the good man (Cf. NE VI 
12, 1144a 29-36; 13, 1144b 30ff; VII 8, 1151a 14ff). 
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human praxis requires an identification of the function of each one that does not 
tear the conjunction apart. If, in order to safeguard the rationality of the process, 
desire were reduced to the task of ‘activating’ action, as Gauthier suggests125, aretē 
would cease to be a constitutive part of phronēsis, because one could reach prudent 
conclusions without being virtuous, i.e. without having a right desire, which would 
clearly contradict Aristotle’s definition of phronēsis. Indeed, “in organic unities 
(symphysis) there is something identical in both parts, which makes them grow 
together instead of merely touching, and be one in respect of continuity and quantity, 
though not of quality”126. Aretē and phronēsis are parts of a continuous (syneches) and 
thus constitute one whole, they never exist or operate (which shall also prove to 
be one and the same thing) in isolation, but still they perform distinct functions. 
That is why, when Gauthier clings to Aristotle’s statement that phronēsis 
“determines the end” and aretē “makes us do the things that lead to the end” (VI 
13, 1145a 5f)127, he only reveals his intellectualistic understanding of phronēsis128, 
which is not Aristotle’s. This author wrongly interprets Aristotle’s distribution of 
functions in the characterization of the precise moment when action is to take 
place as a separation of phronēsis and aretē that openly contradicts Aristotle’s 
recurrent point that they require each other to exist: “it is impossible to be 
phronimos without ethikai aretai”129. Which implies that at the time when phronēsis is 
uttered in this passage, Aristotle is actually considering it as an aretē. Thus, when 
phronēsis is said to determine the end, what is meant is that, through the 
agreement130 between logos and orexis, phronēsis, the good state of the practical part 
                                               
125 “[I]f virtue is necessary, it is not at all to know the end, but to do it” GJ II p. 577. 
126 Met. V 4, 1014b 23ff. 
127 Cf. note 87 above. 
128 Furthermore, his interpretation cannot account for the fact that a few lines above Aristotle says that 
“aretē makes the aim right, and phronēsis the things leading to it” (cf. NE VI 12, 1144a 8f). 
129 NE VI 12, 1144a 36f. Cf. also references in note 124 above. 
130 Cf. NE VI 2, 1139a 30f. 
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of rationality, reaches at the same time the truth of the means and the rectitude of the end. Or 
more precisely, it reaches the rightness or rectitude of the end through the truth of 
the means, i.e. those things ordered to the attainment of the end (ta pros to telos). 
This, as has been stated, is achieved through a transformation of the right end 
provided by orexis, which consists in realizing the end with means. It is in this 
respect that phronēsis can be said to determine the end: not independently from 
virtue, i.e. according to “the highest practical good for man” (VI 7, 1141b 12f)131. 
This (i) organic relation between phronēsis and aretē on which we have been 
insisting is importantly intertwined with the thesis (ii) on the unity of virtues at the 
end of NE VI. One has to note how the argument proceeds from (i) to (ii) and 
subsequently integrates both theses: 
“It is clear, then, from what we have said, (i) that it is not possible to be good 
(agathon) in the strict sense without phronēsis, nor phronimos without ēthikai aretai. But (ii) 
in this way we may also refute the dialectical argument whereby it might be contended 
that the excellences exist in separation from each other (chōrizontai allēlōn)132; the same man, 
it might be said, is not best equipped by nature for all the excellences (...). This is 
possible in respect of the natural excellences (physikai aretai), but not in respect of 
those in respect of which a man is called without qualification good; for (i+ii) with 
the being (hyparchein) of the one quality, phronēsis, will be given at once (hama) all the 
excellences”133  
Only once it has been established that aretai are given simultaneously 
(hama) with phronēsis can we understand why Aristotle states that aretē “makes us 
do the things that lead to the end”. It is aretē as a constitutive part of phronēsis that 
leads the phronimos to act, which explains why action is intrinsic to phronēsis. 
Gauthier is then right in holding that virtue leads us to act, but he is wrong in 
depicting it, with the view to ensuring the role of phronēsis in the settlement of 
ends, as extrinsic to it. Only by observing aretē as intrinsic to phronēsis―and we 
                                               
131 Mod. tr: Ross’ translation is accurate, but too intricate: “...aiming in accordance with calculation at 
the best for man of things attainable by action”. 
132 The occurrence of this expression in this context importantly weakens the validity of separations 
either of means and ends or phronēsis and aretē described above, to the benefit of this organic paradigm. 
133 NE VI 13, 1144b 30 – 1145a 2, mod. tr. 
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expect to have shown that Aristotle holds this to be so―is the circle of human 
praxis accounted for, gathering together actions, orexis and dianoia in a practical 
agent. 
1.6. Community or the Missing Link 
Our preceding argument has shown that Aristotle’s account of the circularity of 
human praxis necessarily includes choice. Out of this the question arises, con-
cerning the beginning of intelligent desire in human life: if it does not come from 
previous choices, because there is no use of reason for that, where and how is it 
originated? Aristotle’s clear framing of the NE within a wider project that includes 
the book known as the Politics134, provides the answer. Man is born in a commu-
nity, and this community is his departing point135. It is social transmission that 
provides the intelligence for the desire of those who still do not have intelli-
gence―which does nothing but reinforce Aristotle’s stress on the irreducibility of 
orexis. 
The missing link is, therefore, education. Here an important trend of con-
tinuity between Aristotle and Plato is shown again136, which has been referred to 
                                               
134 Cf. I 2 and X 9. “It is surprising―Marías argues―to see the extent to which the interpretations of 
the ethical works of Aristotle tend to neglect its connection with the Politics, in spite of the 
extraordinary explicitness with which it is underscored in the texts (...). This connection is generally 
enunciated, but later cast aside, so that it is of no help to the understanding of the NE. I believe to the 
contrary that only an approach of both can be fruitful (...)” (MARÍAS, J. “Introducción” to Aristotle, 
Ética a Nicómaco p. xvii). Bodéüs, considers it a capital error to “regard Aristotle’s Ethics as an attempt 
to contribute to «the moral formation of the individual» considered in isolation from society” (Cf. 
BODÉÜS, R. 1994 p. 42).  
135 Cf. Politics I 1, 1253 a 3-5. Cf. VIGO, A. 1996 p. 306: “In the world of praxis there is no such a thing 
as a zero point from which the agent could start without the load of the past (...). The praxis subject 
lives right from the beginning as a member of a society”.  
136 Cf. refs. in note 33. “Plato expressly states his conviction that at the earliest age the totality of 
character is basically determined by habit (...). Hence the importance reserved in [Laws] for education 
defined as the primary acquisition of virtue in children. Plato started from the idea that those still 
incapable of reason must be trained to rule their appetites and their aversions by rational norms whose 
rationality they will later acknowledge (...). Aristotle decisively adopts the same perspective regarding 
both the nature of primary education and the importance of laws”. (BODÉÜS, R. 1994. pp. 48-49). 
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above: Aristotle alludes to his teacher, who understands good education as an or-
dering of our desire that leads us “to delight in and to be pained by the things that 
we ought, for this is the right education” (II 3, 1104b 12f). This goal is given high 
political priority in the Politics: “No one will doubt that the legislator should direct 
his attention above all to the education of youth”137. And education is primarily 
understood in the same terms as in the NE:  
And as the body is prior in order of generation to the soul, the irrational is prior to 
the rational. Anger and wishing and desire are implanted in children from their very 
birth, but reason and understanding are developed as they grow older. For this rea-
son, the care of the body ought to precede that of the soul, and the training of the 
appetitive part should follow: nonetheless our care of it must be for the sake of 
reason, and our care of the body for the care of the soul138. 
This statement has a continuity in Aristotle’s repeated warning that only 
those who are already directed to the good will benefit from the study of the 
NE139. Which implies that the first principles of good praxis are not ultimately to 
be provided by the theoretical discourse of this treatise, but by a previous state of 
affairs: the character (ēthos) “must somehow be there already with a kinship to 
excellence (oikeion tēs aretēs), loving what is noble and hating what is base” (X 9, 
1179b 29ff). Bodéüs has rightly stressed this point:  
“[I]f Aristotelian prudence were the excellence activated by the philosopher who 
argues (...), then that would mean that this virtue is acquired just when one becomes 
a philosopher and also that the philosopher’s teaching produces this intellectual 
virtue”140. 
The primacy of moral education as the good direction of desire, i.e. as a 
transmission of dispositions (hexeis) and not just of theoretical knowledge about 
the good, is crucial to Aristotle’s characterization of the practical nature of 
                                               
137 Politics VIII 1, 1337a 10f. 
138 Politics VII 1, 1334b 20ff. Cf. note 33. 
139 Cf. NE I 3, 1095a 10f. Cf. also X 9, 1179b 23ff. 
140 BODÉÜS, R. 1994 p. 30.  
 40 
phronēsis. If the first practical principles could be grasped without mediation of 
desire, the intimate link between phronēsis and ethical virtues would be missed. 
The references to politics in NE I 2 and X 9 are significant of this continu-
ity. At the start, Aristotle subsumes ‘ethics’ in the wider discipline of ‘politics’, 
which “legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, [so 
that] the end of this science must include those of the others, [and] this end must 
be the good for man (anthrōpinon agathon)” (I 2, 1094b 5ff). Eventually, at the very 
end of the NE, Aristotle announces his plan to analyze legislation and 
constitutions “in order to complete to the best of our ability the philosophy of 
human things (ta anthropeia philosophia teleiōthē)”141. The articulation of these 
passages has generated a wide debate in which we do not intend to enter here142. 
To retain the crucial point, extensively shown by Bodéüs, there is not such a thing 
in Aristotle as “an ethical inquiry which is not political” nor a political science 
which could do without Ethics143. The political dimension is as essential to praxis 
as the ‘orectical’ one. Such is the reach of Aristotle’s categorization of man as a 
political animal (politikon zōon) by nature144: 
The social dimension is always already given in a praxis subject (...). The fiction of an 
individual in pre-social conditions, however relevant it may have become for certain 
modern conceptions of the state, does not play any role in Aristotle. But that is no 
wonder. Quite on the contrary, it can be presumed that such a theoretical assumption 
would be misleading insofar as it tends to ignore and cover a priori the moment of 
facticity that is constitutive of the world of praxis145. 
                                               
141 NE X 9, 1181b 15, mod. tr: Ross renders ta anthropeia as ‘human nature’. We follow here Marías’ 
translation. 
142 A quite complete account of this debate is provided by RODRIGO, P. 2006 p. 8 ff. 
143 BODÉÜS, R. 1994 p. 39 (cf. also esp. 39ff. and 59-63). Rodrigo holds that only the refusal to 
identify the “philosophy of human things” with either ethics or politics as mutually exclusive enables to 
understand their articulation, which is based primarily on the concept of education rather than on that 
of architectony. (RODRIGO, P. 2006 pp. 19-20, 26). Cf. also BERTI, E. “Phronēsis et science 
politique” in Aubenque, P. et al (eds.) 1993 pp. 435-459. 
144 Cf. Politics I 1, 1253a 2f. 
145 VIGO, A. 1996 p. 307. Cf. also RIEDEL, M. “Über einige Aporien in der Praktischen Philosophie 
des Aristoteles” in Riedel, M (ed.) 1972 (vol. 1) p. 84: “[T]he term praxis refers as much to the 
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Analogously to what has been observed with other issues above, the 
misunderstandings concerning the relation between ethics and politics in Aristotle 
might be primarily due to the application of a modern concept of politics alien to 
the organic continuity between man and society that leads Aristotle to envision ethics and politics 
as belonging to one and the same project, namely “the philosophy of human things”146:  
A city can be excellent only when the citizens who have a share in the government 
are excellent, and in our state all the citizens share in the government; let us then 
inquire how a man becomes excellent. For even if we could suppose the citizen body 
to be excellent, without each of them being so, yet the latter would be better, for in 
the excellence of each the excellence of all is involved147. 
Summing up, this conception of politics appears to confirm the pertinence 
of the organic paradigm which we have suggested to explain the relation between 
aretē and phronēsis148. Inasmuch as man needs society to become who he is, society 
needs man to become what it is. Man, who is not only the result of a given 
political-cultural background but much more fundamentally a result of the community of 
reason and desire that he himself is. And it is this inner community that, for better or 
worse, shapes the polis no less than it is shaped by it. 
                                                                                                                                 
individual as to the polis; to the polis insofar as it requires the activity of its citizens to realize its telos, to 
the individual so far as he himself is as a human being the principle of his actions and has a share in 
this telos”. 
146 “Politics is more comprehensive than ethics and superior to it, because the political space is 
extensively wider and includes the ethical one. But in both cases it is about a practical space shaped by 
the behavior of man, as an individual and as a citizen” (BASTONS, M. 2003 p. 52). 
147 Politics VII 13, 1332a 33ff. Cf. also VII 3, 1325b 30ff: “[I]t is evident that the same life is best for 
each individual, and for states and for mankind collectively”. 
148 Trendelenburg also makes extensive to politics the organic paradigm that he suggests for ethics (Cf. 
TRENDELENBURG, A. § 19) 
2. Energeia and the Irreducibility of Praxis 
 
At the beginning of NE VI Aristotle reminds the reader of a previous distinction 
between excellences of character (aretai tou ēthous) and excellences of intellect (aretai 
tēs dianoias)149: the former having engaged him since book III, he now turns to the 
latter. Following the logic of Aristotle’s argument, we have been analyzing the 
relation between aretai tou ēthous and phronēsis, the excellence of the rational part of 
the soul that is intimately connected with ēthos. We must now proceed in the 
determination of the structure of phronēsis by analyzing its articulation with the 
other excellences of intellect. Specially important is in this respect Aristotle’s 
effort to distinguish phronēsis from craft (technē), since the distinction is not only at 
the heart of Aristotle’s ethics and ontology but also of Heidegger’s appropriation 
of his philosophy. 
2.1. Realizing Truth 
Aristotle’s analysis of the excellences of intellect is preceded by some remarks on 
the soul. After distinguishing a rational and an irrational part in it, he makes a 
decisive distinction within the rational part of the soul, concerning the objects it 
deals with, i.e. “the things whose principles cannot be otherwise” on the one 
hand, and “those variable” on the other150. Richardson Lear grasps well what 
Aristotle means by the latter: “[those] things I could bring about”151. This includes 
“both things made and things done” (VI 4, 1140a 1f), i.e. the objects of poiēsis and 
                                               
149 Cf. NE VI 1, 1138b 35f; NE I 13, 1103a 4f. 
150 Cf. NE VI 1, 1139a 6ff. 
151 RICHARDSON LEAR, G. Happy Lives and the Highest Good. An Essay on Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004 p. 100. 
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those of praxis, which are the activities (energeiai) or uses (chrēseis)152 of technē and 
phronēsis, both to be found in an initial list of five states (hexeis): 
Let it be assumed that the states by virtue of which the soul alētheuei by way of 
affirmation or denial are five in number, i.e., art (technē), knowledge (epistēmē), practical 
wisdom (phronēsis), philosophical wisdom (sophia), comprehension (nous); for belief 
and opinion may be mistaken (VI 4, 1139b 15ff). 
It is not easy to translate the verb alētheuein―obviously concerned with 
truth (alētheia)―without leveling its richness, all the more since it is here predicated 
of so many different dispositions. That is after all a central tenet of the philosophy 
of Heidegger, who in one of his early courses is reluctant to translate alētheuein153 
on the grounds that alētheia “conforms rather to beings themselves, and not to a 
determinate concept of scientificity”154. The appreciation is worth mentioning 
here as a sensible methodological precaution: according to this passage of the NE, 
it seems appropriate to understand that the concept of ‘truth’ is wider for Aristotle 
than that of theoretical truth, if it is said to be realized through five different 
dispositions, among which phronēsis or technē are to be counted155. Sparshott 
suggests translating alētheuein as “getting things true”156, which improves the rather 
objectivist translation provided by Ross: “to possess truth”. Greenwood suggests 
“to reach truth”157, but this seems not to reflect well enough Aristotle’s point that 
truth adopts different shapes because of its intertwinedness with the soul (psychē). 
                                               
152 There is a conceptual vicinity in Aristotle between chrēsis and energeia. Yet, Hagen goes too far in 
considering them as synonims (Cf. HAGEN, C. T. “The Energeia-Kinesis Distinction and Aristotle’s 
Conception of Praxis” Journal of the History of Philosophy 23/3 (1984) p. 272). 
153 Cf. GA 19 Platon: Sophistes (WS 1924-25) Ed. by Ingeborg Schüßler, 1992 [Plato’s Sophist Translated 
by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer, IU Press, 1997] § 3a, p. 17 [12]. 
154 Ibidem § 4a, p. 24 [17] Alētheia “richtet sich vielmehr nach dem Seienden selbst und nicht nach einem 
bestimmten Begriff von Wissenschaftlichkeit”. 
155 Rodrigo agrees with Heidegger that the inclusion of these dispositions is a solid reason to suspect 
easy translations such as “énoncer ce qui est vrai” (Tricot) or “dire vrai” (Gauthier-Jolif).  (Cf. 
RODRIGO, P. 2006 p. 144).  
156 Cf. SPARSHOTT, F. E. Taking Life Seriously. A Study of the Argument of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994, p. 206. 
157 Nicomachean Ethics Book Six with Essays, Notes and Translation by L. H. G. Greenwood. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1909. 
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Marías, finally, suggests “realizing truth”, carrying it out―which must not be 
understood as ‘producing’ truth, since alētheuein would then be assimilated to one 
of its senses and would acquire a subjectivist connotation that is alien to Aristotle. 
‘To realize truth’ takes into account on the one hand the idea of a finding 
(Aristotle speaks elsewhere of touching or hitting truth158) and on the other the 
fact that this finding takes place in the relation of the psychē with beings. The idea 
of ‘realizing’, which has been used already before concerning ends and means159, 
sets itself in the vicinity of one of Heidegger’s proposals of translation for 
alētheuein, namely ‘being true’ or ‘being in the truth’160. 
(ii) The five states by virtue of which the soul realizes truth are not 
necessarily equally fundamental, i.e. there could be a hierarchy between them. 
Given the placement of this text in NE VI, the eventual development of the 
argument and the verb used (estō, ‘let it be assumed’), Gauthier considers that this 
list of five hexeis does not render Aristotle’s final view but that of a prevailing 
opinion of the time161. Only two of these states, namely sophia and phronēsis, will 
eventually be granted the title of intellectual virtues of the two sides in the rational 
part of the soul162. Sparsott synthesizes this as follows: 
[Aristotle] gets rid of three of the five candidates, one by subordination and two by 
subsumption. The elimination has a certain untidiness. On the one hand, art is 
excluded from good sense, whereas intuition and knowledge are included in wisdom163. 
                                               
158 Touching, contacting (thigein) truth: Cf. Met. IX 10, 1051b 24f; Hitting, attaining what is good: 
tygchanein NE VI 9, 1142b 25. Gadamer’s translation of alētheuein in VI 4, 1139b 15ff. follows this 
thread: ‘to hit truth’ (“Die Wege, auf denen die Seele (...) die Wahrheit trifft”) GADAMER, Hans-
Georg Nikomachische Ethik VI. Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt 1998. 
159 Cf. p. 26 above. 
160 GA 19 § 4a (p. 23 [16]) “Wahrsein, In-der-Wahrheit-sein”. 
161 Cf. GJ II pp. 450-452. 
162 For Gauthier’s argument, cf. GJ II pp. 453 ff. Cf. also CHATEAU, J.-Y. 1997 pp. 190-191; AQM p. 
151; JOACHIM, H. H. Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics (edited by D.A. Rees) Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1955 pp. 192 ff. 
163 SPARSHOTT, F.E. p. 206. 
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The ‘subsumption’ of nous and epistēmē under sophia does not create many 
difficulties for Aristotle, and he does not either linger too much on it, because it is 
not central to his argument here. As for phronēsis and technē, their relation is far 
more complex, insofar as the determination of what it means for technē to be 
‘subordinated’ to phronēsis concerns in turn the characterization of praxis, the 
relevance of which is most visible in the equation of eupraxia with the center of 
gravity of Aristotle’s enterprise, eudaimonia: “happiness [is] a sort of living and 
faring well (eu zēn kai eu prattein)” (I 8, 1098b 20f)164. The equation actually includes 
a third term coming from the Metaphysics, energeia: “we identify the end (telos) [of 
human life] with certain actions and activities (praxeis tines kai energeiai), for thus it 
falls among goods of the soul (peri psychēn agathōn) and not among external goods” 
(I 8, 1098b 18ff)165.  
When Aristotle suggests that “it makes, perhaps, no small difference 
whether we place the chief good in possession (ktēsis) or use (chrēsis), in state 
(hexis) or in activity (energeia)” (1098b 31ff), he is in fact retrieving a distinction 
that, as different authors convincingly show, he learnt from Plato166. As a matter 
of fact, in the Euthydemus Socrates distinguishes, in the context of a discussion on 
happiness, possessing goods (kektēsthai―to have acquired) from holding or using 
them (chrēsthai)167. Further, in the Theaetetus he speaks of a passive and an active 
sense of hexis: in the same way that one can either have a coat as a possessor 
(kektēmenos) or have it (echein) in the sense of wearing it, knowledge can be either 
just possessed, or also had in the active sense, i.e. used168. 
                                               
164 On the connection between eudaimonia and eupraxia cf. also NE I 8, 1099a 2f; Politics VII 3, 1325a 
31f, 1325b 14f. 
165 On the connection of eudaimonia-eupraxia with energeia cf. also NE I 9, 1099b 26; I 10, 1100a 14; I 13, 
1102a 17; IX 9, 1169b 29-31; X 6, 1176b 1; X 7 1177a 10, Politics VII 8, 1328a 37f; VII 13, 1332a 9. 
166 Cf. SCHANKULA, H. S. A. “Plato and Aristotle: eudaimonia, hexis or energeia? Classical Philology 66 
(1971) pp. 244-246; YEPES, R. 1989 esp. pp. 97 ff. and RODRIGO, P. 2006 pp. 118 ff. 
167 Cf. Euthydemus 280d-e. 
168 Theaetetus 197a - 198a 5. 
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Dynamis and energeia constitute a further elaboration of this distinction in 
Aristotle, and are essential to the architecture of the main theses of the NE, where 
energeia and energein appear over a hundred times169, to refer not only to praxis and 
eupraxia, but also to the enactment of production (poiēsis)170, life (zōē)171 and pleas-
ure (hēdonē)172. It is then no wonder that already at the very outset of the NE a first 
veiled distinction between phronēsis and technē―and their respective enactments, 
praxis and poiēsis―turns on this concept173: 
[T]he good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain 
difference is found among ends (telē); some are activities (energeiai), others are prod-
ucts (erga) apart from the activities (energeiai) that produce them. Where there are ends 
apart from the actions (telē para tas praxeis), it is the nature of the products to be better 
than the activities (I 1, 1094a 2ff)174. 
The point will be retrieved later in NE VI: “while making (poiēsis) has an 
end other than itself, action (praxis) cannot; for good action itself is its end (esti gar 
autē he eupraxia telos)” (VI 5, 1140b 6f). The thought-provoking idea of praxis ‘being 
                                               
169 Yepes speaks of 142 times for energeia (Cf. YEPES, R. “Los sentidos del acto en Aristóteles” Anuario 
Filosófico 25/3 [1992] p. 509). As for the connection of energeia in the ethical treatises with that in the 
rest of Aristotle’s works, cf. AQM esp. pp. 453-509; JOACHIM, H. H. (relevant references to energeia 
throughout the commentary of the treatise); GRANT, A. 1865 pp. 181-201. 
170 Cf. NE I 1, 1094a 4; IX 7, 1168a 6f. 
171 Cf. e.g. NE I 7, 1098a 13; IX 7, 1168a 6; X 4, 1175a 12. 
172 Although in NE X 4 hēdonē is not explicitly called energeia by Aristotle―probably because he wants to 
emphasize that it accompanies other energeiai―he denies that it be a kinēsis (1174b 13) with arguments 
that parallel those in the contrast between energeia and kinēsis in 1048b. 
173 In subsequent references to this passage we assume that Aristotle refers here to poiēsis and praxis in 
spite of the fact that he does not use these specific terms. 
174 Joachim rightly explains why this passage is not incompatible with the sentence shortly below (a16-
18), which at first sight would seem to contradict it bluntly: “it makes no difference whether the 
activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activities, as in the 
case of the sciences just mentioned”. What follows immediately afterwards (a18-22) seems to increase 
the perplexity, but provides the solution: “If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we 
desire for its own sake (...) clearly this must be the good and the chief good”. We agree with Joachim 
that a16-18 refers to the examples that Aristotle provides of techniques subordinated to each other (a6-
16), for which such a distinction is not important (Cf. JOACHIM, H. H. p. 20). Within technē, the 
distinction between ends and means moves within a derivative dimension, as we have suggested above 
(cf. 2.2). Aristotle’s NE has a more fundamental scope, as is shown from a18 on, and the statement in 
a16-18 is intended to show that the hierarchy or teleology he is looking for points beyond the 
dimension of the relations described in a16-18. 
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its end’, ‘having the end in itself’ or, as the late Heidegger puts it, “having-itself-in-
its-end (Sich-im-Ende-Haben)”175, has an ontologic import that should not be 
overlooked―it points precisely to entelecheia, a term of Aristotle’s own coinage 
which is closely related to energeia in Metaphysics IX176. An in-depth elucidation of 
the structure of praxis and of the peculiar alētheuein of phronēsis requires then us to 
linger now on the conceptuality of that book of the Metaphysics, which we believe 
to have deep connections with the line of reasoning of the NE. 
2.2. Energeia: the Immediacy of Life 
Energeia is widely considered as a genuinely Aristotelian concept, and as one, if not 
the most, fundamental of his thought177. Yepes sets its birth in the Protrepticus 
where, he argues, it already appears “as a complete speculative discovery”178. Al-
though the concept permeates Aristotle’s entire work, “it is in the bio-psychologi-
cal field that energeia shows its greatest fecundity to explain phenomena related to 
life, knowledge and operation”179. 
In this respect, it is remarkable that Metaphysics IX 6, the only place of 
Aristotle’s works where a straightforward definition of energeia is provided, 
comprises a passage centered on phenomena related to human life (cf. 1048b 18-
35). Aristotle opens this text by referring to actions (praxeis), which makes it even 
more significant, given the exceptionality of this theme in the context of the 
                                               
175 “Vom Wesen und Begriff der Physis. Aristoteles Physik B 1” (1939) in GA 9 Wegmarken Ed. by 
Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann, 1996 (2nd edition) pp. 309-371, p. 354 [217] for ref. (pagination of 
the Klostermann Einzelausgabe, indicated in the margins. Hereafter WBP). 
176 Cf. Met. IX 3, 1047a 30f. and IX 8, 1050a 22f. Cf. also the comments in YEPES, R. 1989 p. 105; 
AQM pp. 453-454. 
177 Cf. e.g. DÜRING, I. p. 617; GRANT, A. 1865 p. 183; GAUTHIER, R.-A. p. 77; YEPES, R. 1992. 
We preferably use the term energeia instead of its different translations, such as ‘use’ or ‘activity’. We 
have also often replaced the translations for the Greek term in quotations. 
178 YEPES, R. 1992 p. 497 ff.; 1989 p. 95 ff. 
179 YEPES, R. 1992 p. 506. “One of the first applications of energeia in this field is the statement that 
«life is an energeia (zōē energeia tis esti)»” Cf. NE X 4, 1175a 12 (the cross-reference provided by Yepes is 
wrong). 
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Metaphysics180. The whole text has generated a wide debate and it is not by chance 
that our approach to Heidegger’s early interpretation of Aristotle hinges on it181. 
We quote it extensively to facilitate further references in this chapter and below: 
Since of the actions (praxeis) which have a limit (peras) none is an end (telos) but all are 
relative to the end, e.g. the process of making thin is of the sort, and the things them-
selves when one is making them thin are in movement (en kinēsei) in this way (i.e. 
without being already that at which the kinēsis aims), this is not an action (praxis) or at 
least not a fulfilled (teleia) one (for it is not an end); praxis is that in which the end is 
(enyparchein). E.g. at the same time (hama) we are seeing and have seen, are under-
standing and have understood, are thinking and have thought: but it is not true that 
at the same time we are learning and have learnt, or are cured and have been cured. 
At the same time we are living well and have lived well, and are happy and have been 
happy. If not, this event182 would have had some time to cease, as the process of 
making thin ceases (pauesthai): but, as it is, it does not cease; we are living and have 
lived. Of these events, then, we must call the one set kinēseis, and the other energeiai. 
For every kinēsis is imperfect (atelēs)―making thin, learning, walking, building; these 
are kinēseis, and imperfect ones. For it is not true that at the same time we are walking 
and have walked, or are building and have built, or are coming to be and have come 
to be―it is a different thing that is being moved and has been moved, and that is 
moving and that has moved; but it is the same thing that at the same time has seen 
and is seeing, or is thinking and has thought. The latter event, then, I call an energeia, 
and the former a kinēsis183.  
The concept of telos―generally translated as ‘end’―is central to the archi-
tecture of this passage, because it is according to their relation to it that two dif-
ferent kinds of actions (praxeis) or events are delimited. In fact, Aristotle briefly 
suggests that, strictly speaking, we should reserve the term praxis, or at least that of 
praxis teleia, for one of them. The examples used by Aristotle for those praxeis 
                                               
180 Brague calls Met. IX 1048b 18-35 an “aérolithe aristotélicien”. He provides a detailed history of the 
transmission of it, and considers it authentic: cf. AQM p. 454 ff. Yepes also authenticates the text and 
refers to other authors (Cf. YEPES, R. La doctrina del acto en Aristóteles Pamplona: Ediciones Universi-
dad de Navarra [Eunsa], 1993 pp. 258-260). 
181 For an overlook of the debate about Met. IX cf. YEPES, R. 1993 esp. pp. 83-112. 
182 Ross uses here the term ‘process’, as he does before in the text with the kinēsis of making thin (b19). 
However, the idea of a process tends to subsume energeia under the sense of kinēsis, something that is 
on the way; we prefer thus ‘event’ here for the energeia of living and/or being happy (b26), and below, 
in b28 and b34-35, where Aristotle refers both to energeia and kinēsis. In fact, Aristotle only uses the 
term praxeis to refer to both at the beginning of the passage (b18), and he subsequently restricts the 
sense of praxis, or at least praxis teleia, to energeia (b21-22). Elsewhere, either he directly speaks of the 
phenomenon, e.g. ‘the making thin’ (to ischnainein, b 19), or uses pronouns.  
183 Met. IX 6, 1048b 18-35, mod. tr. 
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which are not teleia, like making thin, curing or building, are actually occurrences 
of poiēsis, so we can well envision this passage in the light of the above-mentioned 
statement of NE VI: “while making (poiēsis) has an end other than itself, action 
(praxis) cannot; for good action itself is its end (esti gar autē he eupraxia telos)” (VI 5, 
1140b 6f). Although the relevance of this passage of Metaphysics IX will prove to 
point much beyond this practical context184, the approach through these concepts 
definitely helps read it without distorting its argument. That praxis is its own telos is 
indeed assumed at least three times in 1048b: twice by denying this from poiēsis 
(b18, b22), and subsequently by way of affirmation (b22 f): praxis is that in which 
the telos is (enyparchein). However, what does this inner belongingness of telos to 
praxis entail, in contrast with a poiēsis such as building? 
The question requires first of all a clarification of the sense of telos and its 
distinction from peras (limit, or ending), which is assumed in the first line of our 
passage (b18). While praxis is its own telos, none of the other kind of actions is a 
telos: instead, there is a limit (esti peras) for them, i.e. the time comes when they 
vanish, because the telos towards which they were heading has been attained. This 
distinction is grounded on the definitions of teleion and peras in Metaphysics V 16, 
17. We cannot now linger on those texts, which will be the object of further de-
velopment below in our discussion of Heidegger’s texts in chapter 6; yet, our 
interpretation of 1048b here provides reasons to maintain as a reasonable hy-
pothesis the point that while peras implies completion, the ending of a process, telos 
rather implies perfection, fulfillment. In quoting this passage we have definitely 
avoided Ross’ translation of teleia as complete and atelēs as incomplete, since this 
tends to suggest that a praxis, because it is teleia, i.e. ‘complete’, would cease. This, 
however, is precisely what Aristotle holds that does not happen to praxeis, here 
identified with energeiai: they do not cease. Ross is to our mind much more accu-
                                               
184 Cf. RICOEUR, Paul Soi-même comme un autre Paris: Seuil, 1990 p. 357. 
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rate when he translates entelecheia as fulfillment185, but unfortunately in his 
translation he does not search to harmonize entelecheia with telos or teleion186. 
Rendering teleiōn as ‘complete’ tends to primarily portray energeia as the result of a 
process that has come to an ending (peras), in such a way that the result is, in relation 
to the process that has led to it, immobile. But this is not the fundamental sense 
of energeia187, which is only acquired in the light of telos: energeia designates those 
events, rather than processes188, which have their end in themselves, i.e. which are 
their end themselves189. Their end is nothing to be attained: instead, it is always 
already attained insofar as they are, i.e. their being is attainment or fulfillment itself, but 
not in the sense of something that is there like a piece of property (ktēma) but of 
something that takes place, as a happening, an event (gignesthai)190. 
Under this perspective, energeia and entelecheia are to be considered syno-
nyms, as Aristotle claims both before and after the passage that occupies us191: 
“the word energeia is derived from ergon and points to [i.e. it tends to mean] 
entelecheia”192. While for kinēsis the attainment of a telos is its peras, i.e. the point 
                                               
185 Cf. his translation of Met. IX 3, 1047a 30, b2; IX 8, 1050a 23. Cf. also Physics III 3, 202a 16 (Gaye 
and Hardie). 
186 Cf. also Ross’ translation of teleion as ‘complete’ e.g. in Met. V 16, 1021b 12ff. and NE X 4, 1174a 15. 
187 It is indeed one of them, and in this respect a finished product, as well as a product throughout the 
whole of the process of its production, is there as an energeia. However, this fact itself implies that the 
idea of ‘something finished’ cannot be the ground sense of energeia.  
188 Cf. note 182 above. 
189 “The inmanence of telos in an action does not immobilize it at all: the action continues to exist 
under its perfect modality” (AQM p. 419). 
190 Cf. NE IX 9, 1169b 29f: “an energeia clearly is something that happens (gignesthai), not a thing that we 
possess all the time, like a piece of property (ktēma)”. Mod. tr: according to LSJ, the verb gignomai 
means, when referred to things, to produce (this is how Marías translates the term, although it seems to 
us problematic, insofar as the energeia involved is eudaimonia) or to become; when referred to events, to 
happen, to take place. We adopt this latter translation, which seems us to fit better what Aristotle 
seems to mean, in accordance with his analysis of energeia in the Metaphysics. Cf. also the comment of 
this passage by Brague, to whom we owe the indication of its relevance, in AQM p. 503. 
191 Consistently with that, Aristotle uses the terms interchangeably in his definition of kinēsis in the 
Physics. Cf. III 201a 10f; 2, 201b 31f; 3, 202a 14ff. 
192 Met. IX 8, 1050a 22f. Cf. also IX 3, 1047a 30f: “The word energeia, which we connect with entelecheia 
(...)”. Brague agrees that Aristotle tends to see both terms as equivalent (cf. AQM p. 500). 
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where the kinēsis ceases to be, and leaves an ergon as something different from it, to 
be an energeia means instead to be its own telos and its own ergon. At the same time 
(hama) “we are living and have lived”193: there is not such a thing as a process activated by 
‘living’ of which ‘living’ would be the end, in the sense of a telos different from this event. 
‘Living’ does not mark, as a peras, its own conclusion, its ending; ‘living’ is the end of 
‘living’ in the sense of fulfillment. Its activation immediately implies its fulfillment, and its 
fulfillment implies its continuation194.  
That in energeia the end is immediately reached means that being and telos are 
cooriginary for it: energeia is insofar as it has (echein) the end in itself (en-telos-echein). 
To retrieve Plato’s example195―it is no chance that Aristotle uses it in his defini-
tions of echein and hexis196―energeia ‘has’ the end in the active sense of hexis, i.e. 
‘using’ it (chrēsthai), ‘wearing’ it, instead of having it as a possession (ktaomai), as 
clothes are in the wardrobe. Still, of course, the metaphor has its limits, because 
‘using’ implies to a certain extent a difference between who uses and what is used. 
Probably for that reason Aristotle avoids the term chrēsthai in his discussion and 
instead he directly speaks of “being a telos” (1048b 18, 22) as what fits the struc-
ture of energeia. And still, he explicitly holds that being necessarily means being in 
fulfillment: “some non-being things are potentially (dynamei estin), yet they are not 
(ouk esti de), because they are not (in) fulfillment (ouk entelecheia estin)”197. 
This immediacy with which the telos is attained, to our mind a key pattern 
of energeia which Aristotle is stressing, implies the subsequent statement that such 
                                               
193 Met. IX 6, 1048b 27. Cf. HAGEN, C. T. p. 264 ff. on the debate around the “tense test”, i.e. the 
series of examples among which this one appears. 
194 Cf. AQM p. 486, concerning another example of Aristotle in this series: “perception does not head 
towards itself: it is itself right away (d’emblée)”. Cf. also GONZALEZ, F. J. “Time in a moment. The 
Temporality of Activity and Essence in Aristotle (with and against Heidegger)” Dianoia, 13 (2008) pp. 
7-46 (p. 43 for ref): “Though life is complete, it is never completed; in its very completeness, in its very 
having lived, it is always a present tense verb: living”. 
195 Cf. Theaetetus 197a - 198a 5. 
196 Cf. Met. V 20, 1022b 7; V 23 1023a 11. 
197 Met. IX 3, 1047b 1f. Tredennick (mod. tr). 
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an event as ‘ceasing’ is out of the question for it (b26 f). Because for energeia ‘to be’ 
immediately means ‘to have its telos’, there is nothing in this ‘being’ that can make it 
finish. Energeia is not, like kinēsis, directed towards an ending: what is essential to it 
is to continue198. Therefore, energeia is fulfilled and unlimited at the same time: it has ‘the 
end’ (telos) but it does not have ‘an ending’ (peras). And both traits call for one 
another: on the one hand, denying the continuity or unlimitedness199 of an energeia 
would entail denying its being (its fulfillment), since for an energeia ‘to be’ means 
immediately ‘to go on being’: the immediacy of past and present in the now 
entails, as it were, the infinitesimal perception of the continuity of an event in time 
that is expressed by the hama. On the other hand, denying that an energeia is 
fulfilled right from the start would cancel its being (i.e., its continuity as fulfilled), 
since it would remain always in a state of ‘coming to be’ (genesis): on the way to 
fulfillment. And “as it is, being itself (to on auto) does not come to be nor cease to be (ou 
gignetai oude phtheiretai); for if it did it would have to come out of something (ek tinos 
gar an egigneto)”200. Being is energeia and entelecheia: paraphrasing what we said above 
on life, there is no such thing as a process activated by ‘being’ of which ‘being’ 
would be the end: insofar as something is, it fulfills in itself what is meant by 
‘being’; or, in other words, there is no such thing as a remainder of ‘being’ that 
would not still be part of this being. The point is made precisely in these terms in 
a passage of NE X―one that importantly exhibits the relation between Metaphysics 
IX 6 and Aristotle’s practical philosophy―where Aristotle takes up his first 
example of energeia in 1048b, that of sight: “seeing seems to be at any moment 
                                               
198 Cf. AQM pp. 469-470: “When Aristotle speaks of energeiai, the end is present in a way that French 
cannot express as «having finished» (avoir fini). It means the attainment of a perfection, a fulfillment 
(finition). (...) The end being interior to [energeiai], it is for them a permanent possession. Energeia does 
not finish its finishing, it stops without stopping (l’acte n’en finit pas de finir, il cesse sans cesse)”.  
199 Hagen speaks of “continuability” in his accurate analysis of this passage. We would rather say 
‘continuity’, though, since the former term suggests contingence (it could continue or not), while it 
belongs to the essence of energeia to necessarily continue. Cf. HAGEN, C. T. esp. pp. 267 and 275. Cf. 
also AQM p. 471. 
200 Met. IX 10, 1051b 29f. 
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fulfilled (kath hontinoun khronon teleia), for it does not lack anything which will fulfill 
(teleoyn) its form (eidos) by coming into being later” (X 4, 1174a 14ff)201. 
One could of course wonder what the difference is between this 
conception of being and the Parmenidean negation of movement. The crucial 
difference is best expressed by Polo when he states that a good handling of the 
discovery of energeia implies inferring that the word for being is not subsistence but 
persistence202. This sense can be traced back, again, to Aristotle’s statement in the 
NE that “energeia clearly is something that happens (gignesthai), not a thing that we 
possess all the time, like a piece of property (ktēma)” (IX 9, 1169b 29f). What it 
means for energeia to ‘happen’ hinges on the immediacy expressed by the particle 
hama in the series of examples in 1048b: energeia is and at the same time it has been. 
This conception of being, insofar as it implies at once identity (fulfillment) and 
temporal deployment (continuity or persistence)203 making each other possible as 
an organic whole, is capable of embracing kinēsis within it. As Brague sees it, 
“dynamis situates itself within the domain opened by energeia. It is not moved but 
because energeia opens the way for it”204.  
Kinēsis is in fact a phenomenon situated in the midst of the domain opened 
up by Aristotle’s distinction (diaphoras) between energeia and dynamis205: as argued in 
                                               
201 Mod. tr. Cf. also 1174a 16f and b7, 13f on pleasure. We thank prof. Francisco J. Gonzalez for 
calling our attention on this chapter of the NE and its link to 1048b. Cf. his comment in 
GONZALEZ, F. J. 2008 esp. pp. 39 ff. 
202 POLO, L. El ser (I). La existencia extramental. (1965) Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra 
(Eunsa), 1997 p. 177. 
203 “Energeia is persistence because, instead of being settled and stabilized, it has a unity that consists 
simply of non-contradiction” Ibidem, p. 166. And below, p. 168: “In the formulation of the principle of 
non-contradiction, the opposition between being and nothingness is given in an instant; in reality the 
principle of non-contradiction is the unity of persistence” (our e). 
204 AQM p. 497. 
205 “Energeia means the being of the thing, not in the way which we express by ‘potentially’ (dynamei) 
(...). Our meaning can be seen in the particular cases by induction, and we must not seek a definition of 
everything, but be content to grasp the analogy―that as that which is building is to that which is 
capable of building, so is the waking to the sleeping, and that which is seeing to that which has its eyes 
shut but has sight (...). Let energeia be defined by one member of this antithesis, and the potential 
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the Physics, kinēsis “cannot be classified as a dynamis or an energeia (...). It is a sort of 
energeia, or energeia of the kind described, hard to grasp, but not incapable of 
existing”206. Kinēsis is “hard to grasp” precisely because it is and at the same time it 
is not an energeia: the risk of leveling it with energeia or vice versa is for that reason 
very high207. Why kinēsis cannot be simply classed as an energeia we have already 
seen in 1048b: it is atelēs, i.e. it is insofar as it does not have the end toward which 
it is pointing, its being consists of ‘being on the way’. That is why in the Physics 
Aristotle defines it as “the fulfillment (entelecheia) of what is potentially, as such [i.e. 
as being potentially, C.A.]”208. Insofar as something is still potentially―not yet 
come to the telos towards which it tends―it is kinēsis: its being is from that point of 
view on the way, coming to be, and for that reason it is “hard to grasp”. However, 
if we were to cut kinēsis at any time, i.e. if we could grasp, in the literal sense of the 
word, one of those infinitesimal divisions, what we would find is energeia and 
entelecheia, not dynamis209: “when what is buildable (to oikodomēton), in so far as we 
call it such, is in fulfillment (entelecheia), it is being built, and that is building 
(oikodomēsis)”210. The process itself is, in the full sense of the word―it has its telos, 
i.e. its being―but it is still a process, i.e. it is on the way to a telos. Yet, how can this 
work with the point that “being itself (to on auto) does not come to be”211? 
                                                                                                                                 
(dynaton) by the other” (Met. IX 6, 1048 a30 – b6, mod. tr: “the existence of the thing” is replaced for 
“the being of the thing”). 
206 Physics III 2, 201b 28 - 202a 3 (our e). 
207 Gonzalez and Brague emphasize the distinction: Cf. GONZALEZ, F. J. “Whose Metaphysics of 
Presence? Heidegger’s Interpretation of Energeia and Dunamis in Aristotle” (2006b) The Southern Journal 
of Philosophy 44/4 (2006) pp. 533-568 (cf. esp. p. 539 ff.); AQM pp. 497-509. For a different account, cf. 
Aubry’s extensive analysis, which ultimately tends to identify energeia and kinēsis (AUBRY, G. Dieu sans 
la puissance. Dunamis et energeia chez Aristote et chez Plotin Paris: Vrin, 2006, esp. p. 138). 
208 Physics III 1, 201a 10f. 
209 Cf. POLO, L. 1997 p. 117: “If one cuts kinēsis, one will find energeia, not dynamis (...). The reality of 
dynamis is also energeia, namely kinēsis”. 
210 Physics III 2, 201a 16ff. 
211 Met. IX 10, 1051b 29. 
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A distinction is made in the same passage of the Physics which can help sort 
this out: “kinēsis, though a kind of energeia, is imperfect (atelēs)”―but this imperfec-
tion, Aristotle explains, is not the result of its being an energeia: “the cause of its 
being imperfect is the potential (to dynaton) of which it is the energeia”212. The point 
is made, more concisely, in the De Anima: “movement is an activity of what is 
imperfect”213. Insofar as kinēsis is an energeia, it is teleia. However, it is energeia of 
something imperfect, something on the way: that is what makes it atelēs, not being 
energeia imperfectly214. Still, because “there is no such thing as a kinēsis over and 
above things (para ta pragmata)”215, but kinēsis belongs always to a tode ti, to a ‘this 
something’, we do not grasp this phenomenon if we think of it as comprising an 
energeia on the one hand and a dynamis on the other. Kinēsis is, like we have held of 
the bynomial aretē and phronēsis above, an organic whole formed by energeia and 
dynamis216; and as such an organic whole, it is only properly grasped, as it were, in a 
live picture: 
Aristotelian kinēsis is not an integration made departing from a primary infinitesimal 
division, because it is only real if it is carried out, if it is happening (...). The reality that 
corresponds to dynamis is not that of a ‘there being a dynamis’, but that of ‘there 
happening a kinēsis’217. 
We have brought kinēsis to the fore not only because its determination is 
crucial to the understanding of energeia but also because the reader might 
reasonably object that there is something in the immediacy and continuity of the 
‘happening’ of energeia, as conceived in 1048b, which does not seem to fit our 
                                               
212 Physics III 2, 201b 31ff. (We take Gonzalez’s translation, although like Ross he uses the terms 
‘complete’ and ‘incomplete’, which have been replaced here by ‘perfect’ and ‘imperfect’). Cf. 
GONZALEZ, F. J. 2006b p. 539; Cf. also AQM p. 502. 
213 De Anima III 7, 431a 6f. 
214 Cf. AQM p. 502. 
215 Physics III 1, 200b 32 f. 
216 Cf. Met. V 4, 1014b 23 ff: “in organic unities there is something identical in both parts, which makes 
them grow together instead of merely touching, and be one in respect of continuity and quantity, though not of 
quality”. 
217 POLO, L. 1997 p. 118. 
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experience of human life. While life is fulfilled right from the start, i.e. everything 
that belongs to its eidos is there at any moment in which one says ‘I live’218, we also 
speak of the fulfillment of life as a process, i.e. as a kinēsis, “for one swallow does 
not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does 
not make a man blessed and happy” (I 7, 1098a 18ff). Moreover, life belongs to 
the movement of growth and decay219, and thus eventually comes to an end. The 
same can be applied to seeing: one is surely seeing already when one realizes this, 
but one may see more, e.g. if helped with some more light, and one will not be 
able to see anymore when all the light is out. In this respect, Joachim rightly points 
out that even ‘energeia proper’ (i.e., energeia teleia) has, for man, the imperfection 
of what involves potentiality (dynamis), as directed towards an end beyond and other 
than itself. And it is limited in time, begins and ends (...). Divine activity, on the other 
hand, is aneu dynameos (without residue of potentiality). There is no transition to a 
complete condition, since that which is active (energei) is complete: and there is no 
beginning, no ending (...). The divine activity, therefore, is timeless or eternal, and 
without change or process―an activity of changelessness (energeia akinēsias)220. 
Yet precisely in this passage of the NE to which Joachim refers, Aristotle 
speaks in the first place of an energeia kinēseōs―an energeia of movement221. To be 
sure, every human energeia is constitutively pierced by this sort of ‘delay’ or ‘not 
being yet the end’ that is kinēsis222. That is why Aristotle says that “a short time 
does not make a man blessed and happy”223, or also why later, in placing the 
fulfillment of happiness in theōria, he acknowledges that, insofar as exercised by 
man, it cannot escape this limitation: 
“[If] the activity of intellect, which is contemplative (theoretikē), seems both to be supe-
rior in worth and to aim to no end beyond itself, it follows that this will be the com-
                                               
218 Cf. NE X 4, 1174a 15ff. 
219 Cf. De Anima II 2, 413a 24f; III 9, 432b 9. 
220 JOACHIM, H. H. p. 206. 
221 Cf. NE VII 14, 1154b 27. 
222 Cf. RICOEUR, P. 1990 p. 357; POLO, L. 1997 esp. pp. 141 and 168 ff. 
223 NE I 7, 1098a 20. 
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plete happiness of man (...). But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as 
he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him” (X 7, 1177b 19-
28). 
It could be argued, though inconsistently, that when Aristotle says that 
man “will live so insofar as something divine is in him” he means that in certain 
moments man can live like a god. Indeed, he holds that we “must, [though] so far 
as we can, make ourselves immortal” (1177b 33). But “such a life would be too high 
for a man”, i.e. Aristotle is not meaning ‘temporal lapses where man could live as a 
god’ but ‘a way of living human life that is closer to divine life’. If that, as we 
think, is what the text says, Aristotle would not be losing sight here of the 
characterization of human life developed in the rest of the NE, as Nussbaum 
fears224. 
However, if human life is―like the rest of reality, with the exception of the 
energeia akinēsias that Aristotle identifies with the divine―kinēsis, i.e. an energeia of 
something imperfect, or rather of something perfectible, why then does Aristotle 
speak in 1048b of such a thing as a praxis teleia, or in NE X of hedonē as something 
holon and teleion?225. The aporia can also be formulated thus: on the one hand, hu-
man life is said to be an energeia as much in the Metaphysics as in the NE226; on the 
other, it seems clear from the NE itself and the De Anima that it is also a kinēsis227.  
What dissolves the aporia is precisely the seemingly contradictory fact that 
kinēsis is a kind of energeia, i.e. it is an energeia from a certain point of view. We have 
stated above that what is essential to an energeia is to continue, and this applies for 
any kinēsis, if considered regardless of the telos towards which it is directed, a telos 
that it does not have, because it is different from its being. Still, insofar as a kinēsis 
                                               
224 Cf. NUSSBAUM, M. p. 377. 
225 Cf. Met. IX 6, 1048b 22, NE X 4 1174b 5f, 13f. 
226 Cf. respectively notes 193 and 171 above. 
227 Cf. NE I 7, 1098a 19f. and note 219 above. 
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is, it does have a telos of its own, namely its own being what it is. That is why, if we 
‘cut’ kinēsis, what we find is energeia, not dynamis228. 
 Thus, the fact that energeiai such as seeing or living may finish, as we ex-
perience that perceptions and lives come to an ending (peras), does not stem from 
their inner characterization, but from their relation to what is not their own being. Human 
life is indeed a kinēsis (i) in relation to the world, insofar as it has a beginning and a 
term, and (ii) in relation to itself at its different stages (so that it is somehow other to 
itself), insofar as it implies a development: one does not become good immedi-
ately229, one grows up and grows old, and so on. However, the inner characteriza-
tion of life is not thus reached yet, because it is only understood from the outside, 
namely from (i) its relation to other beings, or from (ii) its relation to its own be-
ing as other. Life is only properly grasped if experienced also from the inside, i.e. 
as it is lived here and now. And it is in the now of life that kinēsis and energeia find 
each other: “kinēsis is only real if it is carried out, if it is happening (...). The reality 
that corresponds to dynamis is not that of a ‘there being a dynamis’, but that of 
‘there happening a kinēsis’230. When Aristotle says that “we are living and have 
lived”231 he is implying at the same time the distension in time that is typical of 
kinēsis and the immediacy that is typical of energeia and entelecheia.  
Human beings are capable of experiencing their own life―they find 
themselves living―and life is for them a domain from which they cannot evade232. 
This experience is not just a psychological phenomenon―it is, more than anything 
                                               
228 Cf. POLO, L. 1997 p. 117.  
229 Cf. NE I 7, 1098a 19f.  
230 POLO, L. 1997 p. 118. 
231 Met. IX 6, 1048b 27. 
232 Cf. AQM p. 491, within Brague’s powerful analysis of the “interiorité de la vie”. pp. 487-492. We 
agree with Brague that Heidegger’s concept of facticity points to this interiority: we find ourselves 
always already (immer schon) living. Yet Ricoeur is right that Heidegger’s equation between energeia and 
facticity tends to blur the “difficult dialectic” between energeia and dynamis (cf. RICOEUR, P. 1990 p. 
365). 
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else, as Brague points out, an ontological fact233: it opens up a new field in reality. 
While a part of reality to which it belongs, man is genuinely distinct from the rest 
of it in that it can experience or live its own life: 
He who sees perceives (aisthanesthai) that he sees, and he who hears, that he hears, 
and he who walks, that he walks, and in the case of all other activities similarly there 
is something which perceives that we are active (energein), so that if we perceive, we 
perceive that we perceive, and if we think, that we think; and (…) to perceive that we 
perceive or think is to perceive that we are (einai). (IX 9, 1170a 29ff). 
To experience one’s life and being, because one is interior to it, entails to 
experience the immediacy and continuity that have been established as the main 
features of energeia. That is why human life is the “fundamental experience”234, or 
the “place of readability par excellence”235 of the meaning of being as energeia and 
dynamis. The acknowledgement that at the same time “we are living and have lived” 
does not express a virtuality of language, but rather finds in language a way to 
express what the phenomena dictate to this being who, because he is aware that 
he is living, is capable of naming236. Human life is a kinēsis, but not like any other: 
it is a kinēsis that discovers itself in its energein, and this experience does not 
misrepresent its being, which is indeed at a time kinēsis and energeia. 
This ‘ontological field’ opened by the experience of one’s own life, while 
rooted in the wider one of being as tension between energeia and dynamis, has an 
inner logic that entitles Aristotle to designate, from within life, some processes as 
energeiai (experienced in the terms of immediateness and continuity in which one 
experiences one’s life) and some processes as kinesēis (experienced in terms of 
mediateness and discontinuity in relation to one’s life). This dialectic, which can 
                                               
233 Cf. AQM p. 494. 
234 AQM p. 475. 
235 RICOEUR, P. 1990 p. 357. 
236 Cf. EE I 6, 1216b 26f: “About all these matters we must try to get conviction by arguments (dia tōn 
logōn), using the phenomena (khrōmenon tois phainomenois) as evidence and illustration”. Cf. also VIGO, 
A. 1996 p. 42, AQM pp. 463-465. 
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also be expressed with the binomial interiority-exteriority237, is to our mind the 
perspective that is required to understand the articulation of phronēsis and technē as 
well as their irreducibility to each other. 
2.3. Poiēsis and Praxis: Ceasing or Not to Be 
It seems plausible from what precedes that the distinction phronēsis/technē or 
poiēsis/praxis is based on the distinction energeia/kinēsis238, i.e. on their different 
relation to telos: “while making (poiēsis) has an end other than itself, action (praxis) 
cannot; for good action itself is its end” (VI 5, 1140b 6f). However, we have 
argued (i) that energeia in man is to be understood as not fully fulfilled―since it is 
not in absence of motion (akinēsia) as divine energeia239―and (ii) that kinēsis is a kind 
of energeia. The statement that “neither acting [is] making nor is making acting” (VI 
4, 1140a 5f) is thus faced with the fact that both acting and making belong to the 
genus energeia, as Aristotle himself acknowledges at the outset of the NE240. So 
that, while the concept of energeia seems to be helpful to distinguish phronēsis and 
technē, in a way it does not seem to.  
This difficulty cannot be sorted out by an interpretation of 1048b which 
does not distinguish the interior and the exterior perspectives, i.e. the fact that 
man is at the same time a being who can on the one hand experience its own 
being as his or her own and, on the other, experience the being of other beings, 
and its own being as other.  
From the exterior perspective, poiēsis and praxis are both kinēseis insofar as 
they imply an alteration of states of affairs and they deploy within time. One sees a 
                                               
237 The term ‘interiority’ (developed in AQM pp. 487-492) corresponds to our ‘immediateness’; 
‘exteriority’, for its part, corresponds to ‘mediateness’. Both aspects shall come up below, along with 
the analysis of technē and phronēsis. 
238 Cf. JOACHIM, H. H. p. 188. 
239 Cf. NE VII 14, 1154b 27. 
240 Cf. NE I 1, 1094a 4f. 
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potter working on clay in his workshop and one perceives an evolution in the jar 
he is making; or one listens to a dialogue and one perceives how the views of 
those who take part in it evolve. But from this external perspective they can also 
be regarded as energeiai, insofar as both immediately acquire a telos: their own 
process. This may seem bizarre of poiēsis, but the fact is that if we consider the 
process developed by the craftsman independently from the fact that the jar is on 
the way to be a finished jar, the poiēin is an energeia together with ‘the jar on the 
way’241. 
Only the interior perspective, that ‘from within life’, allows for the 
distinction, and it is from this perspective that we believe that the argument of 
1048b is built: here the immediacy with which I experience that ‘I am living and I 
have lived’ contrasts with kinēsis, the process through which the work (ergon), the 
telos of poiēsis, ‘takes time’ to be what it is not yet (and it only comes to be insofar 
as poiēsis ceases to be). In contrast, the telos of praxis, while it takes place within 
time, does not ‘take time’ to be, but is immediately, since it coincides with praxis 
itself. That is also why, if we compare it with poiēsis, we cannot say that praxis 
ceases to be in the same sense as poiēsis does. Yet, we said that in another sense 
praxis does cease to be, because it undergoes a change that brings it closer or moves 
it further away from eupraxia or eudaimonia. In this respect, praxis is subject to some 
kind of otherness: it does not seem to be exactly its own telos, so that the distinction 
with technē seems to lose sharpness again.  
While Aristotle’s examples of poiēsis always focus our attention on objects 
being made, Broadie interestingly contends that activities such as dancing and 
singing are also technai, and there is not for them such a thing as a finished product 
                                               
241 “The handiwork is in a sense the producer in activity” (NE IX 7, 1168a 6f). “Set apart from 
movement, the moving object [and the mover, C.A.] is not in an effective relation with the term of this 
movement” (POLO, L. 1997 p. 117, our e). The approach to kinēsis as a “concrete organic unity” is 
developed, on the basis of Physics III, 3 in WATERLOW, Sarah (= Broadie, Sarah)  Nature, Change, and 
Agency in Aristotle’s Physics: A Philosophical Study (1982) New York: Oxford University Press, 1998 (cf. esp 
pp. 200-203). 
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that remains after them; instead, the telos is immediately reached with the activity 
itself: for dancing the principle seems to apply that ‘we are dancing and we have 
danced’. As a result, the idea of a finished product remaining afterwards appears 
as too narrow to understand technē242. Moreover, as much in the process of 
production as in that of dancing a change is being operated in the craftsman 
himself, who becomes better skilled: also this telos is immediately reached in the 
exercise of poiēsis itself243. Does it then still make sense to keep distinguishing 
poiēsis and praxis on the basis of telos? 
It does. These points shed light on additional sides of the relation between 
poiēsis and praxis, which shall be dealt with below, and show where we should not 
look for the fundamental element of irreducibility between them. The crucial 
point is that while poiēsis ceases in the attainment of the telos that has activated 
it―to leave this telos as ‘inheritance’ in the form of the object or the effect 
produced (ergon) and also the skill of the craftsman (technē)― praxis does not cease. 
Praxis is not restricted to an end which could be determined independently from 
life, but immersed in the goal of human life as a whole (to eu zēn holōs)244. 
Concerning praxis we can, no doubt, identify an individual action guided by a 
given end, or even point to the external effects of this action, but this does not 
reach yet its fundamental sense. Two meanings of praxis must then be 
                                               
242 Cf. loc. cit. Still, it is for that reason that Aristotle considers “what is buildable (to oikodomēton), in so 
far as we call it such”, i.e. being built, to be in fulfillment (entelecheia) (Cf. Physics III 2, 201a 16f). 
243 Although one could wish Aristotle had developed this topic more extensively, he shows awareness 
of it in holding that who has learnt, even if he can go on learning, actively exercises his knowledge; 
“otherwise he would be in the contradictory state of not knowing” (Physics VIII 4, 255b 1-5). Cf. also 
the suggestive and rigorous analyses in DUNNE, J. 1993 pp. 315-356, esp. pp. 343 ff, which develop 
Aristotle’s succinct remarks on technē. We feel very close to his widening of the concept of technē, 
insofar as he pushes Aristotle’s rather mechanical image of it towards a more live picture, so that it gets 
rooted in the moving phenomenon of life. This, however, is done starting precisely from Aristotle’s 
characterization of phronēsis, which suggests that the brief remarks on technē in Metaphysics I and NE VI 
do not necessarily exclude this widening. The conciseness of Aristotle in these passages seems mainly 
due to the fact that he is mainly concerned with emphasizing, respectively, the contrast between 
phronēsis and technē and between empeiria and technē. 
244 Cf. NE VI 5, 1140a 25ff. 
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distinguished: on the one hand, praxis as an isolated action245, with a beginning 
and an end, like e.g. giving a speech or having a conversation; on the other, a 
more fundamental sense in which the former is inscribed, namely praxis as a way 
of being, i.e. the ‘conversation’ with oneself that constitutes one’s life as a whole.  
Thus, beneath one’s mediate or external relation to something, be it that of 
poiēsis or of a single action―praxis in the derivative sense―there lies always already 
an immediate or interior relation to oneself that does not cease as long as one’s life takes 
place. Aristotle’s enigmatic assertion that phronēsis cannot be forgotten246 may be 
interpreted in this sense: insofar as phronēsis is not concerned with processes within human 
life but with human life as a whole, its different shapes throughout our life remain with 
us in the form of a shape that at every single moment is the result of them―and 
this reshaping does not cease247. Thus, from this ‘interior’ point of view, the one 
from which Aristotle operates in 1048b, energeia and kinēsis do provide a key to 
distinguish between poiēsis and praxis―or technē and phronēsis―and, moreover, be-
tween praxis in a derivative sense and praxis as a way of being. 
2.4. Phronēsis and Technē: Two Spheres of Ends 
Still, one must be careful not to transform these distinctions into separations: our 
specific actions, whether they result in a transformation of what surrounds us or 
not, are always inscribed in the praxis that we are. Practical dianoia is “the archē of 
productive activity, since he who makes some thing always has some further end 
in view: the act of making is not an end in itself (telos haplōs), it is only a means, and 
belongs to something else, whereas a thing done is an end in itself”248. The act of 
making belongs to the wider project of living. This lays down two spheres of ends 
                                               
245 X, 7 1177b 3f: “from practical activities (de tōn praktikōn) we gain more or less apart from the action 
(para tēn praxin)”. 
246 Cf. NE VI 5, 1140b 29f. 
247 Chateau basically holds this view too (cf. CHATEAU, J.-Y. 1997 p. 234). 
248 NE VI 2, 1139b 1f, Rackham. 
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in human life, which are related within the frame of a hierarchy but which are 
irreducible to each other. This hierarchy is clearly suggested as soon as NE I―“a 
thing pursued as an end in itself is more fulfilled (teleioteron) than one pursued as a 
means to something else”249―but only in NE VI is a more thorough account 
provided: 
Regarding phronēsis we shall get at the truth by considering who are the persons we 
credit with it. Now it is thought to be a mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able 
to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular 
respect (ou kata meros), e.g. about what sorts of thing conduce to health or strength, but 
about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general (pros to eu zēn holōs). This is 
shown by the fact that we credit men with practical wisdom in some particular 
respect when they have calculated well with a view to some good end which is one of those 
that are not the object of any technē (VI 5, 1140a 24ff). 
The contrast that we have examined above between the ceasing of poiēseis 
(or isolated praxeis) and the non-ceasing of praxis as being is here expressed in 
regard to technē and phronēsis, the hexeis of poiēsis and praxis, on the basis of their 
respective focuses. In her comment of this passage, Broadie accurately points out 
that the practical agent differs from the technical one “not by being focused on 
another good that is special because unrestricted”250: Aristotle speaks of the 
phronimos―i.e. the practical agent that is able and willing to unfold a good life―as 
someone who deliberates about specific ends, but this in such a way that he has 
always in view the more genuine telos of his life as a whole. The phronimos does not 
restrict his deliberation to looking after (kata) the way of succeeding in specific 
states of affairs, which are only a part (meros) of his life, but also looks after the wider 
affair of succeeding in life in general (pros to eu zēn holōs).  
This is the case because there is on the one hand a deliberation focused on 
a particular end―which is that of poiēsis―and on the other a deliberation that, 
                                               
249 Cf. NE I 7, 1097a 30f. (Rackham, mod. tr). 
250 BROADIE, S. p. 211. Yet, one must be careful with the distinction between practical and technical 
agent, since the technical agent is always necessarily a practical one, even if he does not mind. Thus, 
the distinction is only useful in terms of concern about the practical relevance of one’s acts. 
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although focused on a particular end (e.g. that of poiēsis), takes into account 
whether that particular end leads one or not to the more general end of a good life 
as a whole―which goes beyond what technē can envision. In the chain of ends and 
means of poiēsis we can indeed speak of an ‘intentional object’ compounded by 
means and end251, which is ordered in turn as a means to a subsequent end. 
However, this subsequent end, insofar as considered by technē, does not transcend 
the instrumental sphere insofar as it does not take care of being (living well in 
general) but of doing. Even the consideration of the craftsman who works with the 
sole aim of practicing, in order to become a better professional, remains in the 
sphere of doing, or of efficacy, which is a partial horizon of his being. That is why at 
the outset of the NE Aristotle downplays as irrelevant the hierarchy between 
technical sciences252, in order to set the view on a deeper level of hierarchy. 
To be sure, the reader might find odd the translation of poiein and prattein 
as ‘doing’ and ‘being’, since these activities are generally rendered as ‘making’ and 
‘acting’253. What we are suggesting with these terms, on the basis of insights of 
Chateau and Dunne254, is not an alternative translation but a reflection on the 
outlooks of poiēsis and praxis: while the technical agent is concerned only with a partial sphere 
of what she is, the practical agent takes into consideration the fact that the whole of her being is 
at stake in her decision255. In praxis already the sole consideration of the ‘intentional 
object compounded by means and end’, without regard to its being ordered in its 
turn to a subsequent end in a chain, transcends the instrumental sphere, while for 
poiēsis alone not even this inclusion in a chain transcends it. While the fact that 
                                               
251 Cf. note 94 above. 
252 Cf. NE I 1, 1094a 16ff. Cf. note 174 above. 
253 Sometimes, the binomial is rendered as ‘making’ and ‘doing’, which does not lack interest, but 
which we exclude to avoid confusion. 
254 Cf. CHATEAU, J.-Y. 1997 p. 233: “true action is a way of being”. For Dunne’s point, see shortly 
below. 
255 As Gauthier puts it, work is the end of the worker, but not that of the man he is (cf. GAUTHIER, 
p. 40). Working embraces only a sphere of him, while acting (prattein) copes with his whole being, even 
when he is working.  
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bridle-making is ordered to the art of riding―and this in turn to stategy256―does 
not entail per se that these arts are considering good life as a whole, the decision to 
help someone else for the sake of helping and regardless of what this action can 
foster in the future is immediately situated beyond the material act of lending 
money257. 
Yet, it would be misguided to search this transcendence beyond the ‘here 
and now’ of ‘this end through these means’: in the practical agent the choice of a means 
for an end is always already installed within the orientation towards one’s living in general: the 
ability of phronēsis to deliberate and decide is always rooted in a more fundamental 
sphere, i.e. the orientation settled by previous decisions and actions258. The 
practical agent indeed adopts a certain point of view in relation to ends, i.e. that of 
the good life in general, but she does so because those ends and the reality that she 
herself is are constitutively demanding that point of view. In this respect, the fact 
that a technical agent may just pay attention to the attainment of ‘this end through 
these means’ does not prevent her from being at the same time a practical agent, 
insofar as she cannot set this technical engagement apart from the praxis that she 
herself is. Thus, what Broadie calls the ‘technical agent’ is in fact a practical agent 
who in his deliberation is not concerned with succeeding in life in general, but whose 
success in that sphere is nevertheless at stake259. All instances of poiēsis necessarily 
                                               
256 Cf. NE I 1094a 10 ff. 
257 Cf. NE IX 7, 1167b 31f. 
258 Cf. NE III 5, 1114b 2ff. 
259 Broadie holds that what distinguishes the ‘practical agent’, i.e. the one who is at a time concerned 
with his life as a whole, is the fact that while he is equally focused on a restricted good, his focus “sets 
no limit on the considerations that could affect which way he goes” (p. 211). However, this seems 
incomplete, since the same could be said too of a craftsman, who depending on the circumstances or 
on the evolution of what he is working on will change his procedure (in fact, that is also an important 
part of good craftsmanship, as Dunne has rightly shown (Cf. DUNNE, J. 1993 p. 352): “it is certainly 
not always the case that we know the end in advance (...). Often we are not just trying to calculate the 
means to our end but are, rather, trying to work out what a worthwhile and feasible end in our 
situation is”. This actually applies both for poiēsis and praxis). Broadie is then right to emphasize that 
unrestrictedness does not refer to the end but to the way in which this end is considered, but the idea 
of an ‘unrestricted openness’ remains ambiguous. It becomes a powerful approach, though, if we 
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imply the presence of praxis: “every making involves doing (…). The activity of 
making the statue is something the sculptor does, and that activity has to be 
considered as an activity within the whole context of the sculptor’s life”260. Which, 
in other words, implies that there is an unavoidable connection between what we 
do and what we are, no matter whether we make a point of it or not, no matter 
whether we are conscious of it or not. Praxis is omnipresent in human life, as long 
as the use of reason is operative261. Yet the rootedness of poiēsis within the texture 
of praxis outlines the fundamental difference between them. As Dunne puts it, 
while in poiēsis there is a possible split between doing and being, in praxis such a split is not 
possible262. One is a shoemaker, but one may not be making shoes right now. 
However, one has an ēthos that is the result of one’s previous actions263, one 
constantly acts according to this ēthos, no matter what one does (making shoes, 
eating one’s dinner or speaking to a neighbor), and one’s ēthos is necessarily and 
constantly becoming something new, for the better or the worse.  
This irreducibility of praxis is also expressed in a dense and crucial passage 
of NE VI by including phronēsis under the genus aretē, in contrast with technē:   
While there is such a thing as excellence (aretē) in art (technē), there is no such a thing 
as excellence in practical wisdom (phronēsis); and in art he who errs willingly is prefer-
able, but in practical wisdom, as in the excellences (aretai), he is the reverse. Plainly, 
then, practical wisdom (phronēsis) is an excellence (aretē) and not a technē. There being 
two parts of the soul that possess reason, it must be the excellence of one of the two, 
i.e. of the part which forms opinions; for opinion is about what can be otherwise, 
and so is practical wisdom. But yet it is not only a reasoned state; this is shown by the 
                                                                                                                                 
specify more and speak, with Aristotle, of openness to the consideration of the upper level of ends, i.e. 
living well in general (eu zēn holōs). 
260 SPARSHOTT, F. E. p. 209 
261 Childhood (Cf. NE III 2, 1111b 8), sleep (cf. I 13, 1102b 7) and drunkenness (Cf. VII 3, 1147b 7) 
are some of the circumstances that Aristotle mentions in which a human being is not, or not fully, an 
agent of praxis. As for childhood, although the seemingly sudden beginning of the use of reason may 
be compared to the regrouping of an army described in Post. Analytics II, 100a 12f, it is preceded by a 
progressive process in which children may be considered to a certain degree agents of praxis; at any 
rate, their lack of autonomy as agents of praxis is made up for by the community that surrounds them. 
262 Cf. DUNNE, J. 1993 p. 267. 
263 Cf. NE III 5, 1114b 1ff. 
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fact that a state of that sort may be forgotten but practical wisdom (phronēsis) cannot 
(VI 5, 1140b 22ff).  
The fact that there is an excellence in technē and not in phronēsis can be read 
in the light of the assertion that phronēsis is itself an excellence, so that there is no 
excellence of it, no virtue making phronēsis better from outside it. In other words, the 
perfection of phronēsis springs from the agreement of reason and desire that 
constitutes it264: “of the part which is practical and intellectual the good (to eu) is 
truth in agreement with right desire” (VI 2, 1139a 29f). This does not entail by any 
means that phronēsis is not subject to perfection, but rather that there is nothing we 
can do apart from phronein to be more phronimos―which assumes the mutual 
belonging between virtues and phronēsis stressed by Aristotle at the end of NE VI: 
any progress in ethical virtues, as distinct from progress in natural virtues, implies 
the operation and progress of phronēsis265. 
On the other hand, it is not by chance that, when it comes to technē, 
Aristotle puts so scarce emphasis on the rectitude of desire266―when any reference 
is made to this rectitude, it is only insofar as poiēsis is inscribed within the practical 
domain267. Phronēsis stands out, then, as the virtue or excellence of that part of 
reason that deals with things which can be otherwise or which we can bring about, 
as Aristotle himself concludes in these passages268. Yet, technē does reach some 
kind of truth on its own269, but a restricted one in relation to human life: not the full 
truth of the part of reason that deals with things that can be otherwise, but a 
derivative form of it, a truth confined to the connection between means and ends, 
regardless of the agreement of ends with right desire, viz. disconnected of the 
                                               
264 Cf. NE VI 13, 1144b 32ff. 
265 Mod. tr: Ross renders to eu as ‘good state’, but this unnecessarily puts the weight of the 
interpretation on the hexis (phronēsis) while the assertion is valid too for its energeia (praxis). 
266 Cf. VIGO, A. 2006d p. 391. 
267 Cf. NE VI 12, 1144a 26ff. 
268 Cf. also NE VI 2, 1139b 1f. 
269 Cf. NE VI 3, 1140a 15ff. 
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mean term (mesotēs) that enables the attainment of eupraxia270. Gauthier is right to 
stress here, therefore, that technē is not a virtue because it is a capacity for 
opposites271: it is truth of a ‘doing’ regardless of what ‘being’ a man is. It attains 
truth concerning one’s ‘doing’, but not necessarily concerning one’s ‘being’. That 
is why, from a point of view restricted to technē, “he who errs willingly is preferable” 
(because this shows his mastery). But if the restriction is removed, i.e. if we 
consider the truth of ‘doing’ in relation to what ‘being’ a man is, then technē cannot 
provide itself the criterion to know whether it reaches truth: it is phronēsis that can 
provide it, precisely because it is not a capacity for opposites: insofar as it is, it is good 
(yet perfectible). That is also why in phronēsis he who errs willingly is bad, because 
the mistake implies a step backward in virtue, i.e. in phronēsis. Or more strictly said, 
phronēsis, like ethical virtue, cannot be used against its nature272 (so that when one 
errs in regard to phronēsis one is not acting as a phronimos, while one can err in 
regard to technē and yet be acting as a technitēs). 
Aristotle’s doctrine of the capacity for opposites, developed in Metaphysics 
IX 9, seems then to confirm the connection of the binomials poiēsis/praxis and 
technē/phronēsis on the one hand and dynamis/energeia on the other: 
That the good energeia is better and more valuable than the good dynamis is evident 
from the following argument (...). The dynamis for contraries is present at the same 
time, and the energeiai also cannot be present at the same time, e.g. health and illness. 
Therefore one of them must be the good, but the dynamis is both the contraries alike, 
or neither; the energeia, then, is better273. 
If phronēsis is not capable of contraries, it is already, to a certain extent, 
more than a mere dynamis. This meets also Aristotle’s chief thesis that eudaimonia or 
                                               
270 Cf. NE II, 1109a 20. In this respect, technē responds to Aristotle’s characterization of deinotēs. Cf. NE 
VI 12, 1144a 23ff. and p. 26 above. Cf. also NE VI 9, 1142b 19f. 
271 Cf. GJ II p. 477. For Aristotle’s exposition on the capacities for opposites, cf. Met. IX 9, 1051a 4 ff. 
The issue was known also to Plato; cf. e.g. Republic 342a ff. 
272 Cf. NATALI, C. 2001 p. 61. 
273 Met. IX 9, 1051a 4-15. 
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eupraxia is not a state but an activity (energeia) of the soul according to virtue274. If 
praxis never ceases, the boundaries between eupraxia and its dynamis (i.e. phronēsis, 
including all the ethical virtues)275 are softened, in two senses: (i) phronēsis, while 
remaining a hexis or dynamis, is active throughout human life, and is at stake in 
every single action; technē, on the other hand, is limited to periods and layers of 
one’s life276; (ii) insofar as phronēsis is not capable of contraries in regard to what 
we have called the ‘full truth’ of things that can be otherwise, it can be said to be, 
regarding this full truth, an energeia: an effective realization of it, while technē remains as 
dynamis. 
Dunne’s and Chateau’s remarks that in phronēsis there is no split between 
“what one is and what one does” and that “true action is a way of being”277 entail 
this constant feedback between phronēsis and praxis: one does what one is, and one 
is what one does. This is the irreducible condition of man: “desiderative thought 
or intellectual desire” (VI 2, 1139b 4f). And it is towards this fundamental dimen-
sion that Aristotle is pointing at in his effort to distinguish technē from phronēsis. He 
does not intend to establish an artificial separation between them, but rather to 
avoid the leveling of life with our relation to things: he is describing the immediate 
relation of human life to itself. 
                                               
274 Cf. NE I 7, 1098a 16f; I 13, 1102a 5f. 
275 Cf. p. 37 above. 
276 Vigo’s development of the concepts of horizontality and verticality in ēthos complements this point 
very well (Cf. VIGO, A. 1996 pp. 386 ff.). While phronēsis embraces the whole of one’s life both 
vertically (insofar as everything one does in a certain moment is related to it) and horizontally (insofar as 
everything one does throughout one’s life is related to it), technē only covers a restricted layer of one’s 
action in a certain moment (vertical dimension) and a restricted period of one’s life (horizontal 
dimension). Even in the case of someone who devoted all his life to a determinate work, this 
horizontality does not reach the fundamental horizontality of phronēsis, which acquires its special 
character from its indissociability with its vertical coverage: “the vertical unity [that is typical of 
happiness] must be realized in the horizontal unity” (ibidem, p. 387). 
277 Cf. respectively notes 262 and 254 above. 
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2.5. The Structure of Practical Truth  
We have held that for any practical agent the choice of a means for an end is al-
ways already framed within the orientation towards one’s good life in general  
(pros to eu zēn holōs). The ‘always already’ structure (immer schon) is a typically 
Heideggerian formulation, but what is meant by it is no less typically Aristotelian. 
‘Being always already installed within an orientation’ implies that what is 
constitutive of the knowledge of phronēsis is not the ability to articulate why one 
regards something as leading one to ‘living well in general’, i.e. as a good end, or to 
mentally conceive of something as such a kind of end. What is constitutive of 
phronēsis is that its deliberation is embedded in this orientation or, in other words, 
that ‘living well in general’, the end towards which the phronimos directs his or her 
actions, is an intelligent desire or desiderative thought that leads to act well (eu 
prattein). Why this end has been chosen may be eventually formulated theoretically 
and become the object of a publication (the NE is an example of that), or just 
accounted for on demand, but this formulation is not the ultimate reason why the 
agent chooses this end: a formulation in words does not reveal the ontological structure of 
practical truth278.  
Natali rightly notes how, while Aristotle’s approach to practical truth 
focuses on deliberation to the point of defining phronēsis as its excellence279, moral 
contemporary philosophy is rather interested in the more theoretical concept of 
justification. Approaching Aristotle through this latter concept, though, risks 
missing the specificity of his conception of practical truth. Departing from 
                                               
278 Berti devotes a relevant chapter of his book Le ragioni di Aristotele to analyze the discourse of the 
NE, which he calls “practical philosophy”, as distinguished from phronēsis, “equally practical, but not 
philosophical, or scientific” (p. 139). Berti’s distinction between phronēsis and practical philosophy is 
relevant, insofar as it shows that the discourse of the NE is fundamentally dialectical, i.e. scientific, as 
the rest of Aristotle’s works. This is crucial if one wants to preserve the practical character of phronēsis 
and also to ensure the possibility of a theoretical discourse on ethics as that of the NE (cf. BERTI, E. 
Le ragioni di Aristotele Bari: Laterza, 1988, pp. 113-152). 
279 Cf. NE VI 9, 1142b 31ff. 
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Aristotle’s crucial categorization of the objects of the rational part of the soul as 
either “things whose principles cannot be otherwise” or “those [that are] 
variable”280, Natali argues that “the logical structure of an investigation aiming at 
the justification of an action that has been carried out is, at least in part, different 
from the deliberation of an action that is still to be performed”281. This special character 
of practical reason or phronēsis and its relation to time, as contrasted to sophia or 
theoretical reason, is noted also by Broadie: deliberation, she argues, “is not an 
explanation or justification of something which the agent was already going to do, 
in the way in which the scientific argument explains an already recognized fact”282. 
In other words, while (theoretical) explanation departs from the fact, (practical) 
deliberation leads to produce it283. Vigo provides further insight in this respect when 
he holds, in comparing the so-called practical syllogism284 with the theoretical one, 
that while in the latter truth is somehow conserved, in the former truth is produced, 
it comes about. 
For the conclusion [of a theoretical syllogism] to be true, its corresponding premises 
have to be true, since syllogistic inference limits itself to conserve the truth of premises 
in the transition from the latter to the conclusion (...). [However,] in the case of 
practical syllogism it would not be right to say that the truth of premises is merely 
conserved in the resulting conclusion (i.e. action). It would not be right, because 
                                               
280 Cf. NE VI 1, 1139a 6ff. 
281 NATALI, C. 2001 p. 46 (our e). 
282 BROADIE, S. p. 226. Cf. also VON WRIGHT, Georg Henrik Explanation and Understanding 
London: Routledge, 1971 pp. 96 ff. 
283 The justification of an action will just explain the reasons that led to choose certain means in order 
to achieve an end: its object may be difficult to find (e.g. evidence on the means in a criminal 
proceeding), but it is already set. Linguistic usage itself shows the contrast: while we say ‘justification of 
an action’, deliberation is for an action: there is no question of explaining here, but of leading to an 
action. 
284 Aristotle himself never uses this term. Scholarship introduced it because Aristotle suggests a 
similarity between the formal scheme for animal movement and human action and that of theoretical 
syllogisms (cf. e.g. De Motu Animalium 7, 701a 23-25). In practical syllogism, the major premise is 
concerned with desire (i.e. ends) while the minor is concerned with means to the end. As Vigo holds, 
the parallelism is very helpful to understand the nature of practical truth, if handled adequately (cf. 
VIGO, A. 2007b esp. pp. 309-323); however, it has also been a source of misunderstandings, insofar as 
it seems to suggest a reduction of practical to theoretical reason―something unacceptable, in view of 
the Aristotelian texts we are working on. Cf. also the developments in NATALI, C. 2001 pp. 63-109; 
NUSSBAUM, M. 1978 pp. 184-210; ANSCOMBE, G.E.M. § 32 ff. 
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practical truth occurs only in the conclusion itself (i.e. action) and is not yet really 
present, as practical truth, in none of the premises as taken separately. Practical truth is 
not, therefore, merely conserved but, strictly speaking, constituted or produced in the 
conjunction of wish and belief that is the fruit of the intervention of choice 
(proairesis)285. 
Practical truth is not only the truth of the means (the fact that they 
effectively lead to the end pursued) nor the rectitude of desire, but it is the 
conjunction of both, that corresponds to Aristotle’s definition of this kind of 
truth, of which phronēsis is the ‘producer’: “truth in agreement with right desire” 
(VI 2, 1139a 29ff). Moreover, the truth one comes up with in the conclusion is new 
in a sense that cannot be said of the conclusion of a theoretical syllogism: its truth 
is structurally different from the truth of the premises. While new knowledge is 
indeed provided in the conclusion of a theoretical syllogism as the fruit of the 
conjunction of the premises, these contain already parts of this theoretical truth, 
and that is why here the conclusion is arrived at through conservation (or, we 
might say, accumulation). The structural difference of the truth arrived at in the 
conclusion of practical syllogism comes into focus in light of Aristotle’s insistence 
that its conclusion is not a statement, but an action: 
[H]ow is it that thought is sometimes followed by an action, sometimes not (…)? 
What happens seems parallel to the case of thinking and inferring about the 
immovable objects. There the end is the truth seen (for, when one thinks the two 
propositions, one thinks and puts together the conclusion), but here the propositions 
result in a conclusion which is an action―for example, whenever one thinks that every 
man ought to walk, and that one is a man oneself, straightaway one walks286. 
Aristotle’s account is here genuinely phenomenological: what we see in 
practical inferences is simply that the combination of the universal and the par-
ticular premises immediately results in action. “The test of the facts of life”287 shows 
that there is no intermediate step between the premises and the action. That is 
                                               
285 VIGO, A. 2007b p. 317. 
286 Movement of Animals 7, 701a 6-14. Cf. also 20 ff. 
287 Cf. NE IX 8, 1179a 20ff. (mod. tr): “We must therefore survey what we have already said, bringing 
it to the test of the facts of life, and if it harmonizes with the facts we must accept it, but if it clashes 
with them we must suppose it to be mere theories”. 
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why Vigo holds that choice (proairesis) is not to be taken for the conclusion of the 
practical syllogism: instead, he suggests, proairesis is the passage from the premises 
of deliberation to the conclusion, i.e. the action288. This does not downplay the 
role of proairesis, but rather prevents it from being considered as an intellectual 
inference; such an account would drive orexis out of practical reasoning, and it 
would require an additional connection between the conclusion of the practical 
syllogism and the action (a connection that Aristotle does not hint at)289. In other 
words: proairesis cannot be understood separately from praxis. Aristotle himself 
relates it to praxis as its origin (archē praxeōs) in NE VI: 
[S]ince moral excellence is a state concerned with choice, and choice is a deliberate 
desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is 
to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of 
intellect and of truth is practical (...). The origin of action (archē praxeōs)―its efficient, 
not its final cause―is choice (proairesis), and that of choice is desire and reasoning 
with a view to an end” (VI 2, 1139a 22-33). 
When desire and deliberation, orexis and dianoia, come to a conclusion of 
their dialogue, a specific course of action among those possible is followed, and 
proairesis is already part of this course of action290. If the conclusion of a reasoning 
on practical affairs were not an action, then we would not be speaking any longer 
of a practical syllogism, but of a theoretical reasoning that either explains the 
course of an action or constitutes the theoretical part of a practical syllogism, e.g. 
it considers the factual possibilities of successfully undertaking an action291. In 
                                               
288 Cf. VIGO, A. 2006b p. 314. 
289 Natali tackles both problems and interestingly argues that without “transmission of desire” there is 
no question of practical reasoning (Cf. NATALI, C. 2001 pp. 93-95, p. 95 for ref). 
290 VIGO, A. 2006b p. 317. Of course, there are defective cases, such as that of the agent who chooses 
but later declines to act; this Aristotle calls “incontinence”. However, if practical reasoning were 
approached on the basis of such a deficient case where in fact the syllogism is not ended (since the 
conclusion―the action―is not inferred), then it would not be understood at all. It is rather 
incontinence that must be understood from the action of the continent (Book VII of the NE is 
devoted to this topic, on which we cannot linger here. It must be noted, at any rate, that it is only 
developed once practical wisdom has been analyzed in book VI). 
291 “Practical truth presupposes, as one of its essential constitutive moments, a component of theoreti-
cal truth, represented by the descriptive premise of the practical syllogism”. (VIGO, A. 2006b p. 318). 
Anscombe exemplifies this thus: “John will drive from Chartres to Paris at an average of sixty m.p.h., 
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both cases, the reasoning examines an action instead of doing it. The NE is a chief 
example of this; however, what it can furnish us with is not practical truth, but 
rather theoretical truth on practical affairs. As Bodéüs rightly claims, if the NE 
provided practical truth, reading and understanding it would suffice to be good292. 
The fact that choice is defined by Aristotle as the origin of action under-
lines its inner connection to it―which implies that even if the choice does not 
actually lead to an action, be it due to incontinence or to external factors, there is 
also a practical moment at play293: praxis is inescapable also when there is no external 
action, because choice itself is already praxis294. Moreover, even those cases in which 
there is no choice do not escape the practical domain. The alternative to ‘choosing 
something’ is not, strictly speaking, ‘not choosing anything’, as though such 
neutrality could be reached: we do choose, namely we choose ‘not to choose’. 
Because our being is praxis, we are always necessarily choosing who we are going 
to be: what is essential to praxis is not whether a change is produced or not in a reality external 
to the agent, but the fact that a change is always necessarily operated in the agent herself. Even 
if the action is not actually carried out, there is praxis. Even if there is no choice, 
there is praxis. This prevents a view of praxis that might consider its effects from the point of 
                                                                                                                                 
he starts around five, Paris is sixty miles from Chartres, therefore he will arrive at six―this will not be 
what Aristotle calls a ‘demonstration’ because, if we ask the question what John will do, that is certainly 
capable of turning out one way or another. But for all that the reasoning is an argument that something 
is true. It is not practical reasoning: it has not the form of a calculation what to do, though like any other 
piece of ‘theoretical’ argument it could play a part in such a calculation” (ANSCOMBE, G. E. M. § 33, our e).  
292 Cf. BODÉÜS, R. p. 30. Cf. also NE X, 1179b 4ff. 
293 In the case of incontinence, the action is not undertaken due to weakness in the right desire that 
had led the agent to judge well or even to choose well. This has an effect on the ēthos, namely weakness 
of desire is increased. As for the case where an external impediment prevents the agent from 
undertaking the chosen action, the ‘making’ moment of the action is not realized, but the ‘doing’ 
moment is, insofar as the intention or interior determination to do something reinforces the agent’s 
ēthos, his disposition to act hereafter in a manner consistent with his choice (concerning the coexistence 
of ‘making’ and ‘doing’ in praxis, developed here as ‘producing’ and ‘operating’, cf. note 260 ff.). As 
Anscombe holds, “the intention itself can be complete, although it remains a purely interior thing” (Cf. 
ANSCOMBE, G. E. M. § 4). 
294 It is to our mind the failure to understand choice as praxis that leads Broadie to claim that practical 
truth occurs in what she calls the ‘prescriptive conclusion’ of the practical syllogism (Cf. BROADIE, S. 
pp. 219-225). For a criticism of Broadie’s argument, cf. VIGO, A. 2006b p. 315 n. 14. 
 76 
view of its external output, which would miss the core of it. It is in this respect that we 
have distinguished above between a derivative sense of praxis (action) and the 
fundamental or original one: praxis as a way of being human. 
The point that there is always an effect in the practical agent, regardless of 
whether something is changed in the world, is traced back to the fact that the orectic 
dimension is present throughout the life of man, that being who is capable of choice, i.e. 
capable of “desiderative thought or intellectual desire”295. This ‘always already’ 
structure of orexis implies at the same time the ‘not yet’ situation that distinguishes 
deliberation from justification: the fact that one is always already installed within 
an ēthos entails that practical reason is irreducible to the reasonings that approach 
action from the outside, i.e. as an object different from what one is actually doing. 
In practical reason there is an identification between knowing and doing: it oper-
ates within action, so that it is constantly in motion, i.e. not yet definitely ‘there’ as the 
object of a theoretical study is said to be ‘there’. What is more, once an action has 
been undertaken, the ‘always already’ of ēthos remains altogether with the ‘not yet’ 
of eupraxia as the vast never fully accomplished and yet definitely real ‘action’ that is a life: ac-
tivity, praxis in the wide sense296. 
We are thus faced once again with Aristotle’s chief thesis that eudaimonia, 
i.e., practical truth (eupraxia), is not a state but an activity (energeia) of the soul ac-
cording to virtue297. Practical truth is neither truth about a state nor about an action, 
but truth realized in an action, truth being operated right now. Truth of a life, which demands 
for a ‘live picture’298. This is the conceptual core that attracts Heidegger towards 
Aristotelian practical philosophy: the tension between ‘always already’ and ‘not yet’ 
                                               
295 NE VI 2, 1139b 4f. 
296 Cf. RICOEUR, P. 1990 p. 357 “[E]nergeia-dynamis points towards a ground of being (fond d’être), at 
once potentiality and actuality (puissant et effectif) against which human action stands out” (our e). 
297 Cf. e.g. NE I 7, 1098a 16f; 13, 1102a 5f. 
298 Cf. pp. 35 and 55 above. 
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in human life, a peculiar motion that constitutes the locus of an original experience 
of truth: 
As a being becoming unveiled and available through the alētheuein of phronēsis, the 
prakton is in the mode of not yet being such an such. As ‘not yet such and such’ and, 
indeed, as the toward-which of concern, it is at the same time already such and such, i.e. 
insofar as it is the toward-which that belongs to a concrete readiness for dealings, the 
constitutive illumination of which is provided by phronēsis. This ‘not-yet’ and this 
‘already’ need to be understood in their ‘unity’, i.e. on the basis of an original 
givenness, with reference to which they are particular explicata299. 
However, the question necessarily arises as to why, despite his live picture of life, 
Aristotle should ultimately consider theory as the highest form of access to truth 
for human beings, or also determine human happiness in relation to theory. Rivers 
of ink have been expended on this question, which is also at the core of 
Heidegger’s Auseinandersetzung with Aristotle in the 1920s. 
2.6. Phronēsis and Sophia: Irreducibility Does Not Mean Supremacy 
We have just held that a reasoning which examines an action instead of leading to 
do it is not a practical reasoning but a theoretical one. We may call it ‘practical 
philosophy’ with Aristotle300, but noting as he does that this is not practical 
wisdom or phronēsis301, but theoretical reasoning on practical affairs. This kind of 
reasoning, we have argued, considers desire in a determined course of action instead 
of being affected by it. Yet, one’s being continues to be “desiderative thought or 
                                               
299 NB 383/35-36 [155, mod. tr, add. e.] “Das prakton als das Seiende, das im alētheuein der phronēsis 
unverhüllt verfügbar wird, ist etwas, was ist als noch nicht das und das Sein. Als ›noch nicht das und das‹, 
und zwar als Worauf eines Besorgens, ist es zugleich schon das und das, als das Worauf einer konkreten 
Umgangsbereitschaft, deren konstitutive Erhellung die phronēsis ausmacht. Das ›Noch-Nicht‹ und das 
›Schon‹ sind in ihrer ›Einheit‹ zu verstehen, d. h. von einer ursprünglichen Gegebenheit her, für die das 
›Nochnicht‹ und das ›Schon‹ bestimmte Explikate sind”. 
300 Cf. Met. II 1, 993b 19ff. 
301 Cf. NE VII, 1152a 9f: “A man has practical wisdom not by knowing only but by acting”. Cf. 
BERTI, E. 1988 pp. 113 ff.  Cf. also BODÉÜS, Richard Le véritable politique et ses vertus selon Aristote. 
Louvain: Peeters, 2004 p. 63: “All the teaching of Aristotle is summarized in two distinct propositions: 
(a) it is reason that teaches the philosopher that virtuous action is the ultimate end of action. (b) But it 
does not teach anyone to take this sort of action as ultimate end of his action”.  
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intellectual desire (orektikos nous hē proairesis ē orexis dianoetikē)” (VI 2, 1139b 5) 
when one is considering a course of action. In other words, practical reason is 
irreducible to theoretical reasonings not because it would have nothing to do with them, but 
rather because it encompasses them: practical reason, in its characteristic ‘not yet being 
finished’, is always already operating in a theoretical exercise, because it is still 
ourselves, with our own always-in-motion ēthos, that are exercising that ability. 
Theory does not simply set a parenthesis within the continuum of our praxis.  
While theōria cannot alter praxis but through praxis itself, one may ask 
whether praxis does not per se alter theōria. A thorough study of the NE does not 
per se alter one’s practical reasoning: “we are none the more able to act for 
knowing (eidenai) [things which are good for man] if the aretai are hexeis” (VI 12, 
1143b 24f). The study may reveal the need of a change, but this change will only 
come true through actions that will modify one’s ēthos. However, does not one’s 
ēthos―the result of one’s practical behavior―condition the way one theoretically 
approaches practical affairs, or any affairs whatsoever? 
What we are asking―which will be answered as our argument unfolds―is 
in fact at the core of one of the widest trends of controversy on the NE, namely 
what the nature of the relation between theōria and praxis is. Aristotle’s remarks 
about this issue are somewhat obscure for us, unless we assume―and this is the 
leading thread of our interpretation―that there is less of an exclusive relation 
between them than has been generally thought302. We believe that, despite the 
important differences between them, Aristotle ultimately envisions them as a 
continuity, when both are given in human life303, as shown in a very much quoted passage 
of the Politics, at the center of Aristotle’s reflection on the best life (aristos bios): 
If we are right in our view, and happiness is assumed to be acting well (euprattein), the 
active life will be the best (aristos bios ho praktikos), both for every city collectively, and 
                                               
302 Against this stands the mainstream view of Aristotle as opposed to Plato: cf. pp. 13 ff. 
303 Cf. NATALI, C. 2001 pp. 157 ff. 
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for individuals. Not that a life of action (ton praktikon) must necessarily have relation 
to others, as some persons think, nor are those ideas to be regarded as practical 
which are pursued for the sake of the objects that result from action (charin  
gignomenas ek tou prattein), but much more the thoughts and contemplations (theōriai kai 
dianoēseis) which are independent and fulfilled in themselves (autotelei); since acting 
well (eupraxia), and therefore a certain kind of action (praxis tis), is an end (telos), and 
even in the case of external actions the directing mind (dianoia) is most truly said to act (prattein)304.  
This text is especially relevant because Aristotle makes here explicit the  
above-mentioned double sense of praxis: (i) praxis as a specific action―either 
internal or externally visible― and (ii) praxis as a way of being―i.e. being happy, 
equated with euprattein. Aristotle’s reasoning departs from the meaning of praxis as 
a way of being, which he explicitly relates below to the NE305: eudaimonia is 
eupraxia or energeia―not a frozen state, but a ‘becoming’, a continuum within which 
we can in turn identify specific actions, praxis in sense (i). Concerning these 
‘individualisable’ actions, Aristotle holds that the term praxis is not limited to 
actions which relate somehow to others, or actions looking for things resulting 
from the action (gignomena ek tou prattein), i.e. what in NE I is called “erga apart 
from the energeiai that produce them” or “ends apart from the actions (telē para tas 
praxeis)”306. That is only praxis in the sense of non-theoretical dealings, the sense of the 
term in which Aristotle thinks when he says in NE X that “from practical 
activities (de tōn praktikōn) we gain more or less apart from the action (para tēn 
praxin)”307. Actually, in this statement, the ambiguity between praktika and praxis 
seems precisely intended to point to the specific meaning of praxis (of which 
praktika are only one occurrence), namely praxis as an activity that does not have an end 
                                               
304 Politics VII 3, 1325b 14ff. (our e, mod. tr). 
305 “The view that we maintain (and this is the definition that we laid down in the Ethics, if those discourses 
are of any value) is that happiness is the complete activity (energeia) and employment (chrēsis) of virtue 
(aretē)” (Politics VII 13, 1332a 7ff, Rackham). Cf. also VII 8, 1328a 37f. Cf. note 164 above for passages 
in the NE linking eudaimonia and eupraxia, and note 165 for passages linking eudaimonia-eupraxia and 
energeia. Cf. also Politics VII 3, 1325a 31f: “it is a mistake to put inactivity (apraktein) over action 
(prattein), for happiness is activity (praxis)”. 
306 NE I 1, 1094a 4f. 
307 NE X 7, 1177b 3f. 
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other than itself, because it is itself its end308. It is from this idea of praxis, the one that 
Aristotle holds throughout the NE and in Metaphysics IX 6, that he remarks in the 
Politics that “thoughts and contemplations”, which have their end in themselves 
(autotelei), are “much more” strictly praxeis. And the point is still reaffirmed, to 
ensure that praxis is not limited to external actions: even when the action is poured 
into the outside the mind is said to act. In other words, reflecting, theōria, which is not 
per se poured into the outside, is praxis too; what we think, even if it is not directed 
or translated into external actions, is praxis: it changes the way we are. What is 
more, it is because of the autotelic character of this praxis that the superiority of 
bios theōretikos is affirmed in a passage of NE X―that parallels the one of Politics― 
where the term energeia is significantly used to signify praxis: 
So if among excellent actions political and military actions are distinguished by 
nobility and greatness, and these are unleisurely and aim at an end and are not 
desirable for their own sake, but the activity of intellect (de tou nou energeia), which is 
contemplative, seems both to be superior in worth and to aim at no end beyond 
itself, and to have its pleasure proper to itself (…) and all the other attributes ascribes 
to the blessed man (…) it follows that this will be the full happiness (teleia eudaimonia) 
of man (NE X 7, 1177b 16-25). 
Because theōria belongs to the genus praxis, Aristotle can freely praise the 
exercise of theōria as the highest for human beings and hold at the same time that 
“life is praxis and not poiēsis”309. Actually, the fundamental sense of praxis as a way 
of being can only be preserved if we realize that what is essential of praxis is the 
fact that with any action a change is always necessarily operated in the agent 
herself, regardless of whether an external effect results from this action. This is 
what Aristotle is meaning―still in our passage of Politics VII 3―when he traces 
action back to the mind (dianoia) and stresses that we must speak of a praxis even 
more (malista) when there are no external effects resulting from the operation of the 
mind. Only by including theōria among praxeis can it make any sense to think of 
                                               
308 Cf. NE VI 5, 1140b 6f. 
309 Politics I 4, 1254a 7. 
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praxis as the way of being of human beings. If we were to deny that theōria is 
praxis, not only would we create artificial parentheses in the continuum of life (the 
times during which man exercises theōria) but we would also necessarily reduce 
praxis to the external effects that may stem from it, and thus notions as hexis, aretē 
and ēthos would become useless. However, if theōria is a form of praxis, why is it 
that knowing (eidenai) what is good does not make us better310?  
Sophia, Aristotle argues, is “a part of full virtue (meros tēs holēs aretēs), [and] by 
being possessed and by actualizing itself makes a man happy. Still, the function 
(ergon) of man is achieved in accordance with phronēsis as well as with ēthikē aretē” 
(VI 12, 1144a 5ff). This surely forbids reading Aristotle’s discussion in NE X 6-8 
as though he would be holding there that contemplative life, i.e. happiness at its 
best (eudaimonia teleia)311 excludes the exercise of aretai. Actually, in book X itself, 
upon acknowledging the limits of theōria for man, Aristotle remarks: “the life of 
the man who is active in accordance with excellence (kata tēn aretēn energountos) will 
be happy” (X 8, 1179a 8f). And in the Politics he puts it straighforwardly: “each 
one has just so much of happiness as he has of aretē and phronēsis”312. 
These statements just assume the above-mentioned continuity between 
praxis and theōria, which does not entail a leveling of their differences: they are 
“one in respect of continuity and quantity, though not of quality”313. If theōrein can 
ever be eudaimonia teleia it is surely not without aretē and phronēsis. Because theōria is 
praxis, it is subject to aretē and phronēsis: as is the case with any other praxis, the 
exercise of theōrein necessarily improves or worsens one’s ēthos. Not only from the 
point of view of the relation between theōrein and the praxis of one’s life as a whole 
                                               
310 Cf. NE VI 12, 1143b 24f. 
311 Cf. NE X 7, 1177b 24. 
312 Politics VII 1, 1323b 21f. 
313 Met. V 4, 1014b 25f. The unity between praxis and theōria, though, is not exactly comparable to that 
between phronēsis and aretē, which require one another to exist. While the exercise of theōria is always the 
exercise of praxis, praxis does not per se require the existence of theōria. 
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(e.g. one can get down to thoroughly studying the NE and consciously neglect 
other urgent duties), but specially from that of how theōrein itself is exercised: one 
may study the NE with a disposition to change one’s mind about certain issues if 
the arguments provided are compelling enough, or instead adopt the dogmatic 
attitude of rejecting certain points that contradict one’s own views. One’s 
scientific ēthos is necessarily transformed as a result of this exercise, and it is from 
this transformed ēthos that subsequent theoretical dealings are to depart. Still, it is 
not because one has been studying the arguments in the NE that one becomes 
good, but because one (i) welcomes them as reasonable, to the extent that they 
are, and (ii) subsequently conducts one’s actions according to these arguments. It 
is not the logoi autarkei that change one’s praxis, but praxis itself, in the form of (i) 
one’s attitude towards them and (ii) one’s further actions. Logoi “seem to have 
power to encourage and stimulate the generous-minded among the young, and to 
make a character which is gently born, and a true lover of what is noble, ready to 
be possessed by excellence (katokōchimon ek tēs aretēs)” (X 9, 1179b 9). They have 
an effect on some youngsters, but only insofar as they have been previously 
prepared for through the ēthos that has been transmitted to them314. As Plato puts 
it in a remarkably close manner in the Republic, those who have been well educated 
“praise beautiful things and take delight in them and receive them into their soul 
to foster its growth and become themselves beautiful and good”315. Yet, they 
must, “when they are grown up”, i.e. when they have to act themselves, “practice 
and be ‘habituated’ (epitēdeuein kai ethizesthai)” to aretai (X 9, 1180a 2f). 
Summing up, the exercise of theōria can modify one’s ēthos, but it does only 
insofar as theōria is a kind of praxis, and not insofar as it is a body of concepts: we 
do not change because we know what is better, but because we do it. Readiness to 
change one’s points of view is surely a move in that direction, but the range of 
                                               
314 Cf. paragraph 1.6 above (pp. 38 ff). 
315 Republic III, 402a (mod. tr). 
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praxeis that constitutes the praxis of a life is necessarily wider than the exercise of 
theōria316. 
Moreover, the fact that theōria is a praxis implies also that one’s praxis may 
have an effect on the disclosing possibilities of theōria. How could this happen? 
Aristotle defines sophia, the hexis of theōria, as epistēmē combined with nous317, i.e. 
with intuition of the first principles (archai) that make possible the operation of 
any epistēmē. Sophia is more than epistēmē, because it does not just use the first 
principles, but it also accounts for them, in a sort of circular movement where the 
same principles that are provisionally taken for granted as basis for the reasoning 
are questioned as to their validity. To question them one must first of all get to 
know them, which occurs in different manners: “of the first principles we see 
(theōrein) some by induction (epagōgē), some by perception (aisthēsis), some by a 
certain habituation (ethismos), and others too in other ways” (I 8, 1098b 3f). The 
second way mentioned is especially relevant for our purpose, and meets a point 
that is repeatedly made by Aristotle: “excellence (aretē) and vice (mochthēria) 
respectively preserve and destroy the first principle” (VII 8, 1151a 15)318. Yet, “it 
is not any and every belief that pleasant and painful objects destroy and pervert, 
e.g. the belief that the triangle has or has not its angles equal to two right angles, 
but only beliefs about what is to be done” (VI 5, 1140b 13ff) 319. One can become 
a perfect villain and still remain an outstanding geometrician. However, insofar as 
theōria must also deal with human things, the lack of a “certain habituation” 
necessarily limits one’s possibilities as far as practical philosophy is concerned. 
One can indeed overlook the role of ēthos for a lack of philosophical insight, but 
                                               
316 Cf. NE X 8, 1178b 33f: “Our nature is not self-sufficient for the exercise of theōrein”. 
317 On sophia as the conjunction of epistēmē and nous, cf. NE VI 7, 1141a 17-20, 1141b 2f. 
318 Cf. also NE VI 5, 1140b 17ff. 
319 “[I]n actions that for the sake of which is the first principle, as the hypotheses are in mathematics; 
neither in that case is it reason that teaches the first principles, nor is it so here―excellence either natu-
ral or produced by habituation is what teaches right opinion about the first principle” (NE VII 8, 
1151a 15ff). Cf. BODÉÜS, R. 2004 p. 59. 
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one will necessarily overlook it for a lack of acquaintance with it, i.e. for a lack of 
exercise of it. Because the object of practical philosophy is oneself, one’s relation 
to oneself is decisive for its development. Because phronēsis includes all aretai, it is 
required to ensure an in-depth access to the principle or principles that any 
reflection concerning human things, such as the NE, requires320.  
Yet, the fact that praxis encompasses theōria and that, insofar as it is 
eupraxia, makes theōria possible to a certain extent, does not entail a superiority of 
phronēsis over sophia: 
[Phronēsis] is not supreme over sophia, i.e. over the superior part of us, any more than 
the art of medicine is over health; for it does not use it but provides for its coming to being 
(hora hopōs genētai); it issues orders, then, for its sake (heneka epitattei), but not to it. 
Further, to maintain its supremacy would be like saying that the art of politics rules 
the gods because it issues orders about all affairs of the state (VI 13, 1145a 6ff). 
The point made here is confirmed by parallel passages in NE VI and EE 
VII321. Phronēsis does not command sophia, it does not give orders to it; but it does 
command for the sake of sophia, i.e. it is one of the factors that make sophia possible. 
How this nuance is to be understood is explained by the example on politics: if 
one were to hold that phronēsis commands sophia, the science that deals with what 
cannot be otherwise―what is not subject to the decisions of man, the order of 
reality―, one would be implying that human decisions could ground the order of a 
reality within which human beings always already find themselves. This is the 
sense in which Aristotle states in NE VI that “it would be strange to think that the 
art of politics, or phronēsis, is the best knowledge, since man is not the best thing of the 
                                               
320 That is why “we ought to attend to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced and 
older people or of phronimoi not less than to demonstrations; for because experience has given them an 
eye they see aright” (NE VI 11, 1143b 11ff). 
321 NE VI 12, 1143b 33ff: “[I]t would be thought strange if phronēsis, being inferior to sophia, is to be 
put in authority over it, as seems to be implied by the fact that the art which produces anything rules 
and issues commands about that thing”. EE VII 15, 1249b 12 ff. “[M]edical science governs in one 
sense, health in another, the former existing for the latter. And so it is with the theoretic faculty; for 
god is not an imperative ruler, but is the end with a view to which phronēsis issues its commands (...), for 
god needs nothing”. 
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world” (VI 7, 1141a 20f). The statement, it must be said, it not a theological as-
sumption, but the acknowledgment that there are states of affairs at many differ-
ent levels of reality which are not ours to change: 
[A]bout eternal things no one deliberates, e.g. about the material universe or the 
incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of a square. But no more do we 
deliberate about the things that involve movement but always happen in the same 
way, whether of necessity or by nature or from any other cause, e.g. the solstices and 
the risings of the stars; nor about things that happen now in one way, now in 
another, e.g. droughts and rains; nor about chance events, like the finding of treasure. 
But we do not deliberate even about all human affairs; for instance, no Spartan deliberates 
about the best constitution for the Scythians. For none of these things can be brought about 
by our own efforts (III 3, 1112a 21 ff). 
Aristotle’s point is evidently not that we cannot change some spheres of 
reality―and of the reality that we ourselves are―with our choices, but rather that 
such changes cannot alter the order of that reality322. We cannot change, for instance, 
the fact that everything we do and think shapes ourselves, i.e. that all this is praxis. 
And neither can we change what right desire or what the human good is323, nor 
the fact that we necessarily tend towards eudaimonia―the whole of the NE is based 
on assumptions like these. In a word, man cannot decide what phronēsis is made of, 
which is tantamount to saying that our phronēsis is not only a result of our own free 
decisions, but also of the fact that they are “in accordance with, or not without, 
rational principle (...) [i.e.] in conformity with aretē” (I 7, 1098a 7, 16f). We cannot 
change this reality for another reality―we can just transform the reality within 
which we find ourselves, our ergon, the ‘always in movement’ result of our actions. 
In fact, we cannot help transforming it one way or the other. 
                                               
322 “The only part of reality in which according to Aristotle it is possible to change the state of things is 
the one that is constituted by human actions” (BERTI, E. 1988 p. 115). 
323 Someone might object to this statement, holding that the rectitude of desire is a result of a 
determined cultural background. That Aristotle does not ignore the effect of culture in our view of 
reality is clear from his constant allusions to the opinions of his contemporaries. But equally clear is the 
fact that the NE is not a sociological description. In this respect, the idea that there is such a thing as a 
rectitude of desire that does not just depend on human decisions is assumed statement after statement 
in the NE. “Concerning the (ultimate) good, Aristotle never seeks in reason a norm for virtue; he 
rather seeks in virtue a norm for reason” (BODÉÜS, R. 2004 p. 59). 
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What is beyond our creative possibilities is not the object of delibera-
tion―and therefore of phronēsis―but that of sophia. Hence the pretension of valid-
ity of the discourse of the NE, its scientificity, requires that its structure be 
sophia324, not phronēsis325. That is the precise sense in which sophia is higher than 
phronēsis: it has to do with what is given prior to our decisions, and what our deci-
sions cannot alter; it is therefore a sensible attitude to discern well what is ours to 
deliberate about, and what is not326. For its superiority, though, sophia is not 
enough to make men good327, so while theōria is a praxis itself, its ergon, its alētheia is 
not practical: the logoi that we can find in the NE, or that Aristotle’s students could 
listen to, do not have an ēthos in the active sense of being it: they just contain ideas 
about how ēthos works, and how a good ēthos can be attained through praxis. And 
vice versa, the specific sense in which a life realizes truth does not have the form 
of logois autarkeis, but that of an enactment, praxis. The being and the alētheuein of 
praxis are one and the same, and for that reason while we can dispose of 
theōria―our life could unfold without exercicing it―we cannot dispose of praxis, 
because we are it. Yet, while it encompasses everything in our life, including theōria, 
it cannot alter its own ontological structure, as known by theōria: that praxis is 
irreducible does not mean that man is “the best thing of the world” (VI 7, 1141a 20f). 
                                               
324 Berti, for his part, reserves the character of sophia to the Metaphysics, and considers ‘practical 
philosophy’ (i.e. the discourse of the NE) to be epistēmē, like mathematics, physics or political science, 
which do not account for the principles with which they operate. (Cf. BERTI, E. 1988 pp. 141-142). 
However, while the Metaphysics is surely mostly concerned with accounting for the archai, we believe 
that this account is also an important part of philosophical works such as the NE, the Physics and the 
De Anima, which stand apart from other more ‘empirical’ works such as the Metereology or On Memory 
for which the term epistēmē seems to be suitable. In this respect, Gadamer argues that Aristotle 
considers both metaphysics and ethics to belong to philosophia: “When [Aristotle] develops his own 
teaching, he speaks of theoretical philosophy instead of theoretical sophia; of practical philosophy 
instead of practical sophia. Why? I believe that in Aristotle the idea is still present of knowledge as a 
search, of knowledge as something that is never absolute but is always on the way towards perfection” 
(GADAMER, H.-G. 1990, p. 63). 
325 Cf. NE VI 8 1142a 23f: “That phronēsis is not epistēmē is clear”. 
326 Cf. NE III 3, 1112a 18ff. 
327 Cf. NE X, 1179b 4ff. 
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Conclusion to Section I 
If one wishes to truly enter in a dialogue, it is required that one set one’s views 
about the matter at stake, not only in order to bring to bear one’s own voice in the 
interchange, but also in order to be able to qualify or change one’s views. This 
requirement, which seems all the more relevant when one is confronted with a 
philosophy like Aristotle’s, is however not the standard practice in the literature 
on Heidegger’s Aristotle, although there are a number of exceptions―the reader’s 
to judge hereafter. In devoting this first section to an ‘independent’ research on 
Aristotle we have intended to set the necessary conditions for a better apprecia-
tion and discussion of what Heidegger found in Aristotle. 
For those readers blessed with a longer acquaintance with Aristotle, whom 
the preceding analyses may not have opened substantial horizons, an important 
element was nevertheless provided in the section we are now concluding: it is from 
our views on phronēsis, energeia and related concepts, as set down in these pages, that 
our dialogue with Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle will unfold. Why we are 
concerned about certain issues when we will follow Heidegger throughout his work 
in the early 1920s finds an answer in this first section, to which the reader will be 
redirected often hereafter. Its main points may now be summarized. 
Our discussion has revolved around two main concepts, which structure 
the two preceding chapters: orexis and energeia. Both come down to an idea that 
parallels Aristotle’s central concern with movement, namely, how to understand 
its structure without betraying what it tells us about itself, i.e. that it is constantly 
in motion and thus cannot be reduced to one of its stages. The introduction of 
orexis in the conceptual matrix of the ethics allows Aristotle to account for the way 
in which our ēthos, which we perceive as evolving throughout time, both comes to be 
and is now. With orexis, Aristotle manages to explain not only what it means that 
we are now better or worse from the point of view of human aretē, but also how we 
have come to be the way we are, and how our present acts will model the way we 
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will be―in short, why what best describes our ēthos is kinēsis: we are a ‘coming to 
be’. Orexis places the notion of telos at the center of ethical life: it is because we 
tend towards what we believe to be our good that we act, and it is because we act 
that we come to tend more strongly towards that good. How one is and how one 
is going to be from an ethical point of view can be ultimately understood in terms 
of the telē towards which one directs oneself. 
From this centrality of telos, the controversies about the relation between 
ends and means in the NE can be dissolved through what we have called an ‘or-
ganic paradigm’, following Aristotle’s understanding of organic unity (symphysis): 
speaking about ends and means in human life is a requirement of our temporal 
distention, but we would betray this temporality if we were to conceive ends and 
means separately. Just as organic life is the result of the interpenetration of its 
components, so is ethical life the result of the intermingling of ends and means: if 
the end towards which one longs cannot be equated with the means it is only be-
cause one cannot reach that end immediately, because “one swallow does not 
make a summer” (I 7, 1098a 18f). The end is always present in our choice of the 
means, as indicated by Aristotle’s denomination of the means as ta pros to telos. It is 
present in the ‘now’ of praxis, not only in the form of an explicit calculation of 
means, but also in the form of the ēthos that, as a result of our previous choices, 
has led us to calculate and desire in a specific manner. In other words, the end is 
not only what we now choose, but what we have chosen before―not only what 
we now do, but what we have come to be with what we have done. It is not only 
something we choose, it is always also something we are already. 
This determination of ēthos as embedded in time, one that transcends the 
here and now of our experience and puts ēthos into motion, is intimately tied with 
one of Aristotle’s central theses in the NE, namely that eudaimonia, the fulfillment 
of our being, is not a state but an activity, energeia: “something that happens, not a 
thing that we possess all the time, like a piece of property (ktēma)” (IX 9, 1169b 
29f). Still, if on the one hand ēthos structurally fits the mold of kinēsis and on the 
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other eudaimonia is supposed to fit that of energeia, the question arises whether we 
should just equate kinēsis and energeia. But Aristotle’s most important determina-
tion of energeia, in 1048b, precisely forbids that. Before the ‘being on the way’ that 
is characteristic of almost everything in human life, and which demands the dis-
tinction between ends and means, energeia stands as a disturbing exception: as it is, 
Aristotle reports how in performing certain activities, such as seeing, or living it-
self―the ‘activity’ that lies beneath any other activity―we experience the immediate 
attainment of ends which, as a constitutive element of the experience itself, 
continue to be. Living is experienced as immediately fulfilled and, insofar as it is 
experienced, it is being, it continues to be. ‘Being’ thus appears as a synonym of 
attainment or fulfillment (entelecheia), but in the active sense of being always at-
tained, of a fulfillment that is, as it were, continuously renewed, continuously en-
acted (energeia). This places energeia at a different ontological level; still, however, 
Aristotle understands kinēsis as a special kind of energeia and entelecheia, which de-
mands further study on our part―the question shall be retaken in section II. 
As we have inferred from 1048b, and from different passages of the NE, 
the determination of energeia (and entelecheia) is also crucial to Aristotle’s distinction 
between praxis and poiēsis, in which the whole of his ethical conception is at stake: 
while poiēsis designates processes that have limits within one’s life, i.e. processes 
that we start and eventually stop, praxis is a constitutive element of life, something 
that is always at stake in our own living: it is not ours to stop it, because it does 
not cease, insofar as life continues to be. While poiēsis is a process that we can ob-
serve from our own self, praxis is not primarily something we can observe, because 
praxis is our own self: something that we are and that we become, something immedi-
ate to our own being and continuous as our own being is. This has some conse-
quences, among which we can now highlight the following: technical truth, which 
is truth about the way to attain certain ends in a restricted domain of human ac-
tion, is subordinated to a deeper level of ends, those which encompass the ‘action’ 
that is our life, a whole that is continuously on the way; praxis is thus primarily 
conceived as a way of being. No part of the truth about this deeper level of ends, 
 90 
i.e. practical truth, is transferable, as is the case of technical or theoretical truth. 
Statements about practical affairs remain as external to life, because they can stand 
without the ‘happening’ of this ‘whole continuously on the way’, as books stand 
on shelves while the lives of their owners unfold. Practical truth only exists in the 
form of praxis, as realized in a life―it only exists as energeia. As a result, ethics in its 
genuine original sense is not a body of rules we follow under certain conditions, 
but a dimension that pervades every single action in our life. 
The immediacy and continuity that are characteristic of praxis imply a third 
essential trait that has appeared in comparing it to poiēsis, and which is reinforced 
with the analysis of the relation between praxis and theōria: its irreducibility. The 
superiority of theōria, so insisted upon by Aristotle at the end of NE VI, and later 
in NE X, does not bring into question the continuum of our praxis; what is more, 
Aristotle’s preference for theōria as the highest praxis ensures a correct under-
standing of praxis, which must not be reduced to the external effects produced by it, 
but essentially consists of the internal effect always necessarily enacted in the agent 
herself, even when no choice is made or no decision is taken. 
The increasing relevance that the concept of energeia has acquired with the 
unfolding of our analysis of phronēsis and praxis lays a very convenient frame to ap-
proach one of Heidegger’s main concerns from his very first early course in 
Freiburg: the characterization of the peculiar structure of human life, of its mov-
edness (Bewegtheit), which is to remain his main topic throughout the 1920s, the 
“laboratory of fundamental ontology”328, until Sein und Zeit and beyond. The frame 
is all the more appropriate if we consider that it springs from the body of con-
cepts found in Aristotelian thought, which, although initially absent, will very soon 
turn out to be a crucial travel mate of Heidegger, at least explicitly until 1939, well 
into the so-called Kehre. 
                                               
328 SOMMER, C. 2005 p. 121. 
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3. From Phenomenology to Aristotle:   
Grasping Immediacy 
 
 
3.1. Phenomenology and the Stream of Life 
Heidegger’s concern with the Bewegtheit of human life pervades his research from 
the first early course in Freiburg, the 1919 Kriegsnotsemester329, under a concept that 
sustains the whole of his questioning in this short term: the immediacy 
(Unmittelbarkeit) with which we experience our own life, which is prior to any 
reflective development of such an experience. Heidegger’s insights in this course 
are acute and thought-provoking, and it is remarkable that many of the motives 
that will occupy him during the 20s are already present here, although if compared 
with the courses of the years to come, these motives are still put in a rather 
generic way; it is obviously a thought that is still steering its way, searching for a 
new language330. 
Although Heidegger, by then under the auspices of Husserl, is prudent 
enough as to avoid making explicit the fact that his development is partly a 
critique of Husserlian phenomenology, his efforts are focused on this immediacy, 
insofar as to his mind it has not been properly approached by Husserl. This is 
clear from the ironical beginning of the course, where Heidegger announces that 
this problem that concerns him “will reveal, in an increasingly radical and decisive 
manner”, that remarks as the following are “incongruent and foreign”: 
                                               
329 Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem (KNS 1919) in GA 56/57 Zur Bestimmung der 
Philosophie pp. 3-117 (hereafter KNS). 
330 The question of immediacy launched here will lead to Sein und Zeit, were Heidegger describes it 
carefully in a prominent passage (cf. SZ § 5 p. 15): “True, Dasein is ontically not only what is near or 
even nearest―we ourselves are it, each of us. Nevertheless, or precisely for this reason, is is 
ontologically what is farthest removed”. (“Das Dasein ist zwar ontisch nicht nur nahe oder gar das 
nächste – wir sind es sogar je selbst. Trotzdem oder gerade deshalb ist es ontologisch das Fernste”). 
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The scientific idea to be pursued is such that with the achievement of a genuine 
methodological orientation we step out beyond and away from ourselves, and must 
methodologically remain behind in the sphere which is forever foreign to the most 
proper problematic of the science to be founded331. 
This somehow pompously depicted idea of philosophical science is the 
blueprint of what Heidegger intends to develop, i.e. one in which we do not step 
out from ourselves, because we ultimately cannot do so. That is one of the conse-
quences of the fact that our life is immediate to us: even when we are reflecting, 
we are still living, so that theoretical efforts must try to grasp this immediacy 
without stopping its moving continuity. The terms ‘theory’ and ‘reflection’, in fact, 
are in this course332 the object of critique, as comportments that ignore the 
fundamental phenomenon of life: 
[I]n reflection (Reflexion) we are theoretically (theoretisch) oriented. All theoretical 
comportment, we said, is de-vivifying (entlebendes). This now shows itself in the case 
of life-experiences, for in reflection they are no longer lived but looked at. We set the ex-
periences out before us out of immediate experience; we intrude so to speak into the 
flowing stream of experiences and pull one or more of them out, we ‘still the stream’ 
as Natorp says333. 
The difference between ‘looking at’ a lived experience and ‘living it’ is the 
difference between a naïve approach that considers it as something that “pass[es] 
                                               
331 KNS § 1 in GA 56/57 p. 3 [3]: “Das Problem (…) wird zusehends entschiedener und radikaler die 
vorbereitenden Anfangssätze als ihm selbst inkongruent und sogar wesensfremd erscheinen lassen. Es 
liegt im sinnmäßigen Zuge der zu verfolgenden wissenschaftlichen Idee, daß wir mit der Gewinnung 
der echtmethodischen Erkenntnisstellung über uns selbst hinaus- und wegschreiten und uns selbst 
methodisch zurücklassen müssen in der Sphäre, die der ureigensten Problematik der zu fundierenden 
Wissenschaft ewig fremd bleibt”. 
332 The critique of theory here should not lead to the hurried conclusion that Heidegger’s thought is 
against theory altogether, as Bowler and Gonzalez correctly warn. Cf. BOWLER, Michael Heidegger and 
Aristotle. Philosophy as Praxis London/New York: Continuum, 2008, p. 97; GONZALEZ, F. J. “On the 
Way to Sophia: Heidegger on Plato’s Dialectic, Ethics, and Sophist” Research in Phenomenology 27 (1997) 
pp. 16-60 (cf. esp. pp. 26-28). 
333 KNS § 19 in GA 56/57 pp. 100-101 [85, our e.] “[I]n der Reflexion wir sind wir theoretisch 
eingestellt. Aller theoretische Verhalten, sagten wir, ist ein entlebendes. Das zeigt sich nun in einem 
ganz eminentem Sinne bei den Erlebnissen. Sie werden ja in der Reflexion nicht mehr erlebt, sondern, 
das ist ihr Sinn, erblickt. Wir stellen die Erlebnisse hin und aus dem unmittelbaren Erleben heraus. Wir 
machen einen Griff gleichsam in den abfließenden Strom der Erlebnisse und greifen eines oder 
mehrere heraus, d.h. ›wir stellen den Strom still‹, wie Natorp sagt”. The latter reference to Natorp (who 
is also the object of critique, cf. ibidem pp. 107 ff. [90 ff.]) is highlighted by Heidegger as the only 
“scientifically noteworthy objection” to phenomenology at that moment. 
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in front of me like a thing”334 and the approach that Heidegger is looking for: 
understanding lived experience “not as a process (Vor-gang), as thing, as object, but in 
a quite new way, as an event (Ereignis)”335. This event is not a kind of detour from 
life in order to conceptualize it from the outside, but an understanding of life from 
within. Insofar as in our questioning we do not lose sight of the fact that we are 
always already installed in life, we cannot speak of limits, as one does when 
designating a process, i.e. when one objectifies a certain period of time from the 
outside, and verifies the action (Gang) before (vor) oneself (Heidegger hyphenates 
Vor-gang in this sense). One’s lived experiences are not placed one after the other, 
or concurrent in time (which would after all remain in the perspective of Vor-
gänge)―they are merged in the continuous stream of life, being at one with life. 
Against the “knowing ‘I’ (erkennendes Ich)” of “the objective occurrence, the 
happening as objectified and known, [which] we describe as process”336, 
Heidegger stresses the “historical ‘I’ (historisches Ich)” that relates to the world as 
the environment in which she finds herself immersed. Thus, because life implies 
the experience of its environment, the immediacy not only refers to the historical 
‘I’ that lives but also, at the same time, to ‘what’ is lived in experience, not as a 
result of a joining “in the manner of existing objects”337 but as an original unity: 
                                               
334 “Das Erleben geht nicht vor mir vorbei, wie eine Sache, die ich hinstelle” Ibidem § 15 p. 75 [63, 
mod. tr.]. The parallelism with a passage of the NE is remarkable: “energeia clearly is something that 
happens, not a thing that we possess all the time, like a piece of property (ktēma)” (Cf. NE IX 9, 1169b 
29f, Rackham, mod. tr.). 
335 “[N]icht als Vor-gang, als Sache, Objekt, sondern als ein ganz Neuartiges, ein Ereignis” (KNS § 15 
in GA 56/57 p. 75 [63]). Sadler translates Ereignis as “an event of appropriation”, but there is no 
textual basis for this sense, that rather belongs to a later stage of Heidegger’s thought (cf. ADRIÁN, J. 
El lenguaje de Heidegger. Diccionario Filosófico 1912-1927 Barcelona: Herder, 2009 pp. 78-80). 
336 KNS § 15 in GA 56/57 p. 74 [62] “Das objectivierte Geschehen, das Geschehen als gegen-
ständliches, erkanntes, bezeichnen wir als Vor-gang”  
337 Ibidem § 13 p. 70 [59] “Das Erleben und das Erlebte sind nicht wie seiende Gegenstände 
zusammengestückt”. 
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“in immediate observation I do not find anything like an ‘I’, but only an 
‘experience of something’, a ‘living towards something’”338.  
This questioning of the modern concepts of ‘subject’ and ‘object’, on the 
basis of a more original unity between them, relegates the question of ‘what’ that 
is typical of an objectifying regard to prioritize the question of the ‘how’. 
Immediacy means sense, i.e. how something concerns me: 
What is immediately given! Every word here is significant. What does ‘immediate’ 
mean? The lectern is given to me immediately in the lived experience of it. I see it as 
such, I do not see sensations and sense data339. 
Heidegger is here referring back to his masterful analysis of the experience 
of the lectern in § 14, which for many reasons has remained as one of the best-
known passages of his early courses. Among these reasons stands out his coining 
of the verb welten (es weltet, “it worlds”), a term that expresses this immediacy 
between experience and the lived of experience, from which the hermeneutic 
relation to the world and to oneself springs, because everything―also oneself― 
“has the character of world (welthaft)”340. Das Erleben, the lived of experience, is not 
primarily a ‘this’ to be approached through the question ‘what’, as something I 
could view from the outside of the world to which I and das Erleben belong, but 
rather a ‘this’ in reference to which I ask myself always in the first place ‘how’. 
                                               
338 Ibidem § 13 p. 68 [57] “Unmittelbar schauend finde ich so etwas wie ein »ich« nicht vor, sondern nur 
ein »Er-leben von Etwas«, ein »Leben auf etwas zu«”. 
339 Ibidem § 17 p. 85 [71] “Was unmittelbar gegeben ist! Jedes Wort ist hier von Bedeutung. Was besagt 
unmittelbar? Unmittelbar ist mir im Kathedererlebnis das Katheder gegeben. Ich sehe dieses als 
solches und sehe nicht etwa Empfindungen und Empfindungsdaten”.  
340 Ibidem § 14 pp. 72-73 [61] “In the experience of seeing the lectern something is given to me from out 
of an immediate environment. This environmental milieu (…) does not consist just of things, objects 
which are then conceived as meaning this and this; rather, the meaningful is primary and immediately 
given to me without any mental detours across thing-oriented apprehension. Living in an environment, 
it signifies to me everywhere and always, everything has the character of world. It is everywhere the 
case that ‘it worlds’”. (“In dem Erlebnis des Kathedersehens gibt sich mir etwas aus einer 
unmittelbaren Umwelt. Dieses Umweltliche (...) sind nicht Sachen mit einem bestimmten 
Bedeutungscharakter, Gegenstände, und dazu noch aufgefaßt als das und das bedeutend, sondern das 
Bedeutsame ist das Primäre, gibt sich mir unmittelbar, ohne jeden gedanklichen Umweg über ein 
Sacherfassen. In einer Umwelt lebend, bedeutet es mir überall und immer, es ist alles welthaft, »es 
weltet«”). 
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This ‘how’ encompasses the determination of ‘this’ as a ‘what’, and of ‘me’ as an 
‘I’, because I originally find myself in the ‘how’ of my relatedness to things and to 
myself, a relatedness that is as previous to the ‘what’ as to the ‘I’. 
The methodological challenge is therefore how we are to approach this 
‘how’ of lived experience without falling prey to “[e]xplanation through dismem-
berment, i.e. destruction (Zerstörung): one wants to explain something which one 
no longer has as such”341. A brief outline of a phenomenological structure that 
could provide this approach is indicated at the end of the course: the “herme-
neutical intuition” (hermeneutische Intution), in which lived experience, in taking hold 
of itself, understands itself342. This requirement to reconcile philosophy and life, to 
find a non-objectifying language to describe life ―something crucial to the correct 
self-understanding of phenomenology―will dominate Heidegger’s efforts in the 
subsequent courses, in which philosophy, but also religion, appear intertwined in 
“a peculiar back-and-forth movement (…), such that each [is] to make the other 
possible”343. This marriage, justified by Heidegger in a famous letter to Löwith 
where he calls himself a “Christian theologian”344, is already hinted at in the closing 
chapter that he wrote in 1916 for the publication of his Habilitationschrift: “Phi-
                                               
341 Ibidem § 17 p. 86 [73] “Erklärung durch Zerstückelung, d.h. hier Zerstörung: Man will etwas 
erklären, das man gar nicht mehr als solches hat”. Heidegger uses here the term Zerstörung, with a 
clearly negative sense that is not to be confused with what he means by Destruktion, in relation to his 
task of appropriation of tradition. 
342 Cf. Ibidem § 20c pp. 116-117 [98-99]. 
343 VAN BUREN, J. “The Earliest Heidegger: A New Field of Research” in Dreyfus, H. L. et al (eds.) 
A Companion to Heidegger Malden/Oxford/Victoria: Blackwell, 2005 p. 24. 
344 “I work concretely and factically out of my «I am»―out of my spiritual and thoroughly factic 
heritage, my milieu, my life contexts, and whatever is available to me from these (…) I am a «Christian 
theologian»” —“Drei Briefe Martin Heideggers an Karl Löwith” in Papenfuss, D. And Pöggeler (eds.) 
Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers. Im Gespräch der Zeit. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990 (Cf. 
pp. 27-32 for the letter to Löwith on the 19th August 1921, p. 29 for ref. [“Letter to Karl Löwith on his 
Philosophical Identity” in Sheehan, T. and Kisiel, T. Becoming Heidegger pp. 97-102, pp. 99-100 for ref.]). 
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losophy as rationalistic construction, removed from life, is helpless; mysticism as 
irrationalistic experience is aimless”345. 
3.2. Phenomenological Method and Christian Kairology,  
Two Key Vectors Pointing towards Aristotle 
An excerpt of Heidegger’s notes for the closing part of the 1919-20 course 
Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie is specially significant of the vivid methodological 
concern of these years, without which mysticism would indeed be “aimless”: 
The ‘strictness’ of method has nothing to do with the rationalistic exactitude of 
natural science (…); ‘stern’, ‘thorough’―pure devoting oneself to the genuine vital situations; 
but also as seen from the other side: no mystic and mysticism, no arbitrary 
illusions346. 
Heidegger’s insistence on the term Strenge suggests a veiled reference to 
Husserl’s idea of “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft”347, from which Heidegger 
is intending to depart, in the name of truly remaining rein hingegeben den echten 
Lebenssituationen. Heidegger tries to find his way between the Neokantian de-
vitalizing (Entlebung) of theory which to his mind Husserl’s phenomenology does 
not escape348, and the methodologically weak claim for the retrieval of life typical 
                                               
345 Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus (1915) in GA 1 Frühe Schriften Ed. by Friedrich-
Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1978 p. 410. “Philosophie als vom Leben abgelöstes, rationalistisches Gebilde 
ist machtlos, Mystik als irrationalistisches Erleben ist ziellos”. 
346 GA 58 Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (WS 1919-20) p. 137 (our e.). “Die »Strenge« der Methode hat 
nichts zu tun mit rationalistischer Exaktheit der Naturwissenschaft (…); »streng«:  »angestrengt« ― rein 
hingegeben den echten Lebenssituationen; aber auch nach der anderen Seite gesehen: nicht Mystik und 
Mystizismus, keine willkürlichen Verstiegenheiten (…)”. The passage in which this remarks are 
included has the significant title of “Philosophy―a struggle for method” (“Philosophie ― ein Ringen um die 
Methode”).   
347 HUSSERL, Edmund Logos 1 (1910-11), Tübingen, pp. 289-341, also in Husserliana 25 Aufsätze und 
Vorträge (1911-1921) The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987. 
348 A thorough exposition of Heidegger’s critical views on the philosophy of Rickert, Husserl and 
Natorp can be found in BOWLER, M.  pp. 7-75. Of course, Heidegger’s assessment of Husserlian 
phenomenology should be carefully nuanced, a task which exceeds our possibilities in this thesis. Bal-
anced outlooks of the idea of phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger can be found in CROWELL, 
Stephen G. Husserl, Heidegger and the Space of Meaning. Paths toward Transcendental Phenomenology Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2001; CRISTIN, Renato Fenomeno storia. Fenomenologia e storicità in Husserl 
e Dilthey Napoli: Guida 1999 esp. 105 ff.; GRONDIN, Jean “La contribution silencieuse de Husserl a 
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of Lebensphilosophie. A strong methodology is surely required, but one that grasps 
our original relatedness to life, our finding ourselves in life, that precedes any 
theoretical formulation:  
An «undistinguished» noise in a room («there is something out of place», «something 
uneasy about it»). The sense-content and the sense-function of this «something» of 
factical experience does not have the least to do with the formal-logic something of 
objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit), which is the correlate of the free process of 
formalization (…). While in the sense of the formal-logic something there is in 
general an absolute and most radical inhibition of factical personal life-concern 
(Lebensbezug) (…), the pretheoretical something (vortheoretische Etwas) brings along the 
highest potential and full uncanniness of life349. 
The methodological key for this mediation between theory and life 
experience lies in the notion of formal indication (formale Anzeige) which, for futher 
evidence of the feedback between philosophy and religion in these years, finds its 
longest development in the context of a course on religion. This concept, 
“perhaps the very heart and soul of the early Heidegger”350, is a more mature 
version of the hermeneutische Intuition summarily announced in KNS, a term which 
is not used again by Heidegger in his courses351. Formale Anzeige, as developed in 
the 1920-21 course Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion352, is opposed to the 
                                                                                                                                 
l’herméneutique” dans Le tournant herméneutique de la phénoménologie PUF, 2003 pp. 19-37; MORAN, 
Dermot “Heidegger’s Transcendental Phenomenology in the Light of Husserl’s Project of First Phi-
losophy” in Crowell, S. et al. (eds) Transcendental Heidegger Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007. 
349 GA 58 § 24 pp. 106-107 “[E]in »unerklärliches« Geräusch im Zimmer (»es ist etwas nicht in 
Ordnung«, »es ist etwas nicht geheuer«). Dieses »Etwas« des faktischen Erfahrens hat seinem 
Sinngehalt und seiner Sinnfunktion nach nicht das mindeste zu tun mit dem formallogischen Etwas 
der Gegenständlichkeit, das Korrelat ist des freien Prozesses der Formalisierung (…). Während im 
Sinne des formallogischen Etwas überhaupt liegt absolute und radikalste Unterbindung faktisch 
lebendigen personalen Lebensbezugs (…), trägt das Vortheoretische Etwas die höchste potentielle und 
volle Unheimlichkeit des Lebens”. 
350 KISIEL, Theodore The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time London: University of California Press, 
1993 p. 172. 
351 Heidegger, as far as I know, only mentions it again in a letter to Heinrich Rickert on the 27th January 
1920. Cf. HEIDEGGER, Martin and RICKERT, Heinrich Briefe 1912 bis 1933 und andere Dokumente 
Ed. by Alfred Denker. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002, p. 48.   
352 Cf. Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion (1920-21) §§ 12-13 in GA 60 Phänomenologie des religiösen 
Lebens Ed. by Matthias Jung, Thomas Regehly and Claudius Strube, 1995 [The Phenomenology of Religious 
Life Trans. by Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei. IU Press, 2004] (hereafter EPR). 
For accurate approaches to this key concept of Heidegger, cf. IMDAHL, Georg Das Leben Verstehen. 
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Formalisierung depicted in the text above, on the grounds that the how of our 
relation (Bezug) to reality has always to be taken into account. Formale Anzeige is a 
prevention against the implicit uncritical establishment of a determined way of 
referring to reality. Specifically, Heidegger is concerned with the “formal-logic 
‘something’ of objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit)”, that takes this outlook for granted. 
This naïve adoption is to be prevented through the inclusion of the Vollzugsinn, 
the sense of the execution, in any account of the meaningfulness (Bedeutsamkeit) 
with which the world comes up. This is the chief difference between formale 
Anzeige and Formalisierung: with the former, the actus exercitus353 is inquired as to the 
adequation of its approach to reality. Only through a “phenomenology of the 
formal (original consideration of the formal itself and explication of the relational 
meaning within its enactment)”354 can philosophy ensure that it has an adequate 
orientation to the phenomena.  
The “three directions of sense” that are present in all our experiences, 
namely the “what” (Was) that is experienced (“content, Gehalt”), the “how” (Wie) 
in which it is experienced (“relation, Bezug”) and the “how” (Wie) of the 
enactment (Vollzug) of the relational meaning “do not simply coexist. 
«Phenomenon» is the explication of this totality of sense”355. As a result, real 
phenomenology, i.e. taking “everything that presents itself (…) originally in 
                                                                                                                                 
Heideggers formal anzeigende Hermeneutik in den frühen Freiburger Vorlesungen. Würburg: Königshausen & 
Neumann, 1997 esp. pp. 142-174; KISIEL, T. 1993 pp. 164-173; VAN BUREN, John The Young 
Heidegger. Rumor of the Hidden King IU Press, 1994 pp. 324-341; VIGO, Alejandro Arqueología y 
aletheiología y otros estudios heideggerianos. Buenos Aires: Biblos, 2008 pp. 231-257 (esp. 251-255).  
353 Gadamer has highlighted the importance that Heidegger attached in these years to the medieval 
distinction between actus exercitus and actus signatus. Cf. GADAMER, Hans-Georg “Vom Anfang des 
Denkens” (1986) in Gesammelte Werke 3, Neure Philosophie I. Hegel/Husserl/Heidegger. Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1987c pp. 375-393 (p. 389 for ref.). 
354 EPR § 13 in GA 60 p. 62 [43] “Phänomenologie des Formalen (ursprüngliche Betrachtung des 
Formalen selbst und Explication des Bezugsinns innerhalb seines Vollzugs)”. 
355 Ibidem p. 63 [43] “Diese drei Sinnesrichtungen (Gehalts-, Bezugs-, Vollzugssinn) stehen aber nicht 
einfach nebeneinander. »Phänomen« ist Sinnganzheit nach diesen drei Richtungen”. 
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«intuition» (…) simply as it gives itself”356, only occurs by keeping open once and 
again the relational meaning, i.e. by always letting phenomena answer the question 
of how they are to be approached. This is precisely what formal determination does not 
take into account, since it orders (ordnen)357, it prescribes to reality how it is to be 
approached, instead of letting reality determine that ‘how’ in each case. The 
“precautionary measure (Vorsichtsmaßregel)”358 of formale Anzeige is required against 
the narrowing of the sense of being implied by formalization, which 
hides the enactment-character (…) and turns one-sidedly to the content. A glance at the 
history of philosophy shows that the formal determination of the objective entirely 
dominates philosophy. How can this prejudice, this pre-judgment, be prevented? 
This is just what the formal indication achieves359. 
Formal indication always faces anew the philosopher with the original 
experience of phenomena. What is essential is not to have the opportunity of 
enacting materially the experience (because everyone does so all the time, and we 
are not thereby doing phenomenology), but to enact it formally, i.e. to ‘keep in 
view’ the full spectrum of sense that constitutes a phenomenon when we attempt 
to analyze it, which implies to ask whether the way in which we enact our relation 
to this phenomenon corresponds to its structure360. In this respect, the fact that 
for Aristotle “truth in Ethics can only be judged in terms of performances in 
                                               
356 “Alles, was sich uns in der »Intuition« originär (...) darbietet, [ist] einfach hinzunehmen (...) als was 
es sich gibt”. HUSSERL, E. Husserliana 3. Ideen zu einer Reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen 
Philosophie. Erstes Buch (1913) The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950 § 24 p. 43 (according to the original 
pagination in margins). Heidegger quotes this passage in KNS § 20 in GA 56/57 p. 109 [92]). 
357 Cf. EPR § 13 in GA 60 p. 64 [44] The terms Ordnung and geordnet are used. 
358 Ibidem p. 64 [44]. 
359 Ibidem p. 63 [43] “[Die formale Bestimmung] verdeckt das Vollzugsmäßige (…) und richtet sich 
einseitig auf den Gehalt. Ein Blick auf die Geschichte der Philosophie ergibt, daß die formale 
Bestimmtheit des Gegenständlichen die Philosophie völlig beherrscht. Wie kann diesem Präjudiz, 
diesem Vorurteil vorgebeugt werden? Das leistet gerade die formale Anzeige”. 
360 “The notion of formal indication (…) means that the terms used to describe existence require a 
specific and non-prescribable process of appropriation on the part of the reader or listener. This 
process is not contained in the concept itself, it can only be awakened, encouraged, urged by the 
concept” (GRONDIN, Jean “The Ethical and Young Hegelian Motives in Heidegger’s Hermeneutics 
of Facticity” in Kisiel, T. et al. (eds.) Reading Heidegger from the start. Essays on his early thought SUNY, 1994 
pp. 345-357 [p. 353 for ref.]). 
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living, [because] otherwise it is mere words (…) [is] perfectly in line with 
Heidegger’s notion of formal indication”361. 
Closely related to formal indication, as what makes it possible, there is an-
other relevant methodological insight that is crucial to Heidegger’s early rethinking 
of phenomenology, and this one comes directly from the Husserl of the Logische 
Untersuchungen: categorial intuition (Kategoriale Anschauung)362. The relevance of this 
concept, to which the late Heidegger referred in his very last seminar course in 
Zähringen as “the focal point of Husserl’s phenomenology”363, is not explicitly 
stressed by the early Heidegger until the 1925 summer semester course History on 
the Concept of Time364. However, in one of his renowned short intellectual 
autobiographies, he relates categorial intuition to his reading of Aristotle in the 
early 1920s365. Indeed, formale Anzeige presupposes the “new objectivity” that is 
                                               
361 HATAB, Lawrence J. Ethics and Finitude. Heideggerian Contributions to Moral Philosophy. Maryland: 
Rowman & Little Field, 2000 p. 107. Cf. NE X 8, 1179a 18f (Hatab’s reference). 
362 Cf. HUSSERL, E. Husserliana 19/2 Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band. Zweiter Teil. Untersuchungen 
zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis (1901) Martinus Nijhoff, Haag 1984 §§ 40 ff, on the 6th 
research (“Elemente einer phänomenologisches Auflärung der Erkenntnis”). A good synthesis of this 
Husserlian discovery and its relevance for Heidegger can be found in TAMINIAUX, Jacques “Le 
regard et l’excédent. Remarques sur Heidegger et les Recherches Logiques de Husserl” Revue Philosophique 
de Louvain 75 (1977) pp. 74-100. 
363 Seminar in Zähringen (1973) in GA 15 Seminare (1951-1973) Ed. by Curd Ochwadt, 1986 pp. 372-400 
(p. 373 for ref.) [Seminar in Zähringen in Heidegger, M. Four Seminars Translated by Andrew Mitchell and 
François Raffoul, IU Press, 2003 pp. 64-81, p. 65 for ref.]. This is not just a remark made in passing: 
Heidegger extensively dwells on an explanation of categorial intuition.  
364 Cf. GA 20 Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (SS 1925) Ed. by Petra Jaeger, 1979 §§ 6-7 [History 
of the Concept of Time. Prolegomena, trans. by Theodore Kisiel. IU Press, 1985]. 
365 “Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie” (1963) in GA 14 Zur Sache des Denkens Ed. by Friedrich-
Wilhelm von Herrmann, 2007 pp. 91-104 (previously published in Zur Sache des Denkens Tübingen: Max 
Niemeyer, 1969) [“My way to Phenomenology”, trans. by John Stambaugh in On time and being Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2002 pp. 74-82]. Cf. p. 98 [78]: “As I myself practiced phenomenolo-
gical seeing, teaching and learning in Husserl’s proximity after 1919 and at the same time tried out a 
transformed understanding of Aristotle in a seminar, my interest leaned anew toward the Logical In-
vestigations, above all the sixth investigation in the first edition”. (“Als ich seit 1919 selbst lehrend-
lernend in der Nähe Husserls das phänomenologische Sehen einübte und zugleich im Seminar ein 
gewandeltes Aristoteles-Verständnis erprobte, neigte sich mein Interesse aufs neue den »Logischen 
Untersuchungen« zu, vor allem der sechsten in der ersten Auflage”).  
On this connection, cf. ADRIÁN, Jesús El joven Heidegger. Un estudio interpretativo de su obra temprana a la 
luz de la pregunta por el ser. Doctoral Dissertation. Bellaterra: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2000 p. 
464; BRAGUE, Rémi “La phénoménologie comme voie d'accès au monde grec. Note critique sur la 
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constituted with categorial acts, which is not the “result of the activity of intellec-
tual understanding upon the external world”366: sensitive intuition brings alto-
gether with it the categories with which we are to understand reality, in such a way 
that it is in each case the given phenomenon and not the attitude of the subject 
that prescribes how it is to be approached. Thus, for instance, “I can in a single 
act of perception simply see a flock of birds or a row of trees. Such given wholes 
are self-contained. The unity of a row, a swarm, a flock of wild ducks is not based 
upon a prior act of counting. It is an intuitive unity which gives the whole sim-
ply”367. We are able to say ‘one’, or ‘this’ not because we have a priori categories to 
approach reality but because reality itself is constituted in this way, and provides 
itself the categories with which we can understand it, as correlates of the acts of 
perception368. This is indeed the perspective that is at stake when Aristotle speaks, 
for instance, of a substance as a tode ti, a ‘this something’369, or when he holds that 
movement is not something “over and above things (para ta pragmata)”370.  “With-
out being explicitly conscious of it, phenomenology returns to the broad concept 
of truth whereby the Greeks (Aristotle) could call true even perception as such 
and the simple perception of something”371. The fact that intuition recovers its 
                                                                                                                                 
Vorhandenheit comme modèle ontologique dans la lecture heideggérienne d’Aristote” in Marion, J.-L., 
Planty-Bonjour, G. (eds.) Phénomenologie et Métaphysique Paris: PUF, 1984 pp. 247-273 (cf. esp. p. 252); 
KISIEL, T. 1993 pp. 370-371; VOLPI, Franco Heidegger e Aristotele Padova: Daphne, 1984 pp. 72 ff. 
366 GA 20 § 6d p. 96-97 [71] “Die kategorialen Akte konstituieren eine neue Gegenständlichkeit (…). 
Diese Gegenständlichkeit (…) ist nicht Resultat der Betätigung des Verstandes an der Außenwelt”. 
367 GA 20 § 6c 90 [66] “Ich kann in einem Akte der Wahrnehmung einen Schwarm von Vögeln, eine 
Allee von Bäumen schlicht sehen. Diese vorgegebene Ganzheit ist in sich geschlossen. Die Einheit 
einer Allee, eines Schwarmes, eines Zuges von Wildenten beruht nicht auf vorheriger Durchzählung, 
sondern ist anschauliche Einheit, die schlicht das Ganze gibt”. Heidegger acknowledges immediately 
below his debt to Husserl on this. 
368 Cf. GA 20 § 6b p. 79 [59]. Cf. HUSSERL, E. 1984 § 44 pp. 669-670 (Heidegger quotes p. 141 of the 
2nd edition [1921]) 
369 Cf. e.g. Met. VII 3, 1029a 28. 
370 Physics III 1, 200b 32f. 
371 GA 20 § 6a p. 73 [55] “Sie kehrt ohne ausdrückliches Bewußtsein davon zu der Weite des 
Wahrheitbegriffes zurück, in der die Griechen ― Aristoteles ― auch die Wahrnehmung als solche und 
schlichtes Wahrnehmen von etwas wahr nennen konnten”. But because phenomenology is not 
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broadness with Husserl’s logical investigations, after having been limited in mod-
ernity to the perception of disjointed sense data, paves the way for the under-
standing of ontology that guides the whole of Heidegger’s approach to Aristotle, 
which is marked by the assumption that Aristotle himself proceeded under that 
broad idea of intuition, in which phenomenology and ontology are one and the 
same: 
The exhibition of categorial structure serves to broaden the idea of objectivity so that 
this objectivity can itself be exhibited in its content in the investigation of the corre-
sponding intuition. In other words, the phenomenological research which breaks 
through to objectivity arrives at the form of research sought by ancient ontology. 
There is no ontology alongside a phenomenology. Rather, scientific ontology is nothing but 
phenomenology372. 
We said above that hand in hand with methodological questions―the 
preventive role of formale Anzeige and the breakthrough discovery of categorial 
intuition―there is another important source for Heidegger’s rethinking of 
phenomenology and his new return to Aristotle in the early 20s: his acquaintance 
with the experience of life in primal christianity, which brings about a kairological 
understanding of temporality that is very much in line with the attentiveness to the 
particularity of phenomena prescribed by formale Anzeige. In fact, in his course on 
the Phenomenology of Religion, Heidegger turns abruptly from his longest ever 
explicitation of this methodological strategy to an exegesis of the Pauline letters, 
apparently because of the growing dissatisfaction of some of the students in the 
course due to the absence of religious content in the lessons. Whether this befits 
or not Heidegger’s original intentions for this course, we do not know, remarks 
                                                                                                                                 
conscious of this return (Rückgang), Heidegger adds, it cannot ultimately find this original sense of 
truth, which he refers to Aristotle’s development in Met. IX 10. 
372 GA 20 § 6d p. 98 [72] “Mit dem Aufweis der kategorialen Struktur ist die Idee der Objektivität 
erweitert, so zwar, daß diese Objektivität selbst nun in der Durchforschung der entsprechenden 
Anschauung in ihrem Gehalte aufweisbar wird. Mit anderen Worten: In der damit durchbrechenden 
phänomenologischen Forschung ist die Forschungsart gewonnen, die die alte Ontologie suchte. Es 
gibt keine Ontologie neben einer Phänomenologie, sondern wissenschaftliche Ontologie ist nichts anderes als 
Phänomenologie”. Cf. also SZ § 7c p. 35. 
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Kisiel373. What seems clear, though, is that Heidegger could only make this shift 
because he had come to appreciate the high phenomenological potential of the 
primitive Christian view of life that characterizes the Pauline letters. The content 
of the course becomes more explicitly ‘religious’, but the aim remains 
fundamentally methodological: “In the following, we do not intend to give a 
dogmatic or theological-exegetical interpretation, nor a historical study or a 
religious meditation, but only guidance for phenomenological understanding”374.  
Phenomenologically relevant for Heidegger is the fact that “Christian ex-
perience lives time itself («to live», understood as verbum transitivum)”375. By this 
transitive sense, Heidegger means a disposition of one’s entire being towards its 
temporality, by which time appears not primarily as something in which we are, 
but as part of us, as a whole that is given prior to our analytical understanding. 
From this perspective, the correct access to time is not to see it as something in 
which we live, but to live it in the first place. This will be argued in clear-cut terms 
in the 1924 lecture on the concept of time376: “Dasein, conceived in its most 
extreme possibility of being, is time itself, not in time”377; and, as a result, “[t]he 
primary relation to Dasein is not that of seeing but of “being it”378. 
                                               
373 KISIEL, T. 1993 p. 171. Kisiel suggests from examination of the text that Heidegger had probably 
thought of a softer transition from philosophy to religion (cf. p. 173). 
374 EPR § 14 in GA 60 p. 67 [47, our e.] “Wir beabsichtigen im Folgenden nicht, eine dogmatische 
oder theologisch-exegetische Interpretation, auch nicht eine historische Betrachtung oder eine religiöse 
Meditation, sondern lediglich eine Anleitung zum phänomenologischen Verstehen zu geben”. 
375 Ibidem § 21 p. 82 [57] “Die christliche Erfahrung lebt die Zeit selbst (»leben« als verbum transitivum 
verstanden)”. 
376 “Der Begriff der Zeit. Vortrag vor der Marburgen Theologenschaft Juli 1924” in GA 64 Der Begriff 
der Zeit Ed. by F.-W. von Herrmann, 2004 pp. 107-125 [“The Concept of Time”, trans. by Th. Kisiel in 
Sheehan, T. and Kisiel, T. Becoming Heidegger. On the Trail of his Occasional Early Writings, 1910-1927 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007 pp. 200-213]. 
377 Ibidem p. 118 [208] “Das Dasein, begriffen in seiner äußersten Seinsmöglichkeit, ist die Zeit selbst, 
nicht in der Zeit”. 
378 Ibidem p. 114 [205] “Der primäre Bezug zum Dasein ist nicht die Betrachtung, sondern das »es 
sein«”. 
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One of the key aspects of this early Christian attitude towards time is 
found by Heidegger in Paul’s answer to the request of the Thessalonians about the 
day of the Parousia, the “appearing again of the already appeared Messiah”379. Paul, 
Heidegger argues, avoids the term ‘when’ in his answer, and speaks instead of time 
and moment, “peri de tōn chronōn kai tōn kairōn”380, because “[t]he entire question 
for Paul is not a cognitive question (cf. 5,2; autoi gar akribōs oidate [for yourselves 
know perfectly]). He does not say, «at this or at that time the Lord will come 
again» (…) ―rather he says: «You know exactly…»”381. Paul does answer to the 
aim for security that the Thessalonians reveal in the inquiry for a “when”, but he 
does so with a formal indication, i.e. he returns back the question to them: the 
proper answer to the question does not lie anywhere to be grasped as a knowledge 
that one could possess, but rather is realized in one’s readiness, in how one expects 
the coming of the Lord.  
How the parousia stands in my life, that refers back to the enactment (Vollzug) of life itself. 
The meaning of the «when», of the time in which the Christian lives, has an entirely 
special character (…). One cannot encounter this temporality in some sort of 
objective concept of time. The when is in no way objectively graspable382. 
The ‘when’ of parousia cannot be grasped from the outside as a Vor-gang, as 
something that one is to expect, as an established “peace and safety”383; instead, 
this ‘when’ has to be enacted here and now, this ‘when’ requires an answer which 
is at each time new, because the answer is nothing different from one’s life. This is 
the core of the kairological temporality as primal christianity conceives it, but also 
                                               
379 EPR § 26 in GA 60 p. 102 [71] “die Ankunft des Messias als Stellvertreter Gottes”. 
380 I Thessalonians 5, 1. 
381 EPR § 26 in GA 60 p. 102-103 [72] “Die ganze Frage ist für Paulus nicht eine Erkenntnisfrage. (vgl. 
5,2; autoi gar akribōs oidate). Er sagt nicht »dann und dann kommt der Herr wieder« (…) ― sondern er 
sagt: »Ihr wißt ganz genau…«”. 
382 Ibidem § 26 p. 104 [73, our e.] “Wie die Parousia in meinem Leben steht, das weist zurück auf den 
Vollzug des Lebens selbst. Der Sinn des »Wann«, der Zeit, in der der Christ lebt, hat einen ganz 
besonderen Charakter (…). Von irgendeinem objecktiven Begriff der Zeit kann man unmöglich diese 
Zeitlichkeit treffen. Das Wann ist auf keine Weise objektiv faßbar”. 
383 I Thessalonians 5, 3. 
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as Aristotle grasps it in his account of praxis in the NE: “the end of an action is 
relative to the occasion (kata ton kairon)” (III 1, 1110a 13)384; and this not in the 
manner of a merely technical knowledge of what is to be done in each case, but as 
a result of one’s attitude: “a man has phronēsis not by knowing only but by acting” 
(VII 10, 1152a 10). Far from the theologia gloriae of Scholasticism that was so much 
vituperated by Luther, Aristotle here seems to be grasping in philosophical terms 
something very close to the experience of factical life that is peculiar to the 
theologia crucis of the Pauline letters. In fact, this was not hidden to Luther himself; 
although “in moments of excess [he] condemned Aristotle’s entire corpus, he 
often expressed a great respect for Aristotle’s practical writings”385. In his lectures 
on Paul’s letters to the Romans, e.g., he observes: 
it is most correct to say that man is always in privation, always in becoming or in po-
tentiality, in matter, and always in action. Aristotle philosophizes about such matters, 
and he does it well, but people do not understand him well. Man is always in nonbe-
ing, in becoming, in being, always in privation, in potentiality, in action, always in sin, 
in justification, in righteousness, that is, he is always a sinner, always a penitent, al-
ways righteous386.  
Aristotle philosophizes well about such matters―he gives an account of 
man as a being that is always in motion, so that his being can only be grasped 
from within this motion―but he is not well understood. This remark very well 
summarizes the task that Heidegger will set for himself as of 1921, following the 
intuitions of Luther and Kierkegaard on the oportunities of the philosophy of 
                                               
384 Cf. also NE I 6, 1096a 24-27 “Things are called good (…) in time [insofar as they meet] the right 
opportunity (en chronō kairos)”. 
385 VAN BUREN, J. 1994 p. 199. 
386 LUTHER, Martin Luther’s Works 25. Lectures on Romans Ed. by Hilton C. Oswald. Saint Louis: 
Concordia Publishing House, 1999 chapter 12, p. 434. Cf. also ad loc. cit: “For just as there are five 
stages in the case of the things of nature: nonbeing, becoming, being, action, being acted upon, that is, 
privation, matter, form, operation, passion, according to Aristotle, so also with the Spirit: nonbeing is a 
thing without a name and a man in his sins; becoming is justification; being is righteousness; action is 
doing and living righteously; being acted upon is to be made perfect and complete. And these five 
stages in some way are always in motion in man”. In view of these statements, it seems narrow to hold, 
despite Luther’s ferocious criticisms elsewhere, that “against Aristotle, Luther holds that movement is 
constant until the death of christians” (Cf. SOMMER, C. 2005 p. 60, our e.). 
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Aristotle but also on its limitations387. This implies to understand Aristotle’s 
philosophy better than tradition understood it―better than Heidegger himself 
understood it until 1915388. But more importantly, the task also consists of under-
standing Aristotle better than he understood himself. Throughout the background 
of Heidegger’s Ausainandersetzung with Aristotle there lies the conviction that an 
inner tension in the philosophy of this author outweighs his best intuitions: hand 
in hand with the accuracy of his sharp vision of human life in its movedness, there 
is in Aristotle an unquestioned understanding of being which this very same 
understanding of life could call into question (indeed it should, and that is 
precisely the sense of Heidegger’s Abbau), i.e. being conceived as constant 
presence (Anwesenheit) and completedness (Fertigkeit). This thesis, one of the most 
constant and deep-rooted in Heidegger’s intellectual path389, and which is crucial 
to his reading of Aristotle, is forged precisely in these years. Pöggeler reports 
Heidegger to have located the origin of this fundamental approach around 1922-
23 in a conversation with him: by those years, Heidegger would have arrived at the 
conclusion that Western tradition had levelled the idea of time to the present, due 
to its option for being as presence390. 
Van Buren, echoing the view of other relevant commentators, argues that 
“the violent, explosive force of Heidegger’s destruction of the concept of being as 
                                               
387 A thorough account of the influence of Luther, Kierkegaard and different Christian authors in 
Heidegger during these years is provided in SOMMER, C. 2005; VAN BUREN, J. 1994 pp. 157-202. 
Briefer accounts, with different emphases, in COURTINE, Jean-François “Une difficile transaction: 
Heidegger entre Aristote et Luther” in Cassin, B (ed.) Nos Grecs et leurs modernes. Les stratégies 
contemporaines d’appropriation de l’antiquité Paris: Seuil, 1992 pp. 337-366; GADAMER, Hans-Georg “Die 
religiöse Dimension” (1981) in Gesammelte Werke 3 1987d pp. 308-319; LARIVÉE, Annie et LEDUC, 
Alexandra “Saint Paul, Augustin et Aristote comme sources gréco-chrétiennes du souci chez 
Heidegger” Philosophie 69 (2001) pp. 30-50; VAN BUREN, J. 2005 pp. 19-31. 
388 Cf. “Vorwort zur ersten Ausgabe der »Frühen Schriften«” (1972) in GA 1 Frühe Schriften Ed. by 
Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1978 pp. 55-57 (p. 55 for ref.). 
389 “From paragraph 6 in Sein und Zeit until his last writings, [this is] one of the most constant theses of 
Heidegger’s work”. (GRONDIN, Jean “La persistance et les ressources éthiques de la finitude chez 
Heidegger” Revue de Métaphysique et Morale 1988/3 pp. 381-400 [p. 389 for ref.]). 
390 Cf. PÖGGELER, Otto Neue Wege mit Heidegger Freiburg: Alber, 1992 p. 185. 
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presence” in the history of metaphysics and in Aristotle could only find its roots 
in his “passionately anti-Greek Christian heritage”391. Indeed, in Luther’s lectures 
on the Romans, not far from the place where we have seen him praising the 
conceptuality of Aristotle as suitable to “philosophize” about man, he 
recommends the doctrine of Paul over the vanity of the “glories of philosophy” of 
those people who, set before the “Creation of God, (…) look only at its 
mechanics but never see its final goal”392. Luther, although without mentioning 
Aristotle, clearly denounces the entanglement of such a philosophy in a frozen 
gaze at the present, and ‘explosively’ calls for an urgent destruction of its 
categories:   
The apostle [Paul] philosophizes and thinks about things in a different way than the 
philosophers and metaphysicians do. For the philosophers so direct their gaze at the 
present state of things that they speculate only about what things are and what quality 
they have, but the apostle calls our attention away from a consideration of the present and 
from the essence and accidents of things and directs us to their future state. For he 
does not use the term «essence» or «activity» of the creature, or its «action», «inac-
tion», and «motion», but in an entirely new and marvelous theological word he speaks 
of the «expectation of the creation» (…). But alas, how deeply and painfully we are 
ensnared in categories and questions of what a thing is; in how many foolish meta-
physical questions we involve ourselves! (…) Therefore I warn you all as earnestly as 
I can that you finish these studies quickly and let it be your only concern not to es-
tablish and defend them but treat them as we do when we learn worthless skills to de-
stroy them and study errors to refute them (…). Therefore you will be the best phi-
losophers and the best explorers of the nature of things if you will learn from the 
apostle to consider the creation as it waits, groans, and travails, that is, as it turns away 
in disgust from what now is and desires that which is still in the future. For then the study of 
the nature of things, their accidents and their differences, will quickly grow worth-
less393. 
Nevertheless, Heidegger’s very same distrust against the presentialism that 
allegedly stems from the Greeks goes hand in hand―as in Luther394―with a deep 
                                               
391 Cf. VAN BUREN, J. 1994 p. 202. Cf. also GADAMER, H.-G. 1987c  p. 389, 1987d  p. 313, “Die 
Geschichte der Philosophie” (1981) in Gesammelte Werke 3 1987e pp. 297-307 (p. 299 for ref.). 
392 LUTHER, Martin Luther’s Works 25. Lectures on Romans chapter 8, p. 362. 
393 Ibidem pp. 360-361 (our e.). Cf. Romans 8, 19. 
394 For instance, a few paragraphs below the passage just quoted, Luther quotes Aristotle’s De Anima 
III as relevant to his argument (cf. ibidem p. 364). 
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appreciation of the high potential of Aristotle, which will lead Heidegger to plunge 
into “a voracious appropriation”395 of Aristotelian practical philosophy, as the 
initial impulse for a rethinking of ontology which takes as its first task that of se-
curing the approach to Dasein, which is the departing point for any ontology396. 
The first sketches of this ontology, the ‘hermeneutics of facticity’ that unfold in 
the Natorp Bericht397 and in the 1923 summer semester course398, are the result of 
this “complex interweaving of Christianity, phenomenology and Aristotle”399 that 
Heidegger himself summarily and accurately draws at the beginning of that course: 
“Companion in my searching was the young Luther and the pattern Aristotle, whom 
the former hated. Impulses were given by Kierkegaard, and Husserl opened my 
eyes”400. Luther and Kierkegaard awake in Heidegger the need of a destruction of 
tradition, in which Aristotle appears both as the ally and as the enemy. The ally, 
                                               
395 VOLPI, Franco “In Whose Name? Heidegger and ‘Practical Philosophy’” European Journal of Political 
Theory 6/1 (2007b) pp. 31-51 (p. 33 for ref.). 
396 Cf. GADAMER, H.-G. 1987c p. 389: “Heidegger’s interpretations―although his early listeners, 
among which I was numbered, did not understand this aspect until later―pointed to show that, while 
Aristotle had indeed carried out the fateful turning that led to the metaphysics of presence, he was 
however the only thinker to whom Heidegger was willing to recognize the merit of having developed 
an appropriate conceptuality for his intentions”. 
397 “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation). 
Ausarbeitung für die Marburger und die Göttinger Philosophische Fakultät” (1922), in GA 62 (SS 
1922) Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik Ed. 
by Günther Neumann, 2005 pp. 237-269, hereafter Natorp Bericht in the main text, and NB in 
footnotes. We indicate the pagination of the GA volume and, separated with a slash, that of the 
original document, as indicated in the margins of its first publication in Dilthey Jahrbuch für Philosophie 
und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften 6 (1989) pp. 237-269. [“Phenomenological Interpretations in 
Connection with Aristotle. An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation” (trans. by John Van Buren) 
in Heidegger, M. Supplements. From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond SUNY, 2002 
pp. 111-145]. 
398 GA 63 Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität). (SS 1923) Ed. by Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns, 1995 (2nd 
edition) [Ontology―The Hermeneutics of Facticity Translated by John Van Buren, IU Press, 1999]. 
399 VAN BUREN, J. 1994 p. 220. 
400 GA 63 p. 5 [4, mod. tr, our e.] “Begleiter im Suchen war der junge Luther und Vorbild Aristoteles, 
den jener haßte. Stöße gab Kierkegaard, und die Augen hat mir Husserl eingesetzt”. Another relevant 
reference in this respect is Heidegger’s choice of quotations from Kierkegaard, Paul and Luther to 
“characterize the intention of the interpretation” in his winter semester 1921-22 course (Cf. GA 61 
Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung. Ed. by Walter 
Bröcker and Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns, 1994 (2nd edition) [Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle. 
Initiation into Phenomenological Research. Translated by Ricard Rojzewicz, IU Press 2001], p. 182 [137]. 
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because of the potential of Aristotle’s method for a reframing of phenomenology; 
and the enemy, because it is the understanding of ontology stemming from 
Aristotle’s synthesis of Greek thought that Heidegger intends to overturn; the aim 
of his interpretation, he argues at the beginning of a lecture on NE VI in 1924,  
is to enable Aristotle to speak again, not in order to bring about a renewal of Aristo-
telianism, but rather in order to prepare the battleground for a radical engagement 
with Greek philosophy―the very philosophy in which we still stand401. 
3.3. Ethics or Ontology: a Dilemma for Aristotle and Heidegger? 
The two first occasions in which Heidegger taught on Aristotle by closely 
following the original texts, a seminar on the De Anima and the Metaphysics during 
the summer of 1921402 and a course one year afterwards on the first chapters of 
the Metaphysics and the Physics403, reveal the primarily ontological interest that 
activates Heidegger’s return to Aristotle. That this continues to be his concern 
when he suddenly retrieves NE VI in the Natorp Bericht is made clear by a 
preliminary admonishment which has been the focus of extensive commentary:  
                                               
401 “Diese Interpretation hat nun die Absicht, Aristoteles wieder zum Wort zu verhelfen, nicht um 
einen Aristotelismus zu erneuern, sondern um den Kampfplatz für eine radikale Auseinandersetzung 
mit der griechischen Philosophie, in der wir selbst noch stehen”. “Dasein und Wahrsein nach 
Aristoteles (Interpretationen von Buch VI [der] Nikomachischen Ethik)” (1924) pp. 1-2 [219]. An 
unpublished typewritten transcript of this lecture is quoted, which will be presumably a source for the 
forthcoming publication in GA 80 Vorträge (hereafter DWA). [“Being-There and Being-True 
According to Aristotle” translated by Brian H. Bowles in Sheehan, T. and Kisiel, T. Becoming Heidegger. 
On the Trail of his Occasional Early Writings, 1910-1927 Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007 
pp. 218-237]. We thank prof. Sheehan for kindly providing us with a copy of this transcript. 
402 Übungen über Aristoteles, De Anima (SS 1921) in Heidegger-Jahrbuch 3 (2007) (Heidegger und Aristoteles) pp. 
9-22 (Oskar Becker’s transcript of the seminar, presumably a source for the forthcoming publication in 
GA 83 Seminare: Platon ― Aristoteles ― Augustinus). 
403 Cf. GA 62 (SS 1922) Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur 
Ontologie und Logik 
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Temporarily leaving aside the specific problem of ethics in these discussions, our interpretation 
of them explains the ‘dianoetic virtues’ as different modes of having available the 
possibility of actualizing a genuine true safekeeping of being404. 
Heidegger seems to be implying here that he intends to develop an ontology 
that, while taking its lead from the conceptuality of Aristotle in the NE, brackets 
the peculiar ethical characteristics of the phenomena that give rise to these 
concepts in Aristotle. However, nothing could be further removed from the 
phenomenological attitude he prescribes with his formale Anzeige, and that is why 
one should not jump too quickly to the conclusion that Heidegger is happily 
transferring concepts from ethics to ontology without regard to the soil in which 
they emerged405, or that he is ‘perverting’ their ethical meaning406. To start with, 
the passage should be read in the light of another one, placed almost at the end of 
the essay, when Heidegger briefly summarizes “the second part” of his 
investigations, devoted to Metaphysics VII, VIII and IX. Heidegger is interested in 
how Aristotle develops in those books the question of being in relation to 
movement, and how he arrives “at an ontological characterization of the 
‘categories’ of dynamis and energeia”. Yet he significantly remarks:  
Aristotle’s ‘ethics’ is then to be placed into this ontological horizon, so that this ‘ethics’ is seen 
as the explication of the being as human being (des Seienden als Menschsein), i.e., human 
life, the movedness of life (Lebensbewegtheit)407. 
This passage, the only other place where Heidegger lingers on the term 
‘ethics’ in the Natorp Bericht408, has been much less commented on, but it is not in 
                                               
404 NB p. 376/29 [129, our e.] “Die Interpretation dieser Abhandlung macht unter vorläufigem 
Absehen von der spezifisch ethischen Problematik die ›dianoetischen Tugenden‹ verständlich als die 
Weisen des Verfügens über die Vollzugsmöglichkeit echter Seinsverwahrung”. 
405 Cf. ROSEN, Stanley “Phronesis or Ontology. Aristotle and Heidegger” in Pozzo, R. (ed.) The Impact 
of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004 
pp. 248-265 (p. 249 for ref.). 
406 Cf. GONZALEZ, Francisco J. “Beyond or Beneath Good and Evil? Heidegger’s Purification of 
Aristotle’s Ethics” in Hyland, D. et al. Heidegger and the Greeks. Interpretive Essays. IU Press, 2006a pp. 
127-156 (p. 129 for ref.). 
407 NB 397/48-49 [143, mod. tr.] “In diesen ontologischen Horizont wird dann die »Ethik« gestellt, als 
die Explikation des Seienden als Menschsein, menschliches Leben, Lebensbewegtheit”. 
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the least dispensable if Heidegger’s approach is to be properly understood. It 
probably spells out his mind more precisely: he does not intend so much to 
appropriate ethical concepts for an ontological project that would set ethics aside 
as to elucidate the ontological weight of these concepts, and thus retrieve them for a more 
original approach to the being of human beings. If one gives too much weight to 
the perhaps infelicitous statement on ‘temporary leaving aside’ ethics, and reads it 
as the setting of a fundamental direction that will soon crystalize into an ethically 
void thinking, one may just find a somewhat nostalgic retrospective declaration of 
intent in Heidegger’s reflections about ethics and ontology more than twenty years 
later409. We are referring to Heidegger’s perhaps most famous remark on ethics, 
one of the keystones of those studies trying to retrieve the ethical character of 
Heidegger’s work410, in his Letter on Humanism411. Heidegger refers there to 
Beaufret’s question on the relation of ontology to ethics by reflecting, on the basis 
of a text by Heraclitus, on the fundamental sense of ēthos as “abode, place of 
dwelling (...), the open sphere in which man dwells”412. 
If now, in accord with the basic meaning of the word ēthos, ethics dwells in the abode 
of man, then that thought which thinks the truth of being as the original element of 
man as ex-sisting is already in itself at the source of ethics. But then this kind of 
thinking is not ethics, either, because it is ontology. For ontology always thinks only 
the being (on) in its being. As long as the truth of being, however, is not thought, all 
                                                                                                                                 
408 The term ‘ethics’ appears twice more in NB, but is only mentioned in passing (cf. pp. 368-369/20-
22 [124-125]). 
409 “The occasional suggestions of a later return from ontology to ethics”, Gonzalez argues, “represent 
a permanent postponement” (Cf. GONZALEZ, F. J. 2006a p. 139). 
410 Cf. for instance GRONDIN, J. 1994; HATAB, L. 2000; HODGE, Joanna Heidegger and Ethics 
London; New York: Routledge, 1995; MACANN, Christopher E. “Who is Dasein? Towards an ethics 
of authenticity” in Macann, C. E. (ed.) Martin Heidegger. Critical Assessments. Vol II: History of Philosophy 
London/New York: Routledge, 1992 pp. 215-246; NANCY, Jean-Luc “Heidegger’s originary Ethics” 
in Raffoul, F. et al (eds.) Heidegger and Practical Philosophy SUNY, 2002. 
411 “Brief über den »Humanismus«” (1946) in GA 9 Wegmarken pp. 313-364 [“Letter on «Humanism»” 
translated by Edgar Lohner in Barrett, W. and Aiken, Henry D. Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: an 
anthology (vol. 3) New York: Random House, 1962. 
412 Ibidem p. 354 [296] “ēthos bedeutet Aufenthalt, Ort des Wohnens. Das Wort nennt den offenen 
Bezirk, worin der Mensch wohnt”. 
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ontology remains without its base. Hence the thought, which with Sein und Zeit tried 
to think forward into the truth of being, called itself fundamental ontology413.  
Is Heidegger projecting here onto his previous work an increasing concern 
about ēthos that would have been alien to his efforts during the previous quarter of 
a century? Is he perhaps sorting out an uncomfortable question by surreptitiously 
introducing ethics in the project of ontology? Or does the answer mirror the 
specific approach that Heidegger had already adopted towards ethics in the 1920s?  
Surely, his analysis of the NE is limited to the period of 1922-24414, and he 
does not linger on the specific analyses of ethical virtues in books III-V, nor on 
those of incontinence, friendship and pleasure in books VII-X. Instead, he 
primarily focuses on certain concepts of books I, II, VI and X such as mesotēs, 
hexis, praxis, phronēsis, eudaimonia and aretē, with a view to “the explication of the 
being as human being i.e., human life, the movedness of life (Lebensbewegtheit)”415. 
Thus, for instance, in his long interpretation of NE VI in 1924, he will contend: 
“[t]he being disclosed by phronēsis is praxis. In this resides human Dasein (…)―the 
zōē of man is determined as zōē praktikē meta logou”416.  
                                               
413 Ibidem pp. 356-357 [297] “Soll nun gemäß der Grundbedeutung des Wortes ēthos der Name Ethik 
dies sagen, daß sie den Aufenthalt des Menschen bedenkt, dann ist dasjenige Denken, das die Wahrheit 
des Seins als das anfängliche Element des Menschen als eines eksistierenden denkt, in sich schon die 
ursprüngliche Ethik. Dieses Denken ist aber dann auch nicht erst Ethik, weil es Ontologie ist. Denn 
die Ontologie denkt immer nur das Seiende (on) in seinem Sein. Solange jedoch die Wahrheit des Seins 
nicht gedacht ist, bleibt alle Ontologie ohne ihr Fundament. Deshalb bezeichnete sich das Denken, das 
mit »S. u. Z.« in die Wahrheit des Seins vorzudenken versuchte, als Fundamentalontologie”. 
414 The sole exception to this is, to my knowledge, the 1926 summer semester course, where Heidegger 
summarizes some basic lines of his understanding of Aristotelian phronēsis, although he does so in the 
concise style of this course, that of an overview of his interpretations of the Greeks and Aristotle to 
that date. Cf. GA 22 Die Grundbegriffe der Antiken Philosophie (SS 1926) Ed. by Franz-Karl Blust, 1993 
[Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy Translated by Richard Rojzewicz. IU Press, 2008], p. 311-312 [230] 
(Mörchen’s transcript). 
415 NB 397/48-49 [143, mod. tr.] “die Explikation des Seienden als Menschsein, menschliches Leben, 
Lebensbewegtheit”. 
416 GA 19 § 22a p. 146 [100] “Das Seiende, das die phronēsis aufdeckt, ist die praxis. Darin liegt das 
menschliche Dasein (…) ―die zōē des Menschen ist bestimmt als zōē praktikē meta logou”. Cf. NE I 7, 
1098a 3 ff; Cf. also § 21 p. 143 [98]: “[T]he object of phronēsis is praxis, the zōē of man, human Dasein 
itself” (“[D]er Gegenstand der phronēsis ist die praxis, die zōē des Menschen, das menschliche Dasein 
selbst”). 
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With his formal anzeigende phenomenology Heidegger intends to retrieve 
(wiederholen) the phenomenological analyses of Aristotle. He is surely trying to see 
beyond what Aristotle sees and if necessary against what he sees, but in any case he 
is doing so with him: by closely following his analyses. In this respect, the question 
is relevant whether such a thing as an ontological approach is foreign to Aristotle’s 
objectives in the NE, i.e. whether in this work Aristotle does not intend to 
provide as well an ontology of human life, or at least whether he cannot avoid 
providing such an ontology. For Brogan “Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics is rooted 
in an essential insight into the inseparability of ontology and ethics”, and the same 
holds for Sein und Zeit417. Indeed, the ontological elucidation of praxis in Metaphysics 
IX 6, its clear parallelism with NE X 4 and the repeated reference to energeia in that 
work for the characterization of life and happiness among other concepts―to 
recall only some important examples―are to our mind evidence that makes 
Heidegger’s idea of reading the NE from an ontological outlook less violent than 
some commentators tend to think418. His somewhat imprecise remark about 
“temporarily leaving aside the specific problem of ethics”419, then, might not be 
read as a dismissal of ethics altogether from an allegedly ‘purely ontological 
project’ but as a selective reading of the NE which does not linger on the analysis 
of specific actions, because it does not intend to extract guidance for action, but 
light for phenomenological-ontological reflection. 
                                               
417 BROGAN, Walter Heidegger and Aristotle. The Twofoldness of Being SUNY, 2005 p. 148. 
418 Thus, e.g. Rosen, who regards phronēsis and ontology as an exclusive disjuntive and speaks of 
Heidegger’s move as an “ontological temptation” (Cf. ROSEN, S. 2004 p. 249); Gonzalez speaks of an 
“ethics without ethics”, as the strange product of the “ontologizing” to which Heidegger would submit 
NE (Cf. GONZALEZ, F. J. 2006a pp. 149-150). In his paper, Gonzalez does not limit his critical 
comments to the subsumption of ethics in ontology; he also refers, importantly, to the understanding 
of being that Heidegger presupposes in Aristotle, a problem that he has also tackled accurately in other 
papers, among which specifically 2006b. As we intend to show in subsequent chapters, it is rather this 
latter issue―on which our views are very close to Gonzalez’s―that might make some aspects of 
Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle problematical for his own project. Moreover, it might also 
explain some of the specific problems with the ethics that Gonzalez points out.  
419 NB p. 376/29 [129] “unter vorläufigem Absehen von der spezifisch ethischen Problematik”. 
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In this interpretative line, Brogan contends that the NE “is primarily an 
ontology of human being”420. While we agree with him that the ontological weight 
of this work cannot be overemphasized, it seems obvious that Aristotle is 
concerned also with providing a merely ‘ontical’ account of actions, and that is why 
we hold that Heidegger’s reading is indeed selective. This selection, however, does 
not per se entail a perversion of the ethical sense of the concepts in the NE or a 
disposal of the ‘ontical’; it only implies that Heidegger does not intend, like 
Aristotle, to write an ethics and the ontology of human being that grounds this 
ethics, but only the latter. In this respect, Volpi seems to us more accurate in 
arguing that “what interests Heidegger is manifestly not the individual praxeis 
(actions), poiēseis (producings), and theōriai (theorizings) but rather only the 
ontological potential of these determinations”421.  
Volpi does not discard there being a certain ontological intention on the 
part of Aristotle’s understanding of these determinations, and in this respect he 
refers precisely to Metaphysics IX, 6422. Still, he holds that “for Aristotle, practical 
science represents a particular consideration of human life, which thematizes life 
in as much as it is an action that aims at the realization of a ‘to do’ (prakton). But 
this is just one possible way, amongst others, of considering it”423. It is perhaps 
due to “its inferior precision (akribeia)”424, Volpi argues, that tradition has consid-
ered practical philosophy as “a minor philosophy”, and for that reason it is the 
merit of Heidegger to have addressed these practical determinations as ones which  
                                               
420 BROGAN, W. 2005 p. 138. 
421 VOLPI, Franco “Being and Time: A «Translation» of the Nichomachean Ethics?” in Kisiel, T. and 
Van Buren, J. (eds.) Reading Heidegger from the Start. Essays on his Early Thought SUNY, 1994 p. 202. 
422 Ibidem pp. 201-202. Cf. also, by the same author, “Dasein as praxis: the Heideggerian Assimilation 
and the Radicalization of the Practical Philosophy of Aristotle” in Macann, C. E. (ed.) Martin Heidegger. 
Critical Assessments. Vol II: History of Philosophy London/New York: Routledge, 1992 pp. 90-129, esp. p. 
104: “The most perceptive transformation seems to me to be the accentuation, better the 
absolutization, of the ontological character which, to a certain extern, they also possess with Aristotle, 
but which, with him, is not the only character, not even always the determinative character”. 
423 VOLPI, F. 2007b  p. 43. 
424 Aristotle himself warns the reader about that. Cf. NE I 3, 1094b 10 ff.  
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do not exist alongside other possible determinations, but entirely occupy under-
standing and the constitution of existence. This implies that their content, being con-
stitutive of Dasein, is not ultimately something which can be freely chosen, to have or 
not to have, but implicates a determination to which it is indissolubly bound and 
which it cannot escape425. 
While to maintain, as Brogan does, that the NE is primarily an ontology of 
human being seems to us an overstatement, we indeed believe that there is more 
to this work than just an ethical intention: key conceptions of this work such as 
aretē, hexis and praxis are framed within the powerful ontological elucidation that 
was passed down to us as the Metaphysics. And it is precisely this inner 
connectedness, we would like to argue, that enabled Heidegger to explicitate as he 
did the “ontological potential of these determinations” much more than Aristotle 
himself did. Precisely for that reason, in his interpretations of the NE Heidegger 
makes constant cross-references to other works of Aristotle, among which 
especially the Metaphysics and the Physics426. 
From this point of view, Volpi’s influential designation of the 
Heideggerian appropriation of Aristotle’s practical philosophy as an “ontologiza-
tion”427 should to our mind be taken cum grano salis. Volpi argues that Heidegger 
―in contrast to some of his students, such as Gadamer, Arendt and Jonas―trans-
forms the categories of Aristotle’s practical philosophy “into constitutive determi-
nations for the being of man, which is to say that he ‘ontologizes’ them and nulli-
fies their practical-moral force”428. It is beyond doubt that some of Heidegger’s 
students considered the specifically ethical aspects of the NE much more than 
their teacher did. Nevertheless, their new appropriation of Aristotle actually stems 
from Heidegger’s insight into the ontological force of these determinations, which 
once set the basis for Aristotle’s original ethical reflection. Does not the duality of 
                                               
425 VOLPI, F. 2007b p. 43. Cf. also 1984 pp. 113 ff. 
426 These are actually the three works that Heidegger comments in the outline of his projected research in NB. 
427 Cf. VOLPI, F. 1994 p. 200 ff.; 2007b esp. pp. 38 ff. 
428 VOLPI, F. 2007b. 
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Heidegger and his students somehow reflect the two non-mutually excluding main 
tasks that concerned Aristotle in the research that has been handed down to us as 
the NE, i.e. approaching human beings ontologically and, on the basis of this 
ontology obtained from phenomenological observation, analyzing how happiness 
can be achieved from the interplay between dianoetical and ethical aretai? Volpi 
himself, from the outset of his pioneer approach to the young Heidegger through 
the lens of Aristotelian practical philosophy, assumes that  
[i]n what concerns the central concept of praxis, Heidegger thinks he detects in 
Aristotle (…) a dual employment of the concept: an ontic employment in which the 
term indicated particular praxeis (…); and a philosophical and ontological use in 
which praxis does not indicate particular actions but a modality of being (…). It is 
this use of the term one finds, for example, in Nicomachean Ethics VI 5, or in 
Metaphysics IX 6429. 
However, does one actually give an appropriate account of Heidegger’s 
ontological reading when one considers it as an exclusion of “all ontic mean-
ing”430? Is the appearance of practical elements in Heidegger’s interpretation an 
unavoidable fissure in a systematical ‘witch-hunt’ against the ontical431, or is it a 
conscious integration of what is given, as it is given, to his questioning? In other 
words, are the ontical and the ontological really opposed in Heidegger’s 
appropriation of Aristotelian concepts? 
In his 1924 summer course Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie, 
Heidegger refers to Aristotle’s Physics as “an investigation of being, not of beings; not 
an investigation of the ontic, such that it would be pursued with respect to 
individual beings, but rather an investigation into the ontological, insofar as beings 
are addressed in their being”432. This is not said in such a clear-cut manner of his 
                                               
429 VOLPI, F. 1992 pp. 111-112. On the two senses of praxis cf. also 1984 p. 96. 
430 VOLPI, F. 1994 p. 201. 
431 “[P]ractical elements nevertheless slip through Heidegger’s ontological filter” Ibidem p. 207. 
432 GA 18 Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie (SS 1924) Ed. by Mark Michalski, 2002 [Basic Concepts 
of Aristotelian Philosophy Translated by Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer. IU Press, 2009] § 26c p. 
291 [197] “Untersuchung des Seins, nicht des Seienden; nicht in ontischer Untersuchung, so daß dem 
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approach to the NE, but it seems clear that the principle applies to his entire 
interpretation of Aristotle433. Is then Heidegger implying here a ‘purification’ of 
the ontical, which regarding ethics would entail a ‘purification’ of the ethical434? 
Light is shed on the question in §§ 4-5 of Sein und Zeit, in a more extensive 
articulation of the distinction between the ontic and the ontological. While the 
term ‘ontology’ is reserved “for the explicit, theoretical question of the sense of 
beings”435, Heidegger warns that  
no arbitrary idea of being and reality, no matter how «self-evident» it is, may be 
brought to bear on [Dasein] in a dogmatically constructed way (…). The manner of 
access and interpretation must instead be chosen in such a way that this being can 
show itself to itself on its own terms. And furthermore, this manner should show 
that being as it is initially and for the most part―in its average everydayness436. 
Heidegger does not intend to remain in the ontical, i.e. in the particular de-
scription of beings, like “philosophical psychology, anthopology, ethics, «politics», 
poetry”437 do, but still he cannot just leap into the ontological, i.e. to an “idea of 
being and reality” without regard to how Dasein “show[s] itself to itself on its own 
terms”. Ontology goes beyond the ontical, because it asks about the sense of be-
                                                                                                                                 
Seienden im einzelnen nachgegangen wird, sondern in ontologischer, sofern das Seiende in seinem Sein 
angesprochen wird”. 
433 Further analyses of the 1922-24 period in this thesis will provide more evidence for that. A later 
reference, from the 1926 summer semester course, may suffice for now: “the positive outcome of 
Aristotle’s analyses is shown by the fact that his theory of the psychē is aiming at an ontology of life” 
(“Daß Aristoteles mit der Lehre von psychē auf eine Ontologie des Lebens zielt, zeigt der positive 
Ausgang seiner Analysen”) (GA 22 § 65 p. 184 [155, mod. tr.]). 
434 Cf. GONZALEZ, F. J. 2006a. 
435 SZ § 4 p. 12 (mod. tr.) “Wenn wir daher den Titel Ontologie für das explizite theoretische Fragen 
nach dem Sinn des Seienden vorbehalten (…)”. 
436 SZ § 5 p. 16 “es darf keine beliebige Idee von Sein und Wirklichkeit, und sei sie noch so 
»selbstverständlich«, an dieses Seiende konstruktiv-dogmatisch herangebracht [werden] (…). Die 
Zugangs- und Auslegungsart muß vielmehr dergestalt gewählt sein, daß dieses Seiende sich an ihm 
selbst von ihm selbst her zeigen kann. Und zwar soll sie das Seiende in dem zeigen, wie es zunächst und 
zumeist ist, in seiner durchschnittlichen Alltäglichkeit”. Cf. also GA 24 Die Grundprobleme der 
Phänomenologie (SS 1927) Ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1997 § 22c esp. pp. 466 ff. [327 ff]. 
[The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. by Albert Hofstadter. IU Press, 1982]. This course is often 
misspelled in existing literature as “Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie”, which corresponds more 
exactly to GA 58. 
437 SZ § 5 p. 16 “Philosophische Psychologie, Anthropologie, Ethik, »Politik«, Dichtung”. 
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ings: it goes beyond what is given, because it inquires into the structure of this 
givenness and the structure of the being that is given. But still, because 
phenomenology is none other than ontology, it must depart from the given. This 
is nothing other than a reaffirmation of the prescription of formale Anzeige and the 
phenomenological breakthrough of categorial intuition. Heidegger needs the 
ontical anyway if his ontology is to depart from phenomena and fit in with them.  
Thus, we would not say that an attempt to ‘nullify’ the ethical, however 
unproblematic it may seem to Volpi, adequately accounts for Heidegger’s overall 
approach to Aristotle438. Heidegger does not nullify the ethical, but thinks the 
ontological beneath the ethical, he extracts the ontological structures that underlie the 
ethical. Hence, to our mind, the question worth asking is to what extent 
Heidegger’s phenomenological analyses of the NE are wide enough for the goal 
that he sets for himself, i.e. developing an ontology of human existence; or, in 
other words, whether he makes the best of the potential of Aristotle’s 
phenomenological insights and of his ontological analyses. However, asking this 
question requires to set aside the objection that Heidegger’s ontological approach 
to Aristotle’s ethics is a dead end. And we do so on the basis that the subsumption 
of the ethical in the ontological is already operating in Aristotle, but also with the 
conviction that accepting Heidegger’s approach does not necessarily entail an 
acceptance of all his moves in appropriating Aristotelian concepts. A discernment 
of these moves indeed constitutes one of our basic tasks in the subsequent 
chapters, where we would like to analyze to what extent they are conducive to his 
own philosophical goal. 
                                               
438 To be sure, Volpi’s overall interpretation does not ignore Heidegger’s departure from the ontical, 
but his emphasis on “ontologization”, or his contrast between the ontic and the ontological, meant to 
highlight the specificity of Heidegger’s project before Aristotle’s, seems to us a source of confusion. 
We are not, of course, meaning that Aristotle would have already said all that Heidegger intends to say, 
but rather that there might be more of a unity between ethics and ontology in Aristotle than Volpi and 
Heidegger himself suggest. 
4. Energeia and Phronēsis in Heidegger’s  
First Phenomenological Approach to Aristotle 
 
Heidegger’s philosophical wanderings in the late 10s and the early 20s, as we have 
observed them above, reflect the search for a phenomenology that takes what is 
given as it is given at each time, without imposing predetermined and 
unquestioned categories on it, as well as a sense for the performative way in which 
Dasein relates to its own being and a vivid conscience of the immediacy of this 
relation. These fundamental aspects of his thought provide an account of the 
reasons that led him to return to Aristotle, and moreover they structure the way in 
which this return is made. The ‘why’ and the ‘how’ of the retrieval are in fact one 
and the same, and make up the “Aristotle redivivus”439 that Heidegger became in 
the early 20s, to the extent that his students could not tell whether he spoke for 
himself or it was Aristotle that spoke440. Heidegger comes back to Aristotle in the 
unique way he does not only because a Destruktion of tradition has to be traced 
back to this thinker, but also because he finds in Aristotle a strong affinity with his 
own methodological ideas and, specifically, an interweaving of ethics and ontology 
that can open a way to rethinking the sense of being, out of the things themselves. 
4.1. Heidegger’s Early Approach to Energeia 
Because the passage of Metaphysics IX 6 where Aristotle distinguishes energeia and 
kinēsis, in the context of an ontological determination of praxis (1048b 18-35), has 
turned out to be crucial to our interpretation of phronēsis and praxis, a dialogue 
with Heidegger’s appropriation of these concepts demands inquiring about his 
                                               
439 GADAMER, H.-G. “Martin Heidegger ― 85 Jahre” (1974) in Gesammelte Werke 3 1987f pp. 262-270 
(cf. p. 267 for ref.). 
440 Cf. Ibidem p. 266. 
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approach to energeia. Given that 1048b is the only place in Aristotle’s work where a 
direct characterization of energeia is provided, it is noteworthy that despite 
Heidegger’s extended concern with this concept441, we only find detailed analyses 
of this passage of Metaphysics IX twice in 1922 and once in 1939. The subsequent 
pages are devoted to the former, which notwithstanding their seemingly transient 
character within the whole of Heidegger’s courses in the 1920s, play a very 
relevant role in the formation of his approach to Aristotle442.  
The first occurrence of this relevant text is to be found in an excursus to 
the interpretation of Metaphysics I 2 on § 11 of the 1922 summer semester 
course443. Heidegger undertakes here a translation of the whole passage and then 
provides an interpretation of it in relation to other theses of Aristotle444. Peculiar 
to the interpretation is the fact that Heidegger’s interest is restricted to theōrein and 
its hexis―sophia―while Aristotle seems to be concerned with praxis in general. Still, 
though, Heidegger admits that theōria is indeed for Aristotle the highest form of 
praxis445. 
Heidegger acknowledges the controversy about the autenticity of this pas-
sage and agrees with Bonitz in accepting it: “what factually comes up―he admits― 
is genuinely Aristotelian”446. Halfway through his translation of 1048b 21-24, 
Heidegger emphasizes the uniqueness of what Aristotle calls energeia, the 
                                               
441 In contrast, his interest for phronēsis is much more restricted in time (namely, the period we are 
studying). 
442 Actually, in his letter to Richardson (published as preface in Richardson, William J. Heidegger: through 
Phenomenology to Thought New York: Fordham University Press, 2003 pp. viii-xxiii, cf. pp. x-xi for ref), 
Heidegger speaks of “a renewed study of the Aristotelian treatises (especially Book IX of the 
Metaphysics and Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics)” in those years. (“Ein erneuntes Studium der 
Aristotelischen Abhandlungen (im besonderen des neunten Buches der »Metaphysik« und des sechsten 
Buches der »Nikomachischen Ethik«)”). 
443 Cf. GA 62 (SS 1922). 
444 Cf. ibidem § 11f pp. 105-108 for the translation and pp. 108-111 for the analysis.  
445 Cf. Politics VII 3, 1325b 16. 
446 GA 62 § 11f p. 105 “was sachlich zur Sprache kommt, is genuin aristotelisch”. 
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ontological structure that corresponds to praxis (although he does not mention 
praxis): “a movement standing itself in its end, [which] is precisely in the end! 
―which is movement yet or precisely when it is in its end! To be in the ‘end’ and 
to be movement precisely then”447. In addition to the translation of these lines, he 
summarizes Aristotle’s examples: “Having seen, the ‘being at the end’ of the mov-
edness that is seeing, is seeing itself; the how of having thought is thinking”448, and 
he adds in a marginal note: “= energeia”. Movedness (Bewegtheit) is indeed the term 
with which Heidegger translates below, in 1048b 27f, Aristotle’s energeia, as 
contrasted with the movement (Bewegung) of kinēsis, formally indicated as “being 
on the way to (Unterwegssein zu)”. Relevant in Heidegger’s paraphrase of 1048b 21-
24 is also another formal indication, namely that of “the how (das Wie) of having-
thought”, which is adopted in the translation henceforth. Thus, for instance, in 
b26, “the how of having lived well is precisely good life”449; or, in b29-33, con-
cerning the hama, a key word in Aristotle’s characterization of energeia: “this ‘at 
once’ (dieses Zugleich) we cannot find in the movement of going and having gone 
(…); instead, it is another how of being in which ‘he moves’ and ‘he has moved’”450. 
The confluence in a same moment (hama, zugleich) of ‘having lived’ and ‘living’ 
opens up, in the reflection upon the phenomenon, a way of characterizing the 
being of life which seems to transcend the realm of the ‘being on the way to’ 
proper to movements. 
The interest in the Wie, in the “how of being” corresponds to Heidegger’s 
formal anzeigende approach, which is present in his translation of Aristotle’s texts in 
                                               
447 Ibidem p. 106 (our e.) “[Eine Bewegung] die selbst in ihrem Ende steht, am Ende gerade ist! ―die 
noch oder gerade dann Bewegung ist, wenn sie an ihrem Ende ist! Am ›Ende‹ sein und gerade dann 
Bewegung sein”. 
448 Ibidem p. 107 (our e.) “Das Gesehenhaben, das ›am Ende sein‹ der Bewegtheit sehen, ist selbst 
Sehen, das Wie des Gedachthabens ist gerade ›denken‹”. 
449 Ad loc. cit.  “das Wie des Gut-gelebt-habens ist gerade das gut Leben”. 
450 Ibidem p. 108 “[d]ieses Zugleich ist nicht bei der Bewegung des Gehens und dem Gegangensein (…) 
sondern es ist ein anderes Wie des Seins in dem ›er bewegt‹ und ›er hat bewegt‹”. 
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this course from the very beginning, when the first passage of the Metaphysics is 
tackled: the renowned pantes anthrōpoi tou eidenai oregontai physei, traditionally ren-
dered as “all men naturally desire knowledge”451. As Kisiel notes, “clearly seeking 
to counter the substantifying ‘what-being’ which a long tradition has invested in 
phrases like ‘by nature’ and ‘human nature’”452, Heidegger translates physei here as 
“constitutive of the how-being of man”453. Physis, therefore, is used to refer to the 
sense of being of life, about which Heidegger is enquiring. 
The approach to b33-35, finally, sets kinēsis aside and focuses on energeia in 
a translation that makes much more explicit than elsewhere Heidegger’s own 
voice: “Such a movedness I call how-being in the true-safekeeping temporaliza-
tion as temporalizing true-safekeeping (Wiesein in der verwahrenden Zeitigung als zeiti-
gender Verwahrung)”454. The whole formula is an interpretation of Aristotle’s 
succinct sentence “such a process I call energeia” (b34f). Heidegger refers explicitly 
his pointed redundancy to Aristotle’s hama to auto: the same thing at the same time. 
Energeia, therefore, is understood by Heidegger as a peculiar how of being that is 
defined in a circular manner: it is a safeguarding which unfolds at once with one’s 
own time; a safeguarding which does not take place in the form of a specific 
activity or process (in the sense of something that I could be doing or not), but 
simply in being what it is: as a true safekeeping unfolded in the time of life.  
But what is safeguarded (Verwahren) in this unfolding in time (Zeitigung), 
and why does Heidegger introduce this terminology all of a sudden in his transla-
tion? We said that his reading of energeia in this context is directed towards the 
                                               
451 Met. I 1, 980a 21. Thus in Ross’ translation. 
452 KISIEL, T. 1993 p. 240. 
453 GA 62 § 7a p. 17 “Das Verlangen nach dem Leben in Sehen (…) ist etwas, was das Wiesein des 
Menschen mitausmacht”. 
454 Ibidem § 11f p. 108 (our e.). “Eine solche Bewegtheit spreche ich an als Wiesein in der verwahrenden 
Zeitigung als zeitigender Verwahrung”. We use ‘safekeeping’ as substantive for Verwahrung after Van 
Buren’s translation of the Natorp Bericht (cf. e.g. note 457 below) and ‘safeguarding’ as verb for 
Verwahren.  
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theōrein of sophia. In the Natorp Bericht, written soon afterward, in late September455, 
Heidegger refers to Aristotle’s list of hexeis by which the soul is true (alētheuein)456, 
among which sophia and phronēsis, as “the modes in which the soul brings and takes 
beings into true safekeeping as unveiled”457. What is at stake in this safekeeping (ver-
wahren), as a translation for alētheuein, is actually the disclosure of being. This does 
not only become clear in light of the Natorp Bericht, but also from the occurrence 
of the term throughout this whole course and, specifically, from the line of ques-
tioning that Heidegger announces in § 12 for the subsequent sessions on Physics I, 
1-4, centered not on the sense of being in general, but specifically on the sense of 
being of human life: 
From which fundamental experiences and intentions and from which preconceptual 
categorial articulations arises for Aristotle―and the Greeks―the object and the sense of 
being of man and human life?458. 
The interpretation of 1048b in § 11 leads Heidegger to conclude that “the 
sense of being of the first mover, the divine, is pure energeia”459. To the sense of being 
of such a movedness, though, “only the movedness of seeing, theōria, is adequate”. 
Moreover, “to preserve its full sense of energeia, theōrein cannot be directed towards 
arbitrary changeable objects (…). Nothing that for his part refers to something else 
                                               
455 For chronological details on the Natorp Bericht, Cf. KISIEL, T. 1993 pp. 248-249, and the 
“Nachwort des Herausgebers” in GA 62, pp. 438 ff. 
456 Cf. NE VI 4, 1139b 15ff. 
457 NB 376/29 [130] “[die] Weisen, in denen die Seele Seiendes als unverhülltes in Verwahrung bringt 
und nimmt”. In that very same page [129 in translation], he refers to the dianoetic virtues “the 
possibility of actualizing a genuine true safekeeping of being” (“die Vollzugsmöglichkeit echter 
Seinsverwahrung”. Our e.). Later (p. 382/34 [134]) he sets phronēsis and sophia as “the concrete modes of 
the actualizing of this authentic true safekeeping of being” (“die konkreten Vollzugsweisen solcher 
eigentlichen Seinsverwahrung sind sophia und phronēsis”). 
458 GA 62 § 12 p. 111 (our e.) “Aus welchen Grunderfahrungen und Vorhaben und aus welchen 
vorgrifflichen kategorialen Artikulationen erwächst für Aristoteles ―und die Griechen― der 
Gegenstands- und Seinssinn des Menschen und menschlichen Lebens?”. At § 21 pp. 173 ff., in an 
excursus entitled “Ontologie und Geschichte”, Heidegger sets factical-historical human life as the 
sphere for research on being (Seinsforschung). 
459 Ibidem § 11f p. 108 “Der Seinsinn des ersten Bewegers ist reine energeia”. 
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can be the toward-which of the movedness of theōria”460. This, Heidegger notes, 
perfectly fits the sense of being of the divine, characterized by Aristotle as noēseos 
noēsis461. Man, insofar as he has in his way of being the possibility of tarrying (ver-
weilen), has in him something divine, even if he is granted such activity only for a 
short time462. What it means, though, for man to participate in divinity is left 
hanging in the air by Aristotle, and Heidegger does not pursue the question 
further here. 
From this consideration, Heidegger returns to 1048b, where “the elucida-
tion of the sense of energeia encounters: noein, theōrein and eudaimonein and zēn. Which 
implies: theōrein as the most authentic sense of pure movedness is thereby the mode 
of life, the being of life in which life is in its accomplished state”463. This result is 
backed with Aristotle’s statement in NE X that “happiness extends so far as con-
templation does”464 (which follows a consideration of contemplation―theōrein―as 
the activity of the gods). In addition, Heidegger points to that relevant passage of 
the Politics where Aristotle implies that theōria is “the highest praxis (sense of 
movedness! Crucial!)”465. 
All in all, Heidegger’s understanding of energeia and theōria in this passage 
clearly intends to hold an inner tension. On the one hand, he seems to appreciate 
the fact that theōria, “the pure beholding of authentic understanding, is the way-to-
                                               
460 Ibidem pp. 108-109 “Dem Seinssinn solcher Bewegtheit genügt nur die Bewegtheit des Sehens, 
theōria”. “Um also den vollen Sinn der energeia im theōrein zu wahren, kann dieses sich nicht auf beliebige 
veränderliche Gegenstände richten (…). Nichts kann das Worauf der Bewegtheit der theōria sein, was 
seinerseits auf ein anderes verweist”. 
461 Met. XII 9, 1074b 34f. 
462 Cf. GA 62 § 11f p. 109. Cf. NE X 8, 1178b 26ff. (a passage to which Heidegger refers below) Cf. 
also X 7, 1177b 26 ff. 
463 GA 62 § 11f p. 110 “In Met. IX 6 ist bei der Explication des Sinnes der energeia begegnet: noein, 
theōrein und eudaimonein und zēn. Das besagt: das theōrein als der eigenstlichste Sinn reinster Bewegtheit 
ist damit die Weise des Lebens, das Sein des Lebens, in dem es in seiner vollendeten Lage ist”. 
464 NE X 8, 1178b 28ff. 
465 GA 62 § 11 p. 111 “Die höchste praxis (Bewegtheitsinn! Entscheidend!)”. Cf. Politics VII 3, 1325b 16. 
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be in which life has first and last autonomy and, being master of itself, determines 
its movement from out of itself in terms of itself”466. On the other, he notes that 
the exemplary being out of which its structure as energeia is derived in Aristotle is 
none other than divine being, i.e. that being in whose pure movedness (reiner 
Bewegtheit) there is no possibility at all of an emotional behavior (keine Möglichkeit 
eines emotionalen Verhaltens überhaupt)467, i.e. of change.  
The ambiguity is not sorted out in this course, but the passage is discussed 
again, although in a much briefer fashion, in the Natorp Bericht, written some 
months after this course. Here 1048b comes at a very significant point, precisely 
when Heidegger indicates the ontological power of Aristotle’s conception of 
phronēsis and the fact that, despite its relevance, Aristotle does not seem to be up to 
the discovery. The close reading of the text and the articulated reasoning devel-
oped in this summer course will help us understand the ‘hermeneutical situation’ 
on which Heidegger’s more succinct but also more defined interpretation of 
energeia in the Natorp Bericht is grounded, as well as the ontological weight that 
phronēsis is going to acquire. 
4.2. The Doubling of the Point of View in Phronēsis 
The treatment of phronēsis in the Natorp Bericht is the first detailed analysis of this 
concept in Heidegger’s work, and very probably the very first occurrence of it, as 
far as we know from what has been published to date. The concept is not even 
mentioned in the summer course―perhaps it stems from an intuition that 
Heidegger had been maturing during the previous months, and which acquired a 
sharper outline in the intense composition of the Natorp Bericht468? Was Heidegger 
                                               
466 KISIEL, T. 1993 p. 243. 
467 Cf. GA 62 § 11 p. 110 
468 Cf. letter of Martin Heidegger to Karl Jaspers (19. Nov. 1922) in Briefwechsel 1920-1963 Edited by 
Walter Biemel und Hans Saner. München: Piper, 1992 pp. 33-34 “Natorp desired a specific orientation 
on my work plans. I have got down to work on it for three weeks, and I have summarized my ideas by 
 
 127 
perhaps building up an interpretation of Aristotelian sophia in the summer course 
which could be eventually contrasted with phronēsis? The fact is that although in 
the interpretation of NE VI provided in the Natorp Bericht both phronēsis and sophia 
are considered as “the concrete modes of the actualizing of this authentic true 
safekeeping of being”469, the latter is only briefly sketched, and set aside in the 
analysis, which is instead decisively centered on phronēsis. The reason for this shift 
seems to be that while sophia is “a kind of understanding consisting in a pure and 
simple looking at… [which] brings into true safekeeping those beings whose 
‘from-out-of-which’ is, as it is itself, in such a way that it necessarily always is what 
it is”, phronēsis, in contrast, “brings into true safekeeping those beings which, along 
with their ‘from-out-of-which’, can in themselves be otherwise”470. 
All of a sudden, the summer course tension between the true-safekeeping 
temporalization of energeia and the ‘heavenly’ theōrein, the activity of sophia, seems to 
be overcome by the ‘revolutionary’ concept of phronēsis, which not only accounts 
for phenomena which can be otherwise but also, Heidegger argues, 
provides an initial understanding of the basic characteristics of being that phronēsis 
itself has. Phronēsis is a hexis (…) which temporalizes and unfolds itself in life itself as 
its own possibility, brings life into a particular state―and this in a determinate way―, 
and in a certain sense actually brings it about471. 
                                                                                                                                 
writing an «Introduction»”. (“Natorp wünschte eine konkrete Orientierung über meine geplanten 
Arbeiten. Darauf setzte ich mich drei Wochen hin und exzerpierte mich selbst und schrieb dabei eine 
»Einleitung«”). 
469 NB p. 382/34 [134] “die konkreten Vollzugsweisen solcher eigentlichen Seinsverwahrung sind 
sophia und phronēsis”. 
470 NB p. 382/34-35 [134, mod. tr.] “Das reine hinsehende Verstehen bringt das Seiende, dessen ›Von-
Wo-Aus‹ und das selbst ist in der Weise, daß es notwendig und immer ist, was es ist, in Verwahrung; 
das fürsorgend-besprechende Sichumsehen dagegen ein solches Seiendes, das an ihm selbst und dessen 
›Von-Wo-Aus‹ anders sein kann”. 
471 NB p. 385/37 [135-136, mod. tr.] “[S]ie gewinnt zugleich ein erstes Verständnis des Seinscharakters, 
den die phronēsis an ihr selbst hat. Sie ist hexis (…), was sich im Leben selbst als dessen eigene 
Möglichkeit zeitigt ―und dieses in einen bestimmten Stand― in gewisser Weise zu-Stande-bringt”. 
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Phronēsis actualizes or unfolds life because, as the hexis of praxis, it is 
concerned with the dealings of life with itself472. Alētheia praktikē, the peculiar truth 
that is disclosed by phronēsis, is “nothing other than the whole unveiled moment (at 
the particular time) of factical life in the how of its decisive readiness for dealings 
with itself”473. The ontological traits of phronēsis enhance a formal indication of 
both life and its dealings, insofar as they are understood within a kairological frame: 
life is seized in its Bewegtheit because it is seized from within it, and not from a 
paradigm alien to it, as is the case of the pure movedness (reine Bewegtheit) of the 
divine. Hence the phenomenon of phronēsis, as described here, 
is a doubling of the point of view into which Aristotle placed the human being and the 
being of life and which became decisive within intellectual history for the fate of the 
categorial explication of the sense of the being of facticity. In circumspection, life is 
there for itself in the concrete how of the with-which of going about its dealings. 
However, and this is decisive, in Aristotle it is not on the basis of this phenomenon and not 
in a positive manner (nicht positiv hieraus) that the being of the with-which of dealings is 
ontologically defined. Rather, it is defined simply in a formal manner as ‘capable of 
being otherwise’ than it is and thus ‘not necessarily and always’ what it is. This 
ontological definition gets actualized through a negative comparison with another 
kind of being that is considered to be being in the authentic sense”474. 
The text becomes at this stage extremely dense and somehow obscure in 
its reasoning. This detection of a “doubling of the point of view” (Doppelung der 
Hinsicht) in Aristotle marks a crucial turning point in the essay and, we might say, 
in Heidegger’s intellectual path. The term Doppelung grants Aristotle both an 
insight and a fateful error―a phenomenological breakthrough and, at the same 
time, the inability to be up to its relevance. Two interrelated objections are made 
                                               
472 Cf. NB p. 383/35 [134]. 
473 NB p. 384/36 [135] “Die alētheia praktikē ist nichts anderes als der jeweils unverhüllte volle 
Augenblick des faktischen Lebens im Wie der entscheidenden Umgangsbereitschaft mit ihm selbst”. 
474 NB p. 385/37 [136] “So zeigt sich an der phronēsis gerade eine Doppelung der Hinsicht an, in die der 
Mensch und das Sein des Lebens gestellt sind, die für das geistesgeschichtliche Schicksal der 
kategorialen Explikation des Seinssinnes der Faktizität entscheidend wird. In der Umsicht ist das 
Leben da im konkreten Wie eines Womit des Umgangs. Das Sein dieses Womit ist aber ―und das ist 
schon entscheidend― nicht positiv hieraus ontologisch charakterisiert, sondern nur formal als solches, 
›das auch anders sein kann‹, ›nicht notwendig und immer ist‹, wie es ist. Diese ontologische 
Charakteristik ist vollzogen im negierenden Gegenhalt gegen anderes und eigentliches Sein”. 
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to the way in which Aristotle understands the being of what phronēsis deals with 
―namely actions (prakta)―which will necessarily impact upon his understanding 
of the being of phronēsis itself, and thus of the Bewegtheitsinn of human life:  
(i) phronēsis is defined just formally, i.e. as capable of being otherwise and, more 
importantly, (ii) it is understood negatively, insofar as it is only grasped in relation 
to another sense of being which would be the authentic sense, viz. that of what is 
always in the same manner, of what cannot be otherwise475. The phenomenon of 
life is pointed to, but when it comes to grasping it ontologically the discovery is 
squandered, because of its subordination to an ontological frame that does not fit 
its sense of being476. 
This Aristotelian authentic sense of being in relation to which human 
praxis is negatively understood, Heidegger argues, is not derived from the human 
way of being as encountered in phronēsis, but instead “springs from an ontological 
radicalization of the idea of beings that are moved”477. Here we meet for the first 
time a clear formulation of Heidegger’s thesis on Western and, specifically, Greek 
ontology, that settles during these breakthrough years in his mind478. The 
exemplary pattern from which Aristotle conceives movement, Heidegger argues, is 
that of production (die Bewegung des Herstellens). For that reason, being for Aristotle 
means “being-finished-and-ready i.e., a kind of being in which motion has arrived at its 
                                               
475 “The central question is: where does Aristotle obtain the distinction «to be always» - «to be capable 
to be otherwise»?” (“Die Kernfrage ist: Woher gewinnt Aristoteles die Unterscheidung: »immer sein« - 
»auch anders sein können«?”). (Übungen über Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Nikomachische 
Ethik VI; De Anima; Metaphysik VII) (WS 1922-23) in Heidegger-Jahrbuch 3 (2007) pp. 23-48, cf. p. 34 for 
ref).  
476 Cf. the formulation of this thesis, some years later, in SZ § 44 p. 225: “[F]or the Greeks (…) [the] 
primordial sense of truth was also alive, even if pre-ontologically,  and it even held its own against the 
concealment implicit in their ontology―at least in Aristotle”. (“[B]ei den Griechen (...) das 
ursprüngliche, wenngleich vorontologische Verständnis der Wahrheit lebendig war und sich sogar 
gegen die in ihrer Ontologie liegende Verdeckung ― mindestens bei Aristoteles ― behauptete”). 
477 NB p. 385/38 [136] “[eine ontologische] Radikalisierung der Idee des Bewegtseienden”. 
478 Cf. notes 389 and 390 above. 
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end”479. The term her-stellen implies to bring something forth, to place (stellen) 
something as stemming from (her-) a movement that is different from the being of 
what is thus placed: when something has been hergestellt, it is no longer in 
movement; its way of being is readiness, completedness480. Heidegger is obviously 
leading the reader to ask herself: is however this idea of being as production 
suitable to grasp the ontological character of human life, “a being that is precisely 
insofar as it can in each case be otherwise”481, i.e. a being never finished, ever in 
motion while it is alive? 
Heidegger approaches the issue by trying to make sense of how Aristotle 
could actually find a way of understanding human life starting from an outlook 
that is alien to it. Indeed, Heidegger argues, Aristotle did find a way, and this in 
consistency with his ontology. For Aristotle, “the being of life must be looked at 
simply in terms of the pure temporalizing and unfolding of sophia as such, and this is due 
to the authentic kind of movement available in it”482. This authentic kind of 
movement is energeia, the Bewegtheit described in 1048b, which was the object of a 
thorough translation in the summer course that year, and which Heidegger 
retrieves here in a more concise, but substantially similar, version of his 
interpretation483.  
                                               
479 NB p. 385/38 [136] “Sein ist Fertigsein, das Sein, in dem die Bewegung zu ihrem Ende gekommen ist”.  
480 Cf. the development of this topic, some years later, in GA 24 § 11b p. 152 [108]: “To pro-duce, to 
place-here, Her-stellen, means at the same time to bring into the narrower or wider circuit of the 
accessible, here, to this place, to the Da, so that the produced being stands for itself on its own account 
and remains able to be found there and to lie-before there as something established stably for itself”. (“Herstellen 
besagt aber zugleich: in den engeren oder weiteren Umkreis des Zugänglichen bringen, her, hierher, in 
das Da, so daß das Hergestellte an ihm selbst für sich steht und als für sich Ständiges vorfindlich bleibt und 
vorliegt.”). It is worth noting that the latin etymology of pro-duct (brought forth) literally renders the 
sense of the german herstellen. Cf. also WBP in GA 9 p. 354 [217]. 
481 NB p. 386/38 [136] “ein Seiendes, das ist gerade dadurch, daß es je anders sein kann”. 
482 Ibidem “Lediglich in der reinen Zeitigung der sophia als solcher muß, ob der ihr verfügbaren eigentlichen 
Bewegtheit, das Sein des Lebens gesehen werden” 
483 Cf. NB p. 386/38-39 [136-137]. 
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Seeing is identical with having seen, i.e. seeing itself has brought itself to its 
end from the very first moment of its being. It is therefore immediately there, 
immediately ready, finished, i.e. it is ultimately dependent on the sense of being of 
the kinēsis that is production. What is special about seeing, however, is that it is its 
‘being ready’ that activates its motion: I can only see when ‘seeing’ is fully there. 
The same applies for noein: “[i]n having arrived at its end insofar as what it is able 
to perceive in a pure and simple manner now stands before its gaze, [the nous of sophia] 
not only does not cease, but rather now―precisely as having arrived at its end― 
really is motion for the first time”484. For noein ‘to be’ implies to linger on this 
‘motion’ that consists of perceiving something before its gaze. The immediacy 
with which it comes to be inaugurates a new movedness that is different from that 
of kinēsis: its motion is not like that of production, one that ceases when the 
product is ready; quite the reverse, its immediate readiness gives rise to a motion 
that does not cease. Because of its immediacy, energeia can detach from the moving 
stream of kinēsis and is thus able to see life and reality as something standing 
before its gaze. However, it is also for this reason, because in noēsis life is present to 
itself as something standing before its gaze, as different from the pure movement on 
which it lingers and of which it alone is capable485, that “noēsis as pure theōrein” 
shares the leading ontological paradigm of Fertigsein with the specific type of kinēsis 
that is production.  
Heidegger’s dense diagnostic could be summarized as follows: on the one 
hand, because Aristotle―as a Greek―understands being from the perspective of 
production (herstellen), he definitely cannot find in kinēsis―i.e. being unfinished or 
on the way―an adequate characterization of human life. On the other, the 
                                               
484 NB p. 386/38 [136, our e.] “[nous ist] die Bewegtheit, die als zu ihrem Ende gekommene, sofern sie 
das rein Vernehmbare im Blick hat, nicht nur nicht aufhört, sondern gerade erst ― als zu Ende 
gekommene ― Bewegung ist”. The observation must be made that here Heidegger problematically 
tends to reduce sophia to nous, which in Aristotle’s text is only one of the components of sophia, 
together with epistēmē. As Aristotle depicts it, sophia adopts a more discursive form that is less 
convenient to Heidegger’s interpretation. 
485 NB p. 386/39 [137] “Der höchsten Idee reiner Bewegtheit genügt nur die noēsis als reines theōrein”. 
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phenomena seem to indicate that life is indeed a motion, and thus Aristotle 
arrives, starting from the idea of being as Fertigsein, to the concept of energeia. What 
is distinctive about energeia is that it is immediately there as fertig, so that it actually 
‘is’ in a full Greek sense, but at the same time it performs an activity, it has 
‘motion’486. Thus, while there is indeed something like a motion at stake, the being 
of man is ultimately understood from a radicalization of the ontological thickness 
that we find in things which have been produced (herstellt), things which are the 
result of a movement that is different from them: 
The basic character of the being of hexis and thus also of aretē, i.e. the ontological 
structure of human being, is understood on the basis of an ontology of beings in the 
how of a particular kind of movement and on the basis of an ontological 
radicalization of this kind of movement487. 
Approaching life through energeia, the radicalization of the idea of produc-
tion, entails to understand its movedness from the point of view of things as ready 
to hand (Vorhanden), and it is ultimately because of this understanding, Heidegger 
argues, that Aristotle will privilege sophia for ontology. However, sophia “does not 
in any sense have human life as its intentional toward-which”488, it is not 
concerned with prakta as phronēsis is, in which “life is there for itself in the concrete 
how of the with-which of going about its dealings”489. As a result, the ontology 
                                               
486 This ambivalent character of energeia, as Heidegger understands it, is explained more extensively in 
GA 22 (SS 1926) p. 175 [146]: “Life has a telos, an entelecheia. Life as the most proper presence-at-hand: presence 
out of itself and constantly complete, and yet not at rest, not simply lying there immobile. Movedness and 
presence, entelecheia (…): a kind of being of a higher mode. But, as presence, maintaining itself constant, 
autonomous and constant in full, finished presence (…), finished and yet not stopping in its insistent 
presence (…)”. (“Leben hat telos, entelecheia. Leben als die eigentlichste Vorhandenheit: Anwesenheit von sich 
selbst her und ständig vollendet und doch nicht ruhend, unbewegt vorliegend. Bewegtheit und Anwesenheit, 
entelecheia (…): eine Seinsart von höherem Modus. Aber als Anwesenheit sich selbst ständig, 
eigenständig-ständig in der vollen fertigen Anwesenheit halten (…), fertig und doch nicht Aufhören der 
vordränglichen Anwesenheit (…)”). 
487 NB 386/39 [137] “Der Seinscharackter der hexis und damit der aretē, das heißt: die ontologische 
Struktur des Menschseins, wird aus der Ontologie des Seienden im Wie einer bestimmten Bewegtheit 
und der ontologischen Radikalisierung der Idee dieser Bewegtheit verständlich”. 
488 NB 385-386/38 [136] “die sophia hat [das menschliche Leben] überhaupt nicht zu ihrem 
intentionalen Worauf”. 
489 NB 385/37 [136] “In der Umsicht ist das Leben da im konkreten Wie eines Womit des Umgangs”.  
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that we are getting is one which cannot account for the being of the ontologist 
herself. As a result, she remains methodologically blind, unaware of her own 
conditions of access to phenomena, and thus delivered to a determinate 
unquestioned approach to being. 
Is then Heidegger simply dismissing sophia altogether here, in order to re-
place it with phronēsis? This would again be too hasty an interpretation, as we 
warned in the case of the critique of the Entlebung of theory in KNS. In that 
course, Heidegger was not trying to get rid of theory but to acquire a theoretical 
access to life that could grasp its movedness without stopping it (since this would 
imply not having it any longer). In a similar fashion, here Heidegger is concerned 
with the way in which Aristotle understands sophia. The problem, in fact, is not sophia 
itself, but rather the idea of being that allegedly inspires Aristotle in his characterization of it. 
According to Aristotle, Heidegger argues, 
the authentic being of human beings temporalizes and unfolds itself in the pure 
actualization of sophia as a tarrying alongside and pure perceiving of the archai of 
those beings that always are (…)490. 
If, without exclusion of those beings that always are, philosophy (philo-sophia) 
cannot be conceived in such a way that it also truly safeguards the being of human 
life, then it cannot be legitimated, because the how of the access to phenomena 
―the Vollzugsinn―is brushed off491. The task, therefore, is not to substitute 
phronēsis for sophia, but to rethink sophia through phronēsis. This implies rethinking 
                                               
490 NB 386/39 [137] “Eigentliches Sein des Menschen zeitigt sich im reinen Vollzug der sophia als dem 
unbekümmerten, zeithabenden (scholē), rein vernehmenden Verweilen bei den archai des immer 
Seienden”. 
491 Some commentators simplify Heidegger’s interpretation, perhaps because they are lead astray by his 
statement in this essay that “philosophy has to be atheistic” (cf. NB 363/15 [121]), when they read 
Heidegger as though he was reproaching Aristotle for allowing finite human beings into the divine 
sphere (cf. e.g. LONG, C. 2002). However, neither Aristotle is that naïve, nor is Heidegger’s 
interpretation that simple. Brague is straight to the point in this respect when he says that “Heidegger 
does not deny that those realities naively qualified as eternal (mathematical objects, ‘values’, God, etc.) 
are accessible to human spirit. He only holds (...) that the way of being of such realities does not allow 
to think what being means in wide enough a manner to embrace―without deformations―what being 
means when I say ‘I am’” (BRAGUE, R. 1984 p. 261). 
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theōria as praxis, surely as the highest form of praxis, but making sure that praxis, 
human life, is not understood from the foreign ontological frame of energeia, this 
radicalization of that determined sense of kinēsis that is production.  
It is important to stress that Heidegger is concerned with this kind of 
movement, namely production: he does not just consider energeia ‘the radicalization 
of the idea of movement’ in general, but specifically of the idea of poiēsis, that has 
its guiding thread in the readiness of the product toward which it tends. He is 
therefore implying that there is more to kinēsis than just production, and that is 
why later in the essay he turns to the question of kinēsis in the Physics492, and 
summarizes his intention of retrieving a question that he attributes to Aristotle’s 
research in this book: “to what extent is motion itself being seen and genuinely 
explicated on the basis of itself?”493; or―reading between the lines―is kinēsis 
thought, even by Aristotle himself, in wide enough a manner as to liberate being 
from the narrowing to which it was initially subdued?494 
This relation of exclusion between the paradigms of energeia on the one 
hand and kinēsis in a wide sense on the other, so intensively though briefly held in 
1922, could explain why Metaphysics IX 6, 1048b 18-35 is not again the object of a 
close analysis in Heidegger’s published works until the 1939 essay Vom Wesen und 
Begriff der Physis495. The fact that what is at stake in this passage is a positive analysis 
of energeia―in the sense that it is the sole place in Aristotle’s works where it is 
thematised per se―perhaps makes it, once energeia is discarded as belonging to the 
                                               
492 Cf. NB pp. 391 ff./43 ff. [139 ff.] 
493 NB p. 394/47 [142] “wie weit ist jeweils Bewegung an ihr selbst gesehen und genuin expliziert?” 
494 It is in this respect that Gadamer would say, in his introduction to the publication of NB, the 
wiedergefundenes Programm, that “the 6th book of the Nicomachean Ethics appears in this programmatic 
text actually rather as an introduction to Aristotelian Physics” (GADAMER, Hans-Georg “Heideggers 
»theologische« Jugendschrift” Dilthey Jahrbuch 6 (1989) pp. 228-234, p. 231 for ref.). 
495 “Vom Wesen und Begriff der Physis. Aristoteles Physik B 1” (WBP) in GA 9 pp. 354-357 [216-219]. 
Two brief references to this passage within this span of time can be found in DWA (1924) p. 15 [230] 
and GA 22 (SS 1926) § 62 p. 175 [146]. A more veiled reference, with the example of “going for a 
walk”, is provided in GA 18 (SS 1924) § 10b p. 71 [50]. 
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metaphysics of presence, rather useless for Heidegger’s efforts, that are hereafter 
centered on the understanding of life as kinēsis, the very Sache of his thought, 
according to Sheehan496.  
While an unquestioned acceptance of everything Aristotle says is diametri-
cally opposed to Heidegger’s enterprise, and to any sensible approach to Aristotle, 
it is crucial to take heed of the context of those passages which are the object of 
the interpretation, particularly when they are fundamental for it. It is remarkable in 
this respect that nowhere in his analysis of 1048b in the 1922 summer course or, 
later that year, in the Natorp Bericht, does Heidegger refer to the fact that in 
Aristotle this passage is presented as an analysis of praxis (b18) and that phronein 
itself is listed among the energeiai (b24). We might deduce that Heidegger does not 
think phronein should be included there, but he does not even say so. McNeill has 
importantly noted this: 
Aristotle’s text also attributes the simultaneity of seeing and having seen, as the strict-
est sense of praxis, to phronēsis: horai hama [kai keōrake], kai phronei [kai pephronēke] 
(1048b 24), something that Heidegger conspicuously omits to mention. Thus, even if 
we read with Heidegger the reference to noein as alluding to the theoretical nous of 
sophia, phronein comprises no less of an end in itself than does theōrein. Moreover, this 
mention of phronein seems to suggest that we find the authentic Aristotelian meaning 
of being not only in moving away from phronēsis and remaining at a theoretical re-
move from it, but that this sense of being might equally be found in the seeing intrin-
sic to phronēsis itself. Might one speculate that Heidegger’s neglecting to mention the 
entire practical context of this point in Metaphysics Book IX could be due to the sig-
nificance of this insight for his own germinating project of reinscribing the stasis of 
vision (...) back within the Augenblick of a praxis conceived more originarily?497. 
                                               
496 Cf. SHEEHAN, Thomas “On Movement and the Destruction of Ontology” The Monist 64/4 
(1981) pp. 534-542 (cf. esp. P. 536) and “On the Way to Ereignis: Heidegger’s Interpretation of Physis” 
in Silverman, Hugh. J et al. (eds.) Continental Philosophy in America Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 1983 pp. 131-164 (cf. esp. p. 133) The latter provides an analysis of the influence of Heidegger’s 
early orientation towards movement as energeia atelēs in the 1939 essay, as well as on his later concept of 
Ereignis. 
497 McNEILL, William The Glance of the Eye. Heidegger, Aristotle and the Ends of Theory SUNY, 1999, p. 129 
(our e.). Taminiaux and Volpi also consider 1048b as a reference passage for the understanding of 
praxis in Aristotle (Cf. VOLPI, F. 1994 pp. 201-202 and TAMINIAUX, Jacques Lectures de l’ontologie 
fondamentale Grénoble: Jerome Millon, 1989 pp. 163 ff.). 
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The neglect is not unimportant, especially if we take into account the fact 
that the implicit divorce between energeia and a wide idea of kinēsis in Heidegger’s 
interpretation of this passage parallels the one he establishes between phronēsis and 
sophia. However, Heidegger does not intend to oppose these determinations per se 
(since he intends to appropriate them in a new synthesis), but rather to show how 
Aristotle’s ontological characterization of sophia upon the basis of energeia is 
rejected by his phenomenological insight of phronēsis. For that reason, we do not 
think that at the time there was for Heidegger something like a ‘significant insight’ 
in 1048b. The breakthrough, instead, was for him in NE VI, as we have seen in 
the Natorp Bericht. The proof of that, as we suggested, is the scarce attention that 
Heidegger pays to 1048b after 1922. That is why, although he is right in pointing 
out Heidegger’s neglect of the relation between praxis and energeia in 1048b, 
McNeill’s suggestion that Heidegger might be deliberately denying Aristotle a 
valuable insight for his own efforts does not seem plausible to us. Since Heidegger 
is not here whimsically dismissing Aristotle to turn to other thinkers, but starting 
his own long dialogue with this philosopher, it is hardly believable that he could 
just turn down a speculative possibility in Aristotle. We presume that if Heidegger 
does not retrieve this text later in the 1920s, it is because at that moment he does 
not find such a possibility in it. For Heidegger sophia has to be understood as 
praxis, as Aristotle himself states, and praxis has to be understood as kinēsis, 
because energeia, as he understands it, does not fit its way of being. From this point 
of view, if Aristotle intends to understand praxis in terms of energeia it is only 
because he is thinking the how of human being from a paradigm that is 
extraneous to it. Still, we may insist, McNeill is right that Heidegger does not face 
the challenge to his interpretation that is implicit as much in the inclusion of 
phronei [kai pephronēke], right next to noei kai neonēken, as in the clear practical 
framing of the passage498. One would say that the text seems to be swept away by 
the force of the thesis of Anwesenheit before it is allowed to state its case.  
                                               
498 It could be argued that Aristotle could be using phronēsis here in the general sense of knowledge, as 
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4.3. A Widening of the Paradox 
In his introduction to the first publication of the Natorp Bericht in 1989, Gadamer 
acknowledges that the understanding of being as ‘being produced’ (Hergestelltsein) 
that Heidegger assigns to Aristotle for the first time in this text goes hand in hand 
with the idea that “telos does not mean aim (Ziel), but being ready (Fertigsein)”499. If, 
according to this conception of telos, energeia is just a radicalization of the idea of 
production―an immediate herstellen, an immediate reach of Fertigkeit―it obviously 
narrows the sense of being that appears in the phenomenon of Dasein finding 
itself in itself, in being itself500. As a result, a wider determination of being is 
required than energeia can provide. To be sure, though, by this widening Heidegger 
does not intend to dismiss the sense of being as Vorhandenheit altogether, as 
Taminiaux accurately remarks:  
Fundamental ontology does not intend to refuse, but rather to reappropriate this 
understanding or view of being as Vorhandenheit, inherent to poiēsis. In other words, 
the aim is to put it back in its proper place by preventing it from expanding to all the 
field of understanding of beings (…). [The Greeks] were naïve to believe―or at least 
to imply―that all views on being are a simple modification of the view that is 
inherent to poiēsis501. 
Yet the paradox―as Taminiaux points out―is that Heidegger intends to 
overcome this Greek naivety on the basis of Greek texts: “in order to remove the 
limitation and obscuring entailed by poiēsis, Heidegger leans on the Greek analysis 
of another activity, namely praxis as Aristotle ponders it”502. But if praxis can 
overcome the limitations of an ontology tailored on poiēsis, the fact that the only 
                                                                                                                                 
in Met. I 2, 982b 24 or IV 5, 1009b 13. However, apart from the fact that phronēsis, as much as the other 
examples provided, are considered praxeis, while Heidegger reads eudaimonein in this passage as 
restricted to pure theōrein (Cf. GA 62 § 11f p. 110, NE X 8, 1178b 28f), Aristotle conceives theōrein as 
praxis and happiness as including the exercise of ethical aretai, i.e. of praxis (cf. section 2.6 above). 
499 GADAMER, H.-G. 1989 p. 233. 
500 “[Dasein] finds itself in itself (…). The primary relation to Dasein is not that of seeing but of «being 
it»” (Es befindet sich bei sich selbst (…) Der primäre Bezug zum Dasein ist nicht die Betrachtung, 
sondern das »es sein«”) (“Der Begriff der Zeit” (1924) in GA 64 p. 114 [205, mod. tr.]). 
501 TAMINIAUX, J. 1989 pp. 161-162 
502 Ibidem p. 162. 
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positive determination of energeia in Aristotle’s works is obtained precisely from an 
analysis of praxis requires a more detailed discernment of whether the approach to 
energeia in 1048b is effectively led by a narrow idea of being as presence 
(Anwesenheit). Specifically, we have to inquire whether the analysis of energeia in that 
passage is ultimately an application of a previously assembled idea of being―i.e. a 
radicalization of the idea of production (herstellen)―or whether it actually takes its 
lead from the phenomena with which it is faced. While the structure of energeia in 
1048b is elucidated through a contrast with kinēseis, among which poiēseis like 
building are counted, is not Aristotle seeing and genuinely explicating energeia on 
the basis of itself, of its phainesthai503? In other words, are we not here, like with 
phronēsis in NE VI, in the presence of a formale Anzeige? 
This line of questioning necessarily places us in a sort of mit und gegen 
Heidegger position504, given that 1048b is so much at the heart of the genesis of his 
thesis on the Greek and Western submission to the narrowing sense of being as 
Anwesenheit. This thesis, accepted without much discussion in most of the litera-
ture on Heidegger, is questioned to different degrees by a certain number of 
commentators505. Inquiring to what extent it fits Aristotle’s ontological conception 
                                               
503 Ontologically defining a determination on the basis of itself: cf. NB p. 394/47 [142] in reference to 
kinēsis and p. 385/37 [136] in reference to phronēsis. 
504 The expression is a transformation of the mit und gegen Aristoteles that has become popular in the 
secondary bibliography on Heidegger to express synthetically the peculiar character of his approach to 
Aristotle. For instance, it is the heading to a section in the volume comprising the lectures of the 2005 
Tagung of the Heidegger Gesellschaft (Cf. STEINMANN, Michael (ed.) Heidegger und die Griechen 
Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007). The mit und gegen Heidegger may seem daring as an approach, 
given Heidegger’s intellectual stature. But the opposite argument applies too: one has sometimes, in 
reading the literature on Heidegger, the impression that Aristotle’s intellectual stature is undermined by 
an unquestioned faithfulness to Heidegger’s approach. The expression has been used recently in 
GONZALEZ, F. J. 2008.  
505 The most recent critical remarks are developed in: GONZALEZ, Francisco J. 2008, 2006b, and also 
his “Confronting Heidegger on Logos and Being in Plato’s Sophist” (2003) in Damschen, G. et al. 
(eds.) Platon und Aristoteles ― sub ratione veritatis Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003 pp. 102-133; 
SEGURA, Carmen Heidegger y la metafísica. Análisis críticos. Madrid, 2006 and “Crítica a la interpretación 
heideggeriana de la ousia aristotélica” (due to be published in Actas del I Congreso Internacional de Filosofía 
Griega, 2008. Palma de Mallorca, 2010). Cf. also PÖGGELER, Otto “Temporal Interpretation and 
Hermeneutic Philosophy” in Bruzina, R. and Wilshire, B. (eds.) Phenomenology, dialogues and bridges (1982) 
pp. 79-106 (esp. pp. 90 ff.) and Neue Wege mit Heidegger Freiburg: Alber, 1992 pp. 134 ff., 197 ff.; 
 
 139 
obviously exceeds the possibilities of the present research, because a more encom-
passing exegesis of Aristotle’s and Heidegger’s works would be required than we 
can provide here. Our task could be defined as a widening of the paradox that Heidegger 
himself holds throughout his lifelong dialogue with Aristotle, according to which there 
would be insights in Aristotle which point toward an overcoming of the tradition 
that he himself represents: discoveries on the one hand which catch a glimpse of 
the originary sense of being, and naïve ontological assumptions on the other 
which abandon and ultimately hide this sense of being. The indication of this 
paradox is evident in Heidegger with the notion of praxis in the early 1920s and 
with that of physis in the late 1930s. Energeia, in turn, appears with varying intensity 
throughout these years, and a certain evolution of Heidegger’s understanding of it 
can be appreciated, although its interpretation ultimately remains subjugated to the 
suspicion that Anwesenheit constitutes its unthought ground506. That precisely 
energeia could widen the non-naïve side of the paradox, of course, could make 
collapse the paradox, as far as Aristotle is concerned. Would this however imply a 
collapse of Heidegger’s project before the Kehre, as he himself suggests in 1930 
concerning his thesis about the Greek concept of being?:  
If this interpretation of [the Greek concept of] being as constant presence is not 
correct, there can be no basis for unfolding a connection between being and time, as 
demanded by the fundamental question507. 
                                                                                                                                 
GADAMER, Hans-Georg Metafisica e Filosofia Pratica in Aristotele (1990) Napoli: Guerini, 2000 pp. 57, 
99 ff.; RICOEUR, P. 1990 pp. 358 ff.; BERTI, E. 1993 pp. 60 ff.; D’ANGELO, Antonello Heidegger e 
Aristotele: la potenza e l’atto Napoli: Il Mulino, 2000 esp. pp. 418 ff.; DOSTAL, Robert J. “Beyond Being: 
Heidegger’s Plato” in Macann, Ch. (ed.) Martin Heidegger. Critical Assessments. Vol II: History of Philosophy 
London/New York: Routledge, 1992 pp. 61-89 (esp. pp. 71 ff.), POLO, Leonardo Hegel y el 
posthegelianismo Piura: Ediciones Universidad de Piura, 1985 (esp. pp. 293 ff.), MARX, Werner Heidegger 
and the Tradition Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971 (esp. pp. 21-22). 
506 A discussion of this evolution is undertaken in GONZALEZ, F. J, 2006b. 
507 GA 31 Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (SS 1930) Ed. by Hartmut Tietjen, 1982 [The Essence of 
Human Freedom Translated by Ted Sadler, London: Continuum, 2002], § 9 p. 74 [51]. “[D]iese 
Interpretation von Sein, ousia, als beständige Anwesenheit wäre nicht stichhaltig, dann bestände kein 
Anhalt dafür, einen Problemzusammenhang von Sein und Zeit zu entfalten, wie es die Grundfrage 
fordert”. 
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Although our contribution in this thesis can only be to show a side of the 
problematic, we suggest that Heidegger’s project might be transformed rather than 
relinquished, if the elucidation of energeia in 1048b proved to show that “being and 
time are interwoven with one another” in such a way that “the ‘and’ signifies a 
primordial co-belongingness of being and time from the ground of their 
essence”508. What we suggest is that an Urform of what the ‘und’ is to Sein und Zeit 
might be found mutatis mutandis in Aristotle’s “at the same time” (hama) in this text. 
As much as the question on the und between Sein and Zeit―i.e. that of the being of 
Dasein509―comprises the power and originality of the first Heidegger, the 
cooriginality of the ‘I see’ and the ‘I have seen’ described by the hama, which is 
constitutive of the characterization of energeia, encloses one of Aristotle’s most 
fertile intuitions, with effects upon many of his works, among which stand, 
crucially, the NE. On commenting upon Aristotle’s handling of the word hama in 
Physics IV, Derrida remarks: 
The entire force of Aristotle’s text depends on a single word which is scarcely visible 
because it is so evident; as obvious, it is also discreet and hidden, but it operates all 
the more effectively for escaping thematic attention. The tiny hama is that which sets 
the discourse in motion in terms of its articulation; from this point on, it will consti-
tute the inner core (cheville, literally ‘ankle-bone’) of metaphysics; it will be the small 
key (clavis) which both locks and unlocks the history of metaphysics―the skeletal 
frame (clavicula, ‘collar-bone’) on which the entire conceptual apparatus of Aristote-
lian discourse is supported and in terms of which it is articulated510. 
We are surely not suggesting that a determined reading of Aristotle would 
make the project of Sein und Zeit unnecessary because Aristotle would have already 
                                               
508 GA 31 § 11 p. 118 [84] “Sein und Zeit suchen einander und weben einander. Das ›Und‹ ist der Titel 
für eine ursprüngliche Zusammengehörigkeit von Sein und Zeit aus dem Grunde ihres Wesens”. 
509 Cf. GRONDIN, J. 1988 pp. 381-382: “Heidegger’s research will be addressed to the Dasein with a 
view to open the question of the sense of being, which will have to become apparent within the 
horizon of time. Two of these notions, bound by an ‘and’ which the grammar of the depths could call 
an indefined conjunction, have found place in Heidegger’s master work: being and time―but it is 
surely the Dasein that supports their connection. The Dasein, the ‘und’ in Sein und Zeit (...)”.   . 
510 DERRIDA, Jacques “Ousia and Grammē: A Note to a Footnote in Being and Time” in Smith, F. J. 
(ed.) Phenomenology in Perspective The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970 pp. 54-93 (pp. 80-81 for ref.). Cf. 
Physics IV 10, 218a. 
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anticipated it. Instead, we believe that this project―in its unfolding in the early 
1920s―might find in 1048b at least as valuable an insight as it does in the pages of 
NE VI, and that Heidegger seems to us not to unfold it511. If this passage of 
Metaphysics IX is read without the premise that energeia is a structure alien to the 
being of Dasein, the retrieval of Aristotle’s practical philosophy would be rein-
forced from the inside, perhaps not so much against Aristotle himself as against 
the modern philosophy of subjectivity512. In fact, if 1048b has come to be relevant 
for us in our approach to phronēsis in section I it is partly due to reasons which are 
internal to Heidegger’s project: (i) his prevention against reducing our 
understanding of being to presence, which goes hand in hand with his orientation 
towards time as the way out of this narrowing of the sense of being513; (ii) his 
methodological requirement of basing the understanding of being on the relation 
of Dasein to its own being514; (iii) his dissatisfaction with Husserl’s solution to the 
aporia of conceiving a subject founding a world to which it in its turn belongs515, 
and (iv) his ontological reading of phronēsis516. 
                                               
511 Cf. VOLPI, Franco “La «riabilitazione» della dynamis e dell’energeia in Heidegger” Aquinas 33/1 
(1990) pp. 3-27 (p. 27 for ref.): “Heidegger has been able to valorize energeia only to a certain extent, 
that is, only insofar as it served as referral and exhortation to think of a forgotten dimension of 
modern technique, namely the dimension of that movedness which rests upon itself and which as a 
matter of principle keeps out of human machinations, and of which an originaly thought physis is the 
expression”. Volpi’s comment is centered on Heidegger’s understanding of the term from 1931 on, 
which acquired a positive sense that his reading of energeia in the 1920s is far from having. 
512 Cf. POLO, L. 1985 pp. 294-295: “The preeminence of conscience in the modern sense implies that 
the foundation is conscience itself, and that it provides its own objective presentation for itself. This 
inversion of the classic approach is, undoubtedly, a forgetfulness of being, or an usurpation of its 
fundamental character on the part of the priority of conscience. Clearly, if presence is only conscient 
presence, what takes place is a decisive forgetfulness of being. But the confusion of conscience and 
foundation can be refuted from Aristotle; specifically, from his thesis on the plurality of the ways of 
referring to beings”. Cf. also, concerning Aristotle and the moderns in relation to Anwesenheit, 
GADAMER, H.-G. 2000 pp. 57, 99 ff. 
513 Cf. SZ § 5 pp. 17-19 and GA 24 § 19. 
514 Cf. SZ § 5 p. 16 and GA 24 § 20 pp. 417-418. 
515 Cf. GA 20 § 11 and VOLPI, F. 1992 pp. 102-103. 
516 An unwarned reader might object that (ii) and (iii) exclude each other, but such an objection would 
miss precisely the difficult balance that Heidegger is searching: if the relation of Dasein with its own 
being is not dealt with in the first place, then the Dasein is necessarily understood as a subject who 
 
 142 
This determines the sense of our mit und gegen as a perspective to which our 
analysis of Aristotle and Heidegger brings us. What is being inquired here is not 
whether Heidegger is faithful to Aristotle’s text but whether he makes the best of 
its possibilities―whether thought or unthought. Hence the emphasis is definitely 
placed on the mit, to which the gegen is ancillary. In other words, our ‘with and 
against’ Heidegger intends to remain ‘within’ the Heideggerian project, as much as 
Heidegger’s Destruktion of Aristotle intends to define its “positive possibilities”517.
                                                                                                                                 
founds the world, because its belongingness to being is overlooked and the understanding of the world 
as object present to the knowing subject is uncritically accepted. 
517 SZ § 6 p. 22: “The destructuring has just as little the negative sense of disburdening ourselves of the 
ontological tradition. On the contrary, it should stake out the positive possibilities of the tradition, and 
that always means to fix its boundaries”. (“Die Destruktion hat ebensowenig den negativen Sinn einer 
Abschüttelung der ontologischen Tradition. Sie soll umgekehrt diese in ihren positiven Möglichkeiten, 
und das besagt immer, in ihren Grenzen abstecken”). 
5. Phronēsis and the Modes of Alētheuein 
 
5.1. Introducing the 1924 Auseinandersetzung  
with the Nicomachean Ethics 
With the exception of the reflections developed in the Natorp Bericht, and a semi-
nar dealing with different texts of Aristotle that followed it518, 1924 is the center of 
gravity of Heidegger’s engagement with the NE. Its basic moments are the 1924 
summer semester course Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie, the lecture 
“Dasein und Wahrsein nach Aristoteles” on NE VI519, delivered in December of 
that year, and the first third of the 1924-25 winter semester course Platon: Sophistes, 
which spans from early november until the 1924 Christmas break520. After this 
intensive Auseinandersetzung, in which phronēsis plays a central though not exclusive 
role, this term virtually disappears of Heidegger’s repertory521. In this respect, the 
lecture Der Begriff der Zeit, delivered in July 1924, provides an interesting hint on 
how Heidegger’s close and intense reading of Aristotle during this year is 
intimately tied to the elucidation of the philosophical discourse that progressively 
leads to Sein und Zeit, a work undoubtedly related to this close reading of 
Aristotle522, which however operates upon a conceptuality of its own. 
Our approach to the vast constellation of reflections developed in these 
texts shall follow the course Platon: Sophistes (hereafter GA 19) as guideline. This 
                                               
518 Übungen über Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Nikomachische Ethik VI; De Anima; 
Metaphysik VII) (WS 1922-23) in Heidegger-Jahrbuch 3 (2007) pp. 23-48 (Oskar Becker’s transcript of the 
seminar, a source for the forthcoming publication in GA 83 Seminare: Platon ― Aristoteles ― Augustinus). 
519 “Dasein und Wahrsein nach Aristoteles (Interpretationen von Buch VI [der] Nikomachischen 
Ethik)” (DWA) Cf. note 401 above for further references on the text. 
520 For dates and other details on the development of the course, cf. the editor’s afterword in GA 19 
pp. 654 ff. [457 ff.]. 
521 A brief analysis of phronēsis is provided, however, in GA 22 (1926). Cf. note 414 above. 
522 Cf. e.g. SZ § 7b p. 32 and § 44b p. 225. 
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winter course contains the most systematic interpretation of the NE in 
Heidegger’s work. It has to be read, however, in close connection with the imme-
diately previous one, Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie (hereafter GA 18), 
where relevant keys are provided for some interpretative moves which are only 
very succintly accounted for in the long Aristotle ‘introduction’ to his reading of 
Plato’s Sophist. As it is, while at the beginning of his winter course Heidegger 
justifies before the audience his detour through Aristotle on the way to the 
analysis of The Sophist as a way of ensuring a correct access to the thought of 
Plato523, the connection of his interpretation of Aristotle with the previous 
summer course seems even more relevant: Heidegger is surely paving the way for 
his reading of the Sophist, but he is also pursuing an interpretation that he had not 
been able to fulfil in the previous summer524. Indeed, in GA 18, on the occasion 
of the distinction between aretai ēthikai and aretai dianoētikai, Heidegger announces 
that “later we will examine the [latter], since the basic possibility of considering, of 
scientific research, of the bios theōrētikos, and therewith the basic possibility of 
human existence, is found in their domain”525. However, the hexeis of alētheuein are 
finally only tackled very summarily in this course526, and it is only from early 
November on that Heidegger will get to analyze them thoroughly, in an 
interpretation that has been delivered to us in nearly two hundred pages of the 
GA 19 volume527. Obviously, there was more to it than just gaining a proper 
orientation to approach Plato. 
                                               
523 Cf. GA 19 § 1b pp. 10 ff. [7 ff.] 
524 At that time, Heidegger was still engaged in his book project on Aristotle, which however would 
eventually not get published. Cf. KISIEL, T. 1993, esp. pp. 269, 311-312 and 479.  
525 GA 18 § 13 p. 106 [73] “Später werden wir die aretai dianoētikai ins Auge fassen, weil in ihrem Felde 
die Grundmöglichkeit des Betrachtens, der wissenschaftlichen Forschung liegt, der bios theōretikos, und 
damit zugleich die Grundmöglichkeit der menschlichen Existenz”. 
526 Cf. GA 18 § 22a pp. 263-265 [176-179]. 
527 Cf. GA 19 §§ 1-26 pp. 7-188 [5-129]. 
 145 
It is important to bear in mind the peculiarity of the texts with which we 
are dealing now. If we have been working on a programmatical text, the Natorp 
Bericht (which in spite of its concise style has the density of a treatise, quite like 
Aristotle’s ‘class notes’), we are now faced on the one hand with the transcription 
of two oral courses and with the summary style of a lecture to a multifarious audi-
ence528. On the one hand, what the lecture provides in terms of systematicity, it 
does not provide in terms of detailed analysis; on the other, while when reading 
some of Heidegger’s courses one would say that they are closer in their style to 
treaties rather than to transcriptions of lecture courses, this is not so much the 
case with GA 18 and GA 19, retrospectively seen by Heidegger as the most 
important of his Marburg years529. This may be explained by the fact that 
Heidegger is here constantly quoting, translating and paraphrasing Aristotle’s text, 
and the direction of his thought is interwoven with these references. He is at the 
same time trying to make out what Aristotle says―as much as what Aristotle does 
not say―and what he himself intends to say: the elucidation of his philosophical 
project is here indissociable from his interpretation of Aristotle. As Michalski puts 
it, Heidegger is securing, or at least proving the worth of his own thinking in the 
course of his investigation of Aristotle’s concepts530. All in all, these texts are the 
portrait of a search, as it took place during a lecture course, without the 
subsequent reelaboration that is typical of written texts. 
Most commentators approach GA 19 from the point of view of its relation 
to Sein und Zeit531. This reference is more than legitimate, but it could also lead to a 
distortion of what is at stake in this text, if too smooth connections between 
concepts here and in Sein und Zeit are taken for granted. In this course Heidegger 
                                               
528 I.e. GA 18 and GA 19 on the one hand, and DWA on the other. 
529 Cf. “Beilage zu Wunsch und Wille (Über die Bewahrung des Versuchten)” in GA 66 Besinnung Ed. 
By Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1997 pp. 419-428 (pp. 421-422 for ref). 
530 Cf. editor’s afterword to GA 18 p. 417 [279]. 
531 Cf. e.g. Franco Volpi, Jacques Taminiaux, Stanley Rosen. 
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is painstakingly making out his own way, and he is doing so in a very complex 
manner, as we said, not only because of the enterprise he is sketching but also 
because of the fact that it is elucidated through a dialogue with Aristotle. That is 
why, while the problematic of Sein und Zeit remains the horizon of our approach, 
we will rather focus on the breakthroughs and ambiguities of this text and the 
neighboring ones as a way of searching and discussing with a Heidegger who is 
still here making his way to his magnum opus.  
Well into his interpretation of NE VI in GA 19, Heidegger states that if it 
reads “something «into» Aristotle, it does so merely to attain and to understand 
what is genuinely taking place in him”532. Here we might recall that our goal is not 
to evaluate to what extent Heidegger sticks to Aristotle’s letter and spirit, but to 
analyse the phenomena to which he and his reading of Aristotle point, in order to 
see which possibilities are actually opened for Heidegger’s project in his disclosure 
of these phenomena, and to point also to those possibilities which could have been opened. 
In other words, ‘what is taking place’ in Heidegger is also an important part of the 
analysis.  
Methodologically relevant for the approach to these texts is also an 
excursus halfway through the Aristotle ‘introduction’ in GA 19, on the concepts 
of the universal (katholou) and the particular (kath hekaston). These concepts mirror 
Heidegger’s distinction between the ontological and the ontical, respectively―a 
distinction which, as we said elsewhere, does not by any means establish a relation 
of exclusion. The relation between katholou and kath hekaston, Heidegger argues, is 
also that between speech (logos) and sense perception (aisthēsis). On the one hand, 
the katholou “shows itself first and only to legein”, it is an approach exclusive to 
those beings who have logos; on the other, the kath hekaston “is a being as it initially 
                                               
532 GA 19 § 9c p. 62 [43] “[W]enn die Interpretation in Aristoteles etwas »hineindeutet«, so geht es ihr 
darum, wieder zu erlangen und zu verstehen, was eigentlich bei ihm vor sich geht”. 
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presents itself”533. Paraphrasing a passage of the Metaphysics where Aristotle holds 
that “one must start from that which is barely intelligible but intelligible to oneself, 
and try to understand what is intelligible in itself, passing by way, as has been said, 
of those very things which one understands”534, Heidegger concludes: 
[A]lthough in aisthēsis «something uncovered as straightforwardly familiar» is present, 
one must depart from it (…). One must depart from what is thus uncovered, even if it is 
straightforwardly uncovered. One must appropriate this ground explicitly and not leap 
beyond it to a reality which is simply fabricated by theory (…). One must fasten onto 
precisely the kath hekaston of aisthēsis and admit it as the first factual state of beings535. 
The bare intelligibility of what is immediately experienced has to do with 
the fact that it does not have the precision and simplicity of the concept: our 
senses provide many data which have to be sorted out before something is under-
stood in its intelligibility. That is why Aristotle says that this first and elementary 
knowledge “has little or nothing of reality (mikron ē outhen echei tou ontos)”536, be-
cause reality is intelligible in itself, which is hardly the case of these experiences. 
This statement, Heidegger notes, “shows that for Aristotle a determinate sense of being 
guides all his discussions about beings”537: while he acknowledges the need to start 
from the kath hekaston of aisthēsis, he tends to regard this departure point primarily 
as a necessary passageway to genuine reality, which would be beyond, in the clarity 
                                               
533 GA 19 § 12b p. 82 [57] “Das kath hekaston ist das Seiende, wie es sich zunächst und d.h. in der 
aisthēsis darbietet. Das katholou ist etwas, was sich erst und allein im legein zeigt”. 
534 Met. VII 3, 1029b 10ff. Cf. also V 1, 1013a 2ff: “we must sometimes begin to learn not from the 
first point and the origin of the thing, but from the point from which we should learn most easily”. 
535 GA 19 § 12b p. 85 [58-59, add. e.] “[O]bwohl in der aisthēsis ein »schlecht vertrautes aufgedecktes 
gegenwärtig ist«, muß man von ihm her den Ausgang nehmen (…). Man muß von diesem obzwar 
schlecht Aufgedeckten doch seinen Ausgang nehmen; man muß sich diesen Boden ausdrücklich 
zueignen, ― und nicht über die von einer Theorie aus als schlecht angesetzte Realität hinwegspringen 
(…). Gerade das kath hekaston der aisthēsis muß man in den Griff bekommen und an ihm den ersten 
Tatbestand des Seienden aufnehmen”. Cf. also § 14 p. 98 [68]: “sophia does not thereby exclude aisthēsis 
but merely takes it as a point of departure” (“Dabei wird jedoch die aisthēsis nicht ausgeschaltet, sondern 
zum Ausgang genommen”). 
536 Met. VII 3 1029b 9f. 
537 GA 19 § 12b pp. 84-85 [58] “In dieser eigentümlichen Ausdrucksweise zeigt sich, daß für 
Aristoteles ein bestimmter Sinn von Sein leitend ist in allen Diskussionen über das Seiende”. The remark 
parallels the analysis of the experience of a house in the Natorp Bericht above, where Heidegger 
criticizes Aristotle on the same grounds. Cf. NB p. 398-399/50 [144-145]. 
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of the katholou. Heidegger instead holds that “one must appropriate this ground 
explicitly”, as the raw material from which the sense of being has to be gained. 
Failure to do so entails the risk of imposing this sense of being onto beings from 
the outside538, without ensuring “the transparency of the procedure”539. That is 
why, Heidegger contends, Aristotle “was successful here only within certain limits, 
and in spite of his tendency to radicality he did not press on into the ultimate 
originality of the being of the world”540. Nevertheless, Heidegger applauds the fact 
that Aristotle’s fundamental line of questioning remains ontological―“beings are 
addressed in their being”541―and he discusses the texts in these terms. How far 
this is from intending a dismissal of the ontical, though, is clear enough from the 
importance that Heidegger attaches to the kath hekaston of aisthēsis, i.e. to the 
phenomena in their multifariousness. Ensuring that the phenomena are thus 
appreciated is as crucial to Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle as to our reading of his 
reading of Aristotle. 
5.2. Two Key Patterns of Praxis: Logos and Echein 
Alētheia, the Greek word for truth, comes explicitly to the fore both at the begin-
ning and the end of the Aristotle ‘introduction’ in GA 19542, and in fact it under-
lies the whole of this interpretation of Aristotle. In approaching NE VI in section 
I we have noted already how at the beginning of this course alētheuein is presented 
                                               
538 Cf. NB p. 349/3 [113, our e.] “This basic direction of philosophical questioning is not externally 
added and attached to the interrogated object, factical life” (“Diese Grundrichtung des philosophischen 
Fragens ist dem befragten Gegenstand, dem faktischen Leben, nicht von auβen angesetzt und 
aufgeschraubt”). 
539 GA 19 § 12c p. 90 [62] “die Durchsichtigkeit des Ausgangs”. 
540 GA 19 § 12b pp. 85-86 [59] “Das ist auch dem Aristoteles nur in gewissen Grenzen gelungen, so 
daß er trotz der radikalen Tendenz nicht zur letzten Ursprünglichkeit des Seins der Welt gedrungen 
ist”. 
541 GA 18 § 26c p. 291 [197] “das Seiende in seinem Sein angesprochen wird”. An explicit distinction is 
made ad loc. cit. between ontic and ontological, which is only implicit in GA 19.  
542 Cf. § 3a and § 26b, respectively entitled by the editor as “The meaning of the word alētheia. Alētheia 
and Dasein” and “Logos and alētheia”. 
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as rather untranslatable, and only a hint on its meaning is provided: “to be disclosing 
(Aufdeckendsein), to remove the world from concealedness and coveredness. And 
that is a mode of being of human Dasein”543. The reticence has something of a 
pedagogical strategy, because Heidegger does provide different translations for it: 
truth, unconcealedness, uncoveredness, to be true, to be in the truth544. Still, 
alētheia is not granted here an univocal sense and Heidegger continues to use the 
Greek term afterwards in this course and in his work. Why he is reluctant to 
translate alētheia and its verb alētheuein has to do with the methodological (i.e. phe-
nomenological) concern sketched above. One aspect of this we have mentioned 
already in section I: if alētheia is to be understood in all its amplitude (a task that is 
actually the core of Heidegger’s enterprise both on the way to and in Sein und Zeit), 
we have to let beings determine the how of our approach to them, instead of 
unilaterally imposing this how onto them. Alētheia “conforms rather to beings 
themselves, and not to a determinate concept of scientificity”545, it requires the 
“precautionary measure”546 of formale Anzeige: phenomena themselves have to 
show how they are ‘being true’ (Wahrsein). Truth is “a character of beings, insofar 
as they are encountered”547, which leads to a second more important point:  
in an authentic sense [truth] is nevertheless a determination of the being of human Dasein it-
self (…). Hence it is human Dasein that is properly true; it is in the truth―if we do 
translate alētheia as ‘truth’. To be true (Wahrsein), to be in the truth (In-der-Wahrheit-
                                               
543 GA 19 § 3a p. 17 [12] “alētheia: alētheuein. Wir wollen dies nicht übersetzen. Alētheuein meint: 
aufdeckendsein, die Welt aus der Verschlossenheit und Verdecktheit herausnehmen. Und das ist eine 
Seinsweise des menschlichen Daseins”. 
544 “Wahrheit, Unverborgenheit, Aufgedecktsein” (GA 19 § 4a p. 24 [17]); “Wahrsein, In-der-
Wahrheit-sein” (p. 23 [16]). 
545 GA 19 § 4a p. 24 [17] “[Alētheia] richtet sich vielmehr nach dem Seienden selbst und nicht nach 
einem bestimmten Begriff von Wissenschaftlichkeit”. 
546 EPR § 13 in GA 60 p. 64 [44]. 
547 GA 19 § 4a p. 23 [16, mod. tr.] “Die Wahrheit ist also zwar ein Charakter des Seienden, sofern es 
begegnet”. 
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sein), as a determination of Dasein, means: to have at its disposal, as unconcealed, the 
particular being with which Dasein cultivates its dealings548.  
Dasein, human being, is as essential to “uncoveredness” as things are. It is 
in the juncture of things and Dasein that it can make any sense to speak of 
alētheuein: “this uncoveredness does not apply to things insofar as they are but in-
sofar as they are encountered (…). Accordingly, uncoveredness is a specific ac-
complisment of Dasein, which has its being in the soul: alētheuei hē psychē”549. To 
read this statement as a subjectivistic move, one would have to take for granted 
the modern segregation between objects and subject, so that the “accomplishment 
of Dasein” would entail something like a ‘constitution of the world by Dasein’. 
However, this is alien to the way in which the Greeks saw the world, and in which 
Heidegger intends that the world is to be approached550. He surely takes critical 
distance from whatever he considers naïve in the Greek approach, but he 
definitely appreciates how “in keeping with one’s primary being-together with the world” 
the Greeks call things pragmata instead of dividing reality between subject and 
objects551. 
                                               
548 Loc. cit. (mod. tr.) “Die Wahrheit ist (…) im eigentlichen Sinne doch eine Seinsbestimmung des 
menschlichen Daseins selbst (...). Das menschliche Dasein also ist es, das eigentlich wahr ist; es ist in der 
Wahrheit ― wenn wir alētheia mit Wahrheit übersetzen. Wahrsein, In-der-Wahrheit-Sein, als 
Bestimmung des Daseins besagt: das jeweilig Seiende, mit dem das Dasein Umgang pflegt, unverdeckt 
zur Verfügung haben”. 
549 GA 19 §4b pp. 24-25 [17] “Diese Unverdecktheit kommt der Sache nicht zu, sofern sie ist, sondern 
sofern sie begegnet (…). Demnach ist das Unverdecktsein eine spezifische Leistung des Daseins, das 
sein Sein in der Seele hat: alētheuei hē psychē”. 
550 In the SS course of 1923 Heidegger speaks of the “disastrous infiltration” of the object-subject 
schema into phenomenological research. Cf. GA 63 § 17a, pp. 81-82 [62-63]. On the inadequacy of this 
schema to understand Greek thought, cf. also GA 18 § 9b pp. 56-57 [40]. 
551 DWA p. 11 [227] (our e.) “Die Griechen bezeichnen nicht Subjekt und Objekt, sondern das primäre 
Zusammensein mit der Welt, Pragmata”. Heidegger specifies that the Greeks used the term pragmata to 
refer to things produced. Things that are “always already there in advance”, on the other hand, they 
call hypokeimenon (the degree to which this partition is historically precise cannot be analysed here). 
Near the end of the lecture, he adds (p. 16 [231, mod. tr.]): “Dasein means being-in-the-world―that is 
our fundamental finding. There is not first of all a subject, which is enclosed in and for itself as in a 
box, with an object outside. Rather, the fundamental finding is: being-in-a-world” (“Dasein heisst in 
der Welt sein, das ist der fundamentale Befund. Es gibt nicht ein Subjekt zunächst, das für sich 
eingeschlossen ist in einem Kasten, und draussen ein Objekt, sondern der fundamentale Befund ist: in 
einer Welt sein”). 
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The world, then, is not constituted by Dasein, but rather Dasein finds itself 
‘being in’ the world. Dasein is had by the world and at the same time, differently 
from the rest of beings, it has a world, because it has logos. This primary being-to-
gether with the world of Dasein was well grasped by the Greeks in the determi-
nation of man as a zōon logon echon, a being that has and is ‘had’ by logos, by speak-
ing: “The being-in-the world of the human being is determined in its ground 
through speaking”552. This fundamental character of speaking has its roots already 
in the 1923 course Ontologie ― Hermeneutik der Faktizität. Heidegger had by then 
achieved a formal anzeigende approach to the classical Aristotelian definition of man, 
which in 1924 is well settled into his interpretation553. His efforts are directed to 
understanding human beings primarily as a ‘how’554―the how of the being of 
human beings as imbedded in language―rather than as a ‘what’, the approach that 
to his mind was crystallized in the traditional translation animal rationale555. 
Bowler has recently highlighted the importance for Heidegger’s analytic of 
Dasein of the fact that the verb echein, from which comes hexis, is defined in 
Metaphysics V both in an active and passive sense, i.e. having and being had556: 
To have (echein) means many things. (1) To treat a thing according to one’s nature or 
according to one’s impulse, so that fever is said to have a man, and tyrants to have 
their cities, and people to have the clothes they wear. (2) That in which a thing is pre-
sent as in something receptive of it is said to have the thing, e.g., the bronze has the 
form of the statue, and the body has the disease557. 
                                               
552 GA 18 § 5b p. 18 [14] “Das In-der-Welt-sein des Menschen ist im Grunde bestimmt durch das 
Sprechen”. 
553 Cf. GA 63 § 5. 
554 “The human being is determined as zōon logon echon, a «living being», though not in accordance with 
the modern biological concept. Life is a how, a category of being” (“Der Mensch wird bestimmt als zōon 
logon echon, ein »Lebewesen« ― kein biologischer Begriff in moderner Ausformung. Leben ist ein Wie, 
eine Kategorie des Seins”) (GA 18 § 6 pp. 20-21 [16]). 
555 Cf. GA 63 p. 26 [21]: “The question «What is man?» blocks its own view of what it is really after 
with an object foreign to it (Cf. Jaspers)” (“Die Frage: was der Mensch sei, verstellt sich den Blick für 
das, was sie eigentlich will, mit einem ihr fremden Gegenstand (vgl. Jaspers)”). 
556 Cf. BOWLER, M. pp. 119 ff. 
557 Met. V 23, 1023a 8ff. 
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In the first sessions of GA 18, Heidegger refers to logos in a way that im-
plicitly encompasses both senses, although it is clear that he is mainly concerned 
with the passive one: language belongs in the first place to “the genuine drive of 
being of the human being. Living, for the human being, means speaking”558. Much 
more fundamentally than a possession or an usage, logos echein is a feature of our 
being: we are ‘possessed’ by this determination. Later, in § 17a, Heidegger returns 
to echein and hexis, and he undertakes a detailed analysis of the passage of 
Metaphysics V, where he maeks explicit the articulation between the active and the 
passive sense, precisely by regarding it as grounded in the how of the being of 
human beings, on the basis of what Aristotle himself states:  
kai to en tini de einai homotropōs legetai kai hepomenōs tō echein. «Having is said in the same 
way as being-in-something». Hepomenōs: this meaning of being-in-something is already 
co-given with having; the character of having and being had as that of being-in-
something559. 
The logos in the formula zōon logon echon, therefore, indicates not only a 
possession at one’s disposal but, much more originally, a non-disposable dimension 
of our being, in the sense that we always already find ourselves within this 
dimension, and it is not ours to change this how of our being. Logon echein means, 
more fundamentally than having language, ‘being in’ language, as the specific way 
of having a world:  
The human being is seen by the Greeks as zōon logon echon, not only philosophically 
but in concrete living: «a living thing that (as living) has language». This 
determination should not be thought in biological, psychological, social-scientific, or 
any such terms. This determination lies before such distinctions. Zōē is a concept of being: 
“life” refers to a mode of being, indeed a mode of being-in-a-world. A living thing is not 
simply at hand (vorhanden) but is in a world in that it has its world560. 
                                               
558 GA 18 § 6 p. 21 [16] “das Sprechen zum eigentlichen Seinsantrieb des Menschen gehört. Leben des 
Menschen heißt Sprechen”. 
559 GA 19 § 17a p. 174 [118] “»Das Haben wird in derselben Weise gesagt wie das in-Etwas-Sein«. 
Hepomenōs: Es ist diese Bedeutung des In-etwas-Seins beim Haben schon mitgegeben: der Charakter 
des Habens und Gehabtwerdens wie der des In-etwas-Seins”. Cf. Met. V 23, 1023a 23ff. 
560 GA 18 § 5b p. 18 [14] (our e.). “Der Mensch wird von den Griechen gesehen als zōon logon echon, 
nicht nur philosophisch, sondern im konkreten Leben: »ein Lebendes, das [als Lebendes] die Sprache 
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That this structural how of our being is non-disposable is as much a result of 
the immediacy of life as of the continuity between world and Dasein. Care (Sorge) is the 
fundamental concept that concentrates both aspects and, specifically, articulates 
this continuity as a rethinking of intentionality561. What acquires new emphasis in 
this understanding of intentionality, against any subjectivist deviations, is its 
bidirectional or cooriginary character: it is constituted at the same time (hama) from 
Dasein to the world and from the world to Dasein: the active and passive senses are 
intertwined, making one another possible. Concern (Besorgen) is the way “in which 
human beings as human beings live in their being-human (Menchsein)”562, and is the 
result of the unity between logos and praxis. This step is taken by Aristotle in the 
elucidation of the ergon of human beings in NE I 7 in contrast to other living 
beings. As Heidegger paraphrases it, 
Yet «there remains», for human being, still another mode of being-in-the-world, 
which is to be in it in such a way as to be able to be concerned about something, and 
«the concern of a being that speaks». The idion ergon, the genuine mode of human 
beings, is praxis, determined as a mode of being-in-the-world precisely through 
speaking, meta logou, kata logon 563. 
                                                                                                                                 
hat«. Bei dieser Definition darf man nicht an Biologie denken oder an geisteswissenschaftliche 
Psychologie und dergleichen. Diese Bestimmung liegt vor solchen Unterscheidungen. Zōē ist ein Seinsbegriff, 
»Leben« besagt eine Weise des Seins, und zwar Sein-in-einer-Welt. Ein Lebendes ist nicht einfach 
vorhanden, sondern ist in einer Welt, in der Weise, daß es seine Welt hat”. Worth mentioning is a 
comment on the definition zōon logon echon which combines phenomenological acuteness with a touch 
of humor, later in the course. Heidegger remarks: “We do not have a corresponding definition [for zōon 
logon echon]. At best, an approximately corresponding definition would be: the human being is a living 
thing that reads the newspaper” (“Wir haben eine dem entsprechende Definition nicht. Eine ungefähr 
entsprechende wäre höchstens: Der Mensch ist ein Lebendes, das Zeitung liest”) (GA 18 § 13 p. 108 
[74]). 
561 In 1925, Sorge will be explicitly presented as a reformulation of intentionality (Cf. GA 20 § 31 esp. 
pp. 419-420). Cf. also GA 63 (SS 1923) § 26, GA 61 (WS 1921-22) pp. 135-137 [101-102], SZ §§ 12 ff. 
562 GA 18 p. 43 [31] “»Besorgen«, in dem der Mensch als Mensch in seinem Menschsein lebt”. Besorgnis 
is already considered in 1923 as a specific mode of the more encompassing concept Sorge (cf. GA 63 § 
26 p. 102-103 [79]), but we can take Heidegger to be using here Besorgen to refer to the sense of Sorge. 
563 GA 18 § 12 p. 99 [68] “»Es bleibt« am Menschen nur noch eine Weise des Seins-in-der-Welt, die so 
ist, daß sie in ihr etwas besorgen kann, und ein »Besorgen eines solchen Seienden, das spricht«. Das 
idion ergon, die eigentliche Weise des Menschen, ist die praxis, bestimmt als Weise des Seins-in-der-Welt, 
und zwar sprechend, meta logou, kata logon”. Cf. NE I 7, 1098a 3ff, 7f, 13f. This connection between 
praxis and logos is made also in GA 63 § 5 p. 27 [23] and GA 19 § 22a p. 146 [100]. In this passage, 
Aristotle clearly uses this double sense of echein in his understanding of man as zōon logon echon. We 
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Praxis and logos are then the two basic cooriginary determinations of the 
being of human beings for Aristotle―cooriginary because praxis presupposes logos, 
and logos implies praxis―, and Heidegger welcomes this bynomial as suitable for his 
own questioning. The twofold sense of echein operates in both determinations, i.e. 
they are as much non-disposable features of our being as the ways through which 
we act upon being. We are logos and we have logos, we are praxis and we have praxis. It 
is from this double point of view too that the approach to alētheuein in this course 
is to be understood. Heidegger is not asking only after ‘how we disclose’ 
(Aufdecken) nor only after ‘how we are true’ (Wahrsein)564: he is asking at the same 
time after both things, because they are actually the object of the same question. 
The original determination of the alētheuein of Dasein is that in which alētheuein and 
‘being’ are grasped as one and the same thing. 
This is the background from which Heidegger states in GA 19 that 
Aristotle achieves, in connection with the determination of man as zōon logon echon, 
“the first articulation of the five modes of alētheuein”565, and thus he plunges into 
the analysis of NE VI that was promised in the previous course566. Heidegger’s 
                                                                                                                                 
emphasize this in our translation (Rakham and Ross do not), because the context seems to leave no 
room for doubt on Aristotle’s meaning: “There remains therefore what may be called the practical life 
of the being who has and who is in a rational principle (praktikē tis tou logon echontos). Of this, one part is 
rational as obedient to principle (epipeithes logō), the other possessing principle and exercising 
intelligence (echon kai dianooumenon)” (NE I 7, 1098a 3-5, our tr). Bowler does not mention this passage, 
and perhaps for that reason he reads Aristotle’s indication of the polysemy of echein in Met. V 23 as a 
mere “ambiguity”. For Bowler, Aristotle fails to understand the echein in zōon logon echon as the junction 
of both active and passive sense, best expressed―as he rightly points out―in the concept of hexis. This 
makes odd the irreducibility that Bowler observes between echein and hexis, which would make 
Aristotle’s definition of man a “substantial definition”: “At one point, Aristotle says that a human being 
is a living being characterized by its praxis, but when it comes to defining human being, he gives a 
substantial definition” (Cf. BOWLER, M. pp. 119-121, 120 for ref.). While Bowler does not back this 
with any textual evidence, this passage of NE I (as well as Heidegger’s interpretation of it) casts doubt 
on the accurateness of Bowler’s inference, because it importantly brings together the practical character 
of human life and the active-passive sense of echein. To what extent Aristotle unfolded the ontological 
possibilities of this conception is, of course, another question. 
564 Cf. GA 19 § 4a pp. 23-24 [16-17].  
565 GA 19 § 4b p. 27 [19] “Und so gewinnt Aristoteles auch im Anschluß an diese Bestimmung des 
Menschen, im Felde des logon echon und im Hinblick auf dieses, die erste Gliederung der fünf Weisen 
des alētheuein”. 
566 Cf. GA 18 § 13 p. 106 [73] and § 22a pp. 263-265 [176-179]. 
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interpretation from this point on § 5 to the end of the Aristotle ‘introduction’ in § 
26 traces a complex itinerary which actually opens more threads than our work 
can tackle. Although the table of contents provided by the editor offers a valuable 
insight into the structure of this part of the course, still a brief overview of its 
three chapters will be useful to shed light on our further analyses. 
Chapter 1 is a “Preparatory survey of the modes of alētheuein”567. Heidegger 
presents these modes (§ 4) and defines the task of his investigation, which follows 
Aristotle’s in NE VI, i.e. to sort out the relations between them: how they are 
connected and which hierarchy there is between them (§ 5). Already here 
Heidegger advances that Aristotle considers phronēsis and sophia the highest modes 
of alētheuein (beltistai hexeis). According to the unfolding of NE VI, epistēmē is the 
first hexis to be analyzed (§ 6), then technē (§ 7), phronēsis (§ 8) and sophia (§ 9). Nous, 
in turn, is always tackled in relation to these hexeis, in this chapter and beyond, 
because it is present in different ways in each of them568. 
In chapter 2 (§§ 10-17), entitled “The Genesis of sophia within Natural 
Greek Dasein”, Heidegger leaves NE VI aside and pursues the analysis of sophia 
with Metaphysics I 1-2. Heidegger is interested in these chapters insofar as they are 
a description of the genesis of sophia starting from natural experience. In § 11 he 
deals with sense perception (aisthēsis), experience (empeiria) and technē, the first three 
levels of eidenai, a term that he translates as seeing (sehen)569. § 12 is an important 
excursus on the universal (katholou) and the particular (kath hekaston), to which we 
have referred already above, and which provides insights to pursue the analysis of 
Metaphysics I 1-2. Thus, § 13 analyzes the inner tendency of technē to become 
epistēmē, i.e. to start from the kath hekaston towards the katholou, and § 14 reviews 
                                               
567 Titles of chapters and paragraphs, as is usually the case in the Gesamtausgabe, are introduced by the 
editor (Ingeborg Schußler for GA 19), on the basis of the text of the course. 
568 Cf. GA 19 § 5a p. 28 [20]. 
569 Heidegger translates eidenai from the very first line of the Metaphysics as sehen (Cf. § 11 p. 70 [48]). 
Later he uses the term hinsehen, dominant in his comment of Met. I 1-2 in NB 387ff./39ff. [137 ff.]. 
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the different aspects that Aristotle detects in the popular understanding of sophia, 
in 982a 8-19. A long excursus on the essence of mathematics follows in § 15, in 
which Heidegger seems to be mainly interested in the concept of continuum 
(syneches)570. After the excursus, Heidegger returns to the Metaphysics in § 16 to con-
centrate on the fourth moment of sophia as disclosed by popular understanding: 
the autonomy of its alētheuein in regard to other forms of knowledge. This trait 
becomes increasingly important hereafter, insofar as Heidegger detects in it a fun-
damental principle for the predominance of sophia over phronēsis. This direction of 
the interpretation is hinted at in § 17, which sums up the path taken up to here. 
Chapter 3 retakes the analysis of NE VI. What Heidegger is after here is 
“The Question of the Priority of phronēsis or sophia as the highest mode of 
alētheuein”. The structure of this part is clearer, with no more excursus: after a tran-
sition from the Metaphysics to the NE in § 18, §§ 19-23 provide an extensive 
analysis of phronēsis, which was virtually absent in chapter 2. The analysis is 
directed towards a contrast of phronēsis and sophia built upon two criteria which are 
specified in § 24a: firstly, the above mentioned autonomy of the alētheuein of sophia, 
and secondly the kind of beings which phronēsis and sophia make thematic: 
respectively, Dasein―a being who is able to be otherwise (endechomenon allōs 
echein)―and beings which are always (aei) in the same way. On the basis of the 
Greek understanding of being, the higher rank is granted to the alētheuein of sophia 
(§ 24b), which is also prior in regard to eudaimonia (§ 25), as Heidegger infers from 
NE X. Finally, § 26 retakes more explicitly the issue of alētheia and logos to prepare 
the transition to the interpretation of Plato’s Sophist. The remarks in this last 
paragraph also point clearly to the problematic developed one year later in the 
course Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit571. 
                                               
570 Cf. GA 19 § 15b pp. 116 ff. [79 ff.] 
571 GA 21 Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit (WS 1925-26) Ed. by Walter Biemel, 1995 (2nd edition). 
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For all his interest in phronēsis and his criticism of Greek sophia, though, we 
shall argue that, again here, as in KNS, the idea of a dismissal of theōrein altogether 
on the part of Heidegger would be a too much simplistic reading of his aim: his 
interpretation of phronēsis as analyzed by Aristotle shows as much an appreciation 
for its ability to grasp the being of human beings as a clear awareness of its non-
scientific character. Consistent with his methodological efforts of the previous 
years, Heidegger is searching for a third way between phronēsis and sophia, which 
may well explain why after the strong interpretation of NE VI developed in this 
course, Heidegger will not dwell on the text anymore572.  
5.3. Phronēsis and the Continuum of Life 
An inner tendency seems clear in Heidegger’s analysis of the modes of alētheuein 
from § 6 on: it is to portray phronēsis as a disposition which, because of its unique 
structure, remains isolated from the rest of modes of alētheuein. Phronēsis deals with 
what can be otherwise, as technē does, but its telos is intrinsic to it, which makes it 
irreducible to technē. And it is this intrinsic telos, namely praxis itself, that makes 
phronēsis also irreducible to epistēmē573. Moreover, the interpretation of Metaphysics I 
1-2 shows how technē is characterized by Aristotle as a disposition which, taking its 
lead from aisthēsis, is directed towards epistēmē, i.e. towards the knowledge of the 
universals, so that technē and epistēmē are brought closer to each other. Last but not 
                                               
572 In this respect, Sadler is right to downplay the consideration of Heidegger’s approach to Aristotle as 
an ‘appropriation’, if by this is implied a retrieval of Aristotle which would conserve intact the main 
pillars of his thought (although this is definitely not our understanding of ‘appropriation’ as applied to 
Heidegger; that is why we speak of a productive interpretation in our introduction). To our mind, 
Sadler’s approach―with which we share only some points of agreement―underscores Heidegger’s 
distance from Aristotle to an extent that disfigures the relation between these philosophers (e.g. by 
suggesting that “it is Aristotle’s ‘hermeneutical phenomenological’ methodology, and not his 
substantive ontological categories (including those connected with praxis and phronesis) which 
Heidegger sees as neutral and thus as of possible service for a ‘retrieval’ of primal Christianity”), but his 
work still remains as a warning for too enthusiastic connections. Cf. SADLER, Ted Heidegger and 
Aristotle: The Question of Being London / Atlantic Highlands: Continuum, 1996 pp. 14 ff. and 153 for 
ref). 
573 Cf. GA 19 § 20 esp. pp. 139-140 [96]. 
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least, to this vicinity belongs sophia, a special epistēmē that makes thematic the 
principles provided by nous, and thus brings together nous and epistēmē. Nous seems 
to remain at the end of the analysis as the sole link of phronēsis to the other hexeis 
of alētheuein. This, however, seems too little of a connection, if we take into 
account the fact Heidegger regards phronēsis, the hexis of praxis574, as the mode of 
disclosure of Dasein575 and, consistently, welcomes in both 1924 courses the 
Aristotelian understanding of human life―where all the other determinations are 
included―as praxis: 
The idion ergon, the genuine mode of human beings, is praxis, determined as a mode of 
being-in-the-world precisely through speaking, meta logou, kata logon 576. 
The being disclosed by phronēsis is praxis. In this resides human Dasein. For human 
Dasein is determined as praktikē or―to make the determination more complete―the 
zōē of man is determined as zōē praktikē meta logou 577. 
Because the sense of Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle is not that of a 
simple transfer of an intact course of thought into his own questioning, but 
instead a phenomenological test of Aristotle’s concepts, the fundamental concern 
here must be this phenomenological task578. At the same time, however, 
Heidegger means to render a consistent interpretation of Aristotle, which includes 
also pointing out what Aristotle does not say. In other words: Heidegger intends 
to explain what is going on with these concepts in Aristotle, and to ask to what 
                                               
574 Cf. GA 19 §§ 20-21, esp. pp. 138-140 and 144-149 [95-96 and 98-102]. 
575 Cf. GA 19 § 8a pp. 48-51 [34-36] and § 24a pp. 165-168 [114-115]. 
576 GA 18 § 12 p. 99 [68] “Das idion ergon, die eigentliche Weise des Menschen, ist die praxis, bestimmt 
als Weise des Seins-in-der-Welt, und zwar sprechend, meta logou, kata logon” Cf. also NE I 7, 1098a 3ff., 
7f, 14; GA 18 § 17 pp. 188-189 [127]; GA 63 § 5 p. 27 [23]. 
577 GA 19 § 22a p. 146 [100]. “Das Seiende, das die phronēsis aufdeckt, ist die praxis. Darin liegt das 
menschliche Dasein. Denn das menschliche Dasein ist bestimmt als praktikē, bzw. ― um die 
Bestimmung vollständig zu machen ― die zōē des Menschen ist bestimmt als zōē praktikē meta logou”; Cf. 
also § 21 p. 143 [98]: “[T]he object of phronēsis is praxis, the zōē of man, human Dasein itself” (“[D]er 
Gegenstand der phronēsis ist die praxis, die zōē des Menschen, das menschliche Dasein selbst”). 
578 On this methodological approach, cf. GA 18 § 4 pp. 13-15 [12-13]. Michalski, the editor of this 
volume, describes the nature of Heidegger’s task in very acute terms: “Heidegger secured, or at least 
proved the worth of, his own existential-ontological thinking in the course of his investigation of 
Aristotelian conceptuality” (Cf. Editor’s Afterword in GA 18 p. 417 [279]). 
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extent they point to things themselves. As a result, the question arises as to what 
extent this virtual isolation of phronēsis in Heidegger’s reading of NE VI fits the whole 
phenomenological spectrum opened by Aristotle. Further analysis will show that Heidegger 
emphasizes the distinction between phronēsis and the other forms of alētheuein 
through meticulous phenomenological analyses, but he hardly explores the 
possible connections. Why? It is obviously not because he refuses to search for an 
account of the being of Dasein which could articulate the different determinations 
through which Dasein ‘is in truth’, and ‘is itself true’ (alētheuein). More specifically, 
he refuses to search for that account in Aristotle, because he understands that the 
ontological frame which is supposed to gather these different determinations in 
Aristotle’s conception cannot face a thorough phenomenological analysis. 
However, we understand that Heidegger leaves in the shade certain areas of the 
phenomena that Aristotle embraces with these determinations, and that shedding 
light on them might qualify Heidegger’s interpretation. 
At the core of his interpretation of phronēsis in § 8, Heidegger makes clear 
the point that phronēsis is an aretē itself579. This is an inference from Aristotle’s 
laconic and somewhat enigmatic statement that, differently from technē, phronēsis 
has no aretē580: there is no other determination fulfilling it, making it teleion, from 
the outside581. The fact that it has no aretē because it is aretē itself, though, does not 
necessarily enclose phronēsis within itself. Surely, it is irreducible to any other of the 
hexeis, but that is the case of the other hexeis too, as Heidegger’s first approach in 
§§ 6-9 shows. However, from § 10 on, he emphasizes with Aristotle how sophia 
embraces epistēmē and nous and how technē in a certain way overlaps with epistēmē. In 
other words, the irreducibility of these hexeis to one another does not necessarily 
mean a reciprocal relation of exclusion. Aristotle’s concept of organic unity 
                                               
579 Cf. GA 19 § 8c p. 54 [38]. 
580 Cf. NE VI 5, 1140b 21f. “While there is such a thing as aretē in technē, there is not such a thing as 
aretē in phronēsis”. 
581 Cf. GA 19 § 8c pp. 53 ff. [37 ff]. 
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(symphysis)582 must be retrieved here again. The specific organs and limbs of a body 
are distinct and still are one as a living body: the continuity between them does 
not question their specificity. Analogously, if all these hexeis belong to 
Dasein―because it is Dasein itself who is, e.g. technitēs―and Dasein is determined as 
praktikē, why should phronēsis stand so radically apart from the other hexeis as 
Heidegger suggests? If we hold that life is praxis, the question about the 
connection between phronēsis and the other hexeis should not be dismissed without 
further ado on the grounds of structural differences, as Heidegger does, for 
instance, in the case of technē: “Phronēsis cannot be the aretē of technē―because of its 
very mode of carrying alētheuein, quite appart that the object of technē is a poiēton, 
while the object of phronēsis is a prakton”583. 
We pursue the question because in elucidating the distinction between 
phronēsis and technē in section I we have come to the conclusion that, while 
irreducible to one another, these hexeis are intertwined. To our mind, this 
holds―to put it in Heideggerian terms―not only for our ordinary experience 
(ontical level) but also for the philosophical questioning about their being (ontological 
level). Volpi, who in passing refers to the dialectic between phronēsis and technē in 
NE VI to Metaphysics IX 6 (Heidegger, for all the references to the Metaphysics in 
this course, does not), speaks of an intertwining on the ontical level, and contrasts 
it with the distinction that operates on the ontological level: 
If one were to read the differenciation between poieseis and praxeis in book Z of the 
Nicomachean Ethics in conjunction with Metaphysics, Theta 6, one would clearly 
recognize that an ontic differenciation is not at issue, that is, a differenciation with 
reference to individual actualizations of action, where there are poiēseis on the one 
hand and praxeis on the other. Rather, this differenciation has an ontological 
character; it distinguishes two different ways of being that do not ontically stand out 
from one another. For example, giving a speech can have the way of being of a poiēsis 
(...), but it can also have the way of being of a praxis (...); on the ontic level this 
                                               
582 Cf. Met. V 4, 1014b 22 ff. 
583 GA 19 § 8c pp. 54-55 [38] “Die phronēsis kann nicht die aretē der technē sein, und dies auf Grund der 
Vollzugsart des alētheuein selbst, ganz abgesehen davon, daß das Seiende der technē ein poiēton, das der 
phronēsis ein prakton ist”. 
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difference does not appear. It is thus exclusively this ontological content of the 
Aristotelian concepts that Heidegger extrapolates584. 
Heidegger is indeed concerned with the ontological level but, as we said, 
he always starts from the ontical: “one must appropriate this ground explicitly and not 
leap beyond it to a reality which is simply fabricated by theory”585. The specificity 
with which praxeis appear to us with regard to poiēseis surely requires a specific 
ontological determination of praxis vis-à-vis poiēsis. But the continuum (syneches) of 
life that holds together poiēseis and praxeis is also a phenomenon―it is “something 
pregiven, prior to the question of an analytic penetration”586―that requires an 
ontological determination too. The question that Heidegger does not raise, 
because he is content with the acknowledgement of the irreducibility of praxis to 
poiēsis, is whether an ontological solution can be found in Aristotle which 
reconciles the irreducibility between poiēsis and praxis with their intertwinedness in 
the continuum of life. He does not, we suggested, because he believes that these 
determinations, as conceived by Aristotle, cannot meet this requirement. We 
contend, however, that telos, the fundamental concept which ontologically 
distinguishes poiēsis and praxis (or their hexeis, phronēsis and technē) might turn out to 
be as well the concept which binds them together. 
The telos of technē, that for the sake of which technē gets down to produce 
something, is its ergon. But this ergon, Heidegger argues, “as soon as it is finished, is 
para, «beside» technē”587: “the poioumenon, the finished house, is no longer an object 
                                               
584 VOLPI, F. 1994 pp. 201-202. 
585 GA 19 § 12b p. 85 [59] “man muß sich diesen Boden ausdrücklich zueignen, ― und nicht über die 
von einer Theorie aus als schlecht angesetzte Realität hinwegspringen”. 
586 GA 19 § 15b p. 117 [80] “[Das continuum ist] etwas Vorgegebenes (...), vor der Frage nach einer 
analytischen Durchdringung”. 
587 GA 19 § 7b p. 42 [29] “Das ergon, sobald es fertig ist, ist para, »neben« der technē”. Cf. NE I 1, 1094a 
4 ff. 
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of technē. As a finished house, it escapes technē”588. Heidegger does not say here in 
whose hands the finished house remains, but some lines above he remarks that  
the ergon contains in itself a reference to something else; as telos it leads forth from itself: it 
is a pros ti kai tinos, it is «for something and for someone». The shoe is made for 
wearing and is for someone. This double character entails that the ergon of poiēsis is 
something produced for further use, for man589. 
Although Heidegger does not take this step, the double character of the ergon 
of technē entails that poiēsis is not self-sustained: it is inscribed within the praxis of 
human life, within a context of meaning, that of a zōon logon echon. The telos of 
poiēsis―the finished shoe―is, from a point of view internal to poiēsis, only its peras: 
the point that marks its ending. That is why, as Heidegger notes in his lecture in 
December, “Aristotle says that the shoe no longer belongs to the shoemaker as 
shoemaker”590. Although Aristotle does speak of the figure of the shoemaker 
elsewhere, to our knowledge he does not actually make such a statement; this is 
rather an example of Heidegger that he very probably extracts from an important 
statement of NE VI 2 to which we have referred elsewhere591: “the act of making 
is not an end in itself (telos haplōs), it is only a means, and belongs to something 
else, whereas a thing done is an end in itself”592. 
To unfold the insight, both the shoe and its making belong to, i.e. they are 
for the sake of (heneka) the shoemaker as human being (as a zōon logon echon who 
manufactures shoes to earn his living, to wear them himself, etc.), and may also be 
                                               
588 GA 19 § 7b p. 44 [30] “Dagegen ist das poioumenon, das fertige Haus, nicht mehr Gegenstand der 
technē. Es fällt als fertiges aus der technē heraus”. 
589 GA 19 § 7b p. 41 [29, add. e, mod. tr.] “Das ergon hat in sich die Verweisung auf etwas anderes; als 
telos ist es von sich wegweisend: Es ist ein pros ti kai tinos (b2 sq), »zu etwas für jemanden«. Der Schuh ist 
hergestellt zum Tragen, für einen Anderen. In dieser doppelten Characteristik liegt, daß das ergon der 
poiēsis ein Hergestelltes zur weiteren Verwendung ist für den Menschen”. Cf. NE VI 4, 1139b 2f. Cf. 
also DWA p. 13 [228-229]. 
590 DWA p. 13 [229] “Der Schuh aber, sagt Aristoteles, gehört nicht mehr dem Schuster als Schuster, 
sondern der Sinn des Schuhes ist gerade Gebrauchsgegenstand”.  
591 Cf. p. 63 above. 
592 NE VI 2, 1139b 1ff. (Rackham). 
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for the sake of any other human being who, as human being too, acquires the 
shoes. The shoe (the ergon, or poiēton) is peras for poiēsis, because it belongs to a 
realm that poiēsis cannot reach, not even when the shoe is still on the way and we 
recognize it―we call it―as shoe. Poiēsis ‘knows’ the shoe as an assembly process, 
but it does not know the shoe as something for life: this knowledge rather belongs 
to praxis, which embeds the shoe in its teleological structure: a specific action is 
done in order to get the shoe (e.g. walk to the shoemaker’s), and the shoe is in turn 
ordered to subsequent ends (e.g. go to a party). The shoe is telos for praxis, which 
applies as much to the shoe that is finished as to the shoe that is on the way: e.g. 
the half-made shoe is peras of the work session of a shoemaker, the finished shoe 
is peras of that specific productive project, but either on the way or finished it is 
telos within the life-project that he is, and eventually telos within the life-project that 
the client is.  
Despite his reference to the ‘belongingness’ of the shoe to a sphere beyond 
the enclosed process of technē, and at least for the time being, Heidegger focuses 
on the relation between ergon and telos only from the point of view of the ‘having 
been finished’ of the ergon. Thus, he contends: “the telos, taken in its ontological 
character, is peras”593. The fact that the context of the statement is a paragraph 
centered on technē should stand as a sufficient indication that it is meant to be re-
stricted to technē, although it would be desirable to make that more explicit. 
However, the close analysis of telos and peras in GA 18―assumed at different 
stages in GA 19―makes clear that Heidegger’s statement is not restricted to 
technē594. 
Still, if we hold to the point that the ergon is both peras and telos, as distinct 
but coexistent moments of its reality either on the way or as finished, then the 
                                               
593 GA 19 § 7b p. 44 [30] “Nun aber ist das telos, in seinem ontologischen Charakter genommen, peras”. 
Heidegger refers to Met. V, 17, 1022a 4 ff, where peras is defined and brought in the vicinity of telos. 
594 This approach is confirmed in the December lecture (cf. DWA pp. 12-13 [228]). Cf. chapter 6 
below for futher development on it. 
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specific structure of praxis turns out to be disclosed, and this in the precise terms 
in which Heidegger and Aristotle express its superiority over technē: while technē can 
only seize the archē (the eidos of the shoe that will be realized in the real shoe), 
phronēsis embraces both the archē and the telos595. While technē can never ‘witness’ 
the fulfillment of the project, i.e. the moment when the eidos becomes the telos, for 
praxis the eidos or archē is always already a telos. 
In acting―or more accurately, in deciding―I anticipate the archē (…). The conclusion 
of the resolved deliberation is the action itself. But this action is not something 
different from the mode of being of phronēsis; rather, it is the very being of the 
deliberator himself. That is why phronēsis has both the archē and the telos within the 
reach of its power of discovery596.  
Heidegger is pointing here to a wide sense of action which embraces delib-
eration (bouleusis), decision (proairesis), and external action. It is in this wide sense 
that the fundamental structure of praxis, and thus of phronēsis, is disclosed. Praxis is 
present throughout the entire process: the deliberation and the decision are praxis 
as much as the external operation597. From the point of view of the praxis that one 
is―from the ontological approach to Dasein, that which asks for its being―delib-
eration, decision and external operation, which appear as ontically distinct, con-
stitute a continuum. Praxis, as a determination of one’s being, is not ‘on the way’ 
                                               
595 This contrast between phronēsis and technē from the point of view of archē and telos, is articulated in a 
clearer fashion in DWA pp. 13-14 [228-229] than in GA 19 (§ 8c p. 55 [38, mod. tr.]), where it is only 
summarily stated: “[B]ecause phronēsis is directed at once to the archē and the telos and preserves both, it 
is the beltion hexis of the alētheuein that corresponds to those beings that also can be otherwise”. (“Und 
weil die phronēsis sich auf die archē und das telos zugleich richtet und beide verwahrt, ist sie die beltion 
hexis des alētheuein innerhalb desjenigen Seienden, das auch anders sein kann”). Cf. also GA 19 § 20a p. 
139 [96] and Übungen über Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (WS 1922-23) p. 47. For the 
treatment of this issue by Aristotle, cf. NE VI 4, 1140a 13 ff, b 6f. 
596 DWA pp. 13-14 [229, mod. tr.] “In der Handlung ― genauer im Entschluss, nehme ich vorweg die 
arche (...). Der Schluss des entschlossenen Überlegens ist das Handeln selbst. Dieses Handeln selbst 
aber ist nicht etwas, das von der Seinsart der phronēsis verschieden wäre, sondern das Sein des 
Überlegenden selbst. Deshalb hat die phronēsis archē und telos im Machtbereich des Aufdeckens”. 
597 In GA 18 § 17c p. 189 [127] Heidegger makes explicit this double sense of praxis. “In the case of an 
action―in the narrow sense (im engeren Sinne) in which it is opposed to poiēsis―it does not, according to 
its sense, depend on the action simply ending, or a result coming about” (“Bei einer Handlung ― im 
engeren Sinne gegenüber der poiēsis ― kommt es ihrem Sinne nach nicht darauf an, daß sie einfach 
abläuft, daß sich ein Resultat ergibt”). 
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during deliberation, but is ‘fully’ there (da): because “the object of the deliberation 
is zōē itself; the telos has the same ontological character as phronēsis”598. Archē and 
telos, therefore, overlap in phronēsis, the archē is the telos. Only because the telos is 
immediately grasped in praxis can the praktikos ‘make his way’ towards it. This 
statement would surely be a contradiction if praxis had the same structure as technē. 
As it is, however, the praktikos grasps his telos differently from how the technitēs 
grasps the telos of his technē. The technitēs, as such, has the telos only dynamei, as the 
eidos of the pot is in reference to the ergon, the finished pot. In praxis, however, 
there is not such a difference. The eidos is already praxis, like the external action is. 
Of course, something new in relation to the praxis of deliberation happens when 
one decides, and in turn something new in relation to the praxis of decision 
happens when one externally acts: something gets ‘done’ at each of these stages, 
but this ‘getting done’ is precisely indicated from the outside of the kinēsis of 
praxis, observing it as a Vor-gang. This perspective surely must not be ignored, 
because it does make a difference to do something one has decided to do. 
However, beneath these ontically distinct moments, observing the phenomenon 
of praxis from the inside as only a zōon logon echon can do, we are always faced with 
the given continuity (synecheia) of our own life: a laborious one, indeed, which does 
not remain unchanged, but a continuity still599. 
                                               
598 GA 19 § 8a p. 49 [34] “Bei der phronēsis ist vielmehr der Gegenstand des Überlegens die zōē selbst; das 
telos ist vom selben Seinscharakter wie die phronēsis”. Heidegger quotes NE VI 5, 1140b 6f. and 
translates: “in the case of poiēsis, the telos is something other; but this does not hold for praxis: the 
eupraxia itself is the telos” (“Bei der poiēsis ist das telos ein anderes, bei der praxis aber nicht; es ist nämlich 
die eupraxia selbst das telos”). 
599 The substantive synecheia, scarcely used in the Metaphysics, appears in IX 8, 1050b 26 in the context of 
a reflection on the “eternal movement” of the elements of heaven, as distinct from the kinēsis of finite 
beings. Synecheia is assumed for both, under different conditions: “Nor do they tire in this activity; for 
movement does not imply for them, as it does for the perishable things, the potentiality for opposites, 
so that the continuity of the movement should be laborious” (b 24ff). The concept is most often expressed 
thorough the adjective syneches, e.g. in the definition of one (hen) in V 6, where syneches is also used as a 
noun (cf. V 6 1016 a9, and also the definition of physis in V 4, 1014b 25). In this passage, Aristotle 
remarks: “A thing is called continuous which has by its own nature one movement and cannot have 
any other; and the movement (kinēsis) is one when it is indivisible, and indivisible in time” (1016a 5-6). 
This obviously applies to life, because the attempt to divide it, i.e. to separate two parts of it in time, 
can only result in destroying it. 
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This convergence of archē and telos is as much a solid ground for the irre-
ducibility of praxis to poiēsis as a key to explain why the former is the ground on 
which the latter can ever come to be. The first point is clearly made both by 
Heidegger and Aristotle; the second, though, is not explicit in Aristotle, and is 
ultimately denied by Heidegger, insofar as he concludes that “phronēsis cannot be 
the aretē of technē”600. This point he justifies also, we have seen, by the fact that 
their objects (prakton and poiēton) are different, and by Aristotle’s statement that 
“phronēsis is an aretē but not a technē” (VI 5, 1140b 24f). The divorce between 
phronēsis and technē, moreover, seems to be reinforced by the “striking” fact that 
Aristotle designates sophia as the aretē of technē (VI 7, 1141a 12) (…). This must seem 
all the more remarkable in view of the fact that technē has as its theme beings which 
can also be otherwise, whereas the theme of sophia is in a preeminent sense what 
always is601. 
Heidegger emphasizes the paradox because it furnishes a strong basis for 
his interpretation: the analysis of the genesis of sophia in §§ 10-17 aligns technē with 
sophia too, and thus the question of which is highest of the two best hexeis of 
alētheuein, namely phronēsis and sophia, is asked in clear-cut terms, as advanced 
already in § 9c. We are faced with two paradigms which, as Heidegger sees it, 
exclude one another602: an insurmountable tension between on the one hand 
Aristotle’s insight of phronēsis―which is capable of envisioning human life in its 
Bewegtheit―and on the other his typically Greek appreciation for sophia―which is 
aligned with technē and epistēmē in its concern for what stands there before one’s 
                                               
600 GA 19 § 8c pp. 54-55 [38] “Die phronēsis kann nicht die aretē der technē sein”. 
601 GA 19 § 8c pp. 56-57 [39-40] “Das Frappante ist nun, daß Aristoteles die sophia als aretē der technē 
bezeichnet. Das muß umso merkwürdiger berühren, als die technē das Seiende, das auch anders sein 
kann, die sophia aber im ausgezeichneten Sinn das Immerseiende zum Thema hat”. 
602 “Sophia is to be worked out in its own structure versus phronēsis and presented as the genuine mode of 
alētheuein, as the highest possibility of the being of Dasein―whereby phronēsis will appear more concretely” 
(“[Sophia ist] gegenüber der phronēsis in ihrer eigenen Struktur herauszuarbeiten und als die eigentliche 
Weise des alētheuein, als höchte Seinsmöglichkeit des Daseins, durchzusetzen, ― wobei die phronēsis 
konkreter heraustreten wird”). (GA 19 § 9c p. 61 [43, our e.]). 
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gaze603. The tension, Heidegger believes, is fatefully decided in favour of sophia, to 
the detriment of Aristotle’s insights into the peculiarity of the being of Dasein604. 
Still, Heidegger argues, 
Aristotle does not force this result dogmatically on the Dasein of the Greeks of that 
time. Aristotle is not seeking something unprecedented and novel. On the contrary, 
he understands sophia as the highest possibility of being of Dasein on the basis of the Greek Dasein 
itself605. 
However, as regards these statements of NE VI―“phronēsis is an aretē but 
not a technē” (1140b 24f), “[in the arts] we mean by sophia nothing but aretē in 
technē” (1141a 12)―does not Heidegger show here perhaps too much of a concern 
for the letter of Aristotle’s text at the expense of phenomenological and contextual 
analysis? The ‘unsaid’ of Aristotle is not here far too restricted by Heidegger, to 
put it in Gadamerian terms, to the Wirkungsgeschichte606 operating in the fact that he 
is after all a Greek? To be sure, this has to be taken into account, but insofar as we 
are trying “to enable Aristotle to speak again”607, we should balance the ‘wirkungs-
geschichtlich’ elements with the phenomenological analysis and the hermeneutic 
principle of reading the part in the light of the whole and vice versa. This 
hermeneutical balance is a constant throughout the most part of Heidegger’s 
analysis, but it is not so clearly held at this crucial point where he is formulating 
his overall interpretation. As a matter of fact, the context of the second statement 
                                               
603 Cf. NB p. 386/38 [136]. 
604 “This result is all the more astonishing if we consider that the theme of sophia is beings which always 
are, whereas phronēsis aims at and makes transparent precisely the endechomenon allōs echein, the being of 
human Dasein” (“Dieses Resultat ist umso verwunderlicher, wenn man bedenkt, daß die sophia das 
Seiende, das immer ist, zum Thema hat, während doch gerade die phronēsis auf das endechomenon allōs 
echein, das Sein des Menschlichen Daseins, zielt und es durchsichtig macht). (GA 19 § 9c p. 61 [43]). 
605 GA 19 § 9c p. 61 [43] “Dieses Resultat ist nicht dogmatisch von Aristoteles dem damaligen Dasein 
der Griechen aufgezwungen; Aristoteles will nichts Unerhörtes und Neues; sondern er macht die sophia 
als die höchste Seinsmöglichkeit aus dem Sein des griechischen Daseins selbst verständlich”. 
606 Cf. GADAMER, Hans-Georg Wahrheit und Methode (1960) in Gesammelte Werke 1. Hermeneutik I. 
Warheit und Methode. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990 pp. 305 ff. 
607 Cf. DWA pp. 1-2 [219]. “Diese Interpretation hat nun die Absicht, Aristoteles wieder zum Wort zu 
verhelfen”. 
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does not seem to provide a strong basis to infer that Aristotle considers sophia the 
aretē of technē: 
Sophia in the arts (en te tais technais) we ascribe to their most finished exponents, e.g. to 
Phidias as sculptor and to Polyclitus as a maker of statues, and here we mean nothing 
by sophia but excellence in art (aretē technēs); but we think that some people are wise 
(sophos) in general (holōs), not in some particular field or in any other limited respect 
(VI 7, 1141a 9ff). 
Aristotle, following his usual practice, is here expressing a common 
opinion: he is not providing a definition of sophia. Moreover, the sentence to 
which Heidegger clings is explicitly restricted by Aristotle to the sphere of the arts 
(en te tais technais): here we mean nothing by sophia but aretē technēs. Last but not least, 
Aristotle adscribes to common opinion also the conception of sophia as not 
restricted to technai. This justifies Heidegger’s overall approach to Metaphysics I 1-2 
as a description of the genesis of the concept of sophia, but precisely for that 
reason Aristotle does not necessarily establish in philosophical terms that sophia is 
the aretē, or the only aretē, of technē.  
On the other hand, Aristotle does say in NE VI 5, 1140b 24f. that 
“phronēsis is an aretē but not a technē”. Heidegger reads this as a proof that they are 
conceived as reciprocally exclusive. However, a few lines below, Aristotle adds 
that phronēsis “is not only a reasoned hexis (oud hexis meta logou monon); [which] is 
shown by the fact that a hexis of that sort may be forgotten, but phronēsis cannot” 
(b28ff). If we read the former statement in the light of this, another thread is 
opened, namely that phronēsis is more than a technē, more than a reasoned hexis, 
because it is also an aretē, which technē is not. Let us recall the definition of phronēsis, 
placed in this same chapter: “a true, rational, practical disposition (hexis alethē meta 
logou praktikē) with regard to the things that are good or bad for man” (b4f)608. 
One surely does not ‘synthesize’ phronēsis by joining a technically good decision 
                                               
608 Cf. also b20 f. 
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with a virtuous orientation stemming from the advice of a phronimos friend609: 
phronēsis exists only when the moments of its definition come to be at once (which 
of course is not impediment to the phronimos asking for advice―this indeed might 
also be a sign of phronēsis). What remains, in any case, is that the phronimos, as 
Aristotle understands him, is technically well prepared: “phronēsis is not the faculty 
[of cleverness (deinotēs)], but it does not exist without this faculty” (1144a 28f). 
Hence “we call clever (deinous) both phronimoi and villains” (a27 f). 
We have suggested before610, and come back to the point now, that what 
Aristotle calls deinotēs is comparable to technē: it is a faculty that enables us “to do 
the things towards the mark that we have set before ourselves, and to hit it”  
(a24 ff), regardless of the orientation of this mark to the fulfillment of life as a 
whole (to eu zēn holōs)611. The definition, while applicable to other ontical domains 
than that of a workshop, perfectly matches the ontological structure of the technē of 
the craftsman, who conceives a determinate ergon and knows how to proceed in 
order to produce it, regardless of whether the knife that he produces is meant to 
slice bread or to kill someone. As a result, if technē is a specific mode of deinotēs, 
phronēsis can well be considered by Aristotle, at least from a certain point of view, 
the aretē of technē. 
We have lingered on this not because of an exegetic zeal that would ignore 
Heidegger’s problematic, but because Heidegger himself lets his interpretation rest 
so much on what Aristotle says. The letter of the text made clear, let us focus again 
on the phenomenological analysis, which is what can ultimately legitimate or 
accredit (ausweisen)612 the truth of what is contended. We were arguing that the 
                                               
609 Cf. p. 18 above and NE VI 13, 1144b 26f. 
610 Cf. note 270 above. 
611 Cf. NE VI 5, 1140a 25-28. 
612 This term is used by Heidegger in the crucial § 44 of SZ on truth, the only paragraph of SZ in which 
he explicitly refers to NE VI (cf. p. 225) apart from § 7b (p. 32), where he very significantly highlights 
Aristotle’s understanding of logos as apophainesthai. Thus, in § 44a (p. 217) Heidegger asks: “When does 
truth become phenomenally explicit in knowing itself? When knowing is validated (sich ausweist) as being 
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irreducibility between technē and phronēsis needs not imply a relation of exclusion 
between them. In fact, setting such a relation between these hexeis would leave 
unthought the phenomenon that is our experience of the continuity of life. We are actually 
not pointing anywhere else than Aristotle and Heidegger by hinting at praxis as the 
structure that could ground this continuity. But if this is so, the processes that we 
know as poiēsis are not a sort of parenthesis in this continuum, but they are 
imbedded in it. Given that “Dasein is disclosed as the hou eneka, a «for the sake of 
which»”613, if the shoemaker were not, at the start and throughout the process of 
production of the shoe, at the same time a technitēs (as shoemaker) and a praktikos (as 
man, as zōon logon echon), how could he start or pursue the production? How could 
the technitēs provide himself with a telos, with a hou eneka, if technē cannot grasp the 
telos, that remains out of its domain? It can indeed grasp the archē―the shoemaker 
has the eidos of the shoe614―but why would he get down to produce shoes? He 
does so because he is a zōon logon echon, but in his logon echein we cannot absolutely 
separate, not even ontologically, his poiēsis from his praxis. 
5.4. The Twofoldness of Technē 
Our emphasis on the embeddedness of poiēsis in praxis is nonetheless far from 
suggesting that sophia cannot be an aretē of technē. What is questioned is that it be 
the only aretē of technē. In § 11 Heidegger convincingly shows, analyzing Metaphysics I 
1, how in regard to experience (empeiria) technē has a certain claim to universality:  
                                                                                                                                 
true. The self-validation (Selbstausweisung) secures its truth”. (“Wann wird im Erkennen selbst die 
Wahrheit phänomenal ausdrücklich? Dann, wenn sich das Erkennen als wahres ausweist. Die 
Selbstausweisung sichert ihm seine Wahrheit”) Mod. tr: we use the terms ‘validate’ and ‘validation’ 
rather than Stambaugh’s ‘prove to be’ and ‘demonstrate itself’, otherwise correct, in order to highlight 
the only occurrence of the term Selbstausweisung in SZ. In KNS § 17 (GA 56/57 p. 91) Ausweisen is used 
already with this sense: “Das Umweltliche hat seine genuine Sichselbstausweisung in sich selbst”. We 
thank Prof. Alejandro Vigo for drawing our attention to the relevance of this term for Heidegger’s 
understanding of the embeddedness of phenomenology and ontology. 
613 GA 19 § 8a p. 50 [35] “Dasein als das hou heneka, das Worumwillen, aufgedeckt ist”. 
614 Cf. DWA p. 13 [228]. 
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the «as soon as-then» [of empeiria] becomes [in technē] «if such and such, then so and 
so»” (…). The understanding is then no longer founded in a pre-presentification of 
the connection effective in practice, in a retention of the order of succession, but in 
an actual presentation of the outward look of the thing itself which is to be treated in some 
way or other (…). The new phenomenon, which makes it possible to speak of technē as sophōtera 
over and against empeiria, lies on the path of seeing, not of the carrying out in 
practice615. 
The relation that Heidegger makes here between phenomena and speaking 
confirms the balance between phenomenological and textual analysis that 
characterizes most of his approach, and according to which we develop ours 
―only thus is it possible to read Heidegger, and to read Aristotle with Heidegger. 
In technē, Heidegger argues, there is more than the knowledge of who has verified 
‘that’ when I do A, then B happens. The technitēs knows ‘why’ when I do A, B 
happens―in his knowledge there is a “because” (Weil)616, which goes deeper into 
the archē, into what makes this happen: he acquires a certain distance from the 
particular (kath hekaston) to grasp the universal (katholou)617. And it is due to this 
knowledge of the ‘why’, the cause (aition), that the technitēs is regarded as wiser 
(sophōteron) than the experienced (empeirikos): “in the tendency toward simple 
disclosive looking at beings with regard to their archē resides the sophōteron. Hence in 
technē sophia is predelineated”618. 
This phenomenological analysis is accurate, but it is remarkable that, as 
was the case with technē and phronēsis, again here Heidegger seems to shed light only 
on the differences between technē and empeiria. The fact would not be very relevant 
if this emphasis on the differences were not crucial to Heidegger’s interpretation; 
                                               
615 GA 19 § 11c pp. 75 [51-52, add. e.] “Das Sobald – dann wird zum Wenn das – dann das (…). Das 
Verstehen gründet jetzt nicht mehr im Gegenwärtigen des Ausführungs- und Verrichtungszusam-
menhangs, im Behalten der Aufeinanderfolge, sondern in der Präsentation des Aussehens der Sache, auf 
deren Behandlung das Besorgen gerichtet ist (…). Das neue Phänomen, das die Möglichkeit bietet, die 
technē gegenüber der empeiria als sophōtera anzusprechen, liegt in der Richtung des Sehens, nicht der 
Ausführung”. 
616 GA 19 § 11c p. 75 [51]. 
617 Cf. GA 19 § 11c pp. 75-76 [52]. 
618 GA 19 § 11c p. 77 [53] “In der Tendenz auf das lediglich aufdeckende Betrachten des Seinden in 
Hinsicht auf die archē liegt das sophōteron. So ist in der technē die Vorzeichnung für die Sophia gegeben”. 
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however, it is, to the extent that the new way in which he presents technē seems to 
exclude empeiria. Aristotle surely distinguishes these determinations: “with a view 
to action (prattein) empeiria seems in no respect inferior to technē, and we even see 
men of empeiria succeeding more that those who have logos without empeiria”619; and 
a few lines below: “If a man has logos without empeiria, and knows the katholou but 
does not know the kath hekaston included in this, he will often fail to cure, because 
it is the kath hekaston that is to be cured”620. However, Aristotle is not stating that 
insofar as one has logos one does not have empeiria, but that if one were to have logos 
without empeiria one would not be well prepared as action is concerned. Why should 
the technitēs necessarily have no empeiria? For sure, he has a certain universal grasp, 
and in this respect technē heralds sophia―what is more, sophia can be said to be, from 
this point of view, its aretē, its excellence. However, technē also remains a hexis of what 
can be otherwise, as Heidegger himself holds throughout his analysis in § 7. But 
this dimension is now left in the shade; there is no mention of a contradiction in 
Aristotle between the depiction of technē in the NE and in the Metaphysics (which in 
fact does not exist if, as seems to be the case, technē is not said in the Metaphysics to 
exclude empeiria). 
At any rate, regardless of what Heidegger and Aristotle might say, the 
decisive point is that phenomena show that, while empeiria is irreducible to technē, 
they often coexist: ignoring or distancing oneself from the kath hekaston does not 
necessarily follow from the knowledge of the katholou, of ‘why’ if I do A, then B 
results. What is more, this knowledge of the universal usually fosters wider 
involvement in the particular, for instance, in the form of experimentation: 
examining the kath hekaston from even more points of view to discover how it 
works under different particular circumstances. Knowing the ‘because’ between A 
and B usually leads one to try whether, for instance, doing A in the presence of C 
                                               
619 Met. I 1, 981a 12ff. 
620 Met. I 1, 981a 20ff. 
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will still produce B, or will produce something else, and so on. Experimentation 
appears then as a phenomenon that traces the theoretical tendency of technē back 
into empeiria. Aristotle actually refers experimentation to technē in distinguishing it 
from phronēsis; as usual, the remark is powerful but concise: “in technē he who errs 
willingly is preferable, but in phronēsis, as in the aretai, it is the reverse” (VI 5, 1140b 
22ff). Heidegger, who deals with this passage earlier in the course, interprets thus 
the first half of the statement: 
Technē can presume things and concede things. Trial and error are proper to it. 
Through technē, one discovers whether something works one way or another. The 
more technē risks failure, the more secure it will be in his procedure. It is precisely 
through failure that certitude is formed. It is precisely the one who is not ingrained in 
a definite «technique», a set routine (…) who acquires the correct possibility of know-
how, [who] has at his disposal the proper kind of the alētheuein that corresponds to 
technē621. 
The possibility of failure is, as Heidegger puts it, “constitutive to the de-
velopment of technē”622, precisely because technē is referred to what can be other-
wise. In fact, this possibility of being otherwise acquires in technē a specific concre-
tion, which becomes its inner motivation for experimentation: technē is concerned 
with ‘what can be better’, in the restricted sense of ‘better’ that was at the core of 
the concern of the later Heidegger with modern technique: the idea of a limit or 
regulation does not belong to the inner logic of technique623. While Greek technē 
had not this present-day dramatic face of technique, the principle is well grasped 
in Aristotle’s statement, and Heidegger unmistakably assumes the inner tendency 
                                               
621 GA 19 § 8c pp. 53-54 [37-38, mod. tr.] “Die technē kann vor- und zugeben. Zu ihr gehört das 
Probieren. Man versteht in ihr, ob es geht oder ob es auf andere Weise geht. Die technē wird um so 
sicherer gehen, wenn sie einen Fehlversuch riskiert. Gerade auf dem Wege des Verfehlens bildet sich 
die Sicherheit aus. Gerade wer sich nicht auf eine bestimmte »Technik«, eine bestimmte eingefahrene 
Behandlungsart, versteift (…), der bringt sich in die rechte Möglichkeit des Sichauskennens, der 
verfügt über die rechte Art des alētheuein, das der technē entspricht”. 
622 GA 19 § 8c p. 54 [38] “Diese Möglichkeit des Fehlgehenkönnens ist konstitutiv für die Ausbildung 
der technē”. 
623 Cf. “Die Frage nach der Technik” (1953) in GA 7 Vorträge und Aufsätze Ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm 
von Herrmann, 2000 pp. 9-40, p. 31 for ref. (pagination of the Neske Einzelausgabe). 
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of technē towards experimentation624. That is why it is surprising that in § 11 we are 
left only with the remark that “the new phenomenon” of knowing the ‘why’ 
“makes it possible to speak of technē as sophōtera over and against empeiria [and] lies on 
the path of seeing, not of the carrying out in practice”625. The knowledge of the 
‘why’ is indeed a new phenomenon, but the inner tendency of technē towards 
empeiria is another one―thoroughly appreciated by Heidegger in § 8c, though 
without mention of the term empeiria―and we very often find this tendency 
stemming from the impulse of technē to enlarge knowledge. This proximity 
between universality and particularity within technē, however, is displaced from 
§ 11 on: 
«(…) technē, by its very sense, is concerned with the katholou», the outward look which 
recurs in all the single cases, whereas the meaning of praxis is, e.g., healing, i.e. 
making the determinate sick person healthy. Praxis is concerned with the kath 
hekaston. (Here we touch upon concepts, the katholou and the kath hekaston, which are 
very important for grasping the distinction between sophia and phronēsis)626. 
In the text that Heidegger paraphrases, Aristotle does say that technē is 
knowledge of the universals, while actions (praxeis) and produtions (geneseis) are 
concerned with the individual. However, Aristotle is using here a restricted 
concept of praxis, as externally perceptible action, and therefore not the wide 
sense of praxis as the way of being of human beings. Heidegger himself makes that 
clear in his interpretation, because he also uses this restricted sense: praxis, in 
contrast with the theoretical knowledge of the technitēs, means curing this man here 
and now. However, because in curing this man, the doctor does not produce 
                                               
624 The specific term ‘experimentieren’, however, is only used by Heidegger to exclude it from the 
domain of phronēsis (although by doing so he implicitly attaches it to technē): Cf. GA 19 § 8c p. 54 [38], 
quoted in note 628 below. 
625 GA 19 § 11c p. 75 [52, our e.] “Das neue Phänomen, das die Möglichkeit bietet, die technē gegenüber 
der empeiria als sophōtera anzusprechen, liegt in der Richtung des Sehens, nicht der Ausführung”. 
626 GA 19 § 11c p. 76 [52] “»Der Grund liegt darin, daß die technē ihrem Sinn nach auf das katholou geht«, 
auf das Aussehen, das jeweils in den einzelnen Fallen wiederkehrt, während der Sinn der praxis z.B. das 
Heilen ist, d.h. den betreffenden bestimmten Kranken gesund zu machen; die praxis geht auf das kath 
hekaston. ― Damit sind wir auf Begriffe gestoßen, die für das weitere Verständnis und für die 
Unterscheidung der sophia und der phronēsis wichtig sind: katholou und kath hekaston”. Cf. Met. I 1, 981a 
15ff. 
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health as health does―i.e. not according to the way in which physis brings about 
physis and in which praxis brings about praxis―but from the outside, the praxis that 
he is undertaking is a poiēsis, the activity whose hexis is technē.  
As a result, we are actually faced with the phenomenon of a doctor who 
applies his technē to a particular case (kath hekaston). Technē, therefore, not only 
points to epistēmē but also to praxis. However, this second dimension is not 
convenient for Heidegger’s interpretative line, as the parenthesis in the quotation 
above suggests: “Praxis is concerned with the kath hekaston. (Here we touch upon 
concepts, the katholou and the kath hekaston, which are very important for grasping 
the distinction between sophia and phronēsis)” 627. If phronēsis turns out to be the only 
form of alētheuein that is truly concerned with the kath hekaston, as Heidegger 
suggests, then it definitely remains isolated from the rest of them, which allegedly 
fall under the paradigm of readiness (Fertigkeit). However, if phronēsis does not 
prove to be the only hexis dealing with what can be otherwise, i.e. if technē also has 
a share in this, and as a result it is linked not only to sophia but also to phronēsis and 
empeiria, then the relation between sophia and phronēsis may acquire a different 
shape, and this is precisely the wider perspective we are aiming at. 
Our reflection on experimentation now illuminates the second half of 
Aristotle’s statement: while in technē he who errs willingly is preferable, “in 
phronēsis, as in the aretai, it is the reverse” (VI 5, 1140b 22ff). Heidegger comments: 
[I]n the case of phronēsis, on the contrary, where it is a matter of a deliberation whose 
theme is the proper being of Dasein, every failure entails failing oneself (jedes Fehlgehen 
[ist] ein Sich-Verfehlen) (…). Phronēsis is not oriented toward trial and error; in moral 
action I cannot experiment with myself628. 
                                               
627 GA 19 § 11c p. 76 [52]. 
628 Cf. GA 19 § 8c p. 54 [38, mod. tr.] “Bei der phronēsis dagegen, wo es sich um das Überlegen handelt, 
dessen Thema das eigene Sein des Dasein ist, da ist jedes Fehlgehen ein Sich-Verfehlen (…). Die 
phronēsis is nicht darauf orientiert, zu probieren; ich kann im sittlichen Handeln nicht mit mir 
experimentieren”. 
 176 
While a mistake in technē may not necessarily entail a lack of skill or 
knowledge, but an experiment or a pedagogical strategy, which shows precisely a 
certain development in one’s technical knowledge, a mistake in phronēsis necessarily 
brings phronēsis itself into discredit. While the failure to bring about a desired ergon 
on the part of technical experience remains in the restricted domain of a 
production, of an ergon that is different from oneself, the ergon that phronēsis 
deliberates and decides about is the deliberator and decision maker himself. That 
is why Heidegger contends that “a result is not constitutive for the being of an 
action; only the eu, the how, is. The telos in phronēsis is the anthropos himself. In the 
case of poiēsis, the telos is something other, a worldly being over and against Dasein; 
not so in the case of praxis”629. 
But however other the telos of poiēsis be, it is still conceived and desired by 
Dasein―otherwise, poiēsis would be left floating in the void. It is in this respect that 
we can speak of a certain technical achievement (i.e. doing the things that tend 
towards a bad mark that we have set ourselves)630 as a personal or social 
shortcoming: because the erga of poiēsis are not the work of chance but of a zōon 
logon echon, their consideration always necessarily requires a wider perspective, 
encompassing the ground on which they come to be: human life as a whole (to eu 
zēn holōs)631. The how is always already at stake in any activity of Dasein, so that 
poiēsis cannot be an independent domain, but belongs to the determination of the 
being of Dasein as praxis. Aristotle clearly assumes this to be so632; the key 
question, again, is whether his conceptuality allows for conceiving these 
determinations in such a unity―and we believe that Heidegger too quickly 
dismisses that possibility. 
                                               
629 GA 19 § 8a p. 51 [35-36] “Ein Resultat ist nicht konstitutiv für das Sein des Handelns, sondern lediglich 
das eu, das Wie. Das telos in der phronēsis ist der anthropos selbst. Bei der poiēsis ist das telos ein anderes, ein 
weltlich Seiendes gegenüber dem Dasein, bei der praxis aber nicht”. Cf. NE VI 5, 1140b 6-7. 
630 Cf. NE VI 12, 1144a 24-27. 
631 Cf. NE VI 5, 1140a 25-28. 
632 Cf. NE VI 2, 1139b 1-3. 
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At first sight, one could say that Heidegger is for once implicitly assuming 
that technē is embedded in praxis when he says that “phronēsis is different from 
technē; for in the case of technē the prakton is a telos which is para”633. Heidegger 
indeed speaks here of technē as concerned with a prakton. However, because his 
statement itself assumes once again that praxis is never para, for the sake of 
precision it should replace ‘the prakton’ with both ‘the poiēton’ and ‘the poiēsis’: 
insofar as the craftsman (poiētēs, or technitēs) is a man, his prakton is not a telos which 
is para, as much as the telos of the client who ‘makes her way’ to the shoemaker’s 
(i.e. buying a pair of shoes) is not para for her. What is para for the shoemaker is 
the production itself (poiēsis) or the finished shoe (poiēton), the pro-duct634, because 
once he has finished it he does not have it any longer as shoemaker, but he does 
have it as a man; and what is para for the client is ‘the way she makes’ as a biped, 
insofar as once she has ‘made it’ she does not have it any longer: the telos of her 
kinēsis is para, because as soon as she gets to the shoemaker’s it is completed and 
thus set aside; however, because she is at the same time a biped and a zōon logon 
echon, the telos that activates her ‘making her way towards the shoemaker’s’ is there 
(Da) as much on the way to the shoemaker’s as once she has arrived there. The 
telos that leads her to set off for the shoemaker’s is the same that, once she has 
arrived, leads her to finally buy her pair of shoes. 
Because all poiēseis are activated and pursued by praxis, while “neither acting 
[is] making nor making acting” (VI 4, 1140a 5f), poiēsis can only come to be within 
the span opened by praxis, as much as kinēsis can only come to be within the span 
opened by energeia or entelecheia635. Our reading of Heidegger’s interpretation 
requires now making more explicit his understanding of these other concepts, 
                                               
633 GA 19 § 8a p. 50 [35]“Und doch ist die phronēsis verschieden von der technē; denn bei der technē is das 
prakton ein telos, das para ist”. 
634 Cf. note 480 above. 
635 Cf. AQM p. 497 “Dynamis situates itself within the domain opened by energeia. It is not moved but 
because energeia opens the way for it”. 
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which hinge on that of telos, and analyzing how he envisions their relation to basic 
ethical-ontological concepts such as hexis and aretē. This leads us back to the 1924 
summer course, where the conceptual architecture on which GA 19 rests is laid. 
6. Telos: Where Everything is Decided 
 
6.1. Telos and Peras in 1924 
We have argued above that Heidegger, in his interpretation of Aristotle during 
these years, tends to read telos and peras as almost interchangeable concepts. This is 
due to basically two intertwined reasons. Firstly, his thesis―stated quite at the 
beginning of GA 18―that Dasein (in the wide sense of any being) for the Greeks 
means “1. primarily presence, present, 2. being-complete, completedness―[these are] the two 
characters of the there (Da) for [them]. In these two characters, all beings with 
regard to their being are to be interpreted”636. Secondly, there is the fact that 
Aristotle, despite dealing with telos and peras as distinct entries of his ‘philosophical 
dictionary’ (chapters 16 and 17 of Metaphysics V), actually brings together to a 
certain extent their meanings when he includes telos among the meanings of 
peras637. 
Heidegger devotes § 11 of the 1924 summer course to teleion (fulfilled)638, 
which is the concept under which telos is approached by Aristotle. According to 
the direction of his interpretation, Heidegger translates teleion as “something that is 
completed” (Fertigseiendes) or “what constitutes being-completed” as a way of 
being (was das Fertigsein ausmacht)639. 
The three senses of teleion, as developed by Aristotle, are thoroughly para-
phrased. “What is addressed as complete (fertig), first of all, is a being outside of 
                                               
636 GA 18 § 7b p. 35 [26] “Dasein heißt also zusamenfassend: 1. primär Gegenwärtigkeit, Gegenwart, 2. das 
Fertigsein, die Fertigkeit ― die beiden Charaktere des Da bei den Griechen. In diesen beiden ist alles 
Seiende hinsichtlich seines Seins auszulegen”. 
637 Cf. Met. V 17, 1022a 6ff. 
638 In paragraph 2.2. above (cf. pp. 49 ff.) we have preferred to render telos as ‘fulfillment’, from which 
‘fulfilled’ for teleion. Our development here shall make clearer the reasons for our choice. 
639 Cf. GA 18 § 11a p. 80 [56]. 
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which no part remains to be encountered”640. Secondly, “what is addressed as 
complete is that which has nothing left in the context of having a genuine being-
possibility at one’s disposal”641. Characteristic to this second translation is the fact 
that Heidegger renders Aristotle’s kat aretēn kai to eu (“in respect of excellence and 
goodness”) as “being-possibility”, according to his formal approach to the good as 
a how of being642. The fact that aretē is read as being-possibility obviously 
reinforces the point that Heidegger wants to make, namely that being teleion 
excludes new possibilities. Otherwise, the formal approach certainly grasps 
Aristotle’s conception of the good as a how of the being of something: its being 
fulfilled. This is especially visible in the third sense of this term, which Aristotle 
phrases as follows: “the things which have attained a good end (telos spoudaion) are 
called teleia; for things are called teleia in virtue of the having of their telos (to echein to 
telos)”643. For things to attain their telos means to attain their good: as a result, being 
good and being teleion are equivalent for him. That is why, Aristotle argues, it is 
only in a derived sense that we speak of bad things as teleion. Heidegger, on his 
part, confirms with this third sense his interpretation of the previous ones: “teleion 
is being in the how of being-completed (im Wie des Fertigseins), the being in which, 
as such, its completedness (Fertigkeit) is at hand in a serious way”644. The formal 
                                               
640 GA 18 § 11a p. 80 [56, mod. tr.] “Als fertig wird einmal angesprochen ein Seiender, außerhalb 
dessen auch nicht ein einziger Teil sich antreffen läßt”. Cf. Met. V 16, 1021b 12ff.  
641 GA 18 § 11a pp. 80-81 [56] “Weiter wird als fertig angesprochen das, was im Umkreis des 
Verfügens über eine eigene Seinsmöglichkeit in ihrer echten Herkünftigkeit kein Darüberhinaus mehr 
hat”. Cf. 1021b 14ff. 
642 Cf. e.g. GA 19 § 8a p. 51 [35-36]. 
643 Met. V 16, 1021b 23ff. 
644 GA 18 § 11a p. 81 [57] “Ferner ist teleion Sein im Wie des Fertigseins, das Seiende, in dem als 
solchem seine Fertigkeit ernsthaft vorhanden ist”. Spoudaion is rendered as “in a serious way”, in 
reference to the way in which the end is had (echein), i.e. to the attitude of that being who can have and 
end consciously (Cf. GA 18 § 11b p. 87 [60]). This translation seems as valid as Ross’―in which 
spoudaion is considered an adjective of the telos, in continuity with the second sense of teleion―because 
the accusative may well have the meaning of an adverb. However, it somehow obscures the relation of 
this passage to the NE that Heidegger will make apparent in § 12, i.e. that teleion and agathon are 
equivalent determinations of being. 
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approach is maintained, and also the point that “being-possibilities” are exhausted: 
what is teleion has come to its utmost possibility and it is therefore ready (fertig). 
Up to here, especially from the perspective of Heidegger’s emphasis on 
Fertigkeit, the sense of telos seems to overlap with that of limit (peras), which is de-
fined as “the last point of each thing, i.e. the first point beyond which it is not 
possible to find any part, and the first point within which every part is”645. But it is 
relevant to note that, still upon unfolding the third sense of teleion, Aristotle adds: 
“the ultimate thing for the sake of which (to hou eneka eschaton) is also an end 
(telos)”646. Heidegger paraphrases: “telos, constituting the end as being-completed, 
means also that for the sake of which something is”647. He then forewarns: “One 
must be cautious with the concept of «teleology». Aristotle had no «teleological» 
worldview. Even a superficial understanding shows that teleion and telos do not 
mean «aim» (Ziel) or «purpose» (Zweck)”648. This is odd, however: to name only 
two examples, in section I we have seen how practical dealings in the NE are 
governed by aims and purposes from the ground up, and how the Metaphysics 
starts stating our desire to know, as something set in our own way of being 
(physei). If a superficial understanding shows something, it is definitely that it is an 
aim, whether implicit or explicit, that moves us to act or to know. Yet, on closer 
inspection the point seems to be reinforced, since it applies also to physis: “the 
nature (physis) is telos and that for the sake of which (hou heneka). For if a thing 
undergoes a continuous change toward some telos, that last stage (eschaton) is 
actually that for the sake of which”649; and in the Metaphysics: “everything that 
                                               
645 Met. V 17, 1022a 4f. 
646 Met. V 16, 1021b 29f. 
647 GA 18 § 11a p. 82 [57] “Telos, Ende als Fertigsein ausmachend heißt auch das, worum willen etwas 
ist”. 
648 GA 18 § 11a p. 82 [57] “Vorsichtig muß man sein mit dem Begriff der ›Teleologie‹. Aristoteles hatte 
keine »teleologische« Weltanschauung. Schon ein flüchtiges Verstehen zeigt, daß mit teleion und telos 
nicht gemeint ist »Ziel« oder »Zweck«”. 
649 Physics II 2, 194a 28ff. 
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comes to be moves towards a principle (archē), i.e. its end (telos). For that for the 
sake of which a thing is (to hou heneka), is its principle (archē), and the becoming is 
for the sake of the end (telos)”650. Telos could hardly be brought closer to the ‘for 
the sake of which’ that is characteristic of phronēsis, and this is done precisely by 
pointing to the same overlapping of telos and archē that Heidegger finds in NE 
VI651. Furthermore, Aristotle himself contrasts in that same book the dispersion 
of telos and archē that is characteristic of technē with their belonging together in 
things that are or become in accordance with nature (kata physin)652, thus implicitly 
associating the how of being of physis with that of praxis.  
That the dismissal of any idea of aim in telos was somehow an excess is 
shown by the fact that Heidegger right away grants that “the end can be 
encountered in the character of purpose or aim, but only because telos is end [in 
the sense of peras, C.A.]. It is aim or purpose with respect to a definite looking-
toward (Hinsehen-auf)… keeping in sight (Ins-Auge-Fassen)”653. This, however, is 
only a half concession: we may indeed consider that telos has the sense of aim or 
purpose, but this has to be understood as subordinated to the primary sense of 
telos, i.e. peras, centered on the idea of Fertigkeit. Hence this aim is designated as 
referred to a seeing: only an aim that can be set out there can be kept in sight, as 
finished. However, Heidegger is not really interested in this ‘teleological’ meaning; 
the idea of telos as aim only appears once more in his commentary: 
                                               
650 Met. IX 8, 1050a 7ff (mod. tr.). Cf. also III 2, 996a 23ff: “Everything that in itself and by its own 
nature is good is an end (telos), and a cause in the sense that for its sake the other things come to be 
and are, and (…) an end or purpose (telos kai hou heneka) is the end of some action”. 
651 Cf. DWA pp. 13-14 [229, mod. tr.]. Cf. NE VI 4, 1140a 13 ff, b 6f. 
652 “For technē is concerned neither with things that are, or come into being, by necessity, nor with 
things that do so kata physin (since these have their origin in themselves). Poiēsis and praxis being differ-
ent, technē must be a matter of poiēsis, not of praxis” (NE VI 4, 1140a 14ff). 
653 GA 18 § 11a p. 82 [57] “In den Charakter von Zweck und Ziel kann das Ende treten, aber nur weil 
telos Ende ist, kann es auch einmal Ziel oder Zweck sein. Es ist Ziel oder Zweck im Hinblick auf ein 
bestimmtes Hinsehen-auf …, Ins-Auge-Fassen”. 
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With the discussion of the teleion we acquire a foundation for the discussion of the 
fundamental concept of the Aristotelian doctrine of being, entelecheia. Telos is not «aim» but 
rather eschaton, having the character of limit, «what is outermost». Aim and purpose 
are definite modes in which the telos is an «end», but they are not primary 
determinations654.  
Fertigkeit having been retained as the underlying sense of telos is the neces-
sary result of the fact that entelecheia is the key to Aristotle’s ontology, provided that 
this concept proves to remain within the Greek view of being as presence 
(Gegenwärtigkeit) and completedness (Fertigkeit)655. The idea of there being some-
thing which is in the full sense of being and yet is moving towards a still non-
achieved possibility, i.e. something that is in this possibility, obviously does not fit 
into this scheme, and that is why Heidegger tends to displace it from the core of 
the meaning of telos as used by Aristotle. Thus, he infers, “for a being there is no 
further being-possibility beyond the telos (…), a being has come to its end with respect 
to its being-possibility”656: a being determined by entelecheia is “the type of being that 
maintains itself in its genuine being-possibility so that the possibility is consu-
mated”657. Having the end in itself (en-telos-echein) implies the ending of possibility 
itself. We must then “hold primarily in view the fact that telos has the determina-
tion of limit”658. 
Of course, the application of this scheme to our experience of Dasein does 
not make much sense, and this is precisely what Heidegger wants to stress: the 
Greek sense of being cannot grasp the genuine being of Dasein, “such a being that, 
                                               
654 GA 18 p. 85 [59] “Mit der Diskussion des teleion bekommen wir ein Fundament für die Erörterung 
des Fundamentalbegriffes der aristotelischen Lehre vom Sein, der entelecheia. Telos ist nicht »Ziel«, sondern 
eschaton, Charakter der Grenze, »Äußerstes«. Ziel und Zweck sind bestimmte Weisen, in denen telos als 
»Ende« ist, aber sie sind nicht primäre Bestimmungen”. 
655 Cf. GA 18 § 7b p. 35 [26]. 
656 GA 18 § 11b p. 85 [59] “Ein Worüber-hinaus-nichts (...) in dem Sinne, daß es über das telos hinaus 
keine weitere Seinsmöglichkeit für ein Seiendes gibt, daß ein Seiendes hinsichtlich seiner Seinsmöglichkeiten 
zu seinem Ende gekommen ist”. 
657 GA 18 § 11c p. 90 [62] “Ein Seiendes, durch die entelecheia bestimmt, besagt fundamental ein solches 
Seiendes, das sich selbst hält in seiner eigentlichen Seinsmöglichkeit, so daß die Möglichkeit vollendet ist”. 
658 GA 18 § 11c p. 89 [61] “[S]o ist primär festzuhalten: telos hat die Bestimmung von Grenze”. 
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in its being, depends upon its being, explicitly or inexplicitly”659. But Heidegger 
does not make this clear at the moment; he sets this objection aside for later, and 
proceeds with his interpretation, now centered on the human good (anthrōpinon 
agathon) as discussed in NE I. The connection with Metaphysics V 16 is clear, 
because the anthrōpinon agathon is here elucidated by Aristotle precisely in terms of 
teleiōsis (what we translate as fulfillment or plenitude, and Heidegger translates as 
Fertigkeit): to ask for the human good is to ask for the specific human telos. The 
question has to be made according to the Greek sense of being: 
For the being-determination of the Dasein of human beings, the basic Greek 
determination of being is to be radically and consistently laid claim to, and it is to be 
shown in this way that agathon is telos in the sense that it is haplōs teleion, teleion in the 
strict sense660.  
This haplōs teleion of human beings is set by Aristotle in eudaimonia, a popu-
lar concept which, as his elucidation progressively unfolds, acquires a philosophi-
cal sense, that of a specific how of one’s being―according to Heidegger, “the 
being-completed (Fertigsein) of Dasein, the very being-possibility (Seinsmöglichkeit) of 
Dasein itself”661. It is conspicuous that Heidegger does not refer here to the specific 
procedure by which Aristotle determines happiness as the haplōs teleion of human 
beings, namely one that reads telos primarily as aim, not as completedness: “we call 
that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more teleion (teleioteron) than that which is 
worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else” (I 7, 1097a 30ff). As a result “we 
call fulfilled without qualification (haplōs teleion) that which is always (aei) desirable 
in itself and never for the sake of something else” (a33 f), and this is happiness. 
                                               
659 GA 18 § 12a p. 95 [65] “Ein solches Seindes, in dessen Sein es ausdrücklich oder unausdrücklich auf 
sein Sein ankommt”. Cf. also § 17c p. 180 [121-122] “Dasein as concern is care about itself, for the most part 
inexplicitly”. (“Dasein als Besorgen ist Sorge um sich Selbst, zumeist unausdrücklich”). 
660 GA 18 § 12a p. 92 [63] “Es wird für die Seinsbestimmung des Daseins des Menschen die 
griechische Grundbestimmung des Seins radikal und konsequent in Anspruch genommen und so 
gezeigt, daß das agathon in dem Sinne telos ist, daß es haplōs teleion, schlechthin teleion ist”. 
661 GA 18 § 12a p. 95 [65] “Das haplōs teleion das ist, was schlechthin das Fertigsein des Daseins 
ausmacht, die schlechthinnige Seinsmöglichkeit des Daseins selbst”. 
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Why does Heidegger leave in the shade this sense of telos as aim, which 
some months later he cannot avoid using in his analysis of the NE662? Surely 
because he is trying to show that Aristotle applies his ontological concepts to the 
ethics. This is indeed an enterprise that fits the nerve of Aristotle’s search. 
However, while considering Fertigsein as the primary sense of teleion in NE I is 
definitely consistent with Heidegger’s thesis on the Greek idea of being, it is 
uncertain that he is letting Aristotle’s phenomenological analysis speak. Is 
Heidegger trying to see with Aristotle, even to see beyond Aristotle? In a much 
quoted passage of the Natorp Bericht the doubt is cast on whether Aristotle is doing 
real phenomenology or is instead applying to phenomena an unquestioned sense 
of being: 
Was the sense ot being Aristotle employed to define the being of human life drawn 
in a genuine manner from a simple, founding experience of this object only and its 
being, or was human life understood as only one being within a more comprehensive 
domain of being, i.e., did Aristotle apply to it a sense of being that he took to be 
archontic for investigating it?663 
This question, though, could also be directed at Heidegger’s approach, 
namely to his taking for granted Aristotle’s submission to a Greek idea of being as 
Fertigsein: does the sense of being that Heidegger reads into Aristotle’s definition 
of the being of human life reflect Aristotle’s founding experience of this object 
only and its being, or is Heidegger applying to Aristotle’s understanding of human 
life a sense of being that he takes to be archontic for investigating Aristotle’s 
approach? 
Heidegger presumes that there is a tension between the ontological molds 
of the Metaphysics and the phenomenological insights of the NE, and he develops 
his interpretation according to this conviction. We have seen how in GA 19 he 
                                               
662 Cf. GA 19 § 7b p. 41 [29]. 
663 NB 373/25-26 [127] “Ist der Seinssinn, der das Sein des menschlichen Lebens letztlich 
charakterisiert, aus einer reinen Grunderfahrung eben dieses Gegenstandes und seines Seins genuin 
geschöpft, oder ist menschliches Leben als ein Seiendes innerhalb eines umgreifenderen Seinsfeldes 
genommen, beziehungsweise einem für es als archontisch angesetzten Seinssinn unterworfen?”. 
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assumes, in the context of NE VI, that an ergon, insofar as it is a telos, “leads forth 
from itself (…), it is «for something and for someone»”664: a shoe, insofar as it is 
inscribed in praxis, is not anymore seen as something fertig: as embedded in praxis, 
it points beyond itself. On the other hand, though, in his analysis of aretē in GA 
18, he concludes that “it is a mistake to conceive of aretē as completedness 
(Fertigkeit), as this contradicts the sense of aretē”665. Aretē is an essential element of 
Aristotle’s understanding of eudaimonia, which is defined by him as “an energeia of 
the soul in accordance with fulfilled excellence (psychēs energeia tis kat aretēn 
teleian)”666. How to reconcile the fact that man is praxis, and therefore its aretai are 
always on the way, with the ontological characterization of aretē as something 
teleion? This is the tension that Heidegger believes to find in Aristotle: in the one 
hand a sharp phenomenological eye in the ethics, and on the other an ontological 
frame, an archontic sense of being that does not live up to the touch with reality 
(thigein)667 unfolded in his practical philosophy. 
6.2. Bringing Physis and Praxis Closer 
However, could there be less of a tension than Heidegger says there is in 
Aristotle? If having the telos does not mean only to have attained a limit (peras) 
beyond which there are no further “being possibilities” (which definitely applies 
for telos as the external endpoint of a kinēsis, where telos is the accomplishment of a 
‘coming to be’), but also to be and yet continue to be, as it seems required for the continuity of 
a kinēsis to be real at each stage668, then Aristotle would not be defining the being of 
                                               
664 GA 19 § 7b p. 41 [29, mod. tr.] “als telos ist [das ergon] von sich wegweisend: Es ist (…) »zu etwas für 
jemanden«”. 
665 GA 18 § 17c p. 188 [127] “[Es ist verfehlt], wenn man die aretē als Fertigkeit fassen würde ― das 
widerspricht dem Sinn der aretē”. 
666 Cf. e.g. NE I 13, 1102a 5-6. 
667 Cf. Met. IX 10, 1051b 24f. Heidegger highlights the distinctiveness of this characterization of truth 
in GA 21 § 13c esp. pp. 189-190. 
668 Cf. Physics III 2, 201a 16f. and POLO, L. 1997 p. 118. 
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human beings in terms of Fertigkeit when he conceives eudaimonia as the haplōs 
teleion of human beings. The late Gadamer has clearly pointed to this balance 
between being and yet not being, the difficulty of which is acknowledged by 
Aristotle himself in his definition of movement as energeia atelēs, “hard to grasp, but 
not incapable of existing”669: 
We are all always in a way which has an end (un fine) and which, at the same time, 
does not have an ending (una fine). Yes, this fits the Aristotelian thought: being always 
in a fulfilled though endless process (un processo finalizzato ma senza fine)670. 
The italian with which Gadamer makes this statement allows for a play on 
words that renders even better than English the dialectic between end and ending: 
finalizzato ma senza fine―fully realizing its telos, and yet continuing on the way towards 
it, insofar as its realization of the telos is constantly changing671 (such is indeed the 
dynamism of life: we fully live insofar as we are living, but at the same time living 
implies a constant redefinition of itself). The statement is made in the context of a 
course on Aristotle given some weeks after having reread the Natorp Bericht, by 
then recently discovered; the Heideggerian text keeps the inspiring force that 
definitely awakened the young intellectual for philosophy in 1923, but now it does 
not do so in the form of generating enthusiastic adherence, but of fostering a deep 
rethinking of his own life-long reading of Aristotle which, while in many respects 
different from Heidegger’s, is nonetheless deeply influenced by his teacher672. 
More specifically, the old Heidegger Schüler is giving a session on the relation 
between the Physics and the Metaphysics where he devotes special attention to 
                                               
669 Physics III 2, 202a 2f. 
670 GADAMER, H.-G. 2000 p. 86. 
671 English does have the verb ‘finalize’, with a slightly different sense from ‘ending’. Usually referred 
to arrangements, it means that the preparations for e.g. an event are ready, that everything is prepared. 
To have finalized the event, then, does not imply that the event has finished, but that it is ready to 
start. However, the moment of ‘readiness’, and the fact that an event is thought as a process bracketed 
in time, make the term only partly adequate as translation. Cf. also note 198 above. 
672 Cf. GADAMER, H.-G. 2000 p. 23. 
 188 
Aristotle’s determination of the sense of being of physis as distinct from the sense 
of being of poiēsis:  
To say that the fruit is the end of the plant is perhaps accurate from the human point 
of view, and more precisely from that of agricultural production, but it is not true from 
the point of view of nature. For nature the fruit is also seed, the beginning of the 
species, and therefore not the end point of the process. That is why in the Physics 
(193b 13) Aristotle, who has always an admirable precision, states that nature odos 
estin eis physin, it is a way towards nature673. 
This, Gadamer remarks later, makes the term Vorhandenheit adequate to 
describe how modern science views things as none other than the objects 
“measured, mathematically constructed and therefore the object of dominion”. 
“But in Aristotle the concept of nature is much more specific, because it is always 
thought within a tension between artificial and natural beings”674. Artificial beings, 
and even natural beings as placed in an artificial―i.e. cultural―context (e.g. the fruit 
in agriculture), can be seen from a certain point of view as independent from the 
being of nature and of man. As Heidegger puts it, “the shoe is the telos in the sense 
that when it has been completed it has its own existence in the world «alongside» 
(para) the being of the shoemaker”675. Nevertheless, we said, the being of the shoe, 
however other it is from the being of Dasein, is framed and encountered within the 
teleological span of praxis as much in its conception as in its production and in its 
finished existence alongside (para) the being of the shoemaker. This phenomenon is 
clearly viewed by Heidegger as soon as 1919, in his analyses of the surrounding 
                                               
673 Ibidem p. 83 (our e). Cf. also p. 107: “The movement of nature (…) is a circular movement. This 
concept of circularity of movement is crucial to the aristotelian solution of the problem represented by 
the relation between being and movement. In fact, a circular movement has always arrived to a final 
point, in the sense that it always has an accomplishment of its own, but it is never at the final point”. 
674 Ibidem pp. 99-100. 
675 GA 18 § 12 p. 91 [63] “Der Schuh ist das telos in dem Sinne, daß er, wenn es fertig ist, »neben« (para) 
dem Sein des Schuhmachers”. 
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world676, which are widely taken up in the Natorp Bericht, and later in Sein und Zeit, in 
explicit reference to what the Greeks called praxis677: 
The dealings geared to useful things, which only here can show themselves genuinely 
in their being, e.g. hammering with the hammer, neither grasp these beings 
thematically as occurring things nor do they even know of using or the structure of 
useful things as such. Hammering does not just have a knowledge of the useful 
character of the hammer; rather, it has appropriated this useful thing in the most 
adequate way possible. When we take care of things, we are subordinate to the in-order-
to (Um-zu) constitutive for the actual useful thing in our dealings with it678. 
In other words: analogously to how the fruit seen from within physis is not 
something vorhanden, the being of a tool or any other artificial object, when we see 
reality from within praxis, does not primarily stand as something para, vorhanden. 
From the point of view of praxis, it is grasped as useful to the telos that I have, e.g. 
to hammer a nail into a piece of wood. From that of physis, in turn, the tool is part 
of an encompassing kinēsis679: only because of its being set apart in a workshop, 
this movement may be slowed down for the hammer. But certain conditions of 
extreme humidity, for example, may transform the iron and the wood into rust 
and organic waste. Aristotle expresses this latter point very clearly: 
A bed and a coat and anything else of that sort, qua receiving these designations―i.e. 
in so far as they are products of art (technē)―have no innate impulse to change. But in 
so far as they happen to be composed of stone or of earth or of a mixture of the two, 
they do have such an impulse, and just to that extent―which seems to indicate that 
                                               
676 Cf. KNS §§ 14 ff in GA 56/57. 
677 Cf. SZ § 15 p. 68 (mod. tr): “The Greeks had an appropriate term for «things»: pragmata, that is, that 
with which one has to do in taking care of things in dealings (praxis)” (“Die Griechen hatten einen 
angemessenen Terminus für die »Dinge«: pragmata, d. i. das, womit man es im besorgenden Umgang 
(praxis) zu tun hat”). Cf. also NB p. 352/6 [115]; GA 19 § 7b p. 41 [29]. 
678 SZ § 15 p. 69 (our e, mod. tr.) “Der je auf das Zeug zugeschnittene Umgang, darin es sich einzig 
genuin in seinem Sein zeigen kann, z. B. das Hämmern mit dem Hammer, erfaßt weder dieses Seiende 
thematisch als vorkommendes Ding, noch weiß etwa gar das Gebrauchen um die Zeugstruktur als 
solche. Das Hämmern hat nicht lediglich noch ein Wissen um den Zeugcharakter des Hammers, 
sondern es hat sich dieses Zeug so zugeeignet, wie es angemessener nicht möglich ist. In solchem 
gebrauchenden Umgang unterstellt sich das Besorgen dem für das jeweilige Zeug konstitutiven Um-
zu”. 
679 Cf. Physics II 1, 192b 19ff. 
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nature is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it 
belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not accidentally680.  
The bed and the coat, qua called and conceived from within praxis681, the 
practical concern of a zōon logon echon, belong to this sphere: they are, as it were, a 
longamanus of praxis, an extension of the ‘hand’ (manus) of praxis, not something 
standing apart from it, not something at hand (vorhanden). However, as conceived 
from praxis, as well as from technē, they are independent from nature, i.e. they do 
not have an inner impulse to change. But if we plant a bed in the garden, then the 
natural being of the bed―which is always already there―comes to the fore: wood 
comes up from the bed, not another bed682, because the telos internal to the nature 
of wood leads it, under the appropriate circumstances, to generate more wood, not 
to generate more beds. This, Aristotle argues, shows that “the arrangement in 
accordance with the rules of art is merely an accidental attribute, whereas the 
substance is the other, which, further, persists continuously through the 
process”683. 
The embeddedness of the tool (das Zeug) and the production within praxis 
reflects this same structure, which can be found in the phenomenological 
approaches of Heidegger in 1919, 1922 and 1927. The Um-zu684 cannot help 
expressing an aim “that persists continuously through the process”: praxis. Why 
then should Heidegger be so concerned in 1924 about displacing the idea of aim 
from telos? Apparently due to the fact that, if Aristotle ultimately understands being 
as Fertigkeit, then entelecheia, his key term to understand being, cannot be pointing 
                                               
680 Physics II 1, 192b 16ff. 
681 From within praxis in general (e.g. using the bed to sleep and the coat to keep oneself warm), or also 
from within the specific practical context of poiēsis (producing a bed or a coat). 
682 Cf. Physics II 1, 193a 12ff: “Antiphon points out that if you planted a bed and the rotting wood 
acquired the power of sending up a shoot, it would not be a bed that would come up, but wood”. 
683 Physics II 1, 193a 14ff. 
684 Cf. SZ § 15 p. 69. 
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to the same phenomena that are envisioned in physis or in praxis. However, could 
entelecheia actually be pointing to those same phenomena?  
If this hypothesis is pursued, a phenomenological-ontological rapproche-
ment between praxis and physis necessarily results. Poiēsis, in turn, appears as situ-
ated halfway between them, and this not by chance. It is because there is a being 
whose being consists of praxis that there can be such a process as poiēsis, which 
otherwise requires physis to be unfolded: no hammer without a zōon logon echon 
praktikon685, who may conceive a hammer, produce it, and then be concerned 
about hammering; but no hammer either without the iron and wood provided by 
the alterity or Vorhandenheit with which hyle presents itself to this zōon, who is 
about to ‘extract’ these elements from the movement of nature. 
This double dependence of poiēsis enables the disclosure, by contrast, of 
the specific way of being of physis and of praxis: “[we] start from what is more 
intelligible to oneself and make what is intelligible by nature intelligible to one-
self”686. The ‘visibility’ of poiēsis, due to the narrow conception of being that it can 
provide per se with its her-stellen, its bringing forth something that stands for itself 
and is there (da) as available687, enables us to grasp the wider conception of being 
at stake in physis and praxis, which may eventually prove to encompass and ground 
the Vorhandenheit revealed by poiēsis. Physis and praxis are not like poiēsis, because 
they do not generate reality from the outside and, as a result, what they generate 
has the same being as them. Physis does not generate physis like a craftsman makes 
a pot out of clay: wood is made by wood itself out of wood, and this because of 
an internal direction or aim to do so. Praxis, for its part, does not generate praxis 
as a product that remains ready to hand: if one acts well, one’s praxis, i.e. one’s 
                                               
685 Cf. NE I 7, 1098a 3f. 
686 Met. VII 3, 1029b 7ff. 
687 Cf. GA 24 § 11b p. 152 [108] (note 480 above) and p. 153 [109], where “disposability (Verfügbarkeit) 
is considered a synomym of “at-handness (Vorhandenheit). Cf. also GA 18 p. 346. 
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being, is changed for the better (or conversely, if one acts wrongly), but this 
change itself has no other external output than one’s own being.  
Still, the domain of praxis is more complex than that of physis, so that this 
latter point requires two specifications. (i) Surely, the social dimension of man 
implies a certain otherness in praxis―it widens the output of praxis to other human 
beings, and it is in this respect that such a thing as education is possible and 
necessary. But the perspective of a sort of intersubjective praxis encompassing the 
praxis of each citizen does not in the least diminish its autotelic and ultimately 
untransferable structure―instead, it provides the missing link for this structure688. 
(ii) Moreover, most of our actions surely have an external output: acting well may 
mean, for instance, preparing a hot drink for someone. The drink stays there, 
vorhanden, but it is the result of the poiēsis generated by one’s praxis, not of the 
praxis itself. If praxis ‘produces’ anything, it is nothing but praxis that it ‘produces’: 
“not as the art of medicine produces health, (…) but as health produces health” 
(VI 12, 1144a 3f).  
Yet we might wonder whether it would make any sense to say that poiēsis 
makes poiēsis, analogically to how praxis makes praxis and physis makes physis. 
Actually, in a way it does, while in another way it does not. It is through poiēsis that 
the empeirikos and technitēs are generated, and in this sense poiēsis is autotelic: a part 
of what poiēsis generates with its exercise remains in the poiētēs. However, intrinsic 
to the structure of poiēsis is a way of causing that necessarily produces also 
something external to it, and in this sense there is a telos that it cannot grasp per se. 
This twofoldness of poiēsis―hinted at above from the point of view of its relation 
to theōria and praxis―reinforces its ontological-phenomenological situation 
between praxis and physis. Phenomenological, because it is through the visibility of the 
processes of poiēsis that we come to determine the specificity of the ‘invisible’ 
                                               
688 Cf. paragraph 1.6 above. 
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processes of praxis and physis689. Ontological, because it is starting from the contrast 
between two different phenomenological experiences―“at the same time we are 
living and have lived” vs. “we are being cured and have been cured”―that 
Aristotle gets to the ontological categories of kinēsis and energeia. It is through the 
contrast with the poiēsis of curing (which does not produce health as health itself 
does) that the praxis of living is understood in its specificity as energeia. Moreover, 
the fact that kinēsis is said in the Physics to be an energeia atelēs, and a principle within 
all things constituted by nature690, brings physis into the vicinity of praxis and its 
ontological characterization in 1048b691. 
6.3. Heidegger’s Other Approach to Telos in 1939 
Is however this ontological vicinity between praxis and physis foreign to Heidegger? 
We do not believe it is, for the following reasons: on the one hand, we are joining 
him in pointing to praxis as an ontological domain that escapes a Fertigsein para-
digm (this is the inner core of the 1922-24 approach to the NE); on the other, 
Heidegger does find these possibilities in physis in his 1939 essay692, where phronēsis 
and praxis however are not central anymore. Yet, in that essay, for all the disclo-
                                               
689 The point is actually made by Heidegger, in relation to praxis and poiēsis, in GA 18 § 10a p. 68 [48]: 
“technē, the «knowing-one’s-way-around the concern at the moment», is that mode of being-in-the-
world in which the agathon becomes explicitly visible. Technē makes the telos explicitly visible” (“Die technē 
nun, das »Sichauskennen im jeweiligen Besorgen«, ist diejenige Weise des Seins-in-der-Welt, in der 
ausdrücklich sichtbar wird das agathon. Die technē macht ausdrücklich sichtbar das telos”). In his 
comment of Aristotle’s definition of kinēsis in book III, a definition which uses solely the example of 
building (Cf. Physics III 1, 201a 16, 201b 8f), Brague makes a similar point, this time in relation to physis 
and poiēsis: “What could be here at stake is nothing other than a simple pedagogical priority of art over nature 
(...). Production is chosen as privileged example because it is the movement that better serves the 
proposed definition: in it, the telos is clearly visible (...). Production even lets the telos stand out more 
sharply than natural generation, which Aristotle considers however as the model that is imitated by art” 
(AQM p. 507, our e). 
690 Cf. Physics II 1, 192b 9ff: “By nature (physei) the animals and their parts exist, and the plants and the 
simple bodies (earth, fire, air, water)―for we say that these and the like exist by nature. All the things 
mentioned plainly differ from things which are not constituted by nature. For each of them has within 
itself a principle of motion (kinēsis) and of stationariness”. Cf. also VIII 6, 259b 1ff. 
691 This vicinity is otherwise implied by Aristotle: cf. e.g. NE II 6, 1106b 14f; VI 4, 1140a 14-17 and VI 
12, 1144a 3f; Met. IX 8, 1050a 16-19. 
692 Cfr. WBP in GA 9 esp. pp. 341-343 [207-209]. 
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sive force that Heidegger finds in Aristotle’s analysis of physis, he still contends―as 
he seems to have maintained to his last days693―that Aristotle “does not formally 
reject” the basic understanding of being as Vorhandenheit694. What is essential, 
though, is not so much whether this judgment is accurate, but whether what 
Heidegger finds in physis in 1939 is not extremely close to what he finds in praxis in 
the 1920s. In this respect, it is remarkable that the longest analysis of 1048b after 
1922 is to be found precisely in this essay695. Praxis is not mentioned at all here, 
but the passage is definitely viewed as relevant to the task of widening the sense of 
being, in an approach that in some respects parallels Heidegger’s interpretation of 
energeia in the 1922 summer course, although now it seems to welcome this 
concept as suitable to grasp the being of finite beings696. 
Heidegger brings the passage up in order to distinguish between moved-
ness (Bewegtheit) and movement (Bewegung). The practical import is not commented 
upon, but it is inevitably implicit for us. Heidegger quotes Aristotle: 
hora hama kai heōrake «Someone sees, and in seeing he or she has also at the same time 
(precisely) already seen». Such seeing is the telos, the end where the movement of 
seeing first gathers itself up and essentially is movedness. (‘End’ is not the result of 
stopping the movement, but is the beginning of movedness as the ingathering and 
storing up of movement)697.  
This approach is remarkably far from the assimilation of telos to peras im-
plicit in the Natorp Bericht698 and so thoroughly emphasized in GA 18: telos is not 
                                               
693 Cf. Seminar in Zähringen (1973) in GA 15 pp. 378-379 [68].  
694 Cf. WBP in GA 9 pp. 342 ff [208 ff]. 
695 Cf. Ibidem pp. 354-357 [216-219]. Met. IX 6 and 8 are analyzed. 
696 Cf. pp. 121 ff. above, and GA 62 § 11f, esp. p. 106. 
697 WBP in GA 9 p. 354 [217] “hora hama kai heōrake »einer sieht und sehend hat er (eben) zumal auch 
schon gesehen« (…) Solches Sehen ist das telos, das Ende, worin sich die Bewegung des Ausblickens 
erst auffängt und wesentlich Bewegtheit ist. (»Ende« nicht Folge des Aufhörens der Bewegung, sondern 
Anfang der Bewegtheit als auffangendes Aufbehalten der Bewegung)”. Cf. Met. IX 6, 1048b 23. 
698 Cf. e.g. NB p. 385/38 [136]; GADAMER, H.-G. 1989 p. 233. 
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anymore the end of being-possibilities (Seinsmöglichkeiten)699, but instead the source 
of being-possibilities itself. For a being there can be such a thing as movement 
only insofar as there is a telos in it. Aristotle himself implies this in considering telos 
as one of the concepts to which we apply the term peras: “[the] end (telos) is that to 
which motion (kinēsis) and action (praxis) proceed, and not the end from which. 
But sometimes (hote de) it is both the end from which and the end to which, i.e. 
that for the sake of which”700. With the hote, as often in the Metaphysics701, Aristotle 
is meaning that from a certain point of view, i.e. that in which telos means something 
else than just peras, telos is also the archē of movement: not in the sense in which the 
finished shoe is telos―because the finished shoe does not exist neither at the be-
ginning nor during the distension of the productive movement that will bring it 
forth―but in the sense in which the eidos of the shoe makes possible as much the 
beginning of the productive movement as its distension, and also in the sense in 
which the project of using it is that for the sake of which the shoemaker gets 
down to produce it. Thus we come across the two levels of telē that are at stake in 
every movement. (i) Telos as peras of the movement, i.e. that telos which the move-
ment as such never attains, because when it is attained the movement is not there 
any longer―and hence it is defined as energeia atelēs702. And (ii), telos as archē of the 
movement, not only at its beginning but throughout all its distension, i.e. that telos 
which is had at every stage by the movement, as what makes it possible―and 
hence movement is also defined as entelecheia703, which does not compromise its 
continuity but instead makes it possible. This second sense, as a result, encom-
                                               
699 Cf. GA 18 § 11b p. 85 [59]: “A beyond-which-nothing (...) in the sense that, for a being, there is no 
further being-possibility beyond the telos (…), a being has come to its end with respect to its being-possibilities” 
(“Ein Worüber-hinaus-nichts (...) in dem Sinne, daß es über das telos hinaus keine weitere 
Seinsmöglichkeit für ein Seiendes gibt, daß ein Seiendes hinsichtlich seiner Seinsmöglichkeiten zu seinem Ende 
gekommen ist”).  
700 Met. V 17, 1022a 7f (Tredennick, mod. tr). 
701 Cf. e.g. Met. III 4, 1001b 22; V 6 1016a 28; V 12, 1019b 5. 
702 Cf. Physics III 2, 201b 31f; Cf. also De Anima III 7, 431a 6f: “tou atelous energeia”.  
703 Physics III 1, 201a 10f. 
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passes both the process and the finished product, i.e. the more restricted sense of 
telos. 
In his approach to 1048b in the 1939 essay Heidegger is referring to this 
second wider sense, which is ontologically more fundamental: that in which telos 
and archē are one and the same. The domain of worldly things is now read from an 
ontological structure that in 1924 was restricted to the domain of Dasein and, spe-
cifically, to phronēsis, the disposition that discloses its being704.  
The movement of a moving being gathers itself into its end, telos, and as so gathered 
within its end, «has» itself: en telei echei, entelecheia, having-itself-in-its-end. Instead of 
the word entelecheia, which he himself coined, Aristotle also uses the word energeia. 
Here, in place of telos, there stands ergon, the «work» in the sense of what is to be 
produced and what has been pro-duced (im Sinne des Herzustellenden und Her-gestellten). 
In Greek thought energeia means «standing in the work», where «work» means that 
which stands fully in its «end». But in turn the «fully ended or fulfilled» (das Vollendete) 
does not mean «the concluded», any more than telos means «conclusion»705. 
Heidegger here considers entelecheia and energeia as equivalent terms, as 
Aristotle himself does, not only in his usage of both terms to define kinēsis in the 
Physics but also in the two passages of Metaphysics IX mentioned above in section 
I706, which we can now recall. Firstly, in IX 3: “the word energeia, which we 
connect with fulfillment (entelecheia), has, strictly speaking been extended from 
movements to other things”707. Equivalence, though, does not mean identity 
―otherwise Aristotle would not have found it necessary to coin entelecheia. The 
                                               
704 “In phronēsis, the praxis ist archē and telos” (“Die praxis is in der phronēsis archē und telos”) GA 19 § 20a 
p. 139 [96]. 
705 WBP in GA 9 p. 354 [217] “Die Bewegtheit einer Bewegung besteht somit zuhöchst darin, daß die 
Bewegung des Bewegten sich in ihrem Ende, telos, auffängt und als so aufgefangene im Ende sich 
»hat«: en telei echei: entelecheia, das Sich-im-Ende-Haben. Statt des von ihm selbst geprägten Wortes 
entelecheia gebraucht Aristoteles auch das Wort energeia. Hier steht für telos ergon, das Werk im Sinne des 
Herzustellenden und Her-gestellten. Energeia besagt griechisch gedacht: Im-Werk-stehen; das Werk als 
das, was voll im »Ende« steht; aber das »Vollendete« ist wieder nicht gemeint als das »Abgeschlossene«, 
sowenig wie telos den Schluß bedeutet”. 
706 Cf. pp. 50 ff. 
707 Met. IX 3, 1047a 30f. 
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term energeia, as Aristotle puts it in IX 8, points to entelecheia708: what is meant when 
we say energeia implies what is meant when we say entelecheia. Energeia, Aristotle 
states in his only direct definition of this concept, “is the being of the thing 
(hyparchein to pragma), not in the way which we express by ‘potentially’”709. But what 
is this way of existing which is not ‘potentially’? The answer was provided in IX 3: 
to be in fulfillment (entellecheia einai), as Ross translates710, or also ‘to be fulfillment’: 
It is agreed that actuality is properly motion. Hence people do not invest non-
existent things with motion, although they do invest them with certain other 
predicates. E.g., they say that non-being things (ta mē onta) are conceivable and 
desirable, but not that they are in motion. This is because, although these things are 
not actually (ouk onta energeia), they will be actually (esontai energeia). For some non-being 
things are potentially (dynamei estin), yet they are not (ouk esti de), because they are not 
(in) fulfillment (ouk entelecheia estin)711. 
Insofar as something actually is (energeia estin)―and kinēsis is the privileged 
phenomenon by which everyone gets to know that712―it is also necessarily in 
fulfillment (entelecheia estin). This does not mean that its being possibilities are 
exhausted, but simply that it is―and, “as it is, being itself (to on auto) does not come 
to be nor cease to be (ou gignetai oude phtheiretai); for if it did it would have to come 
out of something (ek tinos gar an egigneto)”713. Being itself, the being of a movement as 
much as the being of a stone, is immediately, it does not take time to be: it has its 
telos, i.e. it has its being, and it has it inside: en telos echein. It is teleion, i.e. no part of 
                                               
708 Met. IX 8, 1050a 22f: “the word (tounoma) energeia is derived from ‘activity’ (ergon), and points to the 
fulfillment (entelecheia)”. 
709 Met. IX 6, 1048a 30ff (mod. tr). 
710 Tredennick: “to exist in complete reality”. 
711 Met. IX 3, 1047 a32 ff. Tredennick, mod. tr: we have replaced the usage of the verb ‘to exist’ (cf. 
also in Ross) for ‘to be’, which seems to us more suitable, because the former risks suggesting a 
modern reading which does not fit Aristotle’s mind, as Heidegger himself has noted (“Die Metaphysik 
als Geschichte des Seins” [1941] in GA 6.2. Nietzsche II Ed. by Brigitte Schillbach 1997, pp. 363-416, cf. 
pp. 375 ff). Moreover, only thus is the complementary translation ‘to be fulfillment’ feasible, taking 
entelecheia for a nominative. 
712 Cf. Met. IX 3, 1047a 31. 
713 Met. IX 10, 1051b 29f. 
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its being is to be found out of it―whatever its being here and now is, is there in its 
being: 
Matter is potentially (hylē esti dynamei), because it may attain to the form (eidos); but 
when it exists actually (hotan de ge energeia ē), it is then in the form (en tō eidei). The same 
applies in all other cases, including those where the end is motion (kai hōn kinēsis to 
telos)714.  
The latter remark is especially relevant, because Aristotle implies that he is 
not applying this consistency or thickness of being only to material objects but also 
to ‘moving’ beings, i.e. those that have praxis or physis as their way of being: “as 
teachers think they have achieved their telos when they have exhibited the pupil at 
work (energounta), so also does nature (kai hē physis homoiōs) (…). For the ergon is the 
end (telos), and the energeia is the ergon”715.  
Aristotle explicitly brings together here the respective ways of being of physis 
and praxis as we have seen him do elsewhere. Both display the way of being that is 
characterized by the terms energeia and entelecheia, in which the archē immediately 
reaches the telos: insofar as praxis and physis start to be, they are fully there as such. 
This applies also for the exercise of poiēsis716, though not for its ergon on the way: what 
makes physis and praxis distinct from it is the ‘overlapping’ of ergon and enactment 
expressed in the concise statement that “the ergon is the end (telos), and the energeia is 
the ergon”. Ergon is difficult to translate here: Tredennick and Ross suggest render-
ing it as ‘action’, which is suitable for praxis, but not so much for physis. ‘Work’, in 
the sense of a finished product, should be discarded, because of the deeper 
ontological level at which telos is dealt with here. Indeed, in 1930 Heidegger does 
understand it as ‘finished work’, and thus reads the sentence as though Aristotle 
were narrowing the sense of energeia to that of a finished ergon, thus understanding 
                                               
714 Met. IX 8, 1050a 15ff. (Tredennick). 
715 Met. IX 8, 1050a 17ff. 
716 Cf. NE I 1, 1094a 4; IX 7, 1168a 6f. 
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it in terms of Fertigkeit717. This specific passage is not translated by Heidegger in 
1939, but he states that “energeia means «standing in the work», where «work» 
means that which stands fully in its «end». In turn, the «fully ended or fulfilled» 
(das Vollendete) does not mean «the concluded», any more than telos means «conclu-
sion»”718. 
If the fundamental sense of telos is not that of conclusion―if it is primarily 
what fosters the conclusion, not the conclusion itself, and therefore we only call it 
the conclusion, peras, in a derivative fashion―then instead of energeia being read as 
a finished ergon, it is the sense of ergon that is encompassed by energeia, as is the case 
in NE I with respect to man: “the ergon of man is an energeia of soul in accordance 
with, or not without logos” (I 7, 1098a 7f)719. Ergon is here understood not from the 
perspective of a finished product that is inserted from the outside in praxis, but as 
praxis itself720. Kai hē physis homoiōs721: and the same applies to nature, as Heidegger 
reckons in 1939 by referring to physis (yet without mentioning praxis) as the 
fundamental concept to grasp being. That ergon is encompassed by energeia, that its 
being is possible because of energeia, implies that a stone is in the mode of energeia as 
is an athlete in the midst of a race722. And because both belong to physis, they are 
specifically as energeia atelēs: kinēsis is their way of being, regardless of what they do 
(e.g. run or just stand, for the athlete), or of what happens to them (e.g. fall or just 
lie there, for the stone). That is, the fact that the athlete is running is only a kinēsis, 
                                               
717 Cf. GA 31 § 8 p. 69. One year later, Heidegger accepts a wider sense for energeia, although he keeps 
considering ergon in the narrow sense of a finished product (cf. GA 33 § 20b p. 204 [175]). 
718 Cf. WBP in GA 9 p. 354 [217]. 
719 Cf. also NE VI 12, 1144a 6f. 
720 Cf., for the usage of ergon as product, opposed to praxis, NE I 1, 1094a 5f. 
721 Cf. Met. IX 8, 1050a 19. 
722 Hylē is (as) energeia (Cf. Met. IX 8, 1050a 15f). Cf. also MARX, W. 1971 p. 142, POLO, L. 1997 p. 
117. 
 200 
a Vor-gang deployed within the kinēsis (energeia atelēs) that is the fundamental 
constitution of her being, as it is of the stone723. 
6.4. Aretē cannot be teleion? 
The approach to telos that we encounter in the 1939 essay, and which leads 
Heidegger to consider energeia and entelecheia as equivalent, is by no means the 
perspective that governed his reading of Aristotelian ontology fifteen years before, 
in GA 18. But the potentialities that the later Heidegger finds in these concepts 
are very close to the nerve of his early interpretation of Aristotelian practical 
philosophy: Heidegger is precisely intending to grasp life, praxis in its inner 
movedness, as it is immediately experienced, and this is what leads him to discard 
a part of Aristotle’s ontological repertory as inadequate to understand this 
phenomenon. § 17 of this course, revolving on the concept hexis, shows at its best 
the inner conflict that Heidegger believes to find in Aristotle: “it is a mistake to 
conceive of aretē as completedness (Fertigkeit), as this contradicts the sense of 
aretē”724. Indeed, from the understanding of teleion as ‘completed’ which operates in 
GA 18, it does not seem  to make any sense to apply the term teleion to praxis, as 
Aristotle does725.  
However, we have argued that, in view of Heidegger’s later reading of 
Metaphysics IX 6―which is closer to ours―it makes a lot of sense to apply terms 
such as telos, teleion and entelecheia to praxis, precisely because these concepts point 
beyond the idea of Fertigkeit. However, the fact that Heidegger in 1924 sees these 
concepts stemming from the Metaphysics as caught up in this narrow understanding 
                                               
723 Energeia is “a concept of being which is wide enough to encompass the being of the moving object” 
AQM p. 503. 
724 GA 18 § 17c p. 188 [127] “[Es ist verfehlt], wenn man die aretē als Fertigkeit fassen würde ― das 
widerspricht dem Sinn der aretē”. Cf. also NB 386/39 [137]. 
725 Cf. e.g. NE I 13, 1102a 5f: “Happiness is an activity of the soul in accordance with fulfilled 
excellence (psychēs energeia tis kat aretēn teleian)”. 
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of being forces him to develop a strongly ontological analysis of praxis where he 
finds, to a large extent, what at that moment telos does not seem to offer. For the 
rest of this chapter we shall proceed by first briefly showing how Heidegger’s 
reading of teleion in GA 18 § 11 leads to a specific interpretation of energeia and 
entelecheia at the end of the course (§§ 25-28)726, in order to contrast it with his 
analysis of aretē in § 17. With this interpretation of aretē, in turn, we shall be driven 
back, in chapter 7, to the core of the phenomenological analysis of phronēsis in GA 
19 § 8, and analyze Heidegger’s claim that phronēsis is always new (immer neues). 
The approach to energeia and entelecheia at the end of GA 18 is framed by an 
investigation of kinēsis as what “constitutes the genuine there-character of being (Da-
Charakter des Seins)”727, i.e. the way in which being shows itself to us. Ontically or 
phenomenologically, therefore, being is kinēsis, but Heidegger advances that this 
might be also the case at an ontological level: “presumably the being-character 
(Seinscharakter) of kinēsis will also have to be interpreted on the basis of this basic 
sense of being”728. A point that Heidegger holds firm with Aristotle is that “kinēsis 
is not something para ta pragmata, not something alongside beings that are there of 
the world, of nature. This ‘not para’ means, in a positive sense: kinēsis is a mode of 
the being of beings that are themselves there”729. This and other points being 
                                               
726 Two diametrically opposed analyses of these paragraphs of GA 18 can be found in SOMMER, C. 
2005 pp. 81-100 and GONZALEZ, F. J. 2006b.  
727 GA 18 § 25 p. 287 [194] “die kinēsis den eigentlichen Da-Charakter des Seins ausmacht”. 
728 GA 18 § 25 p. 287 [195] “vermutlich wird auch der Seinscharackter der Bewegung aus diesem 
Grundsinn von Sein selbst her interpretiert werden müssen”. 
729 GA 18 § 26 p. 288 [195] “Die kinēsis [ist] nicht etwas para ta pragmata, nicht etwas »neben dem 
Daseienden« der Welt, der Natur. Dieses ›nicht para‹ besagt positiv: Die kinēsis ist eine Weise des Seins 
des Daseienden selbst”. Cf. also § 26e p. 307 [208] and p. 379 [257]. Cf. Physics III 1, 200b 32f: “there is 
not such a thing as kinēsis over and above the things (para ta pragmata). It is always with respect to 
substance or to quantity or to quality or to place that what changes changes (…). [M]otion and change 
[do not] have reference to something over and above the things mentioned; for there is nothing over 
and above them”. 
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assured, he proceeds to analyze the concepts of energeia, entelecheia and dynamis, 
from which kinēsis is to be understood730. 
While in 1939 Heidegger considers energeia and entelecheia as equivalent 
terms to express being731, in GA 18 he sets these terms in an unusual relation, on 
the basis of the above mentioned passages of Metaphysics IX where Aristotle relates 
them to one another732. In both of them, Aristotle is speaking about “the name 
(tounoma) energeia” as related to entelecheia, i.e. as a synonym of it. Surely, Aristotle 
himself would not hold the logical link if it were not grounded on an ontological 
one. What is odd, however, is the fact that Heidegger slips in a remarkably 
unphenomenological fashion from the logical to the ontological: the verbs that 
Aristotle uses to express the relation between the terms are considered to mean, instead, a 
relation between the ways of being supposedly described by each term. In 1050a 23, 
Aristotle uses the verb synteinein, i.e. to direct or tend towards something: energeia 
“synteinei pros tēn entelecheian, «stretches itself out to the end» (spannt sich aus zum 
Ende)”733. As for the verb used in 1047a 30, syntithemenē (to be put together)734, 
Heidegger suggests, probably after Diels735, to replace it by synteinomenē, i.e. the 
middle voice of synteinein, so that the idea of directedness of energeia towards 
entelecheia is reinforced736. Nonetheless, it remains that in both passages Aristotle is 
speaking of the word energeia, so that the directedness, the “stretching towards” is 
referred to the sense of the word, not to the way of being that is defined by energeia. 
                                               
730 Cf. GA 18 § 26d ff. Cf. also NB p. 396/48 [143] 
731 Cf. WBP in GA 9 p. 354 [217]. 
732 Cf. Met. IX 3, 1047a 30f. and IX 8, 1050a 22f. 
733 GA 18 § 26d p. 296 [200] “synteinei pros tēn entelecheian, »spannt sich aus zum Ende«”. 
734 Cf. LSJ, headwords synteinō and syntithēmi. 
735 GA 18 § 26d p. 296 [200] Heidegger does not refer this explicitly to Diels, but he quotes this author 
shortly afterwards. Cf. DIELS, H. “Etymologica” Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung 47 (1916) pp. 
193-210 (p. 201, note 1 for ref.), on the etymology of entelecheia. 
736 For a detailed discussion of this move, cf. GONZALEZ, F. J. 2006b pp. 541-542. 
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The fact that the verbs used by Aristotle are in the first place determining a 
logical relation, as Heidegger admits in 1931737, is not trivial, and neither is 
Heidegger’s directly ontological reading of their articulation, since his entire 
interpretation of energeia and entelecheia in these paragraphs of GA 18 takes its lead 
from this peculiar application of synteinein. This, in turn, is consistent with the 
interpretation of teleion in § 11, rooted in the thesis that Aristotle’s ontology, of 
which entelecheia is the key term, is led by the prevailing motive of presence and 
completedness. The interpretation is surely consistent with the rest of GA 18, but 
this is one of those points were Heidegger perhaps privileges too much the letter 
of the text (or, more specifically, the letter that he believes to see in the text) and 
subjugates his phenomenological analyses to the fundamental direction of his own 
interpretation. If, as Heidegger sees it, energeia ‘stretches itself out’ to entelecheia, then 
these terms do not define different aspects of the sense of being, but different ways of being: while 
entelecheia means “«presence, being-present of a being as end» in the sense of the 
final point that is completed, that has itself in its «end» (…); that which maintains 
itself in its being-completed, what is there in the genuine sense”738, energeia means  
a character of being-there, but such that it is not there in its completedness; energeia: the 
being-character of being-grasped in becoming-completed. In producing, having-been- 
produced is a determinate mode of being-there―only when one sees that, is it 
possible to see what movement is: the being-there of a being that is in its becoming-
completed, but is not completed yet. Energeia is kinēsis, but not entelecheia”739. 
                                               
737 At the end of his course on Metaphysics IX 1-3, Heidegger translates 1047a 30 ff. in a manner that 
renders more accurately the meaning of the text: “the name and meaning of energeia―being at work, [is] a 
meaning which in itself is directed toward entelecheia (…)” GA 33 § 22 p. 224 [192] (our e.). Otherwise, 
these passages will not be the object of a direct translation in 1939. 
738 GA 18 § 26d  p. 296 [200] “Entelecheia: »Gegenwart, Gegenwärtigsein eines Seienden als Ende« im 
Sinne des letzten Punktes, das fertig ist, das sich in sich selbst in seinem »Ende« hat (…); was sich in 
seinem Fertigsein hält, was im eigentlichen Sinne da ist”. Cf. also pp. 367-370 [248-250].  
739 GA 18 § 26d p. 296 [200-201] “ein Charakter des Daseins, aber so, daß nicht in seinem Fertigsein da ist; 
energeia: der Seinscharakter des im Fertigwerden Begriffenseins. Im Herstellen Hergestelltwordensein ist eine 
bestimmte Weise des Daseins ― nur wenn man das sieht, ist es möglich zu sehen, was Bewegung ist: 
das Dasein eines Seienden, das ist in seinem Fertigwerden, aber noch nicht fertig ist. Energeia ist die 
kinēsis, aber nicht entelecheia”. Cf. also GA 18 pp. 378-382 [255-258]. 
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This alignment of energeia and kinēsis, a binomial which in turn is opposed 
to entelecheia, is problematical from the point of view of Aristotle’s text, since it 
cannot take seriously Aristotle’s indistinct use of energeia and entelecheia to define 
movement740. Thus, before Aristotle’s repeated reference to kinēsis as fulfillment 
(entelecheia)741, Heidegger can only remark that “insofar as being ultimately means 
being-in-its-end, maintaining-itself-in-its-end in a conclusive sense, entelecheia, 
Aristotle must, if he is to speak cautiously, designate the being-there of beings-in-
movement as energeia”742. Surely, one must feel free to question Aristotle’s 
handling of his own concepts; however, the question is raised as to whether 
Heidegger’s understanding of these terms here, deeply influenced as it is by an 
understanding of telos743 that he will qualify in the 30s, provides a better account of 
the phenomenon of being. Our preceeding analyses give us reasons to find both 
Aristotle and the later Heidegger more compelling than Heidegger in GA 18. Still, 
it is actually the peculiar understanding of energeia and entelecheia developed in this 
course that leads Heidegger, already from the Natorp Bericht, to look in Aristotle’s 
practical philosophy for alternative ontological categories. 
Despite its contradistinction to entelecheia, energeia is still for Heidegger “a 
how of the there of entelecheia”, namely “being-there as being-uncompleted”744, being 
on the way to telos. In other words, energeia is also encompassed by the archontic 
idea of being as Fertigkeit. This explains why if at the end of GA 18 it is still 
translated as “being-in-work (In-Arbeit-Sein)”, it is only from the perspective of 
                                               
740 On kinēsis as energeia, cf. Physics III 2, 201b 31f; cf. also 202a 2. 
741 Physics III 1, 201a 10f: “the fulfillment (entelecheia) of what is potentially, as such”. Cf. also III 3, 202b 
25ff: “alteration is the fulfillment (entelecheia) of the alterable as alterable (or, more scientifically, the 
fulfillment of what can act and can be acted on, as such)”. 
742 GA 18 § 27d p. 321 [217, our e.] “Sofern Sein letzlich heißt In-seinem-Ende-Sein, Sich-in-seinem-
Ende-Halten in einem endgültigen Sinne, entelecheia, muß Aristoteles, wenn er vorsichtig spricht, das 
Dasein des Seienden-in-Bewegung als energeia bezeichnen”. 
743 “Telos: «end», not the final addition but how of the there of a being that is from production” (“Telos: 
»Ende«, nicht der letzte Zusatz, sondern Wie des Da eines Seienden, das ist aus Herstellung”) (GA 18 
p. 368 [249]).  
744 GA 18 p. 381 [257] “Energeia gerade Dasein als Unfertigsein, ein Wie des Da von entelecheia”. 
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what is “being-produced (Hergestelltsein)”745. Some months later, in GA 19, energeia 
is hardly distinguishable from the sense of entelecheia developed during the summer 
course: “energeia means nothing else than presence, pure immediate presence at 
hand”746.  
Yet in the first lessons of GA 18 Heidegger does not seem to disapprove 
of Aristotle’s usage of energeia to describe the being of Dasein, “a being for whom, 
in its being as such, this very being is a question, a being that is concerned with its being”747. 
The term definitely seems to him more adequate than entelecheia, the determination 
of “[that] type of being that maintains itself in its genuine being-possibility so that 
the possibility is consummated”748. In those first lessons, which we have briefly 
discussed above, Heidegger is immersed in an analysis of NE I, a text that 
eventually leads him to the analysis of teleion in Metaphysics V 16 (§ 11), from which 
spring the interpretations of hexis, energeia and entelecheia later in the course. 
Heidegger quotes the very first lines of the NE, where Aristotle holds that 
“a certain difference is found among ends (telē); some are activities (energeiai), 
others are products (erga) apart from the activities (energeiai) that produce them” (I 
1, 1094a 3ff). The continuation of the text (a5) makes clear that by these energeiai 
Aristotle means praxeis, since the circumstance is considered in which there are 
“ends (telē) apart from the actions (para tas praxeis)”. Heidegger acknowledges the 
equivalence: energeia is “a how of being, such a way of being that has the being-
                                               
745 GA 18 p. 381 [257-258]. 
746 GA 19 § 25a p. 172 [119] “Energeia besagt nichts anderes als Anwesenheit, reines unmittelbares 
Vorhandensein”. Entelecheia hardly appears in GA 19. Cf. § 3b p. 18 [12] where it is mentioned in 
passing in a definition of the soul in the De Anima, “the proper being-present of a living being” (“was 
am Lebenden sein eigentliches Anwesendsein ausmacht”). 
747 GA 18 p. 44 [31] “ein Seiendes, dem es in seinem Sein als solchem auf dieses Sein als solches ankommt, ein 
Seiendes, das um sein Sein besorgt ist”. Cf. also § 12a p. 95 [65]. 
748 GA 18 § 11c p. 90 [62] “ein solches Seiendes, das sich selbst hält in seiner eigentlichen 
Seinsmöglichkeit, so daß die Möglichkeit vollendet ist”. 
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character of praxis”749. He sharpens this specificity of energeia in contrast with 
products (erga) by recurring to the distinction that we encounter in 1048b and in 
NE X 4 (although without explicitly referring to these passages): 
Along with the completing of the shoe, the shoe comes about. The para is meant to 
suggest that the telos of concern is something independent of it (…). By contrast, 
there is going for a walk (…), whose telos is reached in that I go for a walk; not that I 
go here or there, or traverse a definite distance, but that I am out in the air, that I 
have gone for a walk. The telos lies in the praxis. Just through my staying within the 
concern, this being concerned reaches its end750. 
This second idea of telos is not that of something finished, in the sense in 
which an ergon is finished―it refers indeed to something that is wholly there, but 
not as completed, and thus ready (fertig) to be used. The telos of walking is fully 
reached “in that I go out for a walk” because no part of the praxis ‘walking’ is 
missing―which means that ‘walking’, thus seen, is an energeia: I walk and I have 
walked. We only find something missing in ‘walking’ when we do not consider it 
per se but as referred to something else: walking to a destination is an 
unaccomplished process, i.e. a kinēsis. As a result, Heidegger argues, when 
Aristotle holds that “the genuine agathon of human Dasein is, in the end, eupraxia or 
euzōia” he does not mean the eu as “something available out in the world, but 
rather [as] a how of living itself”751. The point is reiterated further on: “the 
anthrōpinon agathon is zōē itself, «living» itself. The ergon is living itself (…). Thus the 
anthrōpinon agathon is psychēs energeia kat aretēn”752. The ergon of life is immediately there 
                                               
749 GA 18 § 10b p. 70 [50] “Energeia ein Wie des Seins, eines solchen Seins vom Seinscharakter der 
praxis”. 
750 GA 18 § 10b p. 71 [50] “Neben dem Verfertigen des Schuhs fällt der Schuh ab. Das para will 
andeuten, daß das telos des Besorgens etwas für sich Eigenständiges ist (…). Dagegen ist ein 
Spaziergang (…), damit bei seinem telos, daß ich spazierengehe; nicht daß ich da und da hingehe, eine 
bestimmte Strecke laufe, sondern daß ich draußen bin an der Luft, daß ich spazierengegangen bin. Das 
telos liegt in der praxis. Dadurch, daß ich mich im Besorgen aufhalte, kommt diese Besorgung zu Ende, 
zu ihrem telos”. 
751 GA 18 § 10b p. 78 [55] “Deshalb ist am Ende das eigentliche agathon des menschlichen Daseins die 
eupraxia oder euzōia. Das eu ist nicht etwas, das außerhalb in der Welt gelegen ist, sondern ein Wie des 
Lebens selbst”. Cf. NE I 8, 1098b 21 ff. 
752 GA 18 § 12b p. 100 [69] “Das anthropinon agathon [ist] die zōē selbst, das »Leben« selbst. Das ergon ist 
das Leben selbst (…). Das anthropinon agathon ist also psychēs energeia kat aretēn”. Cf. NE I 6, 1098a 16f. 
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with life itself, because it is nothing different from it. In this sense, energeia indeed 
means “immediate presence”. But what does not seem to follow from these analyses 
is that energeia means “nothing else than presence”, and specifically “immediate 
presence at hand”753, as Heidegger will put it some months later by referring to 
eudaimonia, which, “insofar as it concerns the being of man as its finished state (als 
ein Fertigsein), (…) as man’s proper being, must be transferred to energeia”754. 
This is all the more surprising in view of Heidegger’s interpretation of aretē 
in GA 18: in § 10 itself, he remarks that “aretē [is] energeia, a matter that shows itself 
in deeds, that has its being in genuine, concrete being-there in every situation”755; 
consistently, in § 17 he holds that “it is a mistake to conceive of aretē as 
completedness (Fertigkeit), as this contradicts the sense of aretē”756. What can be 
distilled from this is that Heidegger is very clear on the structure of aretē but that 
he is markedly ambiguous on the structure of energeia. The key question is whether 
this ambiguity is already in Aristotle or if it is projected on him by Heidegger’s 
restrictive interpretation of telos in § 11 (telos as limit, peras), which increasingly 
reveals itself as crucial for Heidegger’s approach to Aristotle in GA 18, in GA 19 
and beyond: in telos almost everything is decided.  
Heidegger grants Aristotle a powerful insight into the ‘how’ of the being of 
human life, but at the same time he seems convinced that a part of the ontology 
                                                                                                                                 
Cf. also GA 18 § 17c p. 182 [123]: “[T]he basic conditions governing the ergon of human beings are 
entirely different than those in the case of a technē”. (“Deshalb sind für das ergon des Menschen ganz 
andere Grundbedingungen maßgebend als bei einer technē”). 
753 GA 19 § 25a p. 172 [119] “Energeia besagt nichts anderes als Anwesenheit, reines unmittelbares 
Vorhandensein”. Cf. MARX, W. 1971 p. 142: “Other determinations of ousia, first of all as energeia and as 
telos, do not have the sense of ‘appearing’ for a ‘knowing’. It is not true that Aristotle’s ousia is limited to 
merely being the ‘visible’ in the foreground, since the occurrence of energeia and of telos are ‘inner’ 
movements”. 
754 Ibidem [118-119, mod. tr.] “[S]ofern sie das Sein des Menschen als ein Fertigsein [betrifft] (…) muß 
die eudaimonia als das eigentliche Sein in die energeia versetzt werden” 
755 GA 18 § 10b pp. 76-77 [53-54] “die aretē ist energeia, eine Sache, die sich in der Tat zeigt, die ihr Sein 
hat im eigentlichen, konkreten in jeder Lage Dasein”. 
756 GA 18 § 17c p. 188 [127] “[Es ist verfehlt], wenn man die aretē als Fertigkeit fassen würde ― das 
widerspricht dem Sinn der aretē”. 
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with which Aristotle intends to grasp this ‘how’ is inadequate for his purpose757. 
Nevertheless, we said, it is precisely this conviction about Aristotle’s failure to find 
the appropriate concepts to think human life in a way fitting the phenomena that 
constitutes the strong stimulus that leads him to search for this conceptuality 
within Aristotle’s practical philosophy. It is with this aim that Heidegger 
undertakes a thorough analysis of hexis, “one of Aristotle’s ontologically basic 
concepts”758. Aristotle’s connection of aretē and teleion having resulted in 
contradicting the sense of aretē, because of the Fertigkeit import in teleion, he now 
searches for an alternative way in the relation between aretē and its genos, hexis: 
“from the connection between hexis and aretē, we will see the orientation of hexis 
toward the Dasein of human beings in its concrete possibilities”759. 
This connection is developed through the phenomenon of the mean term 
(mesotēs), developed in NE II, where Aristotle holds that “ethical aretē is a 
mesotēs”760. Heidegger makes clear from the beginning how the mesotēs, as con-
ceived by Aristotle, is not a determination of human actions from the measuring 
stick of “mediocrity”: the NE is not a bourgeois morality761. Quite on the 
contrary, Aristotle conceives the mesotēs as a life-long task, since the effort to 
maintain oneself in it is required of us at every single action: “the end of an action 
is relative to the occasion (kata ton kairon)” (III 1, 1110a 13f):  
Aristotle emphasizes, again and again, that the meson is hard to find and easy to miss; 
errors are easy. To fly off the handle is easy, but to be angry at the right moment is 
                                               
757 Cf. the synthetic formulation of this in SZ § 44 p. 225. 
758 GA 18 § 17b p. 176 [119, mod. tr.] “Wir haben in der letzten Stunde einen der ontologischen 
Grundbegriffe des Aristoteles klar gemacht, die hexis”. 
759 GA 18 § 17c p. 179 [121] “Aus dem Zusammenhang zwischen hexis und aretē werden wir die 
Orientierung der hexis auf das Dasein des Menschen in seinen konkreten Möglichkeiten sehen”. Cf. 
NE II 5, 1105b 19ff. (esp. 1106a 11ff.) on hexis as genos of aretē. 
760 NE II 9, 1109a 20 (mod. tr). 
761 Cf. GA 18 § 17c pp. 179-180 [121]. 
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difficult. This requires the possibility of being able to seize the moment as a whole 
(den Augenblick als Ganzes ergreifen zu können)762. 
It is then through Aristotle’s analysis of the phenomenon of the mesotēs that 
he gets to disclose the kairos and in turn, through the kairos, the whole of the being 
of life in its inner movedness: aretē is conceived not as “a property, not [as] a 
possession brought to Dasein from without, but [rather as] a mode of Dasein 
itself”763, whose being is at stake in its own being at each single moment, i.e. in its 
own behaving at each moment. Aristotle uses quite the same terms as Heidegger to 
express this in a passage of NE IX with which we are by now well acquainted: 
“happiness is a form of activity (energeia tis), and an energeia clearly is something that 
happens, not a thing that we possess all the time, like a piece of property (ktēma)” 
(IX 9, 1169b 29f). The term energeia is indeed very meaningful in this respect, 
because it articulates the feedback between ‘being’ and ‘behaving’ that is implicit 
in the recurring formula that, in different forms, keeps its basic sense from these 
years to Sein und Zeit:  
the being of this being [i.e. Dasein] is involved in its own being. Thus it is constitutive 
of the being of Dasein to have, in its very being, a relation of being to this being764. 
                                               
762 GA 18 § 17c pp. 190-191 [128] “Aristoteles betont immer wieder, daß das meson schwer zu finden 
und sehr leicht zu verfehlen ist, die Ausschläge sind leicht. In Zorn geraten ist leicht, im rechten 
Augenblick zornig sein ist schwierig. Es bedarf der Möglichkeit, den Augenblick als Ganzes ergreifen 
zu können”. Cf. NE II 9, 1109a 26ff: “[A]ny one can get angry―that is easy―or give or spend money; 
but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right aim, and in the 
right way, that is not for every one, nor is it easy; that is why goodness is both rare and laudable and 
noble”. 
763 GA 18 § 17c p. 181 [122] “Die aretē als hexis ist keine Eigenschaft, kein von außen an das Dasein 
herangebrachter Besitz, sondern eine Weise des Daseins selbst”. 
764 SZ § 4 p. 12 (mod. tr.) “[D]iesem Seienden in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht. Zu dieser 
Seinsverfassung des Daseins gehört aber dann, daß es in seinem Sein zu diesem Sein ein 
Seinsverhältnis hat”. Stambaugh’s translation of the first sentence, “in its being this being [i.e. Dasein] is 
concerned about its very being” does not to our mind render radically enough the “relation of being” 
that is implied afterwards (on this relation of being cf. also “Der Begriff der Zeit” in GA 64 p. 114 
[205]). The being of Dasein is not just something about which it is concerned: it is something that it is 
and, as a result, Dasein cannot help being at stake in its very being. The point is better rendered to our 
mind by Rivera’s Spanish translation, which can use a reflective form of the Spanish verb ‘ir’ (go, gehen) 
to express this immediate involvement: “a este ser le va en su ser su propio ser” (its being is at stake in 
its own being). Stambaugh’s ‘being concerned about’ would fit the similar formula in GA 18 p. 44 [31], 
where Heidegger speaks of “ein Seiendes, das um sein Sein besorgt ist”. In SZ § 22 p. 104 gehen um 
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Dasein’s being, Dasein’s ‘energeia’, is at stake in its own energein, in its own 
being (i.e. behaving). The fact that Aristotle uses energeia as much to refer to “the 
being of the thing (hyparchein to pragma)”765 as to the being of life―“life is an energeia 
(zōē energeia tis esti)”766―could be indeed used as an argument that the being of life 
is understood by him in terms of the Fertigkeit of erga, of available pragmata, as in 
GA 19767; but it works also as an argument that the being of pragmata is 
understood from a way of being, energeia, that befits the being of life and is in fact 
encountered only from this being and in this being, as seems to be the case in 
1048b, where praxis and energeia are explicitly brought together. In this respect, 
rather than conceiving life from the perspective of pragmata, Aristotle seems 
indeed to be conceiving pragmata from life―or at least he would be setting the 
basis to conceive them in this way. 
If this feedback between erga or pragmata and energeia is only ‘unsaid’ or 
‘unthought’ in Aristotle, we might be standing before an ‘ambiguity’. However, if 
it is deliberate, then we should think of an analogy, so that both pragmata and life 
would participate (metechein) in the structure of being that is defined by energeia, as 
species of this genos. To decide this, one should apply the old hermeneutical 
principle according to which the parts must be understood in view of the whole, 
and the modern hermeneutical principle of charity768 (presupposing consistency in 
Aristotle, unless otherwise proven). If energeia is somehow common to ergon as 
work at hand and ergon as life in enactment―a how of one’s being―, the decision 
                                                                                                                                 
appears as a specific determination of the Besorgen of Dasein, which to our mind shows the relevance of 
our nuance: “Das Besorgen des Daseins, dem es in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht”. 
765 Met. IX 6, 1048a 31. 
766 NE X 4, 1175a 12. 
767 Cf. GA 19 § 25a p. 172 [118-119]. Cf. also GA 31 §§ 7-8 pp. 40 ff, esp. pp. 68-69. 
768 “Since charity is not an option, but a condition of having a workable theory, it is meaningless to 
suggest that we might fall into massive error by endorsing it. Until we have successfully established a 
systematic correlation of sentences held true with sentences held true, there are not mistakes to make. 
Charity is forced on us; whether we like it or not, if we want to understand others, we must count 
them right in most matters”. DAVIDSON, Donald Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984). New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2001 p. 197. 
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on which of these senses is the originary one, as much for Aristotle as for things 
themselves, has to be taken according to what Aristotle says in different passages 
of his works and also according to the phenomena to which he is pointing, explic-
itly or inexplicitly―which goes beyond the classical hermeneutical prescriptions, 
but is required by the things themselves, i.e. by the interweaving of phenomenol-
ogy and hermeneutics that Heidegger urges. 
All this does not imply approching Aristotle in an acritical or naïve man-
ner, nor unfolding a dogmatic reading of his work, but simply taking him seri-
ously, in order to avoid that the hypothesis of an Aristotle consciously or uncon-
sciously faithful to a Greek archontic sense of being may function as a dogmatic 
tenet in the interpretation. This kind of serious work is surely performed in 
Heidegger’s analysis of hexis in § 17 of GA 18, the phenomenological imprint and 
exhaustiveness of which seems to us much stronger than that of energeia and 
entelecheia in §§ 25-28, which show concern about a peculiar reading of the letter of 
Aristotle’s text, to the detriment of phenomenological analysis (perhaps because 
of an excess of faithfulness on Heidegger’s part to his hypothesis about Aristotle’s 
leading concept of being). In the analysis of hexis and kairos, on the other hand, 
one sees Heidegger at his best, starting from Aristotle’s text to analyze things 
themselves, with and beyond Aristotle, according to the guidelines that he himself 
lays down for the course: 
We must see the ground out of which these basic concepts [i.e. Aristotle’s] have 
arisen, as well as how they have so arisen. That is, the basic concepts will be consid-
ered in their specific conceptuality so that we may ask how the matters themselves meant by 
these basic concepts are viewed, in what context they are addressed, in which particular mode they are 
determined 769.  
                                               
769 GA 18 § 1 p. 4 [4] “Es muß gesehen werden der Boden, aus dem diese Grundbegriffe erwachsen, 
und wie sie erwachsen sind, d. h. die Grundbegriffe sollen betrachtet werden auf ihre spezifische 
Begrifflichkeit, so daß wir fragen, wie die gemeinten Sachen selbst gesehen sind, woraufhin sie angesprochen werden, in 
welcher Weise sie bestimmt sind”. 
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Striking the mesotēs, Heidegger contends, requires “the possibility of being 
able to seize the moment as a whole (den Augenblick als Ganzes ergreifen zu kön-
nen)”770. It is worth noting that, although the specific analysis of phronēsis is eventu-
ally postponed to GA 19, it is actually introduced here, since this ability is none 
other than phronēsis, as Heidegger cursorily implies771. The simultaneity with which 
the Augenblick or kairos and the wholeness of life appear in the phenomenon of 
the mesotēs, a phenomenon only accessible to the phronimos, is the precise sense in 
which Heidegger holds that the being of life is sighted. If, in the kairos, the zōon 
logon echon could not see beyond what is present to him at a certain moment, then 
only a state of affairs, and not life itself, would be disclosed. This is in fact con-
firmed by the defective case: the more one is far from being a phronimos, and thus 
of aretē, the more one is absorbed in the present772. On the other hand, if life 
could only be grasped as a whole “in a pure and simple looking at” (reine hinsehende 
Verstehen)773, independently from the situatedness in which this ‘looking at’ itself is 
placed, it would not be grasped as life, because it would be considered from the 
outside, as something vorhanden. The case, however, is that both kairos and the 
wholeness of life are given together in the phenomenon of mesotēs, so that life is 
grasped at once as a whole and in its situatedness in the now, i.e. from the inside. 
But this temporality, this “stretching across time”774 implied in aretē is 
shown in the first place in the way in which hexis is generated: hexis is only arrived 
                                               
770 GA 18 § 17c p. 191 [128]. “Es bedarf der Möglichkeit, den Augenblick als Ganzes ergreifen zu 
können”. 
771 Cf. GA 18 § 18a pp. 192-193 [130]. Cf. NE VI 5, 1140a 28 on phronēsis as directed to “living well in 
general (eu zēn holōs)”. The specific determination of phronēsis is not tackled here, but instead we are 
provided with an analysis of its genē, namely hexis and aretē (hexis is genos of aretē, which in turn is a genos 
of phronēsis). This analysis constitutes a crucial reference for the interpretation of GA 19, where it 
remains for the most part implicit. 
772 The motive of Verfallen, so crucial in Sein und Zeit (cf. §§ 35-38), while possibly stemming also from 
other references, clearly finds here a strong phenomenological basis. 
773 NB p. 382/34 [134]. 
774 GA 18 § 17c p. 181 [122] “Erstreckung in die Zeit”. 
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at through habituation (di ethous)775: “we have the possibility of learning courage, 
of leaving cowardice behind, not in a fantasized reflection upon Dasein, but rather in 
venturing out into Dasein according to the possibilities of existence as encoun-
tered”776. Hexis is not a possession of which we may subsequently make use, but a 
‘possession’ that is the result of our ‘usage’, as Aristotle puts it by opposing hexis 
to senses777. However, how are we to use something that we still do not have? 
―We ‘use’ our self, we ‘venture out into our own Dasein’. This peculiar genesis also 
makes clear that the term ‘possession’ is in fact inadequate to grasp what hexis is. 
Hexis is not a ‘what’ but a ‘how’, “a mode of Dasein itself. We are encountering 
once again, as always, the peculiar category of the how”778. Hexis is the result of 
how we ‘use’ our own existence with its possibilities, and this result is nothing 
other than a ‘how’ of our own existence: more than a having, it is a being. Actually, 
although ‘use’ is more adequate than ‘possession’, it ultimately falls short of the 
sense of hexis, because to use something entails to have a dominion over it, to have 
it, in the sense of embracing it from the outside, which does not accurately explain 
our relation to ourselves. Again with Sein und Zeit, “it is constitutive of the being 
of Dasein to have, in its very being, a relation of being to this being”779: more than 
‘using’ our own self, we are our own self, in the performative sense of ‘venturing 
out into it’. 
In this respect, the structure of Aristotle’s definition of hexis in Metaphysics 
V 20 is not only enlightening but essential. Heidegger alludes to it at § 17a, al-
though later he does not relate it back to the interesting analysis of mesotēs in § 17c 
                                               
775 Cf. NE II, 1103a 25ff. 
776 GA 18 § 17c pp. 181-182 [122-123, add. e.] “[Wir haben] die Möglichkeit, den Mut zu lernen, die 
Feigheit zu verlieren, nicht in einer phantastischen Reflexion über das Dasein, sondern in dem 
Sichhinauswagen in das Dasein je nach den Möglichkeiten der betreffenden Existenz”. 
777 Cf. NE II, 1103a 30f: “We use them because we have them” (Chrēsamenoi eschomen). 
778 GA 18 § 17c p. 181 [122] “eine Weise des Daseins selbst. Wir begegnen immer wieder der 
eigentümlichen Kategorie des Wie”. 
779 SZ § 4 p. 12 (mod. tr.) “Zu dieser Seinsverfassung des Daseins gehört aber dann, daß es in seinem 
Sein zu diesem Sein ein Seinsverhältnis hat”. Cf. also “Der Begriff der Zeit” in GA 64 p. 114 [205]. 
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that we are following. Aristotle says: “we call hexis a kind of energeia (energeia tis) of 
the haver (echontos) and the had (echomenon), something like an action (praxis) or 
movement (kinēsis)”780. Which is translated by Heidegger as follows: “hexis is the 
energeia, «the genuine there, the being-present of the having and of what is 
had»”781. The translation reflects a side of energeia, namely its appearance (genuine 
there, being-present), but it again leaves in the shade its performative side (“some-
thing like an action”), in spite of the fact that Heidegger includes praxis and kinēsis 
in his quotation of the Greek text. This approach is then projected on the inter-
pretation of Aristotle’s explanation of the definition, which Heidegger quotes 
subsequently:  
When one thing makes and one is made, between them (metaxu) there is a making; so too 
between him who has a garment and the garment which he has there is a having. This 
sort of having, then, evidently we cannot have (ouk endechetai echein hexin); for the process 
will go to infinity, if we can have the having of what we have782. 
Heidegger comments that “this having is something ultimate, as nothing 
more can be had on its part. The having of this having is not a new being-deter-
mination, but simply the there (das Da), the being-present (das Gegenwärtigsein)”783. 
Again, however, this account does not seem to reflect all the potential of the con-
cept784. Aristotle denies the possibility that we can have ‘the having’ that exists 
between ‘what we have’ and ‘what is had by us’ because this would initiate a 
process to infinity (apeiron), and thus the determination of the being of hexis would 
                                               
780 Met. V 20, 1022b 4f. 
781 GA 18 § 17a pp. 174-175 [118] “Hexis ist die energeia, »das eigentliche Da, das Gegenwärtigsein des 
Habenden und des Gehabten«”. 
782 Met. V 20, 1022b 5ff. (Ross’ translation, our e). Cf. GA 18 § 17a p. 175 [118]: Heidegger quotes the 
whole fragment in Greek. 
783 GA 18 § 17a p. 175 [118] “Dieses Haben ist ein Letztes, es kann seinerseits nicht mehr gehabt 
werden. Das Haben dieses Habens ist keine neue Seinsbestimmung, sondern einfach das Da, das 
Gegenwärtigsein”. 
784 Cf. in contrast, this remark in his seminar of the winter semester 1922-23, which significantly 
mentions physis: “The hexis of physis is distinguished from that of technē in that I have myself as I grow” 
(“Die hexis der physis is darin von der technē unterschieden: ich habe mich, indem ich wachse”). (Cf. 
Übungen über Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles in Heidegger-Jahrbuch 3 [2007] p. 44, add. e). 
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collapse. In this respect, Heidegger’s contention that peras is a crucial concept for the 
determination of being in Aristotle is straight to the point785. But by this Aristotle 
is appealing precisely to the phenomena themselves: if we are to grasp an ousia or a 
kinēsis starting from our experience of them, the ontological account must pass 
“the test of the facts of life”786, and an infinite regress surely does not, at least 
concerning finite beings. Thus, while the phenomena with which Aristotle deals 
are surely determined by peras, this does not imply that telos is absorbed without 
further ado in this determination, as Heidegger repeatedly infers. 
Apart from the delimitation of the phenomenon in the there (das Da), the 
argument of the regressio ad infinitum entails that if hexis is to be at all, then it cannot 
be had: in hexis ‘being’ excludes ‘being had’. Being appears here at its best in its 
immediacy, as something that is not available, not ready to manipulation, not 
vorhanden. Yet, does this characterization of hexis resist a phenomenological 
analysis? Does this between have phenomenological credentials? Let us examine 
Aristotle’s first example, that of making (poiēin): “when one thing makes and one is 
made, between them there is a making”787. If we read it in the light of Aristotle’s 
designation of hexis as “an action or movement”, we realize that the same 
phenomenon is alluded to in the Physics: “the energeia of that which has the power 
of causing motion is not other than the energeia of the movable; for it must be the 
entelecheia of both”788. In a movement like that of poiēsis the movement of the 
mover (the poiētos) and the being-moved of the movable object (the poiētes) is the 
same, and is not had by them: the poiētes performs the movement (“it is mover 
because it actually can do it (energein)”789) and the poiēton is acted upon (“it is on the 
                                               
785 Cf. GA 18 § 8 pp. 38-39 [28-29]. 
786 Cf. NE IX 8, 1179a 20ff. (mod. tr): “We must therefore survey what we have already said, bringing 
it to the test of the facts of life, and if it harmonizes with the facts we must accept it, but if it clashes 
with them we must suppose it to be mere theories”. 
787 Met. V 20, 1022b 5f. 
788 Physics III 3, 202a 15f. 
789 Physics III 3, 202a 17 (mod. tr.) 
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movable that [the mover] is capable of being active (energētikos)”790), in such a way 
that the poiēton becomes something new through this movement (energeia atelēs).  
The fact that, differently from what happens in physis and praxis, the poiēton 
and the poiētes are different beings, provides the movement of poiēsis with the 
phenomenological privilege to which we alluded before in this chapter. Poiēsis 
enables us to speak of a ‘between’ which, however, is not meant as something set 
apart from the beings of the poiēton and the poiētes. The ‘between’ is not, as it were, 
floating in the void. We can surely understand the poiēton and the poiētes separately 
as different energeiai at any pause in the process (e.g. the poiētes taking a rest while 
the unfinished poiēton rests in the workshop), or even during the process itself. But 
insofar as they are grasped as involved in poiēsis, “there is a single energeia of both 
alike”791 which neither they have nor a third party can have: it is something they 
are. The ‘between’, as a result, is not to be understood as something vorhanden: it is 
energeia, the being of kinēsis. If Aristotle, always so cautious about the risk of 
bestowing being on things that do not exist, speaks of a ‘between’, it is precisely to 
mean that movement, which is nothing apart from things (para ta pragmata)792, is 
this between. 
The phenomenological analysis of poiēsis thus provides us with an insight 
on the ontological structure of hexis which is crucial to understand praxis, and 
which we could not grasp from praxis itself, because of the identity between the 
mover and the movable, i.e. oneself. Hexeis are not possessions, but part of our 
                                               
790 Loc. cit. (mod. tr.) 
791 Physics III 3, 202a 18. 
792 Cf. Physics III 1, 200b 32f. 
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own being, which is not ours to have, but to be793; which is always in performance, 
always at stake: energeia, praxis. Our identity, our being, is a between794.  
If Heidegger does not retrieve the definition of hexis as energeia in 
Metaphysics V for the analysis of the temporality of hexis in § 17c, it is probably 
because he does not find in it this performative side we have been emphasizing. 
To our mind, however, the retrieval is necessary to understand in all its extent the 
important point that hexis is a being more than a having. We have mentioned that 
a first hint of the temporality of hexis is found by Heidegger in the fact that hexis is 
obtained through habit795, and thus its structure is already sketched: use against 
possession, chrēsis against ktēsis, a crucial distinction already used by Plato, and one, 
if not the source of Aristotle’s original conception of energeia796. Now, after 
concluding that “it is a mistake to conceive of aretē as completedness 
(Fertigkeit)”797, Heidegger proceeds to sharpen the determination of hexis and aretē 
as applied to praxis, in contradistinction with poiēsis. In poiēsis, the habituation 
process is directed to reduce deliberation “insofar as it is through training that the 
completedness of attaining a result comes about”798. In praxis, on the other hand, 
it is not the result that is constitutive of the action, but proairesis, “the manner and 
mode of «resolving oneself». It belongs to action that it arise in each case out of a 
                                               
793 Cf. Übungen über Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (WS 1922-23) in Heidegger-Jahrbuch 3 
[2007] p. 44, quoted above in note 784. 
794 Interesting in this respect is a statement in Gadamer’s 1928 Habilitationschrift, which was supervised 
by Heidegger: “Plato’s philosophy is a dialectic not only because in conceiving and comprehending it 
keeps itself on the way to concept but also because, as a philosophy that conceives and comprehends 
in that way, it knows man as a creature that is thus «on the way» and «between» (Unterwegs und 
Zwischen)” (GADAMER, H.-G. 1985 pp. 6-7). The point is unfolded later in Gadamer’s work, as 
applied to philosophical Hermeneutics: “It is in this between (in diesem Zwischen) that hermeneutics 
finds its true place” (1990 p. 300). 
795 Cf. GA 18 § 17c p. 181 [122]. 
796 Cf. p. 45 and notes 52 and 166 (these terms are not used by Heidegger here). 
797 GA 18 § 17c p. 188 [127] “[Es ist verfehlt], wenn man die aretē als Fertigkeit fassen würde ― das 
widerspricht den Sinn der aretē”. 
798 GA 18 § 17c p. 189 [127] “Die Einübung hat gerade den Sinn, die Überlegung zum Ausfall zu brin-
gen, sofern es gerade durch die Einübung der Fertigkeit darauf ankommt, ein Resultat zu erreichen”. 
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resolution. Action has its telos in the kairos”799. While the excellence of poiēsis, from 
the restricted point of view of the particular process that it generates, is judged by 
the result that ‘comes out’, by the ergon as finished product, the excellence of praxis 
is internal to it, i.e. every action is judged on its own, and not primarily according 
to its external results, because those are not the action itself: “it belongs to action 
that it proceed by way of deliberating and as such be fulfilled”800. In deliberating and 
deciding one is already acting: ‘the how of action’ is properly at stake in them, to 
the extent that other considerations of the ‘how’, from the point of view of the 
external results, are ultimately technical considerations. This immediacy of praxis, 
its inseparability from the being of Dasein (because praxis is its own being in its 
inner movedness), entails that  
the manner and mode of habituation, in the case of action, is not practice but 
retrieval (Wiederholung). Retrieval does not mean the bringing-into-play of a settled 
completedness, but rather acting anew in every moment on the basis of the corresponding 
resolution801. 
Heidegger’s point here is of the utmost importance for any interpretation 
of phronēsis in Aristotle: one does not make progress towards aretē, one does not 
put one’s practical hexeis into play by repeating some prescripted rules on how 
something is to be done (as is the case with technical hexeis, that we call skills 
rather than aretai), but by deciding at each time on how to act, “acting anew in 
every moment on the basis of the corresponding resolution”. The immediacy of 
                                               
799 GA 18 § 17c p. 189 [127-128] “die Art und Weise des »Sichentschließens«. Zur Handlung gehört, 
daß sie jeweils aus einem Entschluß entspringt. Die Handlung selbst hat ihr telos im kairos”. On this 
issue, cf. our paragraph 2.5 above, esp. pp. 75 ff. 
800 GA 18 § 17c p. 189 [128] “Zur Handlung gehört also, daß sie gerade durch die Überlegung hindurchgeht 
und als solche vollzogen wird”. 
801 GA 18 § 17c p. 189 [128] “Die Art und Weise der Gewöhnung bei der Handlung ist nicht Übung, 
sondern Wiederholung. Wiederholung besagt nicht: Ins-Spiel-Bringen einer festsitzenden Fertigkeit, 
sondern in jedem Augenblick neu aus dem entsprechenden Entschluß heraus handeln”. Mod. tr: we follow 
Stambaugh’s translation of Wiederholung as ‘retrieval’ (cf. Being and Time SUNY, 1996 p. xv). The 
translators of GA 19 render the term as ‘repetition’. While this is indeed one of the meanings of the 
word, to our mind here it obscures the precise meaning that Heidegger searches and which leads him 
to choose this word: wiederholen means to retake, to take anew, and that is the sense operating in 
‘retrieve’. Below we use also ‘reappropriate’. 
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praxis makes the appropriation of the kairos a must: no action is independent from 
a specific situation―of our own self and of others―requiring an ad hoc resolution, 
no universal rules can ultimately exempt us from facing the ‘here and now’ of an 
action, precisely because this ‘here and now’ is part of the action itself. What is 
more, even if we do not explicitly face it, we are nonetheless faced with it: our 
being is at stake at each ‘here and now’. 
Of course, also in the case of poiēsis, as considered per se, the ‘here and now’ 
does play a role, as Dunne has convincingly argued802. But it is crucial to 
understand that this role is a much more restricted one: the sculptor, e.g. will have 
to adapt himself to the unique characteristics of the piece of marble with which he 
is working. Yet this ‘here and now’, this being ready for the kairos does not 
disclose life as a whole, an ergon which we are ourselves―and which, as a result, is 
unfinished so long as we are―but only the whole of the process of bringing out 
the statue, an ergon which can come to be finished and ready (fertig). 
We understand that it is in this respect that Heidegger here translates poiēin 
as “completing” (verfertigen)803. Both poiēin and prattein “cultivate the how of dealing 
itself. The distinction, [though], lies in the fact that praxis depends on the how”804: 
because its result, its ergon, is internal to life, i.e. because its ergon is life itself, and 
life is never finished as long as it is―it does not cease―, praxis always brings us 
back to the kairos. Apart from sleeping and losing one’s use of reason, there is no 
pause granted to Dasein as praktikos: pauses are possible for Dasein as poiētes, 
because a kinēsis can cease, but the stream of life, and thereby praxis, “does not 
cease; we are living and have lived”805. 
                                               
802 Cf. DUNNE, J. 1993 pp. 315-356, esp. pp. 343 ff. 
803 GA 18 § 17c p. 190 [128]. 
804 Loc. cit. “[N]icht bestimmtes Material aufzunehmen, sondern das Wie des Umgehens selbst auszubilden. 
Der Unterschied liegt darin, daß es bei der praxis auf das Wie umgeht”. 
805 Met. IX 6, 1048b 27. 
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The performative sense of energeia that pervades Aristotle’s conception of 
physis (defined as a way to physis itself) and praxis (for which being is behaving) makes 
senseless his resort to telos and entelecheia for the characterization of concepts such 
as kinēsis or aretē, unless telos and entelecheia point beyond the paradigm of Vorhan-
denheit. This is precisely the point we have intended to make in this chapter: telos 
does not imply the end of being-possibilities806, but instead the source of being-
possibilities itself―as Heidegger sees it in 1939807. Telos not only does not distort 
the ontological force of praxis as Aristotle conceives it in the NE but makes it 
possible. It is certainly not an aim, as it were, attached to beings (para ta pragmata), 
which would stop on arrival at their goal. Telos a determination of being itself, yet 
not one by which beings are completed―as Heidegger sees it―but fulfilled and at the 
same time open and directed towards their fulfillment. “Energeia is the telos”808 that 
structures beings as a way to the realization of what they always already are809. 
                                               
806 Cf. GA 18 § 11b p. 85 [59]: “A beyond-which-nothing (...) in the sense that, for a being, there is no 
further being-possibility beyond the telos (…), a being has come to its end with respect to its being-possibilities” 
(“Ein Worüber-hinaus-nichts (...) in dem Sinne, daß es über das telos hinaus keine weitere 
Seinsmöglichkeit für ein Seiendes gibt, daß ein Seiendes hinsichtlich seiner Seinsmöglichkeiten zu seinem Ende 
gekommen ist”).  
807 WBP in GA 9 p. 354 [217]. 
808 Met. IX 8, 1050a 9. 
809 Cf. Physics II 1, 193b 13. 
7. Kairos and Aei, Poles of the Gigantomachia 
 
 
Our reconsideration in chapter 5 of Heidegger’s portrayal of the relation between 
praxis and technē in GA 19 has brought again to the foreground the relevance of 
the concept of telos. The fourfold dialogue between Heidegger’s very different 
approaches to it in 1924 and in 1939, Aristotle’s own understanding of the term, 
and its phenomenological-ontological possibilities, provides now the basis to pro-
ceed in our reading of Heidegger’s interpretation of the NE in GA 19, and face 
the decisive gigantomachia810 of phronēsis and sophia with which the ‘Aristotle 
introduction’ to that course ends.  
In reappropriating (wiederholen)811 his phenomenological analysis in chapter 
5, we had recognized as problematic Heidegger’s point that Aristotle would 
conceive sophia as the only aretē of technē, to the exclusion of phronēsis. This move 
surely does not in the least imply removing phronēsis from the scene, but rather 
intends to sharpen its uniqueness as far as the possibilities of disclosing the being 
of Dasein are concerned. The analysis of hexis and kairos developed in GA 18 is 
now extended around another cryptic statement of Aristotle: phronēsis cannot be 
forgotten―or, as Heidegger renders it, phronēsis is, like Dasein, always new. This 
makes the idea of there being an abyss between phronēsis and sophia all the more 
evident in Heidegger’s eyes, and as a result Aristotle’s privileging of sophia as the 
highest way of alētheuein for Dasein becomes deeply problematical for Heidegger. 
An approach to this gigantomachia, after which NE VI virtually disappears from 
Heidegger’s work, is to occupy us now. 
                                               
810 Sophist 246a: “a battle of gods and giants (gigantomachia) going on between them over their quarrel 
about reality (peri tēs ousias)”. Cf. GA 19 §§ 67 ff. and SZ § 1 p. 1. 
811 Cf. note 801 above on this term. 
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7.1. Phronēsis is at Each Time New 
Heidegger’s analysis of phronēsis in § 8 of GA 19 had started from the crucial point 
that distinguishes it from technē, namely that technē is concerned with the 
production of something else, understanding by this ‘something else than Dasein 
himself as a whole’. In this respect, “health or bodily strength, which promote 
Dasein in a particular regard”812 are objects of the concern of technē, because they 
result from a deliberation kata meros813, according to a particular aspect of Dasein. 
Phronēsis, instead, “deliberates in the right way poia pros to eu zēn holōs, regarding 
«what is conducive to the right mode of being of Dasein as such and as a 
whole»”814. For this reason, because phronēsis deliberates about the being of zoē itself, 
and not about something that zoē may have (health, strength, properties, etc.), 
because it is a deliberation about the good and not about goods that is at stake here, 
“the telos has the same ontological character as phronēsis”815: eupraxia is the ‘what-
for’ of the deliberation of phronēsis, which is itself praxis.  
Worth noting is the fact that Heidegger’s phenomenological approach 
cannot help finding here again a ‘teleological’ meaning, an idea of aim beyond the 
conception of telos as a limit (peras)816. What is more, it is precisely because telos is 
something else than a limit that phronēsis can appear in its specificity: beyond the 
telē that are attained in human life, there is an ‘always and at the same time never 
fully attained, never fully ready’ telos that keeps life moving: eupraxia. On the one 
                                               
812 GA 19 § 8a p. 49 [34] “Beiträglichkeiten, die in bestimmter Hinsicht, z.B. in Hinsicht auf 
Gesundheit oder Körperkraft, für das Dasein beiträglich sind”. 
813 Cf. NE VI, 5 1140a 27. 
814 GA 19 § 8a p. 49 [34] “Wir nennen einen phronimos den, der in rechter Weise überlegt, poia pros to eu 
zēn holōs, »was zuträglich ist für die rechte Weise des Seins des Daseins als solchem im Ganzen«”. Cf. 
NE VI, 5 1140a 28. 
815 GA 19 § 8a p. 49 [34] “Das telos ist vom selben Seinscharakter wie die phronēsis”. Cf. NE VI, 5 1140b 
6f. 
816 The meaning becomes explicit some lines below: “Dasein is disclosed as the hou eneka, a «for the sake 
of which»”. (“Dasein [ist] als das hou heneka, das Worumwillen, aufgedeckt”) (GA 19 § 8a p. 50 [35]). 
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hand, one can only be happy if the form (eidos) of happiness is fully there817: “At 
the same time (hama) we are happy and have been happy (eudamonein kai 
eudaimonēken)”818. On the other, happiness is not attained all of a sudden: “one 
swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a 
short time, does not make a man blessed and happy” (I 7 1098a 18ff). Happiness 
takes time to come to being; but it only comes to be as it is now because it has 
been somehow previously attained: 
Of that which is coming to be, some part must have come to be, and, of that which 
is changing, some part must have changed (…). It is surely clear, then, in this way, 
that energeia is in this sense also, viz. in order of becoming and of time, prior to 
dynamis (protera tēs dynameōs kata genesin kai chronon)819. 
Our happiness, the eu of our praxis, is always changing. But if we ‘cut’ this 
kinēsis as Aristotle does in 1048b by saying that in an infinitesimal now―the 
hama―“we are happy and have been happy”, then we find energeia, not dynamis820. 
That the telos is fulfilled (teleion), thus limiting (defining: horismos)821 the being of 
life, making it real, does not entail the ending (peras) of the movement of life, but 
rather makes its movedness possible. Only if life is entelecheia can it be understood 
as kinēsis; only if telos is always already there in ‘my praxis here and now’ can 
eupraxia be a telos that, as it were, pushes forward ‘this praxis here and now’. That is 
why, as Heidegger puts it later in the course, in the now of phronēsis, the now that 
phronēsis can see, “praxis is archē and telos”822.  
                                               
817 Cf. NE X 4, 1174a 14-16.  
818 Met. IX 6, 1048b 26. 
819 Met. IX 8, 1049b 35 - 1050 a3. 
820 Cf. POLO, L. 1997 p. 117. 
821 As in the case of Aristotle’s ruling out of characterizations of being that lead to a regressio ad infinitum, 
in respect to which Heidegger points to peras as a fundamental concept of being for the Greeks (cf. GA 
18 § 8 pp. 38 ff. [28 ff.]) we believe Heidegger is also right in including definition (horismos) among 
these fundamental concepts (cf. § 8 pp. 36 ff. [26 ff.]). However as in the case of peras, horismos is, at 
least for Aristotle, only an aspect of being, not its whole characterization. 
822 GA 19 § 20a p. 139 [96] “Die praxis ist in der phronēsis archē und telos”. 
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We have already analyzed the consequences that Heidegger draws from 
Aristotle’s statement that “while there is such a thing as aretē in technē, there is not 
such a thing as aretē in phronēsis” (VI 5, 1140b 21f)823. Heidegger inferred 
―correctly to our mind―that phronēsis itself is an aretē. However, he concluded 
subsequently that phronēsis could not be the aretē of technē, on an objectively very 
tiny textual basis and with scarce phenomenological Selbstausweisung824. Our reserve 
about this second move, however, is not a closed issue, but one we must now 
reopen and put to the test. 
Heidegger expresses the specificity of phronēsis as aretē in another way that 
we can now discuss more deeply, from the background of his important approach 
to hexis and kairos in GA 18. The point stems from Aristotle’s concise statement 
that “in technē he who errs willingly is preferable, but in phronēsis, as in the aretai, it 
is the reverse” (VI 5, 1140b 22ff). Heidegger comments, we have seen, that in the 
case of phronēsis “every failure entails failing oneself (…). Phronēsis is not oriented 
toward trial and error; in moral action I cannot experiment with myself”825. Then 
he adds: 
With phronēsis, unlike technē, there is no more or less, no «this as well as that» (kein 
Sowohl-Als), but only the seriousness of the definite decision, success or failure, 
either-or. Insofar as phronēsis is stochastikē, it is impossible for it to be more 
accomplished826. 
                                               
823 Cf. pp. 159 ff. above. 
824 On the methodological relevance of this term, cf. note 612 above. 
825 Cf. GA 19 § 8c p. 54 [38, mod. tr.] “Bei der phronēsis (…) da ist jedes Fehlgehen ein Sich-Verfehlen 
(…). Die phronēsis is nicht darauf orientiert, zu probieren; ich kann im sittlichen Handeln nicht mit mir 
experimentieren”. 
826 GA 19 § 8c p. 54 [38, mod. tr.] “Bei der phronēsis gibt es kein Mehr oder Minder, kein Sowohl-Als 
auch wie bei der technē, sondern nur den Ernst der bestimmten Entscheidung, das Treffen oder 
Verfehlen, das Entweder-Oder. Sofern die phronēsis stochastikē ist, hat sie gar keine Möglichkeit, 
vollendeter zu sein”. Mod. tr: the English translators render vollendeter as ‘more complete’, which is 
confusing, because ‘complete’ is the term they use elsewhere to translate fertig, which precisely has 
connotations from which Heidegger tends to detach phronēsis. 
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Phronēsis is stochastikē: Heidegger is surely referring to the passage in NE VI 
where Aristotle states, concerning the phronimos, that “the man who is without 
qualification good at deliberating (haplōs eubolos) is the man who is capable of 
aiming in accordance with calculation at the best for man of things attainable by 
action (tou aristou anthropō tōn praktōn stochastikos kata ton logismon)” (VI 7, 1141b 
12ff). Aristotle also uses the term stochastikē three times in book II: “if aretē is more 
exact and better than any art, as physis also is, then it must have the quality of 
aiming at the intermediate (tou mesou stochastikē)” (II 6, 1106b 14f); and later: “aretē 
is a kind of mean (mesotēs tis), since it is skillful in aiming at what is intermediate 
(stochastikē tou mesou)” (1106b 26f)827. NE II is precisely the main thread of the 
analysis of hexis and kairos in GA 18, centered around the phenomenon of the 
mesotēs, which we have discussed above. Following the logic of Aristotle’s 
argument, Heidegger now recovers for his interpretation of book VI his analysis 
of GA 18, in which the specificity of aretē as referred to kairos was gained: because 
differently from technē, phronēsis is an aretē itself, everything is at stake for it in the 
how of its ‘use’, of its being put into play.  
That is the precise meaning in which Heidegger’s statement that in phronēsis 
“there is no more and less” can make sense (he cannot be meaning that 
deliberation does not look for the mesotēs, which is indeed the peak between the 
more and the less). For phronēsis there is no back office, no private workshop 
where one can make mistakes that will not come to the light: whatever is 
‘produced’ by phronēsis is immediately visible, so to speak, in the shop window. 
One may well experiment with oneself, but the experiment itself is the ‘finished’ 
ergon one gets, whether it is successful or not. In this respect, “there is no more or 
less” for it. This, according to our experience of praxis as deployed in time, entails 
that once one has acted, one can certainly consider that one’s anger was out of 
proportion, or that one was too mild―because it is not easy to strike the mesotēs―, 
                                               
827 Mod. tr. For the third occurrence in book II, cf. NE II 9, 1109a 21. 
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but these considerations do not change the ergon just ‘produced’. They may affect 
the ergon that I am going to be from now on, insofar as they lead me to behave 
differently in the future, but not the ergon that I have ‘become’ with my action. 
This, however, is only a way of speaking, because the ergon that I have come to be 
and the ergon that I am going to be do not stand apart but constitute a continuum 
in time, so that what I actually do when I redirect my behavior is to retrieve in a 
new way the ergon that I have come to be. 
Certainly, if we maintain this parallelism of praxis with the productive 
paradigm of poiēsis, it is only in order to disclose its specificity. Against the mode 
of being-there in which the erga of poiēsis stand before me (Vorhandenheit), in such a 
way that I may decide to destroy them because they are defective or sell them 
because they are acceptable, the ergon of praxis does not stand before me, but is 
identical with me, ontologically immediate: I am this ergon, I am my praxis, I am 
this there (Dasein) generated by myself, starting from my previous possibilities. 
(This, in passing, shows how the characterization of Dasein can stem from the 
consideration of praxis as opposed to poiēsis, without this implying a reduction of 
the categories of Dasein to those of being as Vorhandenheit. None other is in fact 
the procedure by which Heidegger is making his way in this interpretation). 
Yet, there is something in Heidegger’s inference from the fact that phronēsis 
is stochastikē, i.e. skillful in aiming at the mesotēs, which might at first sight appear as 
surprising: “insofar as phronēsis is stochastikē, it is impossible for it to be more 
accomplished. Thus it has no aretē but is in itself aretē”828. Heidegger does not gloss 
the inference, but instead swiftly applies it as an argument for his sharp contrast 
between phronēsis and technē with which we have dealt above. Yet, it is important to 
delimit its field of validity, as always, on phenomenological grounds: that phronēsis 
cannot be more accomplished, according to its skill to strike the mesotēs, can be 
                                               
828 GA 19 § 8c p. 54 [38, mod. tr.] “Sofern die phronēsis stochastikē ist, hat sie gar keine Möglichkeit, 
vollendeter zu sein. Sie hat also keine aretē, sondern ist in sich selbst aretē”. 
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understood as meaning that my phronēsis ‘here and now’ has no other ressource to 
make it better than phronēsis itself. Because phronēsis is aretē, its ability is entirely 
dependent on what it ‘is’: that is all it ‘has’. But if we detach ourselves from the 
‘here and now’ of phronēsis and think of it as “stretching across time”829, then it can 
of course be more accomplished, because it is a hexis and, as such, it is generated 
through habituation (di ethous)830, which in turn is the result of action. Because 
more than a having it is a being, phronēsis is as dynamic as our own being, as our 
own praxis―it is, indeed, praxis itself. This in fact draws us back to the 
inseparability between what we do and what we are, so that the inclusion of 
continuity in time in the characterization of the phenomenon secures its correct 
interpretation. 
After summarily discarding the idea that phronēsis be the aretē of technē, 
Heidegger asks whether it could be regarded as the aretē of epistēmē. Aristotle, he 
argues, entertains the possibility: opinion (doxa), which for all its coarseness is still 
a theoretical knowledge, “is about what can be otherwise, and so is phronēsis”  
(VI 5, 1140b 27f). But the leveling is cut short: phronēsis “is not only a reasoned 
state (oud hexis meta logou monon)” (b28). Heidegger translates this as follows: “«but 
phronēsis is not a hexis of alētheuein which is autonomous in itself and is only for the 
sake of disclosing»; on the contrary, it is a hexis of alētheuein which is praktikē”831. 
Relevant is the way in which Heidegger renders the narrow sense of logos in this 
passage―meta logou: “autonomous in itself and only for the sake of disclosing”. 
Because phronēsis is praktikē, because it belongs to my own being, it cannot be re-
                                               
829 GA 18 § 17c p. 181 [122] “Erstreckung in die Zeit”. 
830 Cf. NE II, 1103a 25 ff. and GA 18 § 17c pp. 181-182 [122-123]. 
831 GA 19 § 8c p. 55 [39] “»Aber die phronēsis ist keine hexis des alētheuein, die in sich eigenständig ist, die 
lediglich um des Aufdeckens willen ist«, sondern sie ist eine hexis des alētheuein, die praktikē ist”. Mod. 
tr: Rojcewicz and Schuwer’s English translation of this passage is misguiding: “phronēsis is not a hexis of 
alētheuein, a hexis which is autonomous in itself (…)” leads to understand that what follows the comma 
is an explanatory clause of what hexeis of alētheuein are in general, which is not the case. The clause is 
indeed between commas in the original, but this in German need not imply an explanation: the context 
must say. And, as can be understood from the continuation of the text―well rendered in the 
translation, too―Heidegger is rather specifying the kind of hexis that phronēsis is.  
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duced to a knowledge process that I could bracket in time as having a beginning 
and an end, and which I could objectify as different from me, as vorhanden. For 
instance, a study about metereology consists of a knowledge that falls within the 
phenomenon of alētheuein verified in epistēmē: it has determinate contours in one’s 
life (it was started then and finished then) and it stands apart from it as a product 
of one’s work. For that reason, its accomplishedness is to be judged on its 
objective results, which are appropriated without the being of the researcher. This 
befits to the letter the character of poiēsis, so that in this respect Heidegger is right 
to align epistēmē with it: both are “[hexeis] of alētheuein into which Dasein places itself 
explicitly (sich eigens bringt)”832. English provides us with a very graphical―not to 
say ontological―term to express this: we get down (as it were, from our being in the 
genuine sense) to producing (poiēin) or to investigating (epistasthai) but we do not 
get down to acting (prattein), because we are always already acting, as much as we 
are always already being. The point must be made, however, that this contrast 
implies for epistēmē what has been held elsewhere about poiēsis, namely that, for all 
its differences from praxis, epistēmē is still embedded in it: if epistēmē ever starts to 
operate and persists in its being “for the sake of disclosing”, it does so because it 
stems from our praxis, the only determination of our being that is capable of 
activating the kinēsis of epistēme towards the telos that keeps it moving. 
What we could call the ‘contourability’ or ‘bracketting in time’ of an 
alētheuein like poiēsis and epistēmē is not only apparent in the phenomenon of getting 
down to it or placing oneself in it (sich in es bringen) but also in that of forgetfulness, 
as indicated in the second somewhat enigmatic and concise remark by which 
Aristotle characterizes the distinctiveness of phronēsis. The point has a phenome-
nological potential that Heidegger does not in the least overlook: phronēsis is more 
than a hexis meta logou because “a hexis of that sort may be forgotten, but phronēsis 
cannot” (VI, 5 1140b 28ff). 
                                               
832 GA 19 § 8c p. 56 [39] “[D]ie hexis meta logou ist eine hexis des alētheuein, in die sich das Dasein eigens 
bringt”. 
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Heidegger comes upon this phenomenon starting from the consideration 
of the ‘contourability’: while “I can experience, notice and learn from what has 
already been experienced, noted, and learned (…), phronēsis is in each case new”833. 
Heidegger’s impersonal way of referring to what has already been done is, be it 
intended or not, extremely accurate: he could have said ‘I can experience from 
what I have already experienced’, but he actually says ‘I can experience from what 
has been experienced’. This allows for a full-length portrait of the ‘availability’ 
(which well renders Fertigkeit here) of knowledge in poiēsis and epistēmē: at least a 
part of the knowledge in poiēsis and epistēmē, whether it is drawn from someone else 
who has it or from oneself, because it was previously acquired by oneself, is there 
(Da) as something available, as something I can acquire and possess. This 
availability, which is clearly viewed in the first case―getting the know-how from 
someone else―, is also importantly operating in the latter: when I get down to 
producing something, I get the know-how from myself as other, e.g. when I get 
down to producing a pair of shoes, I get the know-how from my being a shoemaker, 
which is not my being as a whole, which is not me without further ado. On the 
other hand, when I act―in the wide sense of praxis for which I cannot say that I 
get down to it, because I am always at it―, what takes place is a retrieval 
(Wiederholung): not a “bringing-into-play of a settled completedness, but rather [an] 
acting anew in every moment on the basis of the corresponding resolution”834. I am not 
bringing to the kairos a part of myself, as something that I ‘possess’ and thereby 
‘use’, but rather the kairos is bringing my whole being to the occasion where I find myself. 
‘Finding oneself’ (sich befinden)835 is what properly defines our original relation to 
                                               
833 GA 19 § 8c p. [39] “ [I]ch [kann] erfahren, merken, lernen (…), was schon erfahren, gemerkt, 
gelernt ist, während die phronēsis jedesmal neu ist”. 
834 GA 18 § 17c p. 189 [128] “Wiederholung besagt nicht: Ins-Spiel-Bringen einer festsitzenden 
Fertigkeit, sondern in jedem Augenblick neu aus dem entsprechenden Entschluß heraus handeln”. 
835 Cf. “Der Begriff der Zeit” (1924) in GA 64 p. 114 [205]: “The averageness of everyday Dasein does 
not imply a reflection upon the ego of the self, and nevertheless Dasein has itself. It finds itself with 
itself” (“In der Durchsnittlichkeit des alltäglichen Daseins liegt keine Reflexion auf das Ich und das 
Selbst, und doch hat sich das Dasein selbst. Es befindet sich bei sich selbst”). 
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our praxis, a movement that is previous to our own deliberating on what to do: 
one always already finds oneself acting. 
It is not by chance that it is precisely in these terms, i.e. as a ‘finding 
oneself’ that praxis is characterized in 1048b. This passage of Metaphysics IX 6 
provides, in spite of the fact that it is not used by Heidegger in this course, 
another important hint to understand what he finds in this ‘always being new’ of 
phronēsis. Phronēsis is in each case new precisely because “it does not cease”836: 
every single moment of our life, of our kinēsis, is praxis, so that we are modelling it 
all the time, or rather, our praxis is being modelled all the time by itself, “explicitly 
or inexplicitly”837. With praxis it does not make any sense to speak of retaking our 
‘practice’ where we left it the day before, as a harp player does: our praxis is not 
retaken as something that ceased yesterday when time was over or when we 
decided to leave it―instead, it is praxis that ‘retakes’ us at each time, that retrieves 
our whole being. Praxis is not ours to set aside, because it belongs to the structure 
of our being, which is not available, not ready to hand. ‘Playing’ life is not like 
playing the harp: the rehearsal is always already the performance. In praxis 
rehearsal and performance identify with each other in a single movement that 
does not cease―life is always live. 
The contrast between the praktikos and the harpist (although one must not 
forget that ‘being a harpist’ is always encompassed by ‘being praktikos’) reveals the 
inner connection between these two basic tenets of Aristotle about phronēsis to 
which Heidegger reasonably attaches so much importance: firstly, the idea that 
mistakes in phronēsis do not make it stronger; secondly, the idea that phronēsis 
cannot be forgotten. What lies beneath both points is the fact that praxis, the 
energeia atelēs that we are, does not cease: it is always at stake. In praxis, we said, a 
                                               
836 Met. IX 6, 1048b 27. 
837 GA 18 § 12a p. 95 [65] “[Dasein ist] ein solches Seindes, in dessen Sein es ausdrücklich oder 
unausdrücklich auf sein Sein ankommt”. Cf. also § 17c p. 180 [121-122]. 
 231 
mistake is not set apart in the back room: it is not ours to hide or forget, because 
it is not there as available for our decision. In fact it is not properly oneself who does not 
forget, but one’s being, one’s praxis. We believe that it is in this respect that Heidegger 
makes his reputed connection between phronēsis and moral conscience (Gewissen), 
which until the publication of this lecture course was mainly known through 
Gadamer, on whom the move left a deep impression838: 
As regards phronēsis, there is no possibility of falling into forgetting. Certainly the 
explication that Aristotle gives here is very meager. But it is nevertheless clear from 
the context that we would not be going too far in the interpretation by saying that 
Aristotle has here come across the phenomenon of conscience. Phronēsis is nothing other 
than conscience set into motion (das in Bewegung gesetzte Gewissen), making an action 
transparent. Conscience cannot be forgotten (…). Conscience always announces 
itself. Hence because phronēsis does not possess the possibility of lethē, it is not a mode 
of alētheuein which one could call theoretical knowledge839. 
Heidegger’s account of this connection is definitely more extensive than 
Aristotle’s laconic statement that phronēsis cannot be forgotten, but still rather suc-
cinct for the audacity of what it suggests. Volpi asks, “how could Heidegger in his 
accurate and attentive reading of Aristotle bring two concepts so temporally and 
semantically remote as phronēsis and conscience into such an outrageous neighbor-
hood?”840. The question is not less rhetorical than Heidegger’s statement. With 
Gadamer and other commentators, Volpi relates this passage to the call of con-
science (Ruf des Gewissens) which is argued in Sein und Zeit to be the phenomenon 
                                               
838 Cf. GADAMER, Hans-Georg “Die Marburger Theologie” (1964) in Gesammelte Werke 3 1987a pp. 
197-208 (esp. pp. 199-200) and “Auf dem Rückgang zum Aufgang” (1986) in Gesammelte Werke 3 
1987b pp. 394-416 (esp. p. 400). 
839 GA 19 § 8c p. 56 [39] “Bei der phronēsis gibt es nicht die Verfallensmöglichkeit des Vergessens. Zwar 
ist die Explication, die Aristoteles hier gibt, sehr knapp. Aber es ist doch aus dem Zusammenhang 
deutlich, daß man in der Interpretation nicht zu weit geht, wenn man sagt, daß Aristoteles hier auf das 
Phänomen des Gewissens gestoßen ist. Die phronēsis ist nicht anderes als das in Bewegung gesetzte 
Gewissen, das eine Handlung durchsichtig macht. Das Gewissen kann man nicht vergessen (…). Das 
Gewissen meldet sich immer wieder. Weil also die phronēsis nicht die Möglichkeit der lethē hat, ist sie 
keine Weise des alētheuein, die man als theoretisches Wissen ansprechen könnte”. 
840 VOLPI, F. “»Das ist das Gewissen!« Heidegger interpretiert die Phronesis (Ethica Nicomachea VI, 
5)” (2007a) in Steinmann, M. (ed.) Heidegger und die Griechen Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007 pp. 
166-180 (p. 167 for ref). 
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through which Dasein is originally disclosed to itself841. Although a close examina-
tion of this correspondence exceeds our possibilities here, it is fully consistent 
with the fact that Heidegger repeatedly holds in this course, in different guises, 
that “the object of phronēsis is praxis, the zōē of man, human Dasein itself”842. 
Phronēsis is “conscience set into motion”, not in the sense that conscience could be 
actually brought to a halt and then set again in movement and so on, but rather in 
the sense that, because phronēsis discloses praxis843 and is praxis itself, this “eye of 
the soul (omma tēs psychēs)”844 is always in motion, as one’s own being is. 
For Volpi, “Heidegger must have arrived [here] at the conclusion that, if 
[phronēsis] is more than a hexis and if, therefore, it cannot be overlooked, it must be 
a characteristic of the soul itself. It therefore has to be ontologized”845. We have 
argued above why the term ‘ontologization’ does not seem accurate to describe 
Heidegger’s approach to the NE846, as though this work had no ontological weight 
a priori. To be sure, by comparing it with conscience, Heidegger is reading phronēsis 
ontologically, as an eye of the soul that cannot avoid seeing always because it is 
inseparable from our being, i.e. from our behaving. Yet, we believe that this 
ontological reading is actually possible because of the belongingness of praxis to 
the genus energeia that is implied by Aristotle as much in Metaphysics IX 6 as in the 
NE―even if Heidegger does not make that connection explicit. That praxis is 
energeia, both on its own and in relation to poiēsis or epistēmē, entails that, in the 
same way that being is being―that being is essentially performative―the 
                                               
841 Cf. SZ §§ 56-58, esp. pp. 272-273; VOLPI, F. 2007a pp. 175 ff, and 1992 pp. 118-119; GADAMER, 
H.-G. 1987 p. 200; TAMINIAUX, J. 1989 pp. 185-186; VIGO, A. 2008 pp. 223-225. 
842 GA 19 § 21 p. 143 [98] “der Gegenstand der phronēsis ist die praxis, die zōē des Menschen, das 
menschliche Dasein selbst”. Cf. also GA 19 § 8a pp. 48-51 [34-36]; § 22a p. 146 [100]; § 24a pp. 165-
168 [114-115]; NB 384/36 [135]. 
843 GA 19 § 22a p. 146 [100]. “The being disclosed by phronēsis is praxis. In this resides human Dasein” 
(“Das Seiende, das die phronēsis aufdeckt, ist die praxis. Darin liegt das menschliche Dasein”). 
844 NE VI 12, 1144a 30. 
845 VOLPI, F. 1992 p. 119. 
846 Cf. pp. 116 ff. above. 
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knowledge that is at stake in phronēsis is more a knowing than a ‘knowledge’. 
Phronēsis is a ‘knowledge’ being operated anew and as a whole in the kairos, not a 
deposit of knowledge of which one extracts a part to be applied here and now. 
This has an important parallel in the medieval distinction between actus exercitus 
and actus signatus which, although not mentioned in this course, is operating in the 
background of this approach to phronēsis not less than in other of Heidegger’s les-
sons on the way to Sein und Zeit, as Gadamer has recalled847. 
7.2. No Bridge in the Abyss 
At the beginning of this chapter we have compared the opposition between 
phronēsis and sophia maintained by Heidegger in these first lessons of GA 19 with 
the battle of giants (gigantomachia peri tēs ousias)848 of Plato’s Sophist. Later in the 
course, Heidegger interprets this passage and remarks that “the battle is first of all 
over what primarily and genuinely satisfies the meaning of being, i.e., presence”849. 
This battle between those who consider aisthēsis the genuine mode of access to 
being and those who consider that it is noein or logos that fulfills this role850 very 
well reflects Heidegger’s sharp opposition between phronēsis and sophia. The fact 
that he will eventually retrieve Plato’s Sophist to present the guiding thread of his 
questioning in Sein und Zeit851 reveals the reach of this opposition for Heidegger 
on his way to his magnum opus. 
                                               
847 Cf. GADAMER, H.-G. 1987c p. 389. Gadamer himself seems to point to this conceptual core 
when he says that our historically-effected consciousness (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewuβtsein) is more being 
than consciousness (mehr Sein als Bewuβtsein)” (“Zwischen Phänomenologie und Hermeneutik. Versuch 
einer Selbstkritik” (1985) in Gesammelte Werke 2. Hermeneutik II. Warheit und Methode. Ergänzungen/ 
Register. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1993 pp. 3-26 (p. 11 for ref.). 
848 Cf. Sophist 246a. 
849 GA 19 § 67 p. 467 [323]. “Der Kampf geht zunächst darum, was dem Sinn von Sein, Anwesenheit, 
primär und eigentlich genügt”. 
850 Cf. loc. cit. [323-324]. 
851 Cf. SZ p. 1 and Sophist 244a. 
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Heidegger’s thorough emphasis on the uniqueness of the structure of hexis 
and aretē in GA 18 and of phronēsis and praxis in GA 19 culminates in this 
controversy between phronēsis and sophia, centered around the question of which is 
to be the highest possibility of alētheuein for Dasein. The tension is already drawn at 
the end of § 9, devoted to sophia: while “phronēsis aims at and makes transparent 
precisely the endechomenon allōs echein, the being of human Dasein”, sophia is oriented 
towards “beings which always are”852, and nonetheless it is the highest possibility 
of alētheuein. The distinction between these objects, what always is, and what can 
be otherwise, is made by Aristotle quite at the beginning of NE VI, as one that 
constitutes two ways of logon echein: the logistikon (which is concerned with what 
can be otherwise), under which phronēsis and technē fall, and the epistēmonikon, 
(which is concerned with what is always as it is) within which sophia and epistēmē. In 
his presentation of these ways of logon echein in § 5a, Heidegger brings them 
together: 
Home and courtyard have their being under heaven, under the sun, which traverses 
its course daily, which regularly appears and disappears. This world of nature, which 
is always as it is, is in a certain sense the background from which what can be other 
and different stands out. This distinction is an entirely original one. Therefore it is 
wrong to say that there are two regions of being (…). Rather, this distinction 
articulates the world; it is its first general ontological articulation853. 
Why should then the distinction between these two determinations of be-
ings, which is here depicted by Heidegger as one that articulates an understanding 
of reality as a continuity, subsequently become a sharp separation of spheres of 
being in the analysis of phronēsis and sophia? Surely not because Heidegger would 
believe there to be such a separation, which he explicitly denies here, but rather 
                                               
852 GA 19 § 9c p. 61 [43] “[D]ie sophia [hat] das Seiende, das immer ist, zum Thema, während doch 
gerade die phronēsis auf das endechomenon allōs echein, das Sein des menschlichen Daseins, zielt und es 
durchsichtig macht”. 
853 GA 19 § 5a p. 29 [20] “Haus und Hof haben ihr Sein unter dem Himmel, unter der Sonne, die jeden 
Tag ihren Gang geht, jeden Tag gleichmäßig immer wieder erscheint und verschwindet. Diese Welt der 
Natur, die immer so ist, wie sie ist, ist gewissermaßen der Hinergrund, von dem sich das Anders-Sein-
Könnende abhebt. Deshalb ist es verfehlt, zu sagen, es seien zwei Seinsgebiete (…). Vielmehr ist diese 
Unterscheidung die Welt und deren erste ontologische Gliederung überhaupt”. 
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because of the Greek understanding of being as “what exists always, what is 
constantly already there”854, that leads Aristotle to understand the being of human 
beings only negatively855, as what can be otherwise. Surely, “the Dasein of man is 
not something ordained to be aei”856, to be always, and Aristotle is conscious of 
that. However, the point was already made in the Natorp Bericht that this way of 
being that is alternative to the aei is not determined positively by Aristotle, i.e. it is 
not conceived in starting from the phenomenon in which it becomes apparent, 
namely “life [being] there for itself in the concrete how of the with-which of going 
about its dealings”857. The ‘always being changing’ of Dasein is only understood in 
relation to a more authentic kind of being which never changes858, and as a result 
its ontological characterization has no phenomenological validation: we are only 
understanding man derivatively from an ontology which does not account for our 
experience of ourselves as always in motion.  
“The leukon or the eythy is to auto aei, «always identical». These are onto-
logical determinations which are always what they are; therefore they are sophon, 
the object of sophia”859. But surely these determinations do not fit the 
phenomenon of ‘life being there for itself in concern’. This, rather, is accessible to 
phronēsis, which has proved to be a way of alētheuein that can grasp human 
existence, always on the way. “Sophia may indeed deal with the timiōtata, the 
highest beings; but these beings are not ones that concern man in his existence. 
                                               
854 GA 19 § 19 p. 137 [94] “was immer ist, was ständig schon da ist”.  
855 Cf. NB 385/37 [136]. 
856 GA 19 § 19 p. 136 [94] “Das Dasein des Menschen ist nicht etwas, das aei sein will”. 
857 NB 385/37 [136] “In der Umsicht ist das Leben da im konkreten Wie eines Womit des Umgangs”. 
858 Cf. ibidem “This ontological definition gets actualized through a negative comparison with another 
kind of being that is considered to be being in the authentic sense” (“Diese ontologische Charakteristik 
ist vollzogen im negierenden Gegenhalt gegen anderes und eigentliches Sein”). 
859 GA 19 § 19 p. 136 [94] “[D]as leukon oder das eythy ein to auto aei »immer identisch« ist; es sind 
solche Seinsbestimmungen, die immer sind, was sie sind: daher sind sie ein sophon, Gegenstand der 
sophia” Cf. NE VI 7, 1141a 23 ff.: “what is white (leukon) or straight (eythy) is always the same. [A]nyone 
would say that what is wise (to sophon) is the same but what is practically wise (to phronimon) is 
different”. 
 236 
What concerns man is Dasein itself, the akrotaton agathon anthrōpinon, namely 
eudaimonia”860. That is why, Heidegger argues, “phronēsis claims to be the highest 
mode of human knowledge”861, because it is concerned with human existence 
itself.  
But how could Aristotle confer this priority on phronēsis if beings in the 
most proper sense are for him and his contemporaries those which always are as 
they are, and man is in fact granted a share in this divine knowledge, no matter 
what the poets may say862? It would have the priority if it could actually be 
identified with sophia, i.e. if the mode of alētheuein required to disclose the being of 
human beings were the same as that required to disclose the being of things that 
cannot be otherwise. This identification “would be legitimate, provided man is 
ariston tōn en tō kosmō, i.e., provided he is, «of all the beings in the world, a being in 
the most proper sense»”863. But his being is not the highest way of being: he 
changes, while there are things that are “always identical”, about which we cannot 
deliberate, as phronēsis does864.  
As a result, an insurmountable abyss seems to separate sophia and phronēsis: 
what is always the same and what can be otherwise are split into two spheres of 
being, to be grasped in two radically different modes of alētheuein. But the really 
distressing problem is that being is not approached in a unitary sense from the 
                                               
860 GA 19 § 19 p. 135 [92] “Die sophia mag ja von den timiōtata, vom höchsten Seienden, handeln; aber 
dieses Seiende ist dasjenige, was den Menschen in seiner Existenz nicht angeht. Das, was den 
Menschen angeht, ist das Dasein selbst, das akrotaton agathon anthrōpinon, die eudaimonia”. Cf. NE VI 7, 
1141b 2f: “sophia is epistēmē, combined with nous, of the things that are highest by nature” (timiōtata). 
861 GA 19 § 18 p. 135 [93] “Denn die phronēsis erhebt von sich aus den Anspruch, die höchste 
Erkenntnisart des Menschen zu sein”. 
862 Cf. GA 19 § 18 for Heidegger’s comment on Aristotle’s apology of sophia in Met. I 2 and NE VI, X. 
For some of the references of Aristotle to poets or proverbs on this issue, Cf. Met I 2, 982b 30f 
(Simonides) 983a 4 (proverb) and NE X 7, 1177b 31ff. (implicit reference to Euripides and Pindar). 
863 GA 19 § 19 p. 136 [94, mod. tr.] “Die Identifizierung von phronēsis und sophia ware dann im Recht, 
falls der Mensch ariston tōn en tō kosmō ist, falls er das »eigentlich Seiende ist von dem, was in der Welt 
ist«”. Cf. NE VI 1141a 21f. 
864 Cf. NE VI 7, 1141b 8ff. 
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ground up, from the phenomena. As a result, a sense that can account for the 
embeddedness of ‘beings whose being is at stake in their own being’ within the 
sense of being in general is not obtained, and being is categorised into two 
excluding senses, one of which will be surreptitiously absorbed by the other, and 
this not on the basis of a phenomenological experience but of a determined idea 
of being: “sophia has the priority in relation to beings themselves, insofar as the 
beings with which it is concerned have for the Greeks ontological priority”865. 
As if that were not enough, because of its own structure, phronēsis does not 
seem ready to reply to the, as it were, ‘imperialist’ threat of sophia, as far as the 
ontological understanding of the being of Dasein is concerned. Phronēsis is 
absorbed in praxis, so it cannot actually develop any ontological reflection: 
Phronēsis is not a hexis meta logou monon, it is not a mere discussing that proceeds for its 
own sake, but instead, already in every word, in every saying it utters, it speaks of the 
prakton and for the sake of the prakton (…). «Phronēsis must have both»: alētheuein and 
praxis, «or, rather, the latter still more». Phronēsis dwells in praxis still more than in 
logos866. 
While theōrein, the activity of sophia, “is a completely autonomous 
comportment of Dasein”867, phronēsis instead “is not a hexis of alētheuein which is 
autonomous in itself and is only for the sake of disclosing»; on the contrary, it is a 
                                               
865 GA 19 § 19 p. 137 [94] “Die sophia hat den Vorrang in bezug auf das Seiende an ihm selbst, insofern 
das Seiende, auf das sie geht, griechisch seinsmäßig den Vorrang hat”. 
866 GA 19 § 20a p. [96] “Die phronēsis ist nicht hexis meta logou monon, sie ist nicht ein bloßes für sich 
laufendes Durchsprechen von etwas, sondern schon in jedem Wort, in jedem Spruch, den sie tut, 
spricht sie vom prakton und für dieses (…). »Die phronēsis muß beides haben«: das alētheuein und die 
praxis, »oder vielmehr diese noch mehr«. Die phronēsis ist in der praxis noch mehr als im logos”. Cf. NE 
VI 5, 1140b 28 and VI 7, 1141b 21f. Although the first sentence might suggest that Heidegger were 
here confusing phronēsis with practical philosophy (i.e. philosophical discourse about action), the rest of 
the quotation shows this not to be the case. Still, elsewhere in the course (GA 19 § 9a p. 57 [40]) he 
makes the point crystal clear: “phronēsis is not a speculation about the archē and the telos of acting as 
such; it is not an ethics and not a science, not a hexis meta logou monon” (“Die phronēsis ist keine 
Spekulation über die archē und das telos des Handelns als solche: sie ist keine Ethik und Wissenschaft, 
keine hexis meta logou monon”). Cf. also § 22 and our comment below. 
867 GA 19 § 16b p. 128 [88] “ein völliges eingeständiges Verhaltens des Daseins”. Cf. also § 17 p. 129 
[89]; § 24 pp. 165 ff. [114 ff]. 
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hexis of alētheuein which is praktikē”868. It is “indeed an alētheuein, but not an 
autonomous one. It is an alētheuein in service to praxis”869. While it does have a share in 
logos, because it is also “nous and noein and is a genuine disclosure of the archē”870, 
the archai that phronēsis discloses―namely praxeis―are ones that, differently from 
those of sophia, can be otherwise. According to the Greek understanding of being, 
this provides an additional reason on why phronēsis cannot be for Aristotle the best 
human form of alētheuein from the point of view of its ontological disclosing 
possibilities. 
7.3. Sharpening the Spear of Phronēsis 
Before searching for a way out of the confrontation between phronēsis and sophia, 
though, Heidegger still devotes §§ 20 to 23 to sharpen the peculiar traits of the 
structure of phronēsis. In his own notes for the course, he marks the beginning of 
this stage with the heading “To take phronēsis more radically”871. The point of 
departure of this “more radical” approach we have just commented: phronēsis is 
not a hexis meta logou monon. This is in fact a recapitulation of something already 
sustained in § 8, when Heidegger contrasted phronēsis with forms of alētheuein like 
poiēsis and epistēmē872. He now retrieves the point for the confrontation with sophia, 
which is nous kai epistēmē873. 
                                               
868 GA 19 § 8c p. 55 [39, mod. tr.] “»Aber die phronēsis ist keine hexis des alētheuein, die in sich 
eigenständig ist, die lediglich um des Aufdeckens willen ist«, sondern sie ist eine hexis des alētheuein, die 
praktikē ist” (Cf. NE VI, 5 1140b 28). Cf. also § 24 pp. 165 ff. [114 ff]. 
869 § 8b p. 53 [37] “Die phronēsis ist also zwar ein alētheuein, aber nicht ein eigenständiges, sondern ein alētheuein 
im Dienste der praxis”. 
870 GA 19 § 21 p. 143 [98] “Es wird sich zeigen, daß auch die phronēsis nous und noein, eigentliches 
Aufdecken der archē, ist”. 
871 Cf. GA 19 § 20 p. 138 note 1 [95] “phronēsis selbst radikaler nehmen”. 
872 GA 19 § 8c pp. 54-55 [38-39]. 
873 Cf. NE VI 7, 1141a 19. 
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While epistēmē does not have per se a grasp of the principles with which it 
operates, phronēsis does have a grasp of its principles, but these are quite different 
from those of epistēmē. Phronēsis “grasps the archai of the beings which are thematic 
in it, the archai of human zōē”874. In fact, Heidegger remarks, as much as being 
‘thematic’ implies being approached in a theoretical manner, i.e. from the outside, 
we cannot properly say that phronēsis has a ‘theme’875: 
[Phronēsis] is not a study of the situation in which I find myself (…). From the archē on, 
from what I want to do, from my decision to act, all the way up to the completed action itself, 
phronēsis belongs intrinsically to the action. In every step of the action, phronēsis is co-
constitutive876. 
Phronēsis is always in the situation, as it were, always on the stage, because 
deliberating on what to do is a constitutive ‘part’ of the indivisible continuity of 
the ‘action’―the praxis―that I am myself. This continuity is expressed by the 
overlapping of archē and telos in the exercise of phronēsis: “the archē with which 
phronēsis has to do is the action itself. And the telos which is taken into 
consideration in phronēsis is the action itself”877. Exactly like physis odos estin eis 
physin878, nature is a way towards nature, praxis is a way towards praxis: “this entire 
connection from the archē up to the telos is nothing else than the full being of the 
action itself”879. As much as we would not be grasping the full being of nature if 
we were to take it for the simple appearance of a natural being, regardless of its 
inseparability from generation and decay, we do not grasp the full being of praxis 
                                               
874 GA 19 § 21 p. 144 [99] “[D]ie phronēsis [bekommt in den Griff] die archai des Seienden, das ihr 
Thema ist, der zōē des Menschen”. 
875 Cf. GA 19 § 22a p. 146 [100]. 
876 GA 19 § 22a p. 147 [101] “[Phronēsis ist] kein Studium der Situation, in der ich mich befinde (…). 
Von der archē her, von dem, was ich will, von dem, wozu ich mich entschließe, bis zur vollendeten Handlung selbst gehört 
die phronēsis mit zur Handlung dazu. In jedem Schritt der Handlung ist die phronēsis mit konstitutiv”. 
877 GA 19 § 22a p. 148 [101] “Die archē, mit der die phronēsis zu tun hat, ist die Handlung selbst. Das 
telos, das in der phronēsis betrachtet wird, ist die Handlung selbst”. 
878 Physics II 1, 193b 13. 
879 GA 19 § 22a p. 148 [102] “Dieser ganze Zusammenhang von der archē bis zum telos ist nicht anderes 
als das volle Sein der Handlung selbst”. 
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if we cannot grasp it in what we have called elsewhere a ‘live picture’. Heidegger 
does not bring here into relief this structural connection between praxis and physis 
which we have already emphasized before, but the reference seems once more 
unavoidable. In fact, at least technē―which Aristotle contrasts with praxis as much 
as with physis―does appear in the reasoning; Heidegger recalls that “in the case of 
technē the telos is not the architect himself (…) The telos as ergon falls outside of 
technē”880. 
In contrast with this ‘falling outside’ (herausfallen), the consequence of 
deliberation is the action itself; “not some sort of proposition or cognition, but the 
bursting forth of the acting person as such. This shows how in phronēsis the ergon is also 
included and for its part belongs to the being of the acting person”881. That is 
indeed the reason why Aristotle uses not only ergon but also energeia to characterize 
human life, and specifically its fulfilment, eudaimonia. Heidegger, though, does not 
mention energeia here: he just contrasts the ‘falling outside’ of the ergon in poiēsis 
with the ‘falling inside’ of it in praxis. The term only appears later in § 25 where, in 
the context of a comment on Aristotle’s designation of eudaimonia as energeia, it is 
summarily―and surprisingly, in view of the contrast drawn here between the ergon 
of praxis and poiēsis―dispatched as meaning “nothing else than presence, pure 
immediate presence at hand”882, i.e. nothing else than the way of being of the erga 
of poiēsis. 
But the ‘more radical’ analysis of phronēsis is further pursued, now upon the 
concept of deliberation (bouleusthai), as contrasted in NE VI 9 with other modes of 
alētheuein. Heidegger specially lingers on Aristotle’s contrast between excellent de-
                                               
880 GA 19 § 22a p. 148 [101] “[D]as telos ist bei der technē nicht der Bausmeister selbst (…). Das telos qua 
ergon fällt aus der technē heraus”. 
881 GA 19 § 22a p. 150 [103] “[E]s ist nicht irgendein Satz, irgendeine Erkenntnis, sondern das 
Losbrechen des Handelnden als solchen. Damit ist gezeigt, wie in der phronēsis mit das ergon beschlossen liegt 
und sie ihrerseits zum Sein des Handelnden gehört”. 
882 GA 19 § 25a p. 172 [119] “Energeia besagt nichts anderes als Anwesenheit, reines unmittelbares 
Vorhandensein”. 
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liberation (euboulia) and opinion (doxa): “Doxa is not a seeking but instead is some-
thing one has. In having an opinion there resides already a certain phasis [assertion]: 
I am of the opinion that...; I am not seeking”883. In doxa, a raw version of epistēmē 
which in spite of its character of provisionality or ‘being on the way’, shares with 
epistēmē its basic ontological structure, I have an opinion, like I have a knowledge in 
epistēmē. This ‘having’ is there as something ready at hand (vorhanden) in the sense 
that it is in my hands to transfer the opinion or knowledge to someone else, who 
may of course refuse it as nonsense, but may welcome it and therefore come to 
have it. However, such a thing as having does not correspond to the ontological 
structure of deliberation: in deliberation I am seeking, I am making my way in life. 
Being (on the way), not having, describes the alētheuein of deliberation; or, in other 
words, being not as vorhanden but rather as inseparable from one’s own being, 
praxis. That is why, Aristotle argues, “excellence in deliberation (euboulia) is clearly 
a kind of correctness (orthotēs), but neither of epistēmē nor of doxa” (VI 9, 1142b 8f). 
The reason is that while it corresponds to epistēmē and correct doxa to have truth 
(alētheia), “not inquiry but already assertion (ou zētēsis alla phasis)” (b14), deliberation 
is “searching for something and calculating (zētei ti kai logizetai)” (b15).  
Heidegger infers that “bouleuesthai is in general directed to something, and 
precisely not to the alēthes but, as we said, to the boulē, to the being resolved”884. 
The point had been announced some lines above, in reference to excellence in 
deliberation: “Euboulia is not directed toward truth or falsity but primarily and 
exclusively toward being resolved”885. However, this is odd, since euboulia can 
imply either the restricted orthotēs of the one who is able to find the right means 
for the end one is longing for, regardless of the nature of this end―in such a way 
                                               
883 GA 19 § 22b p. 153 [105, mod. tr.] “Die doxa ist kein Suchen, sondern man hat die Ansicht. Im 
Ansicht-Haben liegt schon eine gewisse phasis: ich bin der Ansicht, daß…; ich suche nicht”. 
884 GA 19 § 22b p. 153 [105]. “Das Wesentliche ist jedoch, daß [das bouleuesthai] überhaupt ausgerichtet 
ist auf, und zwar nicht auf das alēthes, sondern, wie gesagt, auf die boulē, das Entschlossensein-zu”. 
885 Ibidem “Die euboulia ist nicht gerichtet auf die Wahrheit oder Falschheit, sondern primär und einzig 
auf das Entschlossensein-zu”. 
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that a man may deliberate correctly, with orthotēs, but yet get for himself a great evil 
(kakon)886, or also the orthotēs of phronēsis, which in addition ensures that the end 
toward which it correctly directs itself is agathon. Thus, when phronēsis is operating, 
there is alētheuein―truth is disclosed―and then deliberation is indeed directed 
toward truth or falsity, of course not in the narrow sense of a “determinate 
concept of scientificity”887, but according to the structure of the beings here 
disclosed, namely praxeis. Heidegger does linger in § 22c on this relation of euboulia 
to kakon and agathon, and acknowledges that only when guided by phronēsis does 
euboulia attain its utmost excellence. However, this challenges the point that 
euboulia would be just directed toward being resolved, to the exclusion of truth and 
falsity. Heidegger avoids relating alētheia to agathon and kakon, which however 
seems precisely the specific form of alētheia that Aristotle conceives as referred to 
praxis: being true as a feature of the how of the being of human beings. One might 
venture that, against his own warnings elsewhere, Heidegger is narrowing too 
much Aristotle’s idea of truth here, to exclude phronēsis from it. 
Heidegger finally shifts to the consideration of the prakton as eschaton, as 
something ultimate, which is to determine the specific structure of the nous of 
phronēsis, in contrast with that of the nous of sophia. In NE VI 11 Aristotle indeed 
grants nous a twofoldness: 
Nous is concerned with the ultimates in both directions; for both the primary 
definitions and the ultimates are objects of nous and not of argument, and in 
demonstrations nous has a grasp of the unchangeable and primary definitions (akinētōn 
horōn kai prōtōn), while in practical reasonings (en tais praktikais) it grasps the last and 
contigent fact (eschaton kai endechomenon) (VI 11, 1143a 35ff). 
While a grasp of archai such as the principle of non-contradiction (which is 
always as it is) is required to unfold a demonstration of things that are always as 
they are, a grasp of another kind of archai is required in the exercise of phronēsis, in 
                                               
886 Cf. NE VI 9, 1142b 19f. 
887 GA 19 §4a, p. 24 [17] Alētheia “richtet sich vielmehr nach dem Seienden selbst und nicht nach 
einem bestimmten Begriff von Wissenschaftlichkeit”. 
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practical affairs. The ‘theme’ of phronēsis is praxis, which can be always different 
(endechomenon), because of its belongingness to the kairos, because it is always 
brought into the particular occasion―i.e, last (eschaton)―by the kairos. In practical 
affairs, in addition to the theoretical knowledge that I may have about what would 
be desirable to do, I always have to decide what I am to do here and now, and this 
knowledge comes from nous, which Aristotle calls here a kind of perception 
(aisthēsis)888. Actually, this is not an isolated occurrence: up in NE VI 8, Aristotle 
develops this point, in a passage on which Heidegger concentrates his interest. 
What is at stake with this aisthēsis is not a perception in the restricted sense of 
apprehension of sensitive data889, but seeing states of affairs as a whole890. This is 
somehow similar to the aisthēsis that takes place in geometry: that perception “by 
which we perceive that the particular figure before us is a triangle; for in that 
direction too it comes to a stop (stēsetai)” (VI 8, 1142a 28f). When we perceive the 
triangle, it is not merely our eye that ‘sees’, as it would perceive a light in the dark, 
but our nous that ‘sees’, i.e. that understands, and thus comes to a stop. “Here it 
can still be said: phainetai, the things show themselves in this way. The only 
possibility here is to look on and, in looking, to grasp”891. But still, the aisthēsis of 
phronēsis is different from that of geometry, where “it is a sheer matter of pure 
onlooking and constatating”892. Phronēsis does not look at settled states of affairs like 
that of ‘there being a triangle before me’, but rather it creates always new states of 
affairs starting from the observation of states of affairs: “the aisthēsis of phronēsis is, 
as phronēsis, related to the prakta. It is, specifically, an ultimate inspection of the 
states of affairs, but this inspection is in phronēsis not a mere inspection (kein 
                                               
888 Cf. NE VI 11, 1143b 5. 
889 Cf. NE VI 8, 1142a 28: “not the perception of qualities peculiar to one sense”. 
890 Cf. GA 19 § 23b pp. 160-161 [110]. 
891 GA 19 § 23b p. 161 [111] “Es kann hier noch gesagt werden: phainetai, die Sache zeigt sich so. Es 
besteht einzig die Möglichkeit, hinzusehen und im Hinsehen zu erfassen”. 
892 GA 19 § 23b p. 163 [112] “In der Geometrie handelt es sich überhaupt nur um das reine 
betrachtende Feststellen”. 
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bloßes Hinsehen) but a circumspection (umsichtiges Hinsehen)”893: it is not “a study of 
the situation in which I find myself”894 but a questioning concerned, in the ‘here 
and now’, with the unfolding of one’s life through one’s praxis. 
7.4. Heidegger’s Place in the Gigantomachia 
At the end of § 23, Heidegger has sharpened enough the traits of phronēsis to make 
visible its clash with those of sophia, in the same terms in which the gigantomachia 
peri tēs ousias895 is framed: aisthēsis and noein as conflicting and excluding ways of 
grasping being: 
Phronēsis is the grasping of the this here now, the grasp of the concrete momentariness of 
the transient situation. As aisthēsis, it is a look of an eye in the blink of an eye, a 
momentary look (Augenblick) at what is momentarily concrete, which as such can 
always be otherwise. On the other hand, the noein in sophia is a looking upon that 
which is aei, that which is always present in sameness (immer in Selbigkeit gegenwärtig). Time 
―the momentary and the eternal (der Augenblick und das Immersein)―here functions to 
discriminate between the noein in phronēsis and the one in sophia896. 
Many elements in this course and elsewhere in Heidegger’s work in the 
1920s that make it tempting to think that Heidegger is directing his discussion in 
these pages towards an assimilation of sophia in phronēsis (Rosen)897, or putting 
forward a “hierarchical displacement” between them (Volpi)898, in which phronēsis 
would become the most authentic alētheuein for human beings. Among them we 
                                               
893 Loc. cit. “Die aisthēsis der phronēsis ist als phronēsis auf die prakta bezogen. Sie ist zwar ein letztes 
Hinsehen auf die Tatbestände, aber dieses Hinsehen ist in der phronēsis kein bloßes Hinsehen, sondern 
ein umsichtiges Hinsehen”. 
894 GA 19 § 22a p. 147 [101] “[Phronēsis ist] kein Studium der Situation, in der ich mich befinde”. 
895 Cf. Sophist 246a. 
896 GA 19 § 23c pp. 163-164 [113, mod. tr.] “Die phronēsis ist das Erblicken des Diesmaligen, der konkreten 
Diesmaligkeit der augenblicklichen Lage. Sie ist als aisthēsis der Blick des Auges, der Augenblick auf das jeweils 
konkrete, das als solches immer anders sein kann. Dagegen ist das noein in der sophia das Betrachten dessen, 
was aei ist, was immer in Selbigkeit gegenwärtig ist. Die Zeit ― der Augenblick und das Immersein ― 
fungiert hier als Discrimen des noein in phronēsis und sophia”. 
897 Cf. ROSEN, S. 2004 pp. 256 ff. 
898 Cf. VOLPI, F. 1994 p. 202. Cf. also 1984 pp. 93-94 and 2007b p. 37. 
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could mention the “doubling of the point of view (Doppelung der Hinsicht)”899 that, 
in the Natorp Bericht, Heidegger detected in Aristotle’s thematization of phronēsis; 
the play on the word Augenblick―which fits as well aisthēsis as kairos―and the link 
between presentness (Gegenwärtigkeit) and sophia in the paragraph above; or 
Heidegger’s statement that “phronēsis claims to be the highest mode of human 
knowledge”900. If that were the case, i.e. if he considered phronēsis as the highest 
form of alētheuein himself, Heidegger would be placed, in the gigantomachia peri tēs 
ousias, on the side of aisthēsis ―against noein. However, the confrontation does not 
end with an ‘enthronement’ of phronēsis. Heidegger does not intend to displace the 
hierarchy of phronēsis and sophia in Aristotle, but rather to explain why it is thus 
conceived by him. Which, of course, does not mean that he does not find such a 
state of affairs aporetical: 
One might suppose that, insofar as his own being, his own existence, is of decisive 
importance for a man, that being-true (Wahrsein) is the highest which relates to Dasein 
itself, and therefore phronēsis is the highest and most decisive mode of disclosure. Yet 
Aristotle says that sophia, pure understanding, is, with regard to its alētheuein (…), the 
highest possible mode of human existence901. 
Heidegger acknowledges that Aristotle’s decision on the superiority of 
sophia is shocking. But it does not seem to us to be the case that, against this 
decision, “Heidegger will time and again look for ways, both in and out of the 
Aristotelian opus, in which phronetic insight asserts its potential superiority over 
contemplative wisdom”902. Heidegger cannot place himself on either side of the 
controversy: not, for sure, on the side of a pure noein that is incapable of grasping 
                                               
899 Cf. NB 385/37 [136]. 
900 GA 19 § 18 p. 135 [93] “Denn die phronēsis erhebt von sich aus den Anspruch, die höchste 
Erkenntnisart des Menschen zu sein”. 
901 GA 19 § 24a p. 166 [114, mod. tr.] “Man möchte vermuten, daß, sofern für den Menschen sein 
eigenes Sein, seine eigene Existenz das Entscheidende ist, dasjenige Wahrsein das höchste ist, das sich 
auf das Dasein selbst bezieht, daß also die phronēsis das höchste und entscheidende Aufdecken ist. 
Trotzdem sagt Aristoteles: Die sophia, das reine Verstehen, ist hinsichtlich ihres alētheuein (…) die 
höchste”. 
902 KISIEL, T. 1993 p. 303. 
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the way of being of Dasein, nor on the side of an aisthēsis like that of phronēsis 
which, for all its ability to grasp the concrete momentariness (Diesmaligkeit) of 
Dasein, is restricted to the direction of praxis, not to its ontological determination: 
“it is an alētheuein in service to praxis”903. Concerning Sein und Zeit, which does not 
necessarily determine what is going on here, but which we cannot just ignore, 
Gonzalez has argued that “if the analysis of Dasein’s being were not purely 
«preliminary» to the addressing of the question of being in general, then we 
perhaps could find in Heidegger a complete reversal of Aristotle’s ranking of 
sophia above phronēsis”904. And, as a matter of fact, Heidegger’s Endstation is not the 
being of Dasein: 
What is common to both the Aristotelian and Heideggerian conceptions of sophia is 
that the highest possibility of human existence is sought in its relation to something 
«outside» itself, specifically, to being, whether understood as eternal presence or oth-
erwise905. 
The way in which Aristotle allegedly understands sophia, due to the Greek 
understanding of being, makes it impossible for Heidegger to welcome it as the 
suitable way to uncover being, precisely because it ignores the structure of Dasein, 
the being who can entertain this uncovering. That is why since 1922 he 
investigates all the possibilities opened up by the Doppelung der Hinsicht that the 
discovery of phronēsis entails. However, phronēsis cannot point beyond the being of 
Dasein himself, so that the finding of a third way between phronēsis and sophia is 
required. It is in this respect that in Sein und Zeit “«Theory» and «praxis»” are only 
considered as “possibilities of being for a being whose being must be defined as 
                                               
903 § 8b p. 53 [37] “Die phronēsis ist also zwar ein alētheuein, aber nicht ein eigenständiges, sondern ein alētheuein 
im Dienste der praxis”. 
904 GONZALEZ, F. J. 1997 p. 31. Cf. also SZ § 41 p. 193, where it is stated that care (Sorge), the 
essential character of Dasein, “by no means expresses a priority of «practical» over theoretical behavior” 
(“Das Phänomen [der Sorge] drückt daher keineswegs einen Vorrang des »praktischen« Verhaltens vor 
dem theoretischen aus”). 
905 GONZALEZ, F. J. 1997 p. 31. 
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care (Sorge)”906. Heidegger finds the ontological key that he is looking for neither 
in sophia nor in phronēsis as they are understood by Aristotle907. Therefore, in GA 19 
Heidegger does not long for the victory of either of the factions of the 
gigantomachia peri tēs ousias; rather he intends to win them over to the search for a 
reinterpretation of sophia908. As Sadler puts it, “Heidegger does not take offence at 
the higher authority of sophia (…). [He] does not reject, but rather reformulates, 
the supreme question addressed by sophia, viz., the question of ‘being qua 
being’”909. 
The tension that Heidegger believes to detect between phronēsis and sophia, 
and which he makes his best to show in its dramatic force, is precisely the frame 
within which a new understanding of being is to come about. In this respect, we 
believe Gadamer to be right in his remark that Heidegger would be following the 
Platonic saying that one should always make stronger the position of one’s 
opponent910, although the seriousness with which Heidegger takes the dilemma is 
mainly directed at grasping the fundamental limitation of his opponent: the 
ontology of Aristotle would remain submissive to an unquestioned idea of being 
as Vorhandenheit in spite of the ontological possibilities unveiled by the 
                                               
906 SZ § 41 p. 193 “»Theorie« und »Praxis« sind Seinsmöglichkeiten eines Seienden, dessen Sein als 
Sorge bestimmt werden muß”. 
907 Long seems to us to read Heidegger’s interpretation as though he were to choose between sophia 
and phronēsis as defined by Aristotle. This leads him to regret the fact that Heidegger gives priority to sophia 
because, he argues, “[this] endorsement prevents [Heidegger] from considering the economy of values 
that has historically determined this priority”. Aristotle, he adds, “offers ontology the tool by which to 
extricate itself from the hegemony of sophia”, namely phronēsis. Long remains in the dichotomy because 
he does not perceive how Heidegger is searching for a kind of fusion of both determinations, and thus 
somehow naïvely concludes that Heidegger has missed the way out of traditional ontology just because 
he does not enthrone phronēsis (Cf. LONG, C. 2002 p. 36). 
908 Cf. GONZALEZ, F. J. 1997 p. 26. 
909 SADLER, T. 1996 p. 147. Cf. also, in this interpretive line, BROGAN, W. 2005 p. 140, and “A 
Response to Bernasconi’s «Heidegger’s Destruction of Phronesis»” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 28, 
Supplement (1989) pp. 149-153 (esp. p. 152); LARIVÉE, A. et al. 2001 p. 47. 
910 GADAMER, H.-G. 1987a  p. 199. Cf. Sophist 246d. 
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characterization of phronēsis, which are capable of blowing up (sprengen) the 
traditional categories of being911.  
To overcome Aristotle means to be able to bring the antithesis between 
aisthēsis and noein in the gigantomachia peri tēs ousias to a synthesis: aisthēsis and noein as 
a single movement, as the indissoluble totality (unzerreißbare Ganzheit) of Sorge912. 
Or, in other words, it means to understand that ontology is only possible as 
phenomenology913: that “one must appropriate [the ground of aisthēsis] explicitly and 
not leap beyond it to a reality which is simply fabricated by theory (…). One must 
fasten onto precisely the kath hekaston of aisthēsis and admit it as the first factual 
state of beings”914. This is the task that, according to Heidegger, would have been 
forsaken by Aristotle, who cannot help dividing being into two spheres, because 
he does not find the right way to conceive them in their unity: 
Sophia is Dasein’s positionality toward the beings of the world in the full sense. 
Phronēsis is Dasein’s positionality towards the beings which are themselves Dasein. 
With this, however, the question arises precisely as to the meaning of being which 
provides the guiding line, on the basis of which Aristotle reaches the point that he 
can attribute to sophia a priority over phronēsis915. 
                                               
911 Cf. EPR § 10 in GA 60 p. 54 [36]. Later in 1939 Heidegger will find these possibilities in physis, 
which then takes up the place of phronēsis. 
912 Cf. SZ § 41 p. 193. 
913 Cf. SZ § 7c p. 35: “Phenomenology is the way of access to, and the demonstrative manner of 
determination of, what is to become the theme of ontology. Ontology is only possible as phenomenology” 
(“Phänomenologie ist Zugangsart zu dem und die ausweisende Bestimmungsart dessen, was Thema 
der Ontologie werden soll. Ontologie ist nur als Phänomenologie möglich”). Cf. also GA 20 § 6d p. 98 [72]. 
914 GA 19 § 12b p. 85 [59] “[M]an muß sich diesen Boden ausdrücklich zueignen, ― und nicht über die 
von einer Theorie aus als schlecht angesetzte Realität hinwegspringen (…). Gerade das kath hekaston 
der aisthēsis muß man in den Griff bekommen und an ihm den ersten Tatbestand des Seienden 
aufnehmen”. Cf. also § 14 p. 98 [68], and GA 24 p. 466 [327] “No understanding of being is possible 
that would not root in a comportment toward beings” (“Kein Seinsverständnis ist möglich, das nicht in 
einem Verhalten zu Seiendem wurzelte”). 
915 GA 19 § 23c p. 164 [113] “Sofern sie Weisen des Daseins sind, machen sie dessen Seinsart aus: die 
sophia sein Gestelltsein zum Seienden der Welt in vollem Sinne, die phronēsis sein Gestelltsein zum 
Seienden als je eigenem Dasein. Damit aber stellt sich gerade die Frage, welches der Sinn von Sein ist, 
der den Leitfaden abgibt, auf Grund dessen Aristoteles dazu kommt, der sophia gegenüber der phronēsis 
den Vorrang zuzusprechen”. 
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7.5. Phronēsis and Sophia: Medicine and Health? 
Now that we have delineated which is to our mind the, as it were, ‘outsider’ posi-
tion of Heidegger in this gigantomachia, we can approach his own representation of 
the confrontation about being in §§ 24-25, which rather than the fury of a war has 
the coldness of a post mortem inspection of the battlefield. Heidegger calls up in the 
first place a point upon which he has insisted before in the course, namely that 
phronēsis is not autonomous because it is embedded in praxis―it is a hexis 
praktikē916. The point is reinforced by referring to Aristotle’s statements that the 
good “does not show itself (phainesthai) but to the good man (agathos)” (VI 12, 
1144a 34) and that “it is impossible to be phronimos without being good” (a36 f)917. 
Insofar as phronēsis is tied to one’s behaviour, it is not autonomous. On the other 
hand, “sophia is indeed autonomous, but what is thematic in it is the aei, hence that which 
has nothing to do with genesis, whereas human Dasein has its being in being genesis, 
praxis, kinēsis”918. 
Aristotle actually addresses the decision on which is to be the best mode of 
alētheuein for human beings. According to Heidegger, he comes to grips with it by 
transferring the discussion “back to a purely ontological level”, i.e. by considering 
these modes of being “precisely as modes of being”919. And  this actually seems to 
be the case: Aristotle holds that phronēsis and sophia “are worthy of choice because 
they are the excellences of the two parts of the soul respectively, even if they do 
not produce (poiēin) anything” (VI 12, 1144a 1ff). Yet, he adds, “they do produce 
                                               
916 Cf. § 8b p. 53 [37]; § 8c p. 55 [39]. 
917 Cf. GA 19 § 24a p. 166 [114]. 
918 GA 19 § 24a p. 164 [115, mod. tr.] “Die sophia ist zwar eigenständig, aber das, was bei ihr im Thema steht, 
ist das aei, also das, was überhaupt nichts mit der genesis zu tun hat, während doch das menschliche 
Dasein sein Sein darin hat, genesis, praxis, kinēsis zu sein”. Heidegger quotes NE VI 13, 1143b 18 ff: 
“sophia will contemplate none of the things that will make a man happy (for it is not concerned with 
any genesis)”.   
919 GA 19 § 24b p. 168 [116] “Aristoteles [verlegt] die Erörterung dieser ganzen Frage auf eine rein 
ontologische Betrachtung [zurück]”. “Die Fragestellung (…) ist solange unangemessen, als man nicht diese 
Seinsarten selbst als Seinsarten betrachtet”. 
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something, not as the art of medicine (iatrikē) produces health (hygieia), however, 
but as health produces health” (a3-4). This is a difficult passage, because in spite 
of the fact that Aristotle uses the third person of the plural (poiousi), the text 
follows “so [i.e. as health produces health] does sophia produce happiness; for, 
being a part of excellence entire (meros tēs holēs aretēs), by being possessed and by 
actualizing itself (tō echesthai kai tō energein) it makes a man happy” (a4 ff). Although 
Heidegger reads the text as though Aristotle were referring this metaphorical 
poiēin, this ‘bringing into being’ (zum Sein bringen) only to sophia, there are a couple 
of reasons why we think Aristotle is referring here also to phronēsis. The most 
important is of strictly phenomenological order and has been thoroughly 
developed elsewhere, namely that praxis―to which phronēsis structurally belongs―is 
generated from praxis itself, analogously to how things occur in physis, and in 
contrast to the genesis of erga in poiēsis. Aristotle’s thorough effort to distinguish 
praxis from poiēsis in NE VI and to distinguish physis from poiēsis in the Physics and 
the Metaphysics is guided by this conviction. Secondly, the text adds: “Again, the 
ergon of man is achieved only in accordance with phronēsis as well as with ethikē 
aretē” (a6 f), which implies that while sophia may make man happy, it cannot do so 
without phronēsis, and that is why Aristotle states above that sophia is only “a part of 
excellence entire”, a part of the ergon of man. Yet an objection to this 
interpretation seems to rise in view of the remark, at the very end of NE VI, that 
phronēsis “is not supreme (kyria) over sophia (…) any more than the art of medicine 
is over health; for it does not use it but provides for its coming into being” (1145a 
6-9). Does this imply that the structure of phronēsis is like that of medicine, i.e. that 
of a poiēsis?  
A nearby text, which also seems to compare phronēsis with medicine, can 
shed light on this: just before transferring the discussion “back to a purely 
ontological level”, i.e. regarding phronēsis and sophia as ways of being, in the context 
of his comment about the uselessness of phronēsis for those who are not good, 
Aristotle says: “it would be enough for us to do what we do in the case of health; 
though we wish to become healthy, yet we do not learn the art of medicine”  
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(VI 12, 1143b 31ff), we just ask those who have that art. However, in the case of 
phronēsis it is not enough to ask the doctor, because phronēsis is not generated like 
medicine generates health, but as health does. Phronēsis is not a knowledge that can 
be just ‘had’, and thus transferred―it is a knowledge that one ‘is’, and one comes 
to ‘be’ it by ‘being’ it; one ‘has’ it as something that one ‘is’. As is the case of sophia, 
being possessed and actualizing itself (tō echesthai kai tō energein)” (1144 a6) are for 
phronēsis one and the same thing. If Aristotle is using the art of medicine here it is 
precisely to say what phronēsis is not per se. And while later in the text he does 
compare phronēsis with medicine, again he is not speaking of phronēsis per se: what is 
now at stake is the relation of phronēsis to sophia. Phronēsis cannot be higher than 
sophia for a strong reason that has been developed elsewhere in section I920: we 
cannot deliberate about what cannot be otherwise921, we cannot just decide how 
we would like our being, and being in general, to be. To maintain the supremacy 
of phronēsis “would be like saying that the art of politics rules the gods because it 
issues orders about all the affairs of the state”922. Analogously to how politics 
issues orders for the sake of the agathon of the polis but not to it, phronēsis issues 
orders for the sake of the agathon, but not to it923. Heidegger recognizes after 
Aristotle that it is hard to strike the mesotēs, which implies that, while there is no 
such thing as an agathon over and above beings, but instead the agathon in beings, 
phronēsis cannot give orders to the agathon: it can only search for it. This non-
disposability of agathon is what we believe Aristotle to be expressing when he says, 
in the wide ontological sense of being, that phronēsis issues orders for the sake of 
sophia, but not to it. Because sophia represents our relation to what cannot be the 
                                               
920 Cf. paragraph 2.6, pp. 76 ff. 
921 Cf. NE VI 7, 1141b 10f. 
922 NE VI 13, 1145a 10f. We understand this statement from a strictly ontological point of view (which 
however, to our mind, does not necessarily prevent it from having a religious application), according to 
Heidegger’s frequent emphasis on the fact the theiōn denotes “simply the higher mode of being of a 
being” (Cf. GA 19 § 19 p. 137 [94]). Cf. also NE VI 7, 1141a 20ff: “it would be strange to think that 
the art of politics, or phronēsis, is the best knowledge, since man is not the best thing of the world”. 
923 NE VI 13, 1145a 9ff. 
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object of deliberation, what is not ours to change, phronēsis cannot just be 
normative for it―reality, instead, is the norm. 
Still, although pantes anthrōpoi tou eidenai oregontai physei924, the ergon of man 
would be left unachieved without phronēsis (1144a 6f)925. How phronēsis provides for 
the genesis of sophia is left hanging in the air by Aristotle, but what remains is that 
sophia cannot do without phronēsis; and also, according to our analysis, that phronēsis 
is generated as health is generated. The comparison of phronēsis with medicine at 
the end of NE VI does not imply that phronēsis has the technical structure of 
medicine―it does not therefore seem enough to us to overturn the whole of 
Aristotle’s characterization of phronēsis as distinct and higher than technē926. We 
would find it more reasonable to see in this latter comment a certain oversight of 
the possible implications of the comparison on the part of Aristotle than a 
fundamental slip-up revealing an unthought background of his idea of phronēsis. 
Otherwise, it is odd that Heidegger, who up to here has so thoroughly maintained 
the specificity of phronēsis before technē, to the unnecesary extent of tearing them 
apart, now tends to conceive of phronēsis as a technē in order to distinguish it from 
sophia. 
We have lingered on the textual analysis because Heidegger is here be-
stowing a great importance to the letter of the text: he is actually sorting out why 
Aristotle decides to give priority to sophia. Heidegger ignores the plural of poiousi, 
he restricts to sophia this peculiar poiēin which ‘brings into being’ as health 
generates health, and instead links phronēsis to medicine (iatrikē). This, he argues, 
                                               
924 Met. I 1, 980a 21. 
925 Cf. also Politics VII 1, 1323b 21ff: “each one has just so much of happiness as he has of aretē and 
phronēsis, and of excellent and wise actions (kai tou prattein kata tautas)”. 
926 Met. V 26, 1023b 34f “Of these things themselves, those which are so by nature (physei) are wholes 
in a higher degree than those which are so by art (technē)”. We consider it to have been thoroughly 
shown that praxis and phronēsis only come to be already as a whole, already ‘assembled’ (a term which 
properly belongs to technē, because there is no assembling of it: the whole of it arises), and we do not 
think Aristotle is forgetting this fundamental determination here. 
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“will decide the priority of sophia”927, because “a higher way of being healthy is 
health itself”928. The theōrein of sophia, unlike the prattein of phronēsis, does not have 
a further goal. Phronēsis, Heidegger argues, “leads and guides all human acting, but 
it is still referred to something else (auf etwas anderes angewiesen), namely the action 
itself”929.  
To be sure, later in NE X Aristotle implies that “from practical activities 
(de tōn praktikōn) we gain more or less apart from the action (para tēn praxin)” (X 7, 
1177b 3f). However, as we have argued elsewhere930, this statement includes two 
senses of praxis: while ‘practical activities’ (ta praktika) means all those activities 
that are not theoretical, ‘action’ (praxis) concerns as much ta praktika as theōrein. 
Aristotle is not playing theōria and praxis against one another, because theōria is a 
specific praxis, but comparing two ways of living (bioi)931: political life, which 
primarily requires phronēsis, and contemplative life, which requires both phronēsis 
and sophia. ‘Political life’ does not concern the structure of praxis, but the content of a 
life devoted to practical affairs, in the restricted sense of praxis as external actions. 
And ‘contemplative life’, similarly, is not a life that excludes praxis, but a life 
mainly devoted to the specific praxis of theōrein. The wide structural sense of praxis, 
which encompasses more than just external actions, that in which “the mind is 
most truly to act (prattein)”932, includes contemplative life. It is because the praxis 
of theōrein better renders the specific character of praxis as autotelic, i.e. generating 
itself as health does, that Aristotle implies that it is a higher praxis.  
                                               
927 GA 19 § 24b p. 169 [116] “An diesem poiēin wird sich ontologisch der Vorrang der sophia 
entscheiden”. 
928 GA 19 § 24b p. 170 [117] “Eine höhere Art des Gesundseins ist aber die Gesundheit selbst”. 
929 GA 19 § 24b p. 170 [117, our e, mod. tr.] “Die phronēsis leitet und führt jedes menschliche Handeln, 
ist aber auf etwas anderes noch angewiesen, nämlich die Handlung selbst”. 
930 Cf. our pp. 79 ff. above and NATALI, C. 2001 pp. 112-176 , esp. pp. 135 and 165. 
931 Aristotle “is not here examining the relations between the dianoetic virtues phronēsis and sophia, and 
their respective realizations, as in NE VI 13. Rather, he is contrasting two ways of living, the 
«philosophical» and the «political»” (Ibidem p. 135). 
932 Cf. Politics VII 3, 1325b 21ff.  
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In any case, it is surprising that after having held that “the object of the 
deliberation is zōē itself; [that] the telos has the same ontological character as 
phronēsis”933, or later, that phronēsis “belongs intrinsically to the action”934, 
Heidegger now contends that the action is “something else” than phronēsis. Surely, 
this applies for action in the restricted sense of what comes out, but not in the 
structural sense of praxis. If Heidegger now returns to the restricted sense of 
praxis, it is only to link phronēsis to the structure of medicine, and to reserve for 
sophia the structure of health, i.e. that in which being and producing are one and 
the same (health produces health through one’s own being healthy), which for 
Aristotle is a more fulfilled way of being. Only thus, by keeping phronēsis detached 
from this model, can the tension of the gigantomachia be preserved. 
Nevertheless, we cannot yet understand to what extent sophia can be compared to 
human health, i.e. to what extent the comportment which is nothing but the 
disclosure of the everlasting constitutes the proper being of man. We can come to 
understand it only on the basis of the Greek concept of being935. 
Because the contemplative life is argued in NE X to be the one that best 
fulfils eudaimonia, and Aristotle time and again insists that eudaimonia is energeia, 
Heidegger decidedly applies what he considers to be the Greek concept of being 
to energeia. In GA 18, as we have seen, Anwesenheit was rather centered on 
entelecheia, and the account of energeia was more ambivalent, although ultimately 
subordinate to it. Here, however, energeia “means nothing else than presence, pure 
immediate presence at hand”936. As a result, eudaimonia is “the presence of the fin-
                                               
933 GA 19 § 8a p. 49 [34] “Bei der phronēsis ist vielmehr der Gegenstand des Überlegens die zōē selbst; das 
telos ist vom selben Seinscharakter wie die phronēsis”. Cf. NE VI 5, 1140 b 6f; Cf. also DWA pp. 13-14 
[229]; GA 18 § 17c p. 189 [128]. 
934 GA 19 § 22a p. 147 [101] “Von der archē her, von dem, was ich will, von dem, wozu ich mich 
entschließe, bis zur vollendeten Handlung selbst gehört die phronēsis mit zur Handlung dazu”. 
935 GA 19 § 24b pp. 170-171 [117] “Aber trotzdem ist nicht verständlich, inwiefern die sophia mit dem 
Gesundsein des Menschen verglichen werden kann, d.h. inwiefern das Verhalten, das das Aufdecken 
des Immerseins ist, das eigentliche Sein des Menschen ausmacht. Das verstehen wir nur aus dem Sinn 
des Seinsbegriffs der Griechen”. 
936 GA 19 § 25a p. 172 [119] “Energeia besagt nichts anderes als Anwesenheit, reines unmittelbares 
Vorhandensein”. 
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ished state (Fertiganwesendsein) of the living being with regard to its highest possi-
bility of being”937. Heidegger further tightens this up with the definition of 
eudaimonia in NE I: psychēs energeia tis kat aretēn teleian (I 13, 1102 a 5f), which he 
translates according to the same conception of telos deployed in GA 18: “the pure 
presence at hand of the living being with regard to its ultimately actualized 
possibility of being”938. Although we have extensively argued why this static idea 
of energeia does not seem to us to fit Aristotle’s mind, and why it does not allow 
energeia to fully unfold its phenomenological and ontological potential, the point 
cannot be overemphasized. Heidegger’s paraphrase of the definition of eudaimonia 
in NE I is definitely consistent with his thesis on what Aristotle and the Greeks 
generally understand by being, but it does not pay heed to Aristotle’s constant 
emphasis in the NE on the performative character of eudaimonia, a character for 
which he reserves the terms energeia and praxis. The issue is patently raised in a 
passage of that same book, on which we have lingered above:  
[I]t makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good [i.e. 
eudaimonia] in possession (ktēsis) or use (chrēsis), in state (hexis) or in activity (energeia). 
For the state may exist without producing any good result, as is a man who is asleep 
or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has the ac-
tivity (energeia) will of necessity be acting (prattein), and acting well (eu prattein).  (I 8, 
1098b 31ff.)939.  
Whoever has an energeia―and eudaimonia is an energeia―will necessarily be 
acting, because energeia cannot exist without ‘producing’ any ‘result’. Human life, 
we have said, is a kinēsis, an energeia atelēs: man cannot exist without changing. 
Because our being is praxis, there are no parts of it which could be set aside from 
its kinēsis. Dasein is, as Heidegger puts it in GA 18, “such a being that, in its being, 
                                               
937 GA 19 § 25a p. 172 [119] “Die eudaimonia ist also das Fertiganwesendsein des Lebenden hinsichtlich 
seiner höchsten Seinsmöglichkeit”. 
938 GA 19 § 25a p. 172 [119] “[D]ie reine Gegenwart des Lebenden hinsichtlich seiner zu Ende 
gebrachten Seinsmöglichkeit”. 
939 Cf. also NE I 8, 1098 b 21f “Happiness as a sort of living and faring well (eupraxia)”; IX 9, 1169b 
29: “[H]appiness consists in life and activity (tō zēn kai energein)”; Politics VII 3 1325a 32: “happiness is 
activity (praxis)”.   
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depends upon its being, explicitly or inexplictly”940: even if we are not conscious 
of it, even if we are conscious of it but we do not like the fact, our praxis is in a 
constant restructuring. Energeia is chrēsis, not ktēsis, “not a thing that we possess all 
the time, like a piece of property (ktēma)”941, like something handy. Energeia is our 
own being, and for that reason it is not in our hands to make it forget942, i.e. to 
remove any part of it, as we would remove a finished ergon from a shelf. It is not in 
our hands to still the stream of praxis like we cease the process of a poiēsis, and for 
that reason in praxis we do not bring into play “a settled completeness”, but rather 
we are “acting anew in every moment”943: the structure of our being is not ‘to be 
ready (Fertig) for something’, but to be always on the way, to be always new. 
This connection between energeia and praxis meant by Aristotle is allowed 
to come out in the first lessons of GA 18. Energeia, Heidegger says there, is “a how 
of being, such a way of being that has the being-character of praxis”944. However, 
the connection, scarcely developed in those first lessons, is now left in the shade. 
But light must be shed on it: if energeia has no less to do with the kairos of phronēsis 
than with the aei of sophia, Aristotle’s elucidation of the superiority of sophia over 
phronēsis seems not so much a gigantomachia that splits being into two spheres as a 
recognition that, although we are always otherwise, it is not ours to deliberate 
about what cannot be otherwise945, e.g., for our purpose, the fact that we are 
always otherwise.  
                                               
940 GA 18 § 12a p. 95 [65] “[Dasein ist] ein solches Seindes, in dessen Sein es ausdrücklich oder 
unausdrücklich auf sein Sein ankommt”. Cf. also § 17c p. 180 [121-122]. 
941 NE IX 9, 1169b 29f (Rackham). 
942 GA 19 § 8c p. 56 [39] “Bei der phronēsis gibt es nicht die Verfallensmöglichkeit des Vergessens”. 
943 Cf. GA 18 § 17c p. 189 [128] “Wiederholung besagt nicht: Ins-Spiel-Bringen einer festsitzenden 
Fertigkeit, sondern in jedem Augenblick neu aus dem entsprechenden Entschluß heraus handeln”. 
944 GA 18 § 10b p. 70 [50] “Energeia ein Wie des Seins, eines solchen Seins vom Seinscharakter der 
praxis”. 
945 Cf. NE VI 7, 1141b 10f. 
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The fundamental aporia that Heidegger believes to detect in Aristotle’s 
decision in favour of sophia is the fact that what is thematic in it is the aei, 
“whereas human Dasein has its being in being genesis, praxis, kinēsis”946. However, 
Heidegger cannot be implying that, because our being is kinēsis, this very same 
determination is subject itself to kinēsis, i.e. our being may be kinēsis today, but may 
be something else tomorrow. If the aei has nothing at all to do with the being of 
Dasein, then there is no point in stating anything about it, not even to say that its 
being is kinēsis. If we cannot say that the being of Dasein is always kinēsis, regardless 
of what we do and say, then we cannot grasp its being. 
Heidegger’s interpretation, both in GA 18 and GA 19, sets all its emphasis 
on the immediate and always dynamic character of our being, as distinct from 
what stands apart from us as available. But Heidegger cannot help implying that a 
certain dimension of the how of our being is not available to us: we may deliberate 
and decide how to act, but we cannot deliberate and decide on whether our 
actions are to restructure our being or not; we are the modelers of our praxis, but 
we are not the modelers of ‘our being praxis’. Paraphrasing Aristotle on ‘being 
white’, it is not because we think that we are praxis, that we are praxis, but because we are 
praxis that we who say this have the truth947. In this respect, Heidegger’s 
characterization of Dasein in Sein und Zeit as a “thrown project” (geworfener 
Entwurf)948 is straight to the point. The thrownness (Geworfenheit) or facticity of 
Dasein is as essential as its possibility (Möglichkeit) to the understanding of its sense 
of being. 
The entire project of fundamental ontology hinges on the assumption that 
we do not create the sense of being, but rather can come to uncover and 
                                               
946 GA 19 § 24a p. 164 [115, mod. tr.] “[D]as menschliche Dasein sein Sein darin hat, genesis, praxis, 
kinēsis zu sein”. Cf. NE VI 13, 1143b 19f.   
947 Cf. Met. IX 10, 1051b 6ff. 
948 Cf. SZ § 58 p. 285. 
 258 
safeguard it. For that reason Heidegger, like Aristotle, preserves the priority of 
sophia for the task of disclosing the sense of being949. Still, because we cannot 
come to understand neither our own being nor being in general by stepping aside 
from our own thrownness, sophia has to be conceived in such a way that it fits our 
way of being, and it is to this point that Heidegger believes Aristotle has not 
arrived. Sophia is not conceived by Aristotle in such a way that it may grasp being 
in a way according to the structure of Dasein, i.e. one that is capable to account as 
much for the being of Dasein as for being in general. Aristotle’s sophia, Heidegger 
contends, leaps directly into the safety of the aei, of beings which are always as 
they are, and is thus incapable of grasping the unity between Dasein and world 
through which we can come to ask at all about being: the unified phenomenon of 
‘being in the world’ (In-der-Welt-sein)950: 
The expression bin is connected with bei. Ich bin (I am) means I dwell, I stay near… 
the world as something familiar in such and such a way (…). Being-in is thus the formal 
existential expression of the being of Dasein which has the essential constitution of being-in the 
world951. 
Dasein first and foremost finds itself as being in the world952, and it is 
starting from this phenomenon, in which ‘I’ and the world appear together, that 
the sense of being is to be pursued. According to Heidegger’s account, Aristotle 
would have missed―under the influence of the Greek sense of being―the 
ontological relevance of his phenomenological description of phronēsis, in which 
this ‘finding oneself’ would have appeared genuinely. However, we would like to 
argue that precisely this ‘finding oneself’ of phronēsis traces its roots back to the 
fundamental experience described in the elucidation of energeia in Metaphysics IX 6, 
1048b 18-35.  This point has been actually working in our argument in the form 
                                               
949 Cf. notes 905 and 909 above. 
950 Cf. SZ § 12 p. 53. 
951 SZ § 12 p. 54. “Der Ausdruck »bin« hängt zusammen mit »bei«; »ich bin« besagt wiederum: ich 
wohne, halte mich auf bei ... der Welt, als dem so und so Vertrauten. (…) In-Sein ist demnach der formale 
existenziale Ausdruck des Seins des Daseins, das die wesenhafte Verfassung des In-der-Welt-seins hat”. 
952 Cf. “Der Begriff der Zeit” (1924) in GA 64 p. 114 [205]. 
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of a telos, as telos is in praxis and physis―it has been imparting a direction on our 
thesis which can only now fully unfold. What has been working as a hypothesis up 
to here, can now appear as a way out of the dilemma that Heidegger believes to 
find in Aristotle, i.e. as a possibility to enrich the returns of this Auseinandersetzung 
on the way to Sein und Zeit. 
 
8. Revisiting Metaphysics IX:  
Hexis, Energeia and Time  
 
The clash between the paradigms of the aei and the kairos that is at the center of 
the gigantomachia between phronēsis and sophia at the end of the ‘Aristotle 
introduction’ in GA 19 ultimately has its roots in the alleged tension between 
Aristotle’s ethical and metaphysical concepts. We have suggested that emphasizing 
the performative sense of energeia―which beyond the mere sense of appearing, of 
being there (da), permeates not only Aristotle’s ethics, but also other works such 
as his Physics and his Metaphysics―may question the inevitability of this conflict. 
While he obviously knew Aristotle’s connection between praxis and energeia, 
nowhere in his interpretation in 1922-24 does Heidegger make thematic the 
connection of this performative sense of energeia with the performative structure 
that he thoroughly detects in the ethics. We have analyzed above the point at 
which he probably gets closer to dwell on it953: in the important § 17 of GA 18 on 
hexis, he refers to the definition of hexis as an energeia in Metaphysics V 20, but he 
only reads energeia as “being-present”954. Thus seen, energeia actually does not seem 
to offer much for the understanding of the temporal structure of hexis and praxis, 
which is rather found in the phenomenon of striking the mesotēs. Through the 
mesotēs we surely gain insight into the kairological experience of praxis: we grasp 
our being from the inside, from our own experience of it. However, how to hold 
together the need of experiencing of our being in the kairos and the fact that our 
being is ever “stretching across time”955? How are we to avoid, in our ontological account, 
the reduction of being to our experience of it in the now? 
                                               
953 Cf. pp. 213 ff. above. 
954 GA 18 § 17a pp. 174-175 [118] “Hexis ist die energeia, »das eigentliche Da, das Gegenwärtigsein des 
Habenden und des Gehabten«”. 
955 GA 18 § 17c p. 181 [122] “Erstreckung in die Zeit”. 
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The question plunges us into the core of the controversy with the 
Megarians that Aristotle develops in Metaphysics IX 3. This passage not only 
constitutes an important prelude of Aristotle’s insights in IX 6 but also directs 
Heidegger, some years after Sein und Zeit, towards an interpretation of energeia that, 
differently from the one developed from 1922 to 1930, precisely emphasizes its 
performative side in relation with hexis. The fact that it is Heidegger himself who 
in 1931 changes his understanding of energeia, and that this change is precisely built 
upon the relation between energeia and hexis, sheds additional light on our approach 
to his interpretation of Aristotle in the 20s956. 
8.1. Energeia and Hexis in 1931 
Aristotle’s confrontation with the Megarians is thoroughly analyzed by Heidegger 
in his course Vom Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft957, devoted to Metaphysics IX 1-3. 
Although Aristotle’s argument here is read positively as a refutation of a subjec-
tivistic and presentialist conception of being (that of the Megarians), the paradox 
that we have found in the early 20s remains: according to Heidegger, Aristotle 
would not escape this conception despite his solid refutation of the Megarians, 
although the point is not ultimately argued958. Worth mentioning is also the 
                                               
956 In any case, for the sake of clarity, the differences between the interpretation here and that in the 
1920s must be marked out. Brogan’s otherwise thorough and in-depth Heidegger and Aristotle sometimes 
fails to do so (Cf. BROGAN, W. 2005). 
957 GA 33 Aristoteles, Metaphysik Θ 1-3. Vom Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft (SS 1931) Ed. by Heinrich 
Hüni, 1981 [Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta 1-3. On the Essence and Actuality of Force (GA33). Translated by 
Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek, IU Press, 1995]. 
958 GA 33 § 18 p. 181 [155, mod. tr.] “Why does Aristotle, like the Megarians see the essence of the 
actuality of something in presence? This is a question which philosophy must do its utmost to answer. 
Here we must be satisfied with recognizing the fact and with having raised the question”. (“Warum 
sieht Aristoteles das Wesen der Wirklichkeit von etwas ebenso wie die Megariker in der Anwesenheit? 
Das ist eine Frage, zu deren Beantwortung die Philosophie ihr Letztes hergeben muß. Wir müssen uns 
hier damit begnügen, das Faktum anzuerkennen und die Frage gestellt zu haben”). Rodrigo believes, as 
we do, that the paradox does not hold and that it is detrimental to the interpretation: “For Heidegger, 
this character of being that Aristotle would have updated in Met. IX 3, while it would surely be a step 
forward towards the effective being of force, would remain under the dominion of the present being 
of the given being. A step forward, then, but at the same time kept back within the sphere of the 
evidence of Anwesenheit. Nothing appears to me as less assured than that, and that is why I said that 
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circumstance that Heidegger does not get to analyze Metaphysics IX 6 in this 
course. Whether this was due to a lack of time as Volpi suggests959 or to the initial 
plan for the course, the fact is that this text is not dealt with again until 1939960. In 
any case, despite the fact that Heidegger persists in sustaining that the narrowing 
of the metaphysics of Anwesenheit applies also to Aristotle, his reading of energeia in 
1931 is not only substantially different from that of the 1920s, but also from that 
of the course in the previous summer, where energeia is read as meaning constant 
presence (beständige Anwesenheit) and the readiness (Fertigkeit) of a produced 
object961. Commenting upon the relation between a dynamis and its enactment 
(Vollzug), he now remarks: “energein and energeia no longer have here the originally 
very narrow reference to ergon, but nevertheless they still have the meaning of 
enactment”962. We should then not overlook the fact that, in his closest ever reading of 
Metaphysics IX, Heidegger finds himself in much more agreement with Aristotle 
than elsewhere in his resistance to the metaphysics of Anwesenheit963.  
Heidegger renders sharply the core of the controversy as Aristotle poses it: 
the Megarians identify dynamis and energeia, i.e. “the actuality of a force and the 
actualization of that force in enactment”964, insofar as they only agree to bestow 
the status of being on those capabilities that present themselves in operation. A 
                                                                                                                                 
Heidegger does not take, neither here nor elsewhere, all the possible advantage of his reading” 
(RODRIGO, Pierre “Heidegger lecteur d’Aristote: Dynamis et energeia sous le regard phénoménologique 
(GA 33, Mét. Θ 1-3)” Les Études Philosophiques 1990 (1) pp. 353-372, p. 369 for ref). 
959 Cf. VOLPI, F. 1990 p. 13. 
960 Cf. WBP in GA 9 esp. pp. 354-357 [216-219]. 
961 Cf. GA 31 Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (SS 1930) §§ 7-8 pp. 40 ff, esp. pp. 68-69. 
962 GA 33 § 20b p. 204 [175] “Energein, energeia haben hier schon nicht mehr die ursprünglich ganz enge 
Bezogenheit auf ergon, aber immer doch die Bedeutung des Vollzugs”. 
963 Rodrigo, who also highlights the contrast between the 1930 and the 1931 courses, is surprised that 
“Heidegger abandons Aristotle, at the end of the [1931] university semester, without having fully 
realized that the interpretation that he has just given of the ‘effectivity of force’ (...) can contribute 
positively to the development of a sense of being different from that of being as constant presence 
(Anwesenheit)” (RODRIGO, P. 1990 p. 356). 
964 GA 33 § 22 p. 184 [158] “[die megarische] Gleichsetzung von Wirklichkeit einer Kraft und 
Verwirklichung derselben im Vollzug”. 
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point that makes this thesis reasonable, suggests d’Angelo, is the fact that we only 
perceive the subsistence of a dynamis when we see its execution965. However, 
neither Heidegger nor Aristotle are willing to take our perception as the full 
account of the being of anything: they see eye to eye in disapproving of the 
subjectivistic imprint of this perspective966. How does then Aristotle confront the 
Megarian equation? 
By pointing to a phenomenon that first of all allows the essence of enactment to be 
grasped properly and thereby allows the presence of the force which lies within it to 
be delimited according to its own specificity. This phenomenon is that of learning and 
unlearning in the broadest sense967. 
Aristotle indeed notes the absurdity of conceiving of a builder who “will 
not have the art when he has ceased to use it, and yet may immediately build 
again; how then will he have got the art?”968; or of thinking, against experience, 
that “the same people will be blind many times in the day”969 just because they are 
not enacting their ability to see at certain moments. The appeal to the 
phenomenon of “learning and unlearning in the broadest sense” against the 
Megarian thesis points then towards the how of the being of dynamis that makes it 
possible for the builder, or for a being who sees, to cease enacting their respective 
dynamei without prejudice to an eventual retaking of their enactments: “Aristotle 
wants to bring into view for the very first time the proper manner of being actual 
of a dynamis; this occurs through the emphasis upon dynamin echein, having a 
                                               
965 Cf. D’ANGELO, A. 2000 p. 371 (the remark does not imply that D’Angelo subscribes to the 
Megarian thesis). Heidegger points to this difficulty, too: the actuality of the capable “is co-determined 
in terms of (...) enactment; but it is not the same as such enactment” (“Die Wirklichkeit des 
Vermögenden (…) bestimmt sich von daher mit; [sie] ist aber nicht dasselbe”) GA 33 § 22 p. 217 
[186]. 
966 Cf. Met. IX 3, 1047a 14ff. and GA 33 § 20 pp. 193 ff., esp. 200-201 [165 ff., esp. 172]. 
967 GA 33 § 22 p. 184 [158] “Durch den Hinweis auf ein Phänomen, das allerest erlaubt, das Wesen des 
Vollzugs recht zu fassen und damit die in ihm liegende Anwesenheit der Kraft nach ihrem 
Eigentümlichen zu umgrenzen. Dieses Phänomen ist das des Lernens und Verlernens im weitesten 
Sinne”. 
968 Met. IX 3, 1047a 3f. 
969 Met. IX 3, 1047a 9f. 
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capability”970. In fact, this is not the very first time that Aristotle does so: we have 
been discussing at length Metaphysics V 20, where Aristotle defines hexis (which 
among other senses has that of a dynamis to act in a certain way) as an energeia971. 
Although Heidegger does not mention this passage here or elsewhere in the 
course, he does relate hexis to this problematic, some sessions before:  
Dynamin echein means that something which is capable is capable in that it «has» a 
capability; it holds itself (sich hält) in this capability and it holds itself back (an sich hält) with 
this capability―and thereby precisely does not enact (...). Here we have to gather all 
this from the Greek word echein. ―The meanings which I have designated here also 
come into play with the corresponding expression hexis972. 
The echein of dynamis is thus articulated in two intertwined moments: on the 
one hand, that of holding its own ground, its own being; on the other, the specific 
how of this holding: remaining self-contained in regard to enactment, not leaping 
into the energein of enactment, and yet being an energeia. However, the fact that a 
hexis is understood as an energeia threatens to collapse the refutation of the 
Megarians, since this refutation was precisely based on the distinction between 
dynamis and energeia. Heidegger depicts the tension in clear-cut terms: 
On the one hand, the Megarian thesis ought to be rejected on the basis of its 
antithesis: the actuality of dynasthai as such is not to be sought in energein. On the 
other hand, for a positive determination of the actuality of dynasthai as such, precisely 
energeia ought now come into play. How can both of these come together?973. 
                                               
970 GA 33 § 22 p. 188 [161] “Es gilt ihm, allererst den Blick zu öffnen für die eigene Art des 
Wirklichseins einer dynamis; das geschieht durch die Betonung des dynamin echein, des Habens eines 
Vermögens”. 
971 Met. V 20, 1022b 4f: “We call a having (hexis) a kind of activity (energeia tis) of the haver (echontos) and 
the had (echomenon), something like an action (praxis) or movement (kinēsis)”. 
972 GA 33 § 19 p. 183 [157] “Dynamin echein heißt: Das Vermögende ist vermögend, indem es ein 
Vermögen »hat«: sich in diesem Vermögen hält und mit diesem Vermögen an sich hält, ― also gerade 
nicht vollzieht (…). All das müssen wir hier aus dem griechischen echein heraushören. ― Die 
Bedeutungen, die ich hier nannte, kommen auch im entsprechenden Ausdruck hexis zur Geltung”. 
973 GA 33 § 22 p. 214 [184, mod. tr.] “Auf der einen Seite soll die These der Megariker abgelehnt 
werden durch die Gegenthese: Die Wirklichkeit des dynasthai als eines solchen ist nicht im energein zu 
suchen. Auf der anderen Seite soll gerade jetzt für die positive Bestimmung der Wirklichkeit des 
dynasthai als eines solchen die energeia mit ins Thema kommen”. 
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The way out of the aporia, Heidegger suggests, can be found by referring 
both dynamis and energeia to kinēsis. That the Megarians would speak of energein, he 
argues, “does not at all prove that they had a proper notion of it”974 (this is, 
indeed, what Aristotle contends: the Megarians have a narrow conception of 
energeia which cannot account for the being of dynamis, because it simply absorbs 
dynamis by equating it with enactment)975. Their mistake, Heidegger contends, is 
that “they did not see precisely that energeia qua energeia is energeia kata kinēsin”976. 
Since Aristotle understands dynamis always in relation to energeia, in co-
determinateness (Mitbestimmtheit) with it977, Heidegger concludes, “the right 
distinction between dynamis and energeia can occur only with the prior and 
consistent maintenance of kinēsis”. Dynamis and energeia “are modes of being in 
movement; they are implicitly associated with this and are to be comprehended only 
on this basis”978.  
However, is not the sense of energeia actually narrowed by considering it as 
grounded on kinēsis? Why would Aristotle then define kinēsis as a kind of energeia 
and not vice versa979? Kinēsis surely connects dynamis with energeia, but this does not 
entail that it constitutes their ultimate ontological ground: the case seems not to be that 
in investigating energeia Aristotle gets to a kinetic ontological ground, but quite the opposite. 
Heidegger himself acknowledges this in commenting a passage of Metaphysics IX 3 
where Aristotle affirms that energeia is arrived at through the experience of kinēsis980:  
                                               
974 Loc. cit. “Daß die Megariker sich auf das energein stützen, beweist noch gar nicht, daß sie den rechten 
Begriff davon hatten”. 
975 Cf. Met. IX 3, 1047a 19f. 
976 Loc. cit. “sie sahen gerade nicht, daß die energeia qua energeia energeia kata kinēsin ist”. 
977 Cf. GA 33 § 22 pp. 215-217 [184-186] and Met. IX 3, 1047a 20ff. 
978 GA 33 § 22 p. 216 [186] “danach kann die rechte Auseinanderhaltung von dynamis und energeia nur 
geschehen unter vorheriger und ständiger Festhaltung der kinēsis. Was bedeutet das? Nichts Geringeres 
als: das Vorhandensein des Vermögenden als solchen in gleicher Weise wie die Wirklichkeit im Sinne 
des Vollzugs sind Weisen des In-Bewegung-seins, auf dieses in sich bezogen und nur von daher zu fassen”. 
979 Physics III 2, 201b 12f; 201b 27 - 202a 2. 
980 Cf. Met. IX 3, 1047a 30ff. 
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dokei gar [hē] energeia malista ē kinēsis einai―movement appears to be something like a 
‘being-at-work’ (Am-Werke-sein); the most obviously general character of kinēsis is 
energeia. To what extent? Where something is in movement, we do say: there is (da es 
ist) something underway, something is afoot, at work, here is an activity981. 
In view of this stance about the genesis of our concept of energeia, it is odd, 
Heidegger proceeds, to learn that Aristotle holds elsewhere that “the essential 
meaning of dynamis and energeia on the contrary, is not given (ergibt sich nicht) kata 
kinēsin, or, stated more carefully, not kata kinēsin monon”982. And the question 
becomes even more obscure (noch dunkler), he points out, when we discover that in 
Physics III, 1-3 “Aristotle achieves this essential meaning (wesentliche Bedeutung) of 
dynamis and energeia precisely through a treatment of kinēsis, with a view toward 
movement”983. 
References to the places where Aristotle may say that the meaning of 
dynamis and energeia is not given kata kinēsin monon are not to be found in the tran-
script of Heidegger’s course. There are two passages in Metaphysics IX, though, 
where those specific terms are used. Firstly, in chapter 1: “dynamis and energeia 
extend beyond the sphere of terms which only refer to motion (pleon tōn monon 
legomenōn kata kinēsin)”984; and later, in chapter 6: “we not only call (ou monon 
legomen) dynaton that whose nature is to move something else”985. However, in both 
passages Aristotle uses the term legein: it is our understanding of these concepts that 
extends further than the sphere of kinēsis, but not necessarily the perception or 
experience that sets the basis to achieve this understanding. Instead, as Heidegger 
                                               
981 GA 33 § 7 p. 51 [42] “dokei gar [hē] energeia malista ē kinēsis einai ― so wie Bewegung erscheint, ist sie 
so etwas wie ein ›Am-Werke-Sein‹; der nächstallgemeine kinēsis-Charakter ist energeia. Inwiefern? Wo 
etwas in Bewegung ist, sagen wir ja: es ist da etwas im Gang, es ist etwas los, etwas am Werk; da ist eine 
Tätigkeit”.  
982 GA 33 § 7 pp. 51-52 [42, mod. tr.] “Die wesentliche Bedeutung von dynamis und energeia dagegen 
ergibt sich nicht kata kinēsin, oder vorsichtiger: nicht kata kinēsin monon”.  
983 GA 33 § 7 p. 52 [42] “Aristoteles die wesentliche Bedeutung von dynamis und energeia gerade an der 
kinēsis gewinnt, gerade im Blick auf sie”. 
984 Met. IX 1, 1046a 1f (Tredennick). 
985 Met. IX 6, 1048a 28f. 
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rightly points out, Aristotle actually gets to energeia through the perception of 
kinēsis, and he makes this procedure explicit. That kinēsis is the starting point, 
however, does not necessarily entail that the sense of energeia should be equated 
with that of kinēsis, and that is why Aristotle makes these precisions in reference to 
legein, which in Heideggerian terms could be explained as a distinction between the 
ontic and the ontological. Still, Heidegger does not seem to recognize such a kind 
of distinction as operating in Aristotle, and tends to read ‘appearing’ (to be given, 
sich ergeben) where Aristotle says ‘understanding’. Only thus can he point towards a 
tension between Aristotle’s confessed phenomenological practice in IX 3 and 
what is implied in these passages of IX 1 and 6, where Aristotle is not speaking of 
the phainesthai of energeia and dynamis, but of our ontological understanding of 
them, in the precise sense in which Heidegger understands ontology in Sein und 
Zeit: “the explicit, theoretical question of the meaning of beings”986. 
What Aristotle is doing in IX 3, on the other hand, is to follow his usual 
practice, i.e. to initiate his discussion from an account of the common view of 
things, to which his own ordinary experience belongs, in order to develop his own 
philosophical analysis. That the statement in this passage is limited to the ontical, 
moreover, seems to be reinforced by the usage of the verb dokei, the context, and 
the usual philosophical practice of Aristotle987. What he is meaning here, as 
Heidegger accurately reflects it in his paraphrase, is that when we see something in 
movement, we say: here there is something going on. In other words: movement, 
kinēsis, is the phenomenon that allows us to access being in the precise sense which 
Aristotle is pointing to. As Heidegger had put it in 1924, “[w]hat shows itself [is] 
                                               
986 SZ § 4 p. 12 “Wenn wir daher den Titel Ontologie für das explizite theoretische Fragen nach dem 
Sinn des Seienden vorbehalten (…)”. 
987 Although differently from Heidegger’s, Tredennick’s translation keeps the original position of the 
terms energeia and kinēsis, it also reflects the ontic character of the statement by displaying the sense of 
dokei: “it is agreed (dokei) that actuality is properly motion”. Ross’ translation, on the other hand, seems 
misguiding to us, because it presents the statement as ontological: “actuality in the strict sense is 
identified with movement”. That the ontic sense implied by dokei should not be omitted is further 
demonstrated by what follows: “And so people do not assign movement to non-existent things, 
though they do assign other predicates” (IX 3, 1047a 32 ff, Ross). 
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kinēsis itself (…). A first step is that kinēsis constitutes the genuine there-character of 
being (Da-Charakter des Seins)”988. However, that kinēsis has the ontical or 
phenomenological priority is not simply comparable to regard it as the ontological 
ground of being. This is precisely what we believe Aristotle to be intending to avoid 
with his statements in IX 1 and 6, which are meant in a strictly ontological sense. 
Being itself (to on auto) is necessarily wider than kinēsis, because otherwise it would 
remain always in a state of coming to be; being “does not come to be nor cease to be (ou 
gignetai oude phtheiretai), for if it did it would have to come out of something (ek tinos 
gar an egigneto)”989, and we would have a process to infinity which does not make 
sense. This is perhaps best expressed in a passage of the Physics that importantly 
meets the characterization of hexis as energeia in Metaphysics V and IX: 
One who possesses knowledge of a science (epistēmēn echōn) but is not actually 
exercising it (mē theōrōn) knows the science potentially in a sense, though not in the 
same sense as before he learnt it. And when he is in this condition, if something does 
not prevent him, he actively exercises his knowledge (energei kai theōrei): otherwise he 
would be in the contradictory state of not knowing990. 
The kinēsis of learning, thus, however much it is on the way, is necessarily 
also energeia: “of that which is changing, some part must have changed”991, so that 
energeia is “prior to dynamis”992 and thus to kinēsis. We still agree with Heidegger, 
though, that the problem of the Megarians is that they understand energeia in too 
narrow a manner. What is at stake is a widening of the understanding of energeia, and we 
believe with him that the concepts of hexis and echein can provide it993. However, if 
                                               
988 GA 18 § 25 p. 287 [194] “Was sich zeigt [ist] die kinēsis selbst (…). Ein erster Schritt ist, daß die 
kinēsis den eigentlichen Da-Charakter des Seins ausmacht”. 
989 Met. IX 10, 1051b 29f. 
990 Physics VIII 7, 255b 1ff. 
991 Cf. also Met. IX 8, 1049b 35f, in a passage to which we return below on p. 283. 
992 Met. IX 8, 1050a 2f. 
993 Cf. p. 263 above. Before in the course, Heidegger notes how, to the Megaric conception that “the 
actuality of a capability lies in its enactment”, Aristotle replies: “the actuality of a capability lies in its 
echein, in having” (“Die Wirklichkeit eines Vermögens liegt im Vollzug, darin stellt es sich dar und her. 
Aristoteles entgegnet: Die Wirklichkeit eines Vermögens als Vermögen liegt im echein, im Haben”) GA 
33 p. 189 [163]. 
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the widening of the understanding of energeia is not feasible in terms of 
understanding both energeia and dynamis as grounded in the wider domain of kinēsis, 
which other way out is available? 
Energeia itself. Detaching ourselves from Heidegger, we aim to understand 
both energeia and dynamis as grounded in energeia. Which of course raises at least two 
questions: (i) is not this tautological as regards energeia? And (ii), again, does not 
this collapse the distinction between energeia and dynamis that, against the 
Megarians, Aristotle insists on holding994?  
Ad (i): First of all, it should be noted that the idea of kinēsis being the 
ontological ground of energeia and dynamis is not only faced with a similar problem 
―since kinēsis is thus its own ontological ground―but also, as we have just argued, 
with a stronger one: if kinēsis is ultimately kinēsis, ‘coming into being’ is always 
coming into being, so that we are faced with a regressio ad infinitum which cannot 
account for its being, unless we assume that we can get to experience and to name 
something that has not yet come to be. In other words, the tautology here turns 
into a contradiction, because it erodes its own basis. 
With energeia, on the other hand, the door seems to open for a productive 
tautology, in the direction in which Heidegger himself, at the very end of his last 
seminar in 1973 holds that “tautological thinking (…) is the primordial sense of 
phenomenology”995. Our proposal would be tautological in the unproductive sense of 
the word if the statement “at the same time (hama) we are seing and have seen”996 
resulted in a contradiction or proved to explain nothing. But if what is expressed 
by this sentence is that being does not take time to be, but instead is immediately, 
                                               
994 “[E]vidently potentiality and actuality are different, but these views [of the Megarians] make 
potentiality and actuality the same, so that it is not small things they are seeking to annihilate” Met. IX 
3, 1047a 17ff. 
995 Seminar in Zähringen (1973) in GA 15 p. 399 [80]: “das Denken, dem hier nachgefragt wird, nenne ich 
das tautologische Denken. Das ist der ursprüngliche Sinn der Phänomenologie”. 
996 Met. IX 6, 1048b 23. 
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then the repetition is meant precisely to express this immediacy: energeia is energein, 
i.e. being is fully there from the very first moment in which it is being. There is 
nothing ‘belonging’ to a tode ti, to a ‘being here and now’ in its ‘being here and now’, 
which is missing or coming to be. It is in this precise sense that Aristotle holds in 
NE X 4―a chapter bearing evident parallelisms with 1048b―that pleasure, as 
opposed to kinēsis, is a whole in the now997.  
Our clause ‘in its being here and now’ is crucial to understand why this is 
far from implying an understanding of being that could not account for change, 
i.e. for kinēsis―to the point that if the phenomenon of kinēsis proved to be rejected 
by this perspective, there would be indeed good reasons to reject the idea of 
energeia being its ontological ground, at least as far as finite beings are concerned. 
What we are implying is that the whole of the tode ti is here and now: insofar as it 
is, it is absolutely. It does not make any sense, as Aristotle states in the Categories, 
to speak of more or less in relation to ousia: “any given substance is not called 
more, or less, [than] that which it is. For example, if this substance is a man, it will 
not be more or less a man (mallon kai ētton anthropos) either than itself or than 
another man”998. Does this statement however collide with the thorough account 
of the inner change of man throughout his life in the NE, and of movement “as a 
sort of life” (zōē tis) that belongs to natural beings999? Is Aristotle implying that, 
insofar as things or human beings are, they cannot be more than they are? Surely 
not, but still the objection might be raised that ‘not meaning’ something does not 
imply providing the ontological account that would avoid the assumption of such 
meaning in one’s ontology. That is the reason why we used above the clause ‘in its 
being here and now’: the tode ti, in its tode ti, in its there (Da), is fully fulfilled: it is 
                                               
997 Cf. NE X 4, 1174b 2ff. (b9: “for that which takes place in a moment is a whole (en tō nyn holon ti)”).  
998 Categories 5, 3b 35ff.  
999 Physics VIII 1, 250b 14. 
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entelecheia1000. Which does not forbid that, in an eventual intercourse with 
something, it may acquire new dimensions which were not in its tode ti, in its being 
here and now1001. Gonzalez has expressed this very acutely, upon commenting on 
Aristotle’s formula to ti ēn einai (what it was to be) in Metaphysics IV1002, one of the 
ways in which he defines ousia: 
What now distinguishes what a thing is in itself from what it only currently happens to 
be is what it was for it to be. On the level of what a thing is in itself, past and present 
tenses become one. This sameness of past and present is (…) what characterizes 
energeia and therefore allows Aristotle to identify to ti ēn einai with energeia (e.g., Met. IX 
8, 1050a 15f, b2f)1003. 
This definition is also the object of a thorough and insightful analysis by 
Schelling1004, for whom what is meant by to ti ēn einai is “that which a being is at 
each time”1005, but only as a result of what it was to be. “The being, the ti estin of 
each thing, or what each thing is, becomes, in reference to what ‘is’ it (that through 
which it is), the ti ēn”1006. An ousia can only be what it is because it was this, and at 
the same time we only come to know what it is (i.e. what it was) through its being 
here and now. The confluence of past and present in energeia expresses the 
consistency of the tode ti―namely, that it is ‘this here and now’―and, at once, the 
consistency of the distension within which ‘this here and now’ may become 
something else: kinēsis. This is in fact the result of kinēsis not being something para 
                                               
1000 “[O]f non existent things some exist potentially, but they do not exist, because they do not exist in 
fulfillment (ouk entelecheia estin)”. Met. IX 3, 1047b 1f. 
1001 In fact, the intercourse not only ‘occurs’ to natural beings, but is essential to them. Thus, in the 
Physics VIII 4, while Aristotle restricts self-motion to life (255a 8), he explains how the natural motion 
of lifeless beings is a result of their own being; thus, e.g. “air is actually light, and will at once realize its 
proper activity unless something prevents it. The activity (energeia) of lightness consists in the light thing 
being in a certain place, namely high up” (255b 10ff). 
1002 Met. IV 8, 1017b 21f.  
1003 GONZALEZ, F. J. 2008 p. 14. 
1004 Cf. SCHELLING, F. W. J. 1966 lecture 17 pp. 403-408. 
1005 Ibidem p. 405. 
1006 Loc. cit. 
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ta pragmata1007. Kinēsis is identical with the tode ti that changes―so that kinēsis is a 
‘this something’―, and any tode ti that changes is kinēsis. But both, in turn, are 
ultimately brought back to energeia. The ‘tautology’, as regards energeia, is expressing 
the arrival to a fundamental ontological ground, a ground beyond which 
foundation attempts cannot go without losing their sense of reality―specifically, 
the sense of man’s own being, which is the topos where the sense of being in 
general can be found. A very celebrated passage of Sein und Zeit is importantly 
enlightening in this respect: 
[T]o see a vitiosum in this circle and to look for ways to avoid it, even to «feel» that it is an 
inevitable imperfection, is to misunderstand understanding from the ground up (…). What is 
decisive is not to get out of the circle, but to get in it in the right way. This circle of 
understanding is not a circle in which any random kind of knowledge operates, but it 
is rather the expression of the existential fore-structure of Dasein itself1008. 
To get into the circle in the right way means precisely to ask about the 
sense of being without betraying in the question itself the structure of our own 
experience of being, of our access to it. Before explaining how energeia provides 
this entrance, though, we must still answer the second objection. 
Ad (ii): If we ground a dynamis like hexis in energeia, how can we avoid the 
collapse of the distinction between dynamis and energeia? The tautology of energeia is 
precisely the key to this question, too. The having, insofar as it is said to be, is an 
energeia itself. But in relation to its enactment it is a dynamis1009: the having (echein, 
energeia) of the ability to build is what makes it possible for the builder to start 
                                               
1007 Cf. GA 18 § 26 p. 288 [195] and Physics III 1, 200b 32f. 
1008 SZ § 32 p. 153 (mod. tr.) “[I]n diesem Zirkel ein vitiosum sehen und nach Wegen Aus-schau halten, ihn zu 
vermeiden, ja ihn auch nur als unvermeidliche Unvollkommenheit »empfinden«, heißt das Verstehen von Grund aus 
mißverstehen (…). Das Entscheidende ist nicht, aus dem Zirkel heraus-, sondern in ihn nach der rechten 
Weise hineinzukommen. Dieser Zirkel des Verstehens ist nicht ein Kreis, in dem sich eine beliebige 
Erkenntnisart bewegt, sondern er ist der Ausdruck der existenzialen Vor-struktur des Daseins selbst”. 
1009 The point is not extraneous to Aristotle: “the same thing can be both potential (dynamei) and 
fulfilled (entelecheia), not indeed at the same time (hama) or not in the same respect (kata to auto)” (Physics 
III 1, 201a 19ff). 
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building (poiein, energeia) or for the harpist to start playing the harp1010. D’Angelo 
expresses this accurately after Aristotle: from the point of view of the totality of 
time, the dynamis is always an energeia1011. It is only in relation to the process of 
building a house―which can be bracketed in time between a starting of the 
process and its ending (peras), marked by the finished product of the house―that 
the technē of the builder can be characterized as a dynamis. On its own, however, 
this technē is an energeia―or else, it would not be at all. Again with D’Angelo, if the 
builder can make a pause in the process “this is actually possible because in a 
certain sense he is always building, in the sense that the end of his capability is 
immanent to the capability itself, and consists also in its use (chrēsis)”1012. 
What is disclosed here, then, is the doubling of telos with which we have 
come across elsewhere: the hexis is fulfilled as hexis insofar as it is, but still can find 
a fulfillment beyond this determination, i.e. in its enactment as an action, towards 
which it is structurally directed, and from which it stems. In this respect, Vigo’s 
analysis of hexis as a “dynamic unity of past and future”, acknowledgedly 
stemming from Heideggerian insights, is very enlightening1013. Heidegger also 
expresses this continuity in a suggestive manner when he notes that, in coming to 
enactment, 
“being trained [i.e., hexis, C.A.] is not transported to something else, which in each case would be 
at hand, but rather the being trained passes over beyond itself into something which first 
forms itself only in and through the passing, what we call carrying out and 
practicing”1014.  
                                               
1010 Cf. Met. IX 8, 1049b 31- 1050a 3. 
1011 Cf. D’ANGELO, A. 2000  p. 382.  
1012 Cf. Ibidem p. 280 (our e). 
1013 Cf. VIGO, A. 1996 p. 225. 
1014 GA 33 § 19 p. 191 [164] (our e.) “Dabei wird das Eingeübtsein nicht hinübergenommen in etwas 
anderes, was je vorhanden wäre, sondern das Eingeübtsein führt sich über in solches, was sich in der 
und durch die Überführung erst bildet und was wir Ausführung und Ausübung nennen”. 
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This provides another hint on why Heidegger finds, in approaching dynamis 
and energeia through echein and hexis, an understanding of energeia which points be-
yond Anwesenheit1015. The unity in which this doubling occurs consists of a “pass-
ing over beyond itself” (Sichüberführung) of hexis in which hexis is “not transported 
to something else”, but becomes itself “something which first forms itself only in and 
through the passing”. This is only possible if this having that we call hexis is actu-
ally not had “like a piece of property (ktēma)”, but rather is “something that hap-
pens”1016 at once with our own being, an energeia atelēs, but still an energeia. 
8.2. Energeia and Time 
Heidegger holds, as we have seen above, that in Metaphysics IX 3 Aristotle intends 
to elucidate the essence of enactment and force (energeia and dynamis) by pointing 
to the phenomenon of “learning and unlearning in the broadest sense”1017. This is, 
though, at least implicitly, an appeal to another phenomenon that Aristotle 
generally assumes as accessible to human beings: our experience of time1018. In his 
reply to the Megarians―concentrated, as Heidegger points out1019, in 1047a 14: 
“these views do away with movement as well as becoming”―Aristotle is indeed 
trying to give, on phenomenological grounds, an account of the temporal unfolding of 
being, something that the Megarians themselves cannot do, precisely because they 
do not recognize any ontological status to hexis: 
                                               
1015 Cf. GA 33 § 20b p. 204 [175] and note 962. After our reading of Heidegger’s acute interpretation 
of the discussion between Aristotle and the Megarians, it keeps surprising us that while Heidegger 
considers the presentialist Megarian thesis to collapse before Aristotle’s refutation (cf. GA 33 p. 212 
[182]) he still holds that Aristotle remains within presentialism. This thread, though, we cannot explore 
here: for our purpose it is not so relevant to show whether Aristotle as a whole escapes this prejudice 
as to show that what he is pointing to here indeed opens a domain that is beyond Anwesenheit, as also 
Volpi and Rodrigo suggest (cf. notes 511 and 963). 
1016 NE IX 9, 1169b 29f (Rackham). 
1017 GA 33 § 19 p. 184 [158]. Cf. note 967 above. 
1018 Apart from Met. IX, e.g. the overall analysis of time in Physics IV 10-13 implies a consciousness of 
time, which is otherwise explicitly acknowledged: cf. e.g. Physics IV 11, 219a 30f and De Anima III, 10 
433b 7. Cf. also the more implicit but relevant reference in NE IX 9, 1170a 29ff. 
1019 Cf. GA 33 § 21 p. 210 [180]. 
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Between actually seeing and being blind lies not-seeing in the sense of the non-
enactment of visual perception, a non-enactment which inherently and actually is 
‘able to enact at any time’. Because the Megarians cannot reconcile themselves to this 
fact, they are compelled to portray the transition from actual non-perceiving to 
perceiving as a transitionless exchange between being blind and being able to see1020. 
That the transition is not explained means that, while the Megarians do 
account for the immediacy with which the ‘now’ of an enactment is experienced, 
they cannot account for the continuity of this enactment in the form of a capability 
to enact later again. This, Aristotle argues, runs against the phenomena, because 
people do not move from blindness to seeing any number of times in a day. But, 
more crucially, the Megarians cannot explain the continuity in time of the enactment itself, 
regardless of its relation to the capability in which, as Heidegger puts it, the 
enactment “holds itself back” (an sich hält)1021. Heidegger does not make this 
explicit in these terms, but the result is that enactment is approached by the 
Megarians from the sole point of view of their perception of it in the now, i.e. 
their account of its way of being can be set only in terms of a simple succession of 
‘nows’, i.e. in the naturalistic sense of time (‘now I see this enactment’, ‘then I see 
it again’, etc.) which Heidegger typically claims to find in Aristotle’s Physics, 
although Aristotle himself explicitly states that time is not made up of nows1022. 
                                               
1020 GA 33 § 20b p. 205 [176] “Zwischen Wirklich-sehen und Blindsein liegt das Nicht-sehen im Sinne 
des Nichtvollziehens von Gesichtswahrnehmung, welches Nichtwollziehen aber in sich ist und 
wirklich ist als ›jederzeit vollziehen können‹. Weil die Megariker diesem Tatbestand nicht gerecht 
werden können, sind sie dazu gezwungen, den Übergang vom aktuellen Nichtwahrnehmen zum 
Wahrnehmen als eine übergangslose Auswechslung von Blindsein und Sehendsein darzustellen”. 
1021 Cf. GA 33 § 19 p. 183 [157] 
1022 Physics IV 10, 218a 8. Of course, one might argue that the statement does not necessarily entail that 
Aristotle succeeds in conceiving time otherwise, but at least it makes clear that he was conscious of the 
problem. Although thoroughly arguing that Aristotle goes beyond a naturalistic conception would 
require at least an additional paper, if not an additional book, that is indeed one of the hypotheses of 
our research here. The question is dealt with in Physics VI (esp. 3-4), in the context of the discussion of 
the crucial concept of ‘continuous’ (syneches) which, among others, frames this book (cf. VI 1, 231a 21). 
In VI 3, 233b 33ff. Aristotle argues that from a certain point of view time can be divided, but from 
another, more fundamental and original point of view―the one that grasps its being―it cannot: “the 
now―the now so-called not derivatively but in its own right and primarily―is indivisible (…) For the now is 
an extremity of the past (no part of the future being in this side of it), and again of the future (no part 
of the past being on this side of it)”. The point is reaffirmed later: “time contains something indivisible 
and this is what we call a now” (234a 22f). An analogous approach is made to the question of the 
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Of course, we cannot deal here with the Aristotelian account of time, 
which is the object of special attention in Heidegger’s 1927 course Die Grundprob-
leme der Phänomenologie1023, but what seems clear is that, however underdeveloped 
and isolated in his works it might be, in his refutation of the Megarians Aristotle is 
pointing to a characterization of being in terms of time on the basis of a phenomenologi-
cal approach to hexis and of its ontological characterization in a certain sense as 
dynamis and in another more fundamental sense as energeia1024. 
What in Metaphysics IX 3 is only implicit becomes central in IX 6 and 
reveals to our mind a strong parallelism with what Heidegger was seeking during 
all these years (i.e. on the way to Sein und Zeit, in the composition of this magnus 
opus, in the “new elaboration” of the unpublished third division of part 1 that was 
the 1927 course1025, and still in the 1931 course): very summarily said, a way out of 
the narrowing of ontology operated by metaphysics of presence, which subjugates being to the 
spontaneity of the knowing subject and, as a result, reduces being into the 
unquestioned category of objects, i.e. available and finished beings, an approach 
which is eventually applied, as a fatal corollary, to this founding subject1026. Surely, 
                                                                                                                                 
continuity of space: cf. in this respect Aristotle’s critique of Zeno’s conception of space as a sum of 
infinite parts (Cf. VI 2, 233a 21ff). 
1023 Cf. GA 24 Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (SS 1927) esp. § 19. Gonzalez comments on part of 
Heidegger’s analysis of time in this course and argues that Heidegger’s insights provide a basis for 
considering Aristotle’s view of time in the Physics as richer than the naturalistic idea that Heidegger 
adscribes to him (Cf. GONZALEZ, F. 2008 pp. 15-25).  
1024 Cf. Physics III 1, 201a 19ff. Cf. also VIII 4, 255a 34ff: “Wherever something capable of acting and 
something capable of being acted on are together, what is potential becomes actual: e.g. the learner 
becomes from one potential something another potential something”.  
1025 Cf. GA 24 § 1 p. 1.  
1026 At the end of the Natorp Bericht (pp. 397-398/49 [144]), Heidegger summarizes thus his scope: 
“What becomes clear on the basis of these interpretations is the extent to which a particular ontology 
of a particular domain of being and the logic of a particular kind of addressing came to be regarded (...) 
as the one and true ontology and the one and true logic, and as such came to dominate not only the history of 
ontology and logic but also that of spirit itself, i.e., the history of human existence”. (Hieraus wird 
sichtbar, inwiefern die bestimmte Ontologie eines bestimmten Seinsfeldes und die Logik eines 
bestimmten Ansprechens, der Verfallensgeneigtheit des Auslegens folgend, zu der Ontologie und der 
Logik wurde, als welche sie nicht nur ihre eigene Geschichte, sondern die Geistesgeschichte selbst, d.h. 
die Existenzgeschichte, entscheidend durchherrscht). 
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it would be anachronistic to try to find this line of reasoning in Aristotle, insofar as 
concepts like ‘subject’ were creations of modernity1027; but it is not anachronistic 
―and it is Heidegger himself who does so―to search in his thought for concepts 
or intuitions that may make possible this line of reasoning. It is in this respect that 
the phenomenological insight and conceptual elucidation of energeia in Metaphysics 
IX 6 seems to us all the more relevant. 
A point must still be reinforced before proceeding. We have argued else-
where that if the NE comes to be valuable for Heidegger it does because of its 
ontological reach. The NE is surely concerned with human actions, which can be 
otherwise, but it is also concerned with the ontological structure of life and happiness, 
which cannot itself be otherwise if the task to define it is to make any sense. While 
deliberation is concerned with what can be otherwise, when Aristotle holds that 
“no one deliberates about what cannot be otherwise” (VI 7, 1141b 10f), he is not 
assuming that his statement could be otherwise, but rather he is acknowledging a 
fact, the truth of which he strives to demonstrate, starting from the phenomena. 
In other words, the discourse of the NE, however concerned it is with life in its 
movedness, is not a deliberation but a philosophical research, theoria. From this point 
of view, Metaphysics IX 6, 1048b 18-35―where the central topic is also life and 
praxis―does not appear as far removed from the scope of the NE as one who 
regarded the Metaphysics as a ‘purely theoretical’ discussion would tend to think 
(which becomes all the more evident in view of the strong parallelism of this 
passage with NE X 4)1028. 
When Aristotle says that “at the same time (hama) we are seeing and have 
seen” he is surely not describing a deliberation on how to act, but a life experi-
ence, as it takes place: the fact is that at the same time we are seeing and have seen. 
This is nothing about which I have to make up my mind, like in a deliberation, but 
                                               
1027 Cf. GA 63 § 17a, pp. 81-82 [62-63]; DWA p. 11 [227]; GA 18 § 9b pp. 56-57 [40]. 
1028 Cf. NE X 4, 1174a 14 ff. and p. 52 above. 
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instead a ‘looking at’: something which my mind must try to make out. The experi-
ence described, therefore, is a matter of sophia. However, while the deliberation 
process described in the NE is irreducible to the theoretical explanation of this 
process itself in the NE, there is here an overlapping or, more precisely, a fusion 
of the description of the experience and the enactment of the experience itself. That is 
to say, when Aristotle is writing “at the same time (hama) we are seeing and have 
seen” he is at the same time enacting what he is writing: the hama, as it were, leaps out 
of the papyrus―the actus signatus fits the actus exercitus. The reader himself, insofar as 
he understands what Aristotle is meaning, reads and at the same time experiences, 
as much as Aristotle writes and at the same time experiences1029.  
What is taking place here is an intellectual experience, starting from the 
phenomena as they are given to a being who has logos. And it is a matter of sophia, 
i.e. of the interplay between nous and epistēmē: an intuition which is articulated in 
language1030, which expresses in logos what is given in an experience of which logos 
itself is an essential moment: the experience (i) that I see, (ii) that I have seen, and 
(iii) that (i) and (ii) are given at the same time (hama). The hama is the how in which 
(i) and (ii) are given to us, and as such it is indissociable from them, it is given with 
them. This literally responds to the structure of the Husserlian categorial intuition, 
and it is not by chance that Heidegger himself traces back its roots to Ancient 
thought1031. 
                                               
1029 This is valid even in the limit case of conjecturing an old blind Aristotle writing this, or someone 
reading Aristotle in Braille: the capability of representing for oneself a previous experience, or the 
analogical relation to other phenomena comprising the same experience, such as thinking and living, 
provides the basis for the phenomenological analysis―‘phenomenological’, as Heidegger understands the 
term―that Aristotle is unfolding here. 
1030 Agnello extensively argues that nous itself in Aristotle has a linguistic character. This passage seems 
to reinforce her thesis, insofar as the grasping of the how in which the phenomena are given, which 
eventually is referred to with the term hama, contains itself the logos that makes possible its articulation 
(cf. AGNELLO, C. 2006 esp. pp. 57 ff.) 
1031 Cf. GA 20 § 6a p. 73 [55]. 
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Moreover, the phenomenon which Aristotle is facing, and which he is 
leading us to face is not any phenomenon, but that of life itself. The fact that the 
statement “we are living and have lived (zē kai ezēken)”1032 is included provides an 
additional hint in this respect, although the precise direction of the phenomenon 
is already fully present in the experience of seeing. Moreover, the experience of 
life here described is not that of an object standing before the gaze of noēin1033, but 
that of something in which one finds oneself: here Dasein “finds itself in itself (es 
befindet sich bei sich selbst)”1034, namely it finds itself being, which constitutes the 
primary relation to Dasein1035. 
Aristotle’s interest is not merely directed towards the content of what we 
live―to say it with Heidegger, the Gehaltsinn of living―nor only towards how we 
experience that content (Bezugsinn), i.e. through sight or intelligence or life itself, 
but also towards a central aspect of the how of the execution itself of our perceiving 
that we live (Vollzugsinn): we know that we know, but this knowing is experienced 
as something immediate―I know and I have known. And it is precisely for that 
reason that Aristotle is experiencing, in the enactment of the description itself, 
what he is describing: Aristotle is faced before his praxis―the praxis of his theōrein― 
in the enactment itself, and relates how this praxis immediately appears 
(phainesthai). Thus, he is reappropriating the phenomenon of living in the formal 
anzeigend sense required by Heidegger: to know is knowing―i.e, prior to any deter-
mination of what knowledge is, I am faced with the ‘live picture’ of knowledge as a 
how, as enacted. This immediacy in the enactment of sophia is the result of the fact 
                                               
1032 Met. IX 6, 1048b 27. 
1033 NB p. 386/38 [136]. 
1034 “Der Begriff der Zeit” (1924) in GA 64 p. 114 [205, mod. tr.]: “The averageness of everyday Dasein 
does not imply a reflection upon the ego of the self, and nevertheless Dasein has itself. It finds itself in 
itself” (“In der Durschnittlichkeit des alltäglichen Daseins liegt keine Reflexion auf das Ich und das 
Selbst, und doch hat sich das Dasein selbst. Es befindet sich bei sich selbst”). 
1035 Cf. loc. cit: “The primary relation to Dasein is not that of seeing but of «being it»” (“Der primäre 
Bezug zum Dasein ist nicht die Betrachtung, sondern das »es sein«”). 
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that theōrein itself―in spite of what many commentators infer from Aristotle’s 
contrast, perhaps somehow misguiding for us moderns, of bios theōretikos and bios 
praktikos―is praxis. 
In holding that while phronēsis cannot help being concerned with life itself, 
sophia is always concerned with other things than life itself, Heidegger does not 
intend to deny the possibility of concern with life for sophia in general, but for 
Aristotle’s sophia. He reproaches Aristotle for not being able to conceive sophia in 
such a way that it can have this concern, which results in his failure to develop a 
concept of being that really departs from the disclosing possibilities of Dasein. 
Aristotle would have just seen the Bewegtheit of life―he would have been “the last of 
the great philosophers who had eyes to see”1036―but he would have built an 
ontology with his back to what he had seen. Therefore, if Aristotelian sophia “can-
not take into true safekeeping human life in the how of its factical being”1037 it is 
only because his concept of being is far too reduced. That is why Heidegger’s 
overall efforts from 1922 on are precisely an attempt to conceive sophia in such a way 
that it can be said to have human life “as its intentional toward-which” (zu ihrem 
intentionalen Worauf)1038, and in such a way that it can actually be executed as a 
genuine movement of human life, so that a concept of being may be disclosed 
which is wide enough “to embrace―without deformations―what ‘being’ means 
when I say ‘I am’”1039. As Larivée and Leduc accurately argue, “the main aim of 
                                               
1036 GA 24 § 19, p. 329 [232] “Aristoteles war der letzte der großen Philosophen, die Augen hatten zu 
sehen”. 
1037 NB 385/38 [136] “Das reine Verstehen bringt nicht etwa nach seinem intentionalen Charakter das 
menschliche Leben im Wie seines faktischen Seins in Verwahrung”. 
1038 NB 385-386/38 [136] “Das reine Verstehen bringt nicht etwa nach seinem intentionalen Charakter 
das menschliche Leben im Wie seines faktischen Seins in Verwahrung, die sophia hat es überhaupt nicht 
zu ihrem intentionalen Worauf, es ist ja ein Seindes, das ist gerade dadurch, daß es je anders sein 
kann”. 
1039 BRAGUE, R. 1984 p. 261. 
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Heidegger in appropriating praxis was indeed to restore the authentic temporal 
sense of sophia”1040. 
However, in 1048b Aristotle seems indeed to be facing the phenomenon 
of life itself from inside life, i.e. from its own temporality. Because the enactment 
(Vollzug) of life itself is in the center of his thematic interest, to the point that 
Aristotle is living what he is describing, life is not seen here as something vorhan-
den: it is described according to the immediacy with which it is experienced. 
Aristotle does not say “life is…”, thus comprising life in a statement that would 
freeze it into a determined foreconception of being. Instead, he says: “I live… and 
I have lived” (b27)―and this experience he calls energeia. As Schelling, after Fichte, 
puts it, the act is not properly in the concept but in the experience1041. We cannot 
originally access energeia otherwise than by experiencing it―by being it― 
because we are energeia ourselves. Which is exactly the same that happens with 
praxis and hexis: we cannot ultimately ‘have’ them―we can just ‘be’ them. Again 
with Schelling, energeia, as opposed to dynamis, never becomes an attribute1042―it 
always brings back to itself. To properly enter the circle, therefore, entails to grasp 
being, so to speak, as it goes along: to grasp being while it is being. This is only 
possible for a being who has logos, who knows that he is, and who can find himself 
being in the act of knowing, seeing, living. 
In the statements that “at the same time (hama) we are seeing and have 
seen” (b23), or “we are living and have lived” (b27), Aristotle is describing the 
phenomenon of his own being as immediately experienced, like Heidegger 
                                               
1040 LARIVÉE, A. et al. 2001 p. 47. 
1041 SCHELLING, F. W. J. 1966 lecture 13, p. 315 “Aristotle indeed says, only on the occasion 
(Gelegenheit) of the act, that one need not try to define everything, but that one must also be satisfied 
with analogies (…). Since it is only a question of showing what the act is in general, Fichte was not 
mistaken in referring us straight away to what is closest to us, the continuing act (fortgesetzte That) or, as 
he thought to express it in a stonger way, the act-action (Thathandlung) of our own consciousness. The 
act is then generally not in the concept (nicht im Begriff), but in the experience (Erfahrung)”.  
1042 Ibidem: “The act does not become what the force (Potenz) becomes, i.e. attribute”. 
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describes the experience of the lectern in KNS1043 or of the handling of the 
hammer in Sein und Zeit1044. To be sure, in seeing or in living Aristotle is not here 
immersed in a practical dealing such as hammering, in which the world and Dasein 
appear as a single original phenomenon through the usefulness of the hammer. However, 
hammering is only a kind of practical dealing, and namely one that can only 
unfold within the encompassing practical dealing that is living itself. Seeing, living 
and thinking are also practical dealings, and specifically ones in which, as zōon logon 
echon, one perceives the immediacy with which the telos of these dealings is attained. 
The phenomenological approach to seeing and living faces us at once with the 
immediacy with which these processes are fulfilled and with their continuity, both 
towards the past and the future. From the inside of my perception that I am living, 
i.e. from the here and now of my perception, this praxis shows itself as unlimited: I 
have been living (past) and at the same time I live (moving present, i.e., future). 
The present is the hama, which is none other than the continuity between past and 
future. The present is, as a result, nothing we can come to understand by mentally 
stilling the stream of time: we can only grasp being here and now as being. And 
this phenomenon, this experience, Aristotle states, we call energeia. 
Is this however a solipsistic experience that would leave the world 
unthought, in the manner of a Cartesian reduction? This might perhaps be the 
case, if the experience of seeing could be made without there being things to be 
seen, or if the experience that we are living did not require the perception of our 
own alive body. But as it is, we perceive things and we perceive our body. No-
where in 1048b does Aristotle hint at any kind of reduction―that would not sup-
port “the test of the facts of life (ta erga ton bion)”1045. Instead, his reasoning is 
                                               
1043 Cf. KNS § 14 in GA 56/57. 
1044 Cf. SZ § 15 p. 69. 
1045 NE IX 8, 1179a 20f. 
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grounded on the given of perception, as in an above-mentioned passage of NE IX that 
would not have shocked anyone if it had been placed instead in Metaphysics IX:  
He who sees perceives (aisthanesthai) that he sees, and he who hears, that he hears, 
and he who walks, that he walks, and in the case of all other activities similarly there 
is something which perceives that we are active (energein), so that if we perceive, we 
perceive that we perceive, and if we think, that we think; and (…) to perceive that we 
perceive or think is to perceive that we are (einai) (IX 9, 1170a 29ff).  
However, these energeiai such as thinking, living, perceiving, are not perfect 
energeiai, in the sense that they are subject to change: we usually see something, and 
then by getting closer, putting our glasses on or watching more carefully we come 
to see that better, and therefore differently. As for life, it is clear from the NE that 
more than just being subject to improvement and therefore kinēsis, it is essentially 
kinetic. But then, if the energeiai of 1048b are not pure energeiai, as only the divine 
energeia can be, i.e. if they are at the same time atelēs and teleion, why does Aristotle 
build upon ‘being or not teleion’ the distinction between kinēseis like walking to a 
place and energeiai like living or seeing? A passage of Metaphysics IX 8 makes the 
question more pressing, and simultaneously provides the answer. 
He who learns to play the harp learns to play it by playing it, and all other learners do 
so similarly (…). [S]ince of that which is coming to be, some part must have come to 
be, and, of that which is changing, some part must have changed (…), he who is 
learning must, it would seem, know some part of the science. It is surely clear, then, 
in this way, that energeia is in this sense also, viz. in order of becoming and of time, 
prior to dynamis (protera tēs dynameōs kata genesin kai chronon)1046. 
Learning, which in 1048b is opposed to seeing, because it takes time to be, 
is here assimilated with the immediacy of seeing. This is consistent with the refu-
tation of the Megarians in IX 3, which was precisely built upon the phenomenon 
of learning: if I cannot say at each infinitesimal stage of a learning process that ‘I 
am learning and I have learnt’ to play the harp, although learning here may not still 
mean enough as to play a simple melody, I will never get to be able to play the 
                                               
1046 Met. IX 8, 1049b 31 - 1050a 3. 
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harp, I will never get to have that dynamis. That is why energeia is also at the basis of 
dynamis itself, making its genesis possible, and constituting its persistence as hexis. 
But this, we said, seems to make the distinction between kinēsis and energeia 
at IX 6 problematic, because now in IX 8 ‘learning’ is seen as immediate as ‘living’. 
Both are teleion from the very first moment of their existence: otherwise they 
would not be at all―if learning or life are real, they are a whole in the now. And 
yet neither learning nor living have ‘come to an end’ just by being: their being 
possibilities are not exhausted―one can go on learning, one goes on living. This is 
entirely consistent with the rest of book IX, but what remains then of the kinēsis-
energeia distinction in 1048b? 
It is precisely by seeing this distinction through the lens of Heidegger’s 
conviction that ontology can only work as phenomenology that we discover its 
relevance. The designation of the processes of learning and living as kinēsis and 
energeia, respectively, is a phenomenological designation: learning shows itself as a 
process that takes time to be, while living shows itself both as a process that takes 
time to be and as an accomplished fact: life appears there, immediately, while 
learning does not. 1048b emphasizes this contrast, not to deny the distension of 
life in time, so thoroughly acknowledged in the NE, but to disclose the immediacy 
of being. Analogously to how the structure of praxis and physis can only be grasped 
through a contrast with that of poiēsis, one can only grasp the specificity of ‘living 
and at the same time having lived’ by contrast with ‘learning and having learnt’ or 
‘building and having built’. This, however, is only an ontical contrast: we are still 
only halfway to the ontological. The ontological account returns back to illuminate 
the ontical, the phenomena from which it arose, in showing that both learning and 
living are immediately, because both learning and living are.  
But this immediacy is not the only aspect to be retrieved for the ontologi-
cal account: the distension in time that is experienced in learning, as a process with 
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a beginning (peras) and an ending (peras)1047 in different moments of time, also has 
a crucial ontological weight. The phenomenon cannot be simply dismissed as a 
defective way of being in relation to the purity of the immediacy of energeia: “one 
must appropriate this ground explicitly and not leap beyond it to a reality which is 
simply fabricated by theory”1048. And we believe that this phenomenon is assumed 
within the structure of being as energeia and entelecheia. One’s life is entelecheia, again, 
because there is no part of ‘this life here and now’ outside of it: it is all here and 
now. That the next meal today will become part of my life (insofar as it will be 
embodied in its metabolism) or that I plan to go to Athens tomorrow, are not part 
of my life as entelecheia, but only dynamei, as a dynamis. And yet they prove that the 
fact that my life is entelecheia, a whole in the now, does not exclude the possibility 
―even the need, in the case of the meal―of its change: the fact that the meal is my 
life only dynamei, and that it can become ‘my life’ as entelecheia, entails that my life is 
at a time entelecheia and dynamis or, in other words, that it is energeia atelēs. There is 
no halfway between living and not living, just like there is no halfway between 
being and not being. Kinēsis is indeed on the way; not on the way to being what it 
is itself, though, but on the way to being something else. That is why it is at a time 
fulfilled and not fulfilled, entelecheia and energeia atelēs: kinēsis. 
Energeia atelēs: immediacy and continuity in time are concentrated in this 
formula, and in such a way that the phenomenological experience is safeguarded 
through its ontological explicitation. The continuity of an energeia atelēs is not that 
of something that persists unchanged: the non-ceasing of this life which I find 
myself living here and now is not an immobile replication of my finding myself 
living. Because my life here and now is energeia, because there is an identity 
between past and future making it real―I live and I have lived―, my life from now 
on is still one and the same, namely my life: an ontological account of our experience 
                                               
1047 Met. V 17, 1022a 4f. 
1048 GA 19 § 12b p. 85 [59]. “Man muß von diesem obzwar schlecht Aufgedeckten doch seinen 
Ausgang nehmen; man muß sich diesen Boden ausdrücklich zueignen”. 
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of identity through time is thus provided. But this identity is also experienced as a 
dynamic one, and that is what the term atelēs indicates. The structure of praxis, as 
developed thoughout the NE, is dynamic from the ground up, insofar as one 
cannot refrain from being so: even declining to decide is a way of deciding; even 
declining to act is a way of acting. Man is not granted a sort of tarrying outside its 
own ēthos: we are always what we do. Life, praxis, because it is kinēsis, cannot be 
classified only as a dynamis or only as an energeia: “it is a sort of energeia, or energeia of 
the kind described1049, hard to grasp, but not incapable of existing”1050. 
We always already find ourselves within this distension, that is, within 
kinēsis, and within the conscience of it. The experience of what Aristotle calls 
energeia is made from the kinēsis that is life: human being is a kinēsis that, because it 
has logos, can be conscious of its own being energeia and kinēsis1051. However, this 
experience cannot be the matter of phronēsis, but of sophia, which can look at life from life itself. 
Surely, the practical experience of phronēsis gives us eyes to see our being in time: 
As a being becoming unveiled and available through the alētheuein of phronēsis, the 
prakton is in the mode of not yet being such an such. As ‘not yet such and such’ and, 
indeed, as the toward-which of concern, it is at the same time already such and such, i.e. 
insofar as it is the toward-which that belongs to a concrete readiness for dealings, the 
constitutive illumination of which is provided by phronēsis. This ‘not-yet’ and this 
‘already’ need to be understood in their ‘unity’, i.e. on the basis of an original 
givenness, with reference to which they are particular explicata1052. 
                                               
1049 Cf. Physics III 1, 201b 31f. 
1050 Physics III 2, 202a 1ff. 
1051 Volpi poses the key question in his analysis of Heidegger’s understanding of energeia in the 1930s, 
although he does not provide an answer: “How is praxis itself to be understood? Is it kinēsis, or more 
precisely, insofar as it implies the whole of human life, the kinēsis tou biou? Or is it to be understood as 
energeia?” (cf. VOLPI, F. 1990 p. 10). 
1052 NB 383/35-36 [155, mod. tr, add. e.] “Das prakton als das Seiende, das im alētheuein der phronēsis 
unverhüllt verfügbar wird, ist etwas, was ist als noch nicht das und das Sein. Als ›noch nicht das und das‹, 
und zwar als Worauf eines Besorgens, ist es zugleich schon das und das, als das Worauf einer konkreten 
Umgangsbereitschaft, deren konstitutive Erhellung die phronēsis ausmacht. Das ›Noch-Nicht‹ und das 
›Schon‹ sind in ihrer ›Einheit‹ zu verstehen, d. h. von einer ursprünglichen Gegebenheit her, für die das 
›Nochnicht‹ und das ›Schon‹ bestimmte Explikate sind”. 
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The original givenness that Heidegger looks for is the moving continuum 
of life that we perceive in praxis. But the ontological elucidation of this perception 
cannot be the matter of a faculty that deliberates about what can be otherwise, and 
that is why Heidegger very reasonably does not subsume sophia under phronēsis. 
Still, because he considers Aristotle to conceive being as Fertigkeit, he cannot either 
remain with Aristotle’s sophia and his overall ontological account. As he put it at 
the end of his last seminar in Zähringen in reference to his lifelong way, the “tau-
tological thinking” he pursued, “the primordial sense of phenomenology (…), 
holds its ground before any possible distinction between theory and praxis”1053. 
However, we believe that Aristotle’s elucidation of energeia in 1048b―built 
as it is upon a conception of theōria as the highest praxis―provides, in the experi-
ence of time described and always retrieved (Wiederholen) in it, a conceptual articu-
lation of this unity between not yet being and at the same time (Zugleich) being al-
ready, which reverberates in Heidegger’s designation in Sein und Zeit of care (Sorge), 
the being of Dasein, as a “thrown project” (geworfener Entwurf)1054. Heidegger’s 
strenuous and multifarious effort to think being starting from the experience of 
temporality of Dasein could find here a fertile soil. 
 
 
                                               
1053 Seminar in Zähringen (1973) in GA 15 p. 399 [80] (“das Denken, dem hier nachgefragt wird, nenne 
ich das tautologische Denken. Das ist der ursprüngliche Sinn der Phänomenologie. Diese Art Denken 
hält sich noch diesseits von aller möglichen Unterscheidung zwischen Theorie und Praxis”). 
1054 Cf. SZ § 58 p. 285. 
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Conclusion to section II 
After his intensive Auseinandersezung with Aristotle’s NE in 1924, Heidegger does 
not return to phronēsis anymore. We do not believe this is due to an increasing in-
terest in ontology on his part―the 1924 approach is already fully ontological― 
but to his ongoing search for the proper terminology with which an ontology of 
factical life could be developed. The inner tensions that Heidegger finds in 
Aristotle make him abandon the idea of an Aristoteles-Buch, yet the intensity of his 
engagement with Aristotle both before and after Sein und Zeit and the continuity of 
his questioning do not seem to leave much room for doubt about the fact that 
Aristotle is one, if not the fundamental dialogue partner in his intensive work in 
the 1920s.  
However, Aristotle’s understanding of praxis not only as kinēsis but also as 
energeia and entelecheia seems to us to open new ways of thinking that Heidegger 
might have followed if his understanding of telos in 1924 had been that of 1939. 
These ways might have given a different shape to Sein und Zeit, a work of which, 
for all its breakthrough insights, Heidegger himself said that it had dared too early 
to go too far1055. Yet, it is more productive to open new lines of questioning than 
to speculate about how things could have been. Heidegger himself pointed in that 
direction when, in choosing a motto for his Gesamtausgabe, he hinted that he did 
not want his works to be regarded as (finished) works, but rather as ways: Wege, 
nicht Werke1056. Here still comes to the fore the twofoldness of ergon operating 
throughout the NE and through Heidegger’s powerful interpretation of Aristotle: 
Heidegger wants his readers to ‘ergazesthai’ his works, to ‘perform’ them―not to 
                                               
1055 Cf. GA 12 Unterwegs zur Sprache Ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1985 p. 93: “Perhaps the 
basic defect of the book «Sein und Zeit» ist that I dared too early to go too far” (“Vielleicht ist der 
Grundmangel des Buches »Sein und Zeit«, daß ich mich zu früh zu weit vorgewagt habe”). 
1056 VON HERRMANN, W. “Nachwort des Herausgebers“ in GA 1 p. 437: “»Wege ― nicht Werke« 
ist der Leitspruch, den Martin Heidegger wenige Tage vor seinem Tod für seine Gesamtausgabe letzter 
Hand zusammen mit dem Titelblatt handschriftlich aufsetzte”.  
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contemplate them as a finished ergon, as something fertig. We would consider the 
present research to have attained its main goal if it could foster new readings of 
Heidegger’s project, i.e. new appropriations of the phenomena he pointed at with 
the help of Aristotle in the early 1920s. 
The evolution of Heidegger’s understandings of telos and entelecheia between 
the 1920s and the 30s―even if it did not modify substantially his conviction that 
Aristotle had remained intangled in the metaphysics of presence―necessarily 
gives rise to a question. Could Heidegger have developed such a breakthrough 
approach of Aristotle’s concepts of praxis and phronēsis in the 20s if he had not 
regarded them as conflicting with the alleged Vorhandenheit of the Metaphysics? 
Would he have seen in these concepts first and foremost evidence for the 
development of a new ontology (to which Aristotle would have only hinted, but 
which Heidegger alone would have developed) that could blow up (sprengen) the 
traditional categories about being1057? In other words, might we speak here of the 
fecundity of a misunderstanding? At least as far as this thesis is concerned, and 
provided that our connection of Heidegger’s ontological reading of the NE with 
Aristotle’s elucidation of energeia and entelecheia in Metaphysics IX proves to be 
fruitful for further investigation, we might indeed believe this is the case. It is 
precisely through Heidegger’s insistence on the danger of conceiving being as 
something available (fertig), as something to which we would not always already 
belong, that we have come to try to “enable Aristotle to speak again”1058 and to 
continue with him “to force inquiry back to the phenomena”1059. 
An hypothesis of our work which we believe to have been confirmed is 
that what Heidegger found in phronēsis in the early 1920s he could find precisely 
                                               
1057 Cf. EPR § 10 in GA 60 p. 54 [36]. 
1058 DWA pp. 1-2 [219]: “Diese Interpretation hat nun die Absicht, Aristoteles wieder zum Wort zu 
verhelfen”. 
1059 GA 24 p. 329 [232] “Die Untersuchung immer wieder auf die Phänomene (...) zurückzuwingen”. 
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because it was already operating in Aristotle’s own notion of energeia, even if in 
those years he opposed the ontological paradigms represented by these concepts. 
Our emphasis on the relation between Aristotle’s ethics and metaphysics enlarges 
or perhaps questions the Heideggerian paradox of an ‘Aristotle left in the shade’ 
by Western ontology who would be the cure for the hitherto ‘Aristotle in the 
light’. Against Heidegger, we believe that the ontological force of phronēsis, praxis 
and hexis―so sharply highlighted by him―stems from Aristotle’s insights into 
energeia and entelecheia, of which the most telling trace is to be found in Metaphysics 
IX. Yet, while Heidegger repeatedly concludes that the relations between both do-
mains—ethics and metaphysics—are unfortunately conflicting in Aristotle, he hints 
at a link through the concept of hexis in the 1920s (GA 18), which becomes more 
explicit in 1931 (GA 33), when he considers hexis and energeia as a challenge to the 
metaphysics of presence. However, in the 1930s Heidegger does not unfold this 
connection anymore in relation to the concept of praxis, which in this new light 
might sustain an ontology stemming from Dasein 1060. 
When we suggest that the Heideggerian paradox of ‘Aristotle healing 
Aristotle himself’ could collapse, we are not suggesting an acritical reading of 
Aristotle. Even less do we assume that his metaphysical insights have been always 
properly understood in the Western tradition. Such directions would entail con-
sidering Heidegger’s effort as a superfluous overinterpretation or unnecessary in-
terpretative violence inflicted upon Aristotle’s text. This is far from being our per-
spective. Our efforts have been rather directed at showing how not only praxis and 
physis but also the central concepts of Aristotle’s ontology—namely energeia and 
entelecheia—make it possible to escape the Verfallungstendenz of the metaphysics of 
presence. This is not a complete overturning of Heidegger’s appropriation of 
                                               
1060 Ricoeur has actually pointed to the possibility of developing an ontology from the experience of 
praxis (“l’agir humain”), as the “topos of legibility par excellence” of the meaning of being as energeia and 
dynamis. (Cf. RICOEUR, P. 1990 pp. 355 ff, p. 357 for ref). While he acknowledges the relevance of 
Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle for this task, he underlines the need to qualify Heidegger’s views 
on the relation between energeia and praxis. 
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Aristotle, but a challenge to his conviction that there is an insurmountable conflict 
between the paradigms of praxis and energeia. To our mind, the perspective that 
opens up with this challenge can foster the productivity of Heidegger’s powerful 
insight into the interplay between phenomenology and ontology that we also 
believe to dominate Aristotle’s philosophy.  
Heidegger emphasizes after Aristotle in NE I that the being of Dasein is 
that of a zōon logon echon praktikon. In Metaphysics IX 6, where energeia is elucidated, 
the logos and the praxis of its zōē are woven into one another in an original 
phenomenological access to the being of Dasein: one’s logos perceives one’s own 
praxis not through a determination that would look at praxis as an object 
detachable from oneself―as something vorhanden―but through the enactment of 
this perception itself. This phenomenological access to one’s own being is 
analogous to the one that Heidegger acutely finds in the enactment of phronēsis. 
But it has something that phronēsis cannot provide, as Heidegger otherwise shows 
in his treatment of this concept in his 1924-25 course. Differently from the 
alētheuein of phronēsis―which, as Heidegger notes, is confined to directing 
action―we believe that the alētheuein of sophia, as depicted in 1048b, shows its 
capability of developing a research about the sense of being―in a word, an ontol-
ogy1061―departing from the way in which being is originally present to us, prior to 
any modern distinction between objects and subject. What Aristotle is doing in 
1048b, as we have argued, is very close to what Heidegger intends to establish in 
Sein und Zeit by pointing to Sorge as an approach to being that is prior to any 
distinction between theory and praxis1062: in 1048b one’s theōria unfolds at once 
(hama) with one’s praxis; theōria describes its own ‘being’ as it becomes aware (first 
momentum of logos) and puts into words (second one) this experience. Because it 
has and is ‘had’ by logos, Dasein can discover itself being praxis in the enactment of 
                                               
1061 Cf. SZ § 4 p. 12. 
1062 Cf. SZ § 41 p. 193. 
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the praxis of theōria. Thus, it actually succeeds in explicitating its own being in a genuinely 
original manner, i.e. within the relation of being to its own being that is characteristic of it 1063. 
The consideration of praxis as energeia allows for an integration of, on the 
one hand, the approach to Dasein as that which can be otherwise―a being whose 
being is at stake in its own being―, and on the other the necessary approach to 
Dasein as a being that belongs to the domain of what is always as it is, i.e. not only 
as a living body that is subject to the rhythm of nature, but also, more 
fundamentally, as a being whose ontological constitution itself cannot be otherwise. 
Understanding that this constitution is not subject itself to kinēsis, we argued, is a 
necessary condition for the project of a fundamental ontology.  
The quest for this articulation between ‘what is always as it is’ and ‘what 
can be otherwise’ is at the core of Heidegger’s efforts in the Sophist course, where 
he comes to the conclusion that Aristotle could not avoid splitting being into two 
irrenconciliable spheres, in such a way that one of them would win the battle. 
Heidegger’s point would not be well rendered if we just said that the wrong one 
won; the real problem to his mind was Aristotle’s failure to find an articulation 
between both spheres. However, we believe that such a battle does not ultimately 
exist in Aristotle, and that this articulation between ‘what can be otherwise’ and 
‘what is always as it is’ can be actually found in the temporal experience of praxis 
in 1048b, through which Dasein comes to recognize its own being as embedded in 
being in general. In the experience of the immediacy and continuity of energeia in 
1048b, Dasein does not merely acknowledge that it now lives―it acknowledges 
that ‘living’ is prior to perceiving that one lives, i.e. that being is prior to knowing. It realizes 
that it is not the subject that grounds the world, even if the world requires a 
‘subject’ to be a phenomenon―or in other words, Dasein discovers that while 
                                               
1063 Cf. SZ § 4 p. 12. 
 293 
being cannot be approached otherwise than as a phenomenon, its sense is wider 
than that of appearing. 
What precedes makes it quite evident that the philosophical problem that 
lies in the distinction between phronēsis and technē, or praxis and poiēsis, is at the core 
of Heidegger’s question about being—at least in the 20s and in the 30s. Even if 
these Greek terms are not analyzed anywhere else by Heidegger as extensively as 
in the texts we have been dealing with, we believe that his life-long crusade against 
the reduction of the sense of being to Vorhandenheit has its roots in the ontological 
distinction between the temporal immediacy of praxis and the distension in time of poiēsis, which 
appears in 1048b as intimately tied with the distinction between energeia and kinēsis. We have 
tried to shed light on the delicate equilibrium that we believe Aristotle to have 
delineated between the components of these binomials: while energeia and praxis 
are respectively irreducible to kinēsis and poiēsis, they encompass them as their on-
tological ground. This equilibrium reopens the question of the validity of 
Aristotle’s ontological categories for Heidegger’s quest of a unitary account of 
being1064. We believe that what makes possible this balanced unitary account―not 
a separation, nor a confusion, but a distinction according to the paradigm of 
symphysis―is Aristotle’s conception of telos, the principle that makes things to be 
what they are, and at the same time leads them to be what they are called to be. 
Telos is certainly not an aim, as it were, attached to beings (para ta pragmata), but a 
determination of being itself by which beings are not completed but fulfilled and at the 
same time open to fulfillment. Being is fulfillment (entelecheia), and ‘being in time’ 
(kinēsis) is a continuous enactment and renewal of this fulfillment. Yet Heidegger’s 
                                               
1064 Cf. e.g. GA 19 § 5a p. 29 [20] and Heidegger’s letter to Richardson in RICHARDSON, W. J. 2003 
(cf. pp. x-xi for ref.): “To on legetai pollachōs. I translate: «A being becomes manifest (sc. with regard to its 
being) in many ways». Latent in this phrase is the question that determined the way of my thought: what 
is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of being that permeates all of its multiple meanings?” 
(“To on legetai pollachōs. Ich übersetze: »Das Seiende wird (nämlich hinsichtlich seines Seins) in vielfacher 
Weise offenkundig«. In diesem Satz verbirgt sich die meinen Denkweg bestimmende Frage: Welches ist 
die alle mannigfachen Bedeutungen durchherrschende einfache, einheitliche Bestimmung von Sein?”). 
Volpi has rightly highlighted, from his very first works on Aristotle and Heidegger, the centrality of 
this question for Heidegger (Cf. VOLPI, F. 1984). 
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insistence on reading telos as completedness, because of Aristotle’s supposed faith-
fulness to a Greek reduction of being to Vorhandenheit, forbids this articulation 
between the acknowledgment of the consistency of beings―i.e. that beings are in 
a full sense―and the account of the phenomenon of change. In the 1920s, the 
Aristotelian telos only describes ‘consistency’ for Heidegger, so that the circle be-
tween logos and the phenomena does not work. However, we believe that a peculiar 
way of consistency―namely, one that copes with change within itself―is 
obtained if Aristotle’s telos is not narrowed down to ‘completedness’ (which is oth-
erwise something that Heidegger significantly avoids to do in 1939). Aristotle’s 
fruitful application of the insights of Metaphysics IX to his characterization of the 
peculiar being of life in the NE is perhaps one of the best signs that his under-
standing of telos points far beyond Vorhandenheit. 
In his essay Die Frage nach der Technik Heidegger quotes Hölderlin’s verses 
“But where there is danger,/A rescuing element grows as well”1065 to gloss over 
the point that inside the fateful risk implied by the essence of technology―the 
reduction of being to availability and manipulation, summarized by Heidegger 
under the concept of das Ge-stell―resides the key for an overcoming of this 
reduction. Analogously, the ‘visibility’ of beings―not only of products, but also of 
natural beings, and of human beings themselves1066―entails the risk of conceiving 
their being from the restricted point of view of what is there ready to hand, as the 
outcome of a production (which ultimately means to reduce being to our grasp of 
it). Yet, we have argued, it is only through the visibility of telos in poiēsis that we can 
come to grasp the ‘invisibility’ of telos in praxis and physis. Only through a contrast 
with our experience of poiēsis―a genesis that results in a telos that is different from 
                                               
1065 “Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst / Das Rettende auch”, quoted in “Die Frage nach der Technik” in 
GA 7 p. 32 (translation of the verses, belonging to the poem “Patmos”, by James Mitchell. Poems of 
Friedrich Hölderlin San Francisco: Ithuriel’s Spear, 2007). 
1066 Cf. GA 24 § 20 p. 422 [297]: “Fellow humans are certainly also extant; they join in constituting the 
world” (“Die Mitmenschen sind eben auch vorhanden, sie machen die Welt mit aus”). 
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the genesis itself―does Aristotle get to understand, in the original experience of 
1048b, that (our) finite being is a genesis that has its telos in the genesis itself, like physis is a 
way towards physis1067. In other words, while the possibility was there for Aristotle 
to fall prey to the temptation of reducing being to the paradigm of poiēsis, he was 
attentive enough to the phenomena as to conceive telos in the light of an original 
experience of his own praxis, and thus point to the more encompassing paradigm 
of energeia and entelecheia as suitable to grasp being. Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit actually 
follows a similar logic: it takes its lead from poiēsis, namely in the primacy of 
Zuhandenheit over Vorhandenheit, which is only preparatory to the understanding of 
Dasein; and in turn the analysis of Dasein is preparatory to the understanding of 
being, declared from the start as the goal of this unfinished project. Perhaps 
energeia and entelecheia—which in Aristotle are wide enough to encompass both 
beings as vorhanden and the being of Dasein—could help us find a way out of the 
Holzweg of Sein und Zeit.  
 
                                               
1067 Cf. Physics II 1, 193b 13. Cf. also the gignesthai in NE IX 9, 1169b 29-30 “energeia clearly is something 
that happens (gignesthai), not a thing that we possess all the time, like a piece of property (ktēma)”. 
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